- About
-
The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is
provided by the
Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
Search results
Showing 61 to 70 of 70 (0.045 seconds)| 61 |
A questão do mundo na fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl / The question of the world in Edmund Husserl‟s phenomenologyCabral, Michelle Silvestre 27 October 2010 (has links)
Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
Michelle S Cabral.pdf: 1060781 bytes, checksum: b88fc5e113d9ff36c876bfbcf2c52bdd (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2010-10-27 / Fundação Araucária / The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the statute of the notion of world in Husserl‟s phenomenology. It starts of an analysis of the elements involved in the characterization of this as universal objective correlate of the transcendental life. To do so, it was necessary to examine the notions of conscience and epoché, insofar as the understanding of its unique and original sense is determinative to a full apprehension of the proposed question. The notion of conscience is elaborated by Husserlian phenomenology in a radically opposing meaning to the modern conceptions of it, in which it was conceived, in general, as psychic interiority that articulates ideas or psychological data from incoming from stimulations received from the outside. According to Husserl, the true subjectivity should be described as ideal- transcendental field that encloses the constitution of both the poles involved in any experience. Its basic characteristic will be drawn by intentionality operative that ensure the direct correlation between possible subjects and possible objects. The method that allows to have access such field, becoming possible the pure description of the reference apriórica of the noetic acts its respective noematic correlates, is the method of epoché. The validation of this as appropriate procedure and demanded by the character of the inquiry is indispensable within the Husserlian thought. The process of eidetic variation and the role of the fantasy are also highlighted in function of its importance in the whole operation. The conception of the world drew from the use of this methodology that invalidates the natural attitude of consideration, while an naive and insufficient procedure to establish the knowledge, is extracted, first, in a movement of refutation to the concept modern of world. The conception of world as a horizon of meaning for each and every experience is based only through the overcoming of the traditional figures of conscience and idealism. The new meaning, established by phenomenology, brings as specificity determinative the essential character of the analysis, resource that allows it to raise it to the transcendental attitude of inquiry abandoning, concomitantly, the facticity imposed by natural consideration. The meticulous examination of the essential structure present in any one experience allows the verification of the horizons involved in each individual lived. The interconnection of these in an indefinite system of new experiences eidetically predetermined from the internal and external horizons of each objectivity individually taked, leads to the total horizon of the world. The world then will be characterized as the horizon of horizons or, still, as correlative infinite idea to infinities of possible experiences in the unity of one same life. It is, at last, to understand the world as sense Omni-encompassing that involves each individual experience in order to determine the indefinite possibility experiences possible according to the telos of agreement and sedimentation. / O objetivo da dissertação é investigar o estatuto da noção de mundo na fenomenologia de Husserl. Parte-se de uma análise dos elementos implicados na caracterização deste como correlato objetivo universal da vida transcendental. Para tanto, fez-se necessário examinar as noções de consciência e epoché, na medida em que a compreensão de seu sentido inédito e original é determinante para uma plena apreensão da questão proposta. A noção de consciência é elaborada pela fenomenologia husserliana numa significação radicalmente oposta às concepções modernas da mesma, nas quais era concebida, em geral, como interioridade psíquica que articula idéias ou dados psicológicos provenientes de estímulos recebidos do exterior. De acordo com Husserl, a verdadeira subjetividade deverá ser descrita como âmbito ideal-transcendental que abrange a constituição de ambos os pólos implicados numa experiência qualquer. Sua característica fundamental será traçada pela intencionalidade operante que garante a correlação direta entre sujeitos possíveis e objetos possíveis. O método que permite acessar tal âmbito, tornando possível a descrição pura da apriórica referência dos atos noéticos aos seus respectivos correlatos noemáticos, é o método da epoché. A validação deste como procedimento cabível e exigido pelo caráter da investigação se mostra indispensável no interior do pensamento husserliano. O processo de variação eidética e o papel da fantasia também são destacados em função de sua importância no todo da operação. A concepção de mundo haurida a partir do emprego desta metodologia que invalida a atitude natural de consideração, enquanto um procedimento ingênuo e insuficiente para fundar o conhecimento, é extraída, primeiramente, num movimento de refutação ao conceito moderno de mundo. A concepção de mundo como horizonte de sentido para toda e qualquer experiência somente encontra fundamento através da superação das tradicionais figuras de consciência e de idealismo. A nova acepção, instaurada pela fenomenologia, traz como especificidade determinante o caráter essencial da análise, recurso que lhe permite alçar-se à atitude transcendental de investigação abandonando, concomitantemente, a faticidade imposta pela consideração natural. O exame meticuloso da estrutura essencial presente em uma experiência qualquer permite a constatação dos horizontes implicados em cada vivido singular. A interconexão destes num sistema indefinido de novas experiências, eideticamente pré-determinadas a partir dos horizontes interno e externo de cada objetividade tomada individualmente, leva ao horizonte total do mundo. O mundo será então caracterizado como horizonte dos horizontes ou, ainda, como idéia infinita correlativa às infinidades de experiências possíveis na unidade de uma mesma vida. Trata-se, enfim, de compreender o mundo como sentido omni-englobante que envolve cada experiência individual de modo a determinar a possibilidade indefinida de experiências possíveis segundo o telos de concordância e sedimentação.
|
| 62 |
The Phenomenology of Harmonic ProgressionRussell, Michael Lance 05 1900 (has links)
This dissertation explores a method of music analysis that is designed to reflect the phenomenology of the listening experience, specifically in regards to harmony. It is primarily inspired by the theoretical approaches of the music theorist Moritz Hauptmann and by the writings of philosopher Edmund Husserl.
|
| 63 |
Makro- und Mikrozeit: Zur Temporalität zeitgenössischer MusikPoller, Tom Rojo 23 October 2023 (has links)
No description available.
|
| 64 |
Prolegomena to a Phenomenology of Music: A Comparative Study of Arnold Schoenberg and Edmund HusserlKimmey, John A. 08 1900 (has links)
Chapter One introduces the problem that existed in music and logic-psychology at the end of the 19th century. Both music and logic-psychology were in the cul-de-sac of relativism, which had led to obscurity of method and language. Asthetics-criticism is seen to be in the same relativistic position. It is postulated that phenomenological method could aid in music criticism and aesthetic awareness. The second chapter presents a motivic, or Idea, analysis of Schoenberg's second and third string quartets, showing how the twelve-tone method was developed as a way of curing musical composition of the tonal obscurity of late Romanticism. The third chapter is a short exposition of Husserl's development of phenomenological method from his initial work in logic and mathematics to transcendental phenomenology. Chapter Four discusses some of the methodological parallels between Schoenberg and Husserl. Parallels are drawn from all creative periods of their respective work. Chapter Five focuses on similar problems raised in contemporary aesthetic-criticism and their relationship to the methods of Husserl and Schoenberg. Showing how both men solved their problems, a solution is projected for aesthetics-criticism.
|
| 65 |
La raison à l'épreuve du sensible : depuis Husserl et Levinas / The Sensible or the Challenge of Reason : from Husserl and LevinasLorelle, Paula 01 December 2014 (has links)
Avec la phénoménologie, naît une nouvelle idée de la raison qui, au-delà de l’alternative du rationalisme et de l’irrationalisme et contre sa réduction kantienne à une faculté, est redéfinie à l’aune de l’expérience qu’elle permet de décrire. Mais la difficulté survient lorsqu’il s’agit d’atteindre la raison de l’expérience sensible elle-même, en son irréductibilité à toute exigence rationnelle - en son caractère particulier, complexe, lacunaire ou indéterminé. Dès lors, à quelles conditions peut-on penser une logique du sensible, sans aussitôt trahir le sensible ou perdre la raison ? Le projet husserlien d’une « logique-du-monde » exige en sa compréhension comme en son renouvellement, une réévaluation des concepts de « raison » et de « sensibilité ». Notre travail consiste donc en l’étude problématique et critique de ces concepts, depuis deux moments de leur déploiement :leur inauguration husserlienne et leur radicalisation lévinassienne. Le choix de ces deux oeuvres a pour intérêt historique de mesurer l’ampleur de l’élargissement phénoménologique de la raison – d’une conception« intellectualiste » de la sensibilité chez Husserl à sa profondeur lévinassienne ; et pour intérêt problématique de mener le problème à son terme et dans ses dernières contrées, là où le sensible n’apparaît plus comme pétri de sens mais dans son irrationalité même, là où la sensibilité n’est plus la saisie perceptive d’une identité mais l’expérience affective radicale d’une exposition à l’altérité. C’est donc en sa fondamentale équivocité que la sensibilité doit se faire le lieu d’une épreuve renouvelée de la raison, le principe critique de la rationalité mobilisée par sa description. / A new idea of reason was born with phenomenology. Beyond the opposition between rationalism andirrationalism, and against its Kantian reduction to a faculty, reason is redefined in the light of the experiencethat it enables to describe. But the difficulty arises when we attempt to reach the rationality of the sensibleexperience itself, in its own irreducibility to the demands of reason - in its irreducible peculiarity, complexity,lack and indetermination. Under which conditions can we think a logic of the sensible without betrayingsensibility or compromising reason? Husserl’s project of a “logic-of-the-world” requires, in its understandingas in its renewal, a reevaluation of the concepts of “reason” and “sensibility”. This dissertation consists in acritical study of these concepts, from these two main moments of their unfolding: their Husserlian inaugurationand their Levinassian radicalization. From a historical point of view, this choice enables us to assess thisphenomenological extension of reason - from an intellectual conception of sensibility in Husserl, to itsLevinassian depth. From a problematical point of view, this choice enables us to lead the problem to its finalterms, where the sensible is not made of meaning anymore, but appears in its very irrationality - whensensibility is not the perceptive grasp of an identity, but an affective exposure to otherness. Thought in itsfundamental equivocity, sensibility must be the place of a renewed challenge of reason, the critical principle ofthe rationality used by its description.
|
| 66 |
Mobilité et action humaine :une approche phénoménologiqueLafontaine, Simon 26 June 2019 (has links) (PDF)
Adoptant la langue des flux et des fluides, la théorie sociologique caractérisent aujourd’hui les acteurs sociaux comme des êtres composites, prédisposés à changer et capables d’agencements feuilletés. Alors que l’importance de la mobilité pour penser et analyser le social contemporain est généralement reconnue, rare sont les travaux qui se consacre à en développer les modalités fondamentales. L’objectif de cette thèse est de développer une approche plus différenciée et gradualiste des mobilités que celle proposée par les principales options théoriques en vigueur, sans pour autant abandonner la dimension fluctuante, non linéaire et imprévisible du mouvement sur laquelle elles attirent l’attention. Qu’est-ce qu’être mobile ?Une théorie de l’expérience, en l’occurrence celle proposée par la phénoménologie, offrirait-elle des ressources critiques susceptibles d’ouvrir à l’approfondissement des mobilités comme elles sont vécues ?À titre d’hypothèse, cette thèse pose qu’un ensemble de phénomènes demeurent énigmatiques à l’intérieur de la conception généralement admise du social contemporain et qu’une articulation plus explicite du thème de la mobilité à celui de l’action humaine permet d’approfondir les processus du déplacement dans l’espace des sociétés, du passage du temps impliqué par le déplacement et du changement social. Comment émerge du nouveau dans le cours d’actions ?Qu’est-ce que pouvoir agir ?Quelle est la source du changement ?À partir d’une enquête inédite sur des voyageurs se rendant quotidiennement à Bruxelles et des personnages de romans de route étatsuniens, l’auteur explore des questions de fond portant sur l’expérience du transport, autour de l’éloignement des choses et des personnes aimées, du vide du temps d’attente, des aléas aussi insignifiants qu’irritants, de l’étrangeté des rencontres, de la décision de prendre la route et de choisir une orientation nouvelle. Ces moments de vacillation sont importants, soutient l’auteur, car ils nous ramènent aux motivations fondamentales et aux buts ultimes de nos déplacements les plus quotidiens. À une époque marquée par un idéal de mouvement fluide et sans accrocs, cette thèse éclaire ce qui se passe dans l’expérience des mobilités. Elle incite à une réflexion sur ce que nous éprouvons sur la route et aux possibles que cette expérience fait émerger. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
|
| 67 |
A sceptical aesthetics of existence : the case of Michel FoucaultSimos, Emmanouil January 2018 (has links)
A Sceptical Aesthetics of Existence: The Case of Michel Foucault Emmanouil Simos (Hughes Hall) Michel Foucault's genealogical investigations constitute a specific historical discourse that challenges the metaphysical hypostatisation of concepts and methodological approaches as unique devices for tracking metaphysically objective truths. Foucault's notion of aesthetics of existence, his elaboration of the ancient conceptualisation of ethics as an 'art of living' (a technē tou biou), along with a series of interconnected notions (such as the care of the self) that he developed in his later work, have a triple aspect. First, these notions are constitutive parts of his later genealogies of subjectivity. Second, they show that Foucault contemplates the possibility of understanding ethics differently, opposed to, for example, the traditional Kantian conceptualisation of morality: he envisages ethics in terms of self-fashioning, of aesthetic transformation, of turning one's life into a work of art. Third, Foucault employs these notions in self-referential way: they are considered to describe his own genealogical work. This thesis attempts to show two things. First, I defend the idea that the notion of aesthetics of existence was already present in a constitutive way from the beginning of his work, and, specifically, I argue that it can be traced in earlier moments of his work. Second, I defend the idea that this notion of aesthetics of existence is best understood in terms of the sceptical stance of Sextus Empiricus. It describes an ethics of critique of metaphysics that can be understood as a nominalist, contextualist, and particularist stance. The first chapter discusses Foucault's late genealogy of the subject. It formulates the interpretative framework within which Foucault's own conceptualisation of the aesthetics of existence can be understood as a sceptical stance, itself conceived as nominalist, contextualist and particularist. As the practice of an aesthetics of existence is not abstract and ahistorical but the engagement with the specific historical circumstances within which this practice is undertaken, the second chapter reconstructs the intellectual context from which Foucault's thought has emerged (Heidegger, Blanchot, and Nietzsche). The third chapter discusses representative examples of different periods of Foucault's thought -such as the "Introduction" to Binswanger's "Traum und Existenz" (1954), Histoire de la folie (1961), and Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir (1976)- and shows in which way they constitute concrete instantiations of his sceptical aesthetics of existence. The thesis concludes with responses to a number of objections to the sceptical stance here defended.
|
| 68 |
The Constitution of Movement in Rudy Wiebe's Fiction : A Phenomenological Study of Three Mennonite NovelsSigvardson, Malin E. January 2006 (has links)
This study investigates movement as a phenomenon of constituting directedness in the Canadian writer Rudy Wiebe’s Mennonite novels. In Peace Shall Destroy Many (1962), in The Blue Mountains of China (1970), and in Sweeter Than All the World (2001), the phenomenon of movement is complexly at work as a decisive factor on numerous levels of constitution. Employing the concept of phenomenological directedness, the study elucidates phenomena central to the kinetic-kinaesthetic materiality of the three works. Focusing on textual nuances of kinaesthetic accentuation, the investigation highlights ways in which directedness shapes subjectivity rather than vice versa. Kinetic reality emerges as something torn between distance as a separating interval and distance as a remote intimacy manifesting an elision of the span between source-point and terminus. Such discrepancy shapes a sense of existential inconsecutiveness, in which an intriguing diminishment of feeling is a heightening of the affective life. This state of affairs is frequently aligned with faith as world-withdrawal. The wandering of persecuted believers is a theological process that at any given time can reduce itself to an external, purely geographic enterprise, thus becoming a substitute for faith. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of perpetual travel has the capacity to produce an overarching bonding-affect at the constituting heart of a community whose kinetic life is inseparable from the movement of regeneration.
|
| 69 |
La phénoménologie comme manière de vivreSetlakwe Blouin, Philippe 08 1900 (has links)
Au cœur de la phénoménologie gît une thèse métaphysique selon laquelle le flux phénoménal du vécu (Erlebnisstrom) puise son sens et son être en lui-même, plutôt que d’une quelque réalité extérieure ou sous-jacente. En outre, cette thèse de l’autonomie existentielle du flux phénoménal, ou de l’équivalence de l’être et du paraître, ne s’atteste que moyennant une transformation complète de notre rapport au monde, où l’on s’efforce de se mettre à l’écoute des choses, et du mystère qui les enveloppe, plutôt que de les maîtriser. Pris ensemble, cette thèse métaphysique et cette attitude du laisser-être (Seinlassen) constituent les deux piliers de la phénoménologie comme manière de vivre dont la présente thèse se propose de tracer les grandes lignes. Pour ce faire, nous centrons nos recherches sur l’œuvre du fondateur de la phénoménologie, Edmund Husserl, que nous soumettons toutefois à une critique immanente; c’est Husserl qui à la fois dégage l’idée d’une phénoménologie comme manière de vivre et lui pose le plus sérieux obstacle. Cette tension au sein de la pensée husserlienne s’aperçoit à même les deux exigences qui la définissent : celle du « retour aux choses mêmes », d’une part, et celle de la description eidétique, de l’autre. À l’aide de différents interlocuteurs – qui nous permettent d’interroger Husserl rétrospectivement (Pyrrhon), contemporainement (James, Bergson) et prospectivement (Heidegger) –, nous montrons que ces deux exigences sont en fait incompatibles, et proposons afin de résoudre cette contradiction d’éliminer un de ses termes, soit l’exigence de description eidétique. Se fait alors jour la possibilité d’une phénoménologie qui assume pleinement sa vocation existentielle. Enfin, en parallèle à cette critique immanente de Husserl, et afin de l’étayer, nous développons une explication génétique de l’ἐποχή transcendantale, où celle-ci est caractérisée en tant que conversion de l’attitude naturelle à une forme de conscience postréflexive, c’est-à-dire mystique. / At the heart of phenomenology lies a metaphysical claim according to which the phenomenal stream of lived experience (Erlebnisstrom) derives its meaning and its being from itself, rather than from some external or underlying reality. Moreover, this claim of the existential autonomy of the phenomenal stream, or of the equivalence of being and appearing, can only be verified through a complete transformation of our relationship to the world, where we seek to become mindful of things, and of the mystery in which they are steeped, rather than seeking to master them. Taken together, this metaphysical claim and this attitude of letting-be (Seinlassen) constitute the two pillars of phenomenology as a way of life, which the present thesis proposes to describe in broad outline. To do so, we focus our research on the work of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, which we submit however to an internal critique; it is Husserl who both allows us to contemplate the idea of phenomenology as a way of life and at the same time poses the greatest obstacle to it. This tension within Husserlian thought can be seen in the two imperatives that define it: that of the “return to the things themselves”, on the one hand, and that of eidetic description, on the other. With the help of various interlocutors – who allow us to interrogate Husserl retrospectively (Pyrrho), contemporaneously (James, Bergson) and prospectively (Heidegger) – we show that these two imperatives are in fact incompatible, and propose in order to lift this contradiction to eliminate one of its terms, namely the imperative of eidetic description. Thus a path is cleared for a phenomenology that fully commits itself to its existential vocation. Finally, in parallel to this internal critique of Husserl, and to better support it, we develop a genetic explanation of the transcendental ἐποχή, where it is characterized as a conversion from the natural attitude to a post-reflective, that is mystical, form of consciousness.
|
| 70 |
Technik und Bildung in der verwissenschaftlichten LebensweltLumila, Minna 02 June 2023 (has links)
Die Studie versucht, Husserls Modell einer nicht-wissenschaftlichen Lebenswelt für pädagogische Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Technik und Bildung in der verwissenschaftlichen Welt zu öffnen. Sie diskutiert Entwicklungsprobleme der Spätmoderne unter pluralen Fragestellungen und führt Ansätze und Traditionen zusammen, die unterschiedliche Wege zur Weiterentwicklung der modernen Bildungstheorie beschritten haben. Im Zentrum steht die Frage, wie moderne Technik einerseits als lebensweltliche Entfremdung des Menschen problematisiert und andererseits als Produkt menschlicher Freiheit und Weltgestaltung gewürdigt werden kann. In vier Kapiteln werden die methodischen Ansätze und Antworten vorgestellt, die der Philosoph und Pädagoge Eugen Fink (1905–1975), der Philosoph Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), der Philosoph und Erziehungswissenschaftler Theodor Litt (1880–1962) und der Soziologe Helmut Schelsky (1912–1984) auf die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Bildung und Technik gegeben haben. Im Durchgang durch ihre Positionen wird ein Konzert erarbeitet, dessen Originalität darin liegt, Abstimmungsprobleme von Bildung, Technik und Lebenswelt aus postdualistischer, praxistheoretischer sowie posthumanistischer Perspektive zu thematisieren. / The study attempts to open Husserl's model of a non-scientific lifeworld for pedagogical investigations of the relationship between technology and “Bildung” in the scientific world. It discusses developmental problems of late modernity under plural questions and brings together approaches and traditions that have taken different paths to the further development of modern “Bildungs”-theory. The central question is how modern technology can be problematized on the one hand as the alienation of human beings from the world of life and on the other hand be appreciated as a product of human freedom and the shaping of the world. Four chapters present the methodological approaches and answers that philosopher and educator Eugen Fink (1905–1975), philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), philosopher and educationalist Theodor Litt (1880–1962), and sociologist Helmut Schelsky (1912–1984) have given to the question of the relationship between education and technology. In the course of their positions, a concert will be developed whose originality lies in addressing the coordination problems of “Bildung” (education), “Technik” (technology) and “Lebenswelt” (lifeworld) from a post-dualist, praxis-theoretical as well as post-humanist perspective.
|
Page generated in 0.0864 seconds