Humanitarian intervention becomes a focal point of international debate because it seems to be morally right but legally wrong. It challenges the principle of non-intervention and non-use of force encompassed in the Charter of the United Nations (UN), which was established in 1945 to prevent aggressions that led to the two world wars. However, since the 1990s, state practices of military intervention to protect human rights increased dramatically, many of which were even endorsed by the UN or in close cooperation with it. In other words, the UN is the most important, or insofar the only acceptable, body to authorize and legitimize any military operations with humanitarian rationale. This research aims at investigating the limitations of the UN in coordinating its responsibilities of maintaining peace and security and of protecting human rights. Two cases, Rwanda in 1994 and Sudan from 2003 on, are chosen as examples to probe into the practice of the UN and try to determine what has changed and what remains steadfast of the UN practice in humanitarian intervention in these ten years. By focusing on the cases of Rwanda and Sudan, this thesis is intended to address the following questions: (1) In the past decade, has the UN system become more comfortable with humanitarian intervention? (2) What are the limitations of the UN in conducting “humanitarian intervention”? What causes these limitations? And why? (3) What can be done to improve the incompetence of the UN in terms of humanitarian intervention? How to harmonize the UN’s conflicting responsibilities of upholding human rights and defending the principle of non-intervention? This research concludes that the new approach of the “responsibility to protect” that was created in recent years shows that a normative change is on the way. Besides, from Rwanda to Sudan, the UN has made progress in addressing grave humanitarian issues. However, all the efforts still have to depend on the political will of the member states of the UN. Since this issue is still more a political one than a legal one, in the years to come, the UN will still face the difficulty of fulfilling its responsibility.

本文旨在探討日治時期臺灣皇漢醫道復活運動的興衰發展過程。該運動事實上是日本帝國境內「漢方醫學存續運動」的一個支流，在外部、內部與長期、短期因素的交織下，遂於臺灣產生此一運動。 　　一九二八年一月，「東洋醫道會」於東京正式成立，由漢醫學家南拜山擔任會長；同年三月，臺北乾元藥行陳茂通等漢醫藥界人士應和「東洋醫道會」，成立「東洋醫道會臺灣支部」，展開「臺灣皇漢醫道復活運動」，目標在於修訂醫生（漢醫）免許規則，使漢醫合法化，並發展漢醫治法。同年十一月，發行《漢文皇漢醫界》月刊，以做為運動的言論機關。一九二九年一月，臺灣支部舉行第一次請願運動，結果帝國議會回應「參考送付」。一九三○年四月，南拜山來臺參加支部所發起的活動；同年五月四日，支部召開「東洋醫道全島大會」，將該運動帶入高潮。隨後，南拜山展開巡迴演講，陸續至桃園、新竹、臺中、嘉義、臺南、高雄、屏東、竹山、斗六、彰化、鹿港、清水、宜蘭、羅東、礁溪、中和、基隆等地。其間，支部與本部亦不斷籌備第二次請願運動。一九三○年八月，支部向臺灣總督府提出請願；一九三一年初，東洋醫道會東京本部提案於貴、眾議院，並向拓務大臣提出〈臺灣漢方醫生存續陳情文〉，結果未獲得議員贊同，而陷於調查研究中。請願失敗後，支部活動逐漸消沉，遂於一九三三年二月中止會務。同年三月，由畢業於浙江中醫專門學校的蘇錦全承接會務，以「臺灣漢醫藥研究室」的名義發行雜誌，並改題為《臺灣皇漢醫報》；一九三五年四月，又更名為《東西醫藥報》。蘇氏亦主張復興漢醫學，然其做法與先前有所不同。至一九三八年，因戰時統制，雜誌終究面臨停刊。 　　簡言之，「日治時期臺灣皇漢醫道復活運動」即是漢醫藥界人士為了法定漢醫資格、推廣傳統醫術，於二○年代末期至三○年代中期所發起的社會、文化運動。

盧那察爾斯基(Anatoly Lunacharsky, 1875-1933)於1917-1929年間擔任蘇聯教育人民委員部(Narkompros)首任委員，在任期間發表了大量關於藝術的文章及報告，其在蘇聯藝術發展史中扮演極為重要的角色，然而他以藝術達到社會主義理想的主張與正統馬克思主義的經濟決定論十分不同，他相信群眾意識才是推動革命的必要條件。而他從在俄國十月革命之前就抱持這種想法，因此曾一度主張將宗教與社會主義結合，使革命意識成為一種宗教情感而深植人心，而這種想法受到被極度反對宗教的列寧的嚴厲批評，隨後這種想法才轉向以藝術來實現。 在盧那察爾斯基思想中可見到實證主義(Positivism)、費爾巴哈(Ludwig Feuerbach)宗教哲學、尼采(Friedrich Nietzsche)哲學與華格納(Richard Wagner)的色彩，這使盧那察爾斯基的藝術理論在眾多馬克思主義美學家中顯得獨樹一格，本論文主要透過盧那察爾斯基的著作，並加上中西學者對於盧那察爾斯基的研究，不以馬克思主義為中心來理解盧那察爾斯基的藝術思想，探討盧那察爾斯基對於藝術與革命的認知與實踐。 / Anatoly Lunacharsky(1875-1933) was the first Commissar of The People's Commissariat for Education(Narkompros) from 1917-1929. During his tenure, he published many articles and reports about the arts and played a very important role in the history of artistic development in the Soviet Union. However, his proposal to achieve the ideal of Socialism through the arts was very different from the orthodox economic determinism of Marxism. He believed that mass consciousness was a must to promote the revolution. He already held this idea long before the October Revolution in Russia. Thus, he once advocated combining religion and Socialism, making revolutionary consciousness into a religion deeply rooted in everyone’s mind. Nevertheless, this idea was severely criticized by Lenin, who was very opposed to religion. Afterward, Lunacharsky’s thoughts changed, turning instead to realize ideals through art. The influences of Positivism, Feuerbach’s philosophy of religion, Nietzsche’s philosophy and Wagner’s concept of art can be seen in Lunacharsky’s thought, making his views on art unique among Marxist aestheticians. In this paper, instead of understanding Lunacharsky’s theory of art in the context of Marxism, discussion will focus on Lunacharsky’s works and Chinese/Western scholars’ studies on Lunacharsky in order to learn more about Lunacharsky’s thoughts and practice of art and revolution.

本論文探討大躍進時期中共外交決策的內容以及中蘇關係的發展。第二章「依賴的與脆弱的中蘇關係」，試圖分析莫斯科外交策略的雙重性對早期中蘇關係的影響。蘇聯一方面高談援助革命，另一方面越來越重視國家利益。中蘇關係因而擺盪在這兩項決策因素之間，中共並不具有真正的自主性。第三章「新中國和平外交時期不和平的中蘇關係」，試圖分析建立政權後的兩個社會主義國家，在外交上如何面對「輸出革命」的難題，以及它們分歧根源所在。第四章「解構革命與危機視角下的中蘇關係」，嘗試分析「和平外交、大躍進與金門危機三位一體」的中蘇分歧論點。第五章「大躍進與蘇聯模式潛在較勁下的中蘇關係」，試圖分析大躍進的發動因素以及大躍進對中蘇關係的影響。大躍進與人民公社對於中蘇關係的影響涉及了意識型態、國家利益與領導權爭奪三個方面。結論則探討了中蘇關係中「顯性」與「隱性」衝突的概念。

自一九七○年代中期南歐、拉丁美洲與蘇聯暨東歐各國相繼爆發民主浪潮以來，「公民社會」(Civil Society)即成為政治與社會學界探討的焦點。「公民社會」有賴於對個人結社言論自由、公共參與自由和政治參與自由的保障，因此其具有國家及社會走向自由化的意函。由於自由化往往先於民主化，在研究極權與威權國家民主轉型的過程中，「公民社會」便正好可作為研究一國走向民主化的起點。在世界各國民主轉型的例子中，蘇聯的民主轉型過程顯得與眾不同，這一方面是因為蘇聯本身是多民族帝國，境內民族問題嚴重，另一方面是因為蘇聯作為全球第一個、也是實施最久的社會主義國家，其擁抱的極權主義體制對國家與社會之間的關係產生深刻的影響。 本論文主要是採用新制度主義(new institutionalism)的研究途徑，來探討蘇聯末期公民社會萌芽的來龍去脈。在解釋蘇聯公民社會的特殊發展經驗中，一反過去較常被使用的現代化理論或菁英途徑，而是側重於新制度主義下的非正式規則（或制度）因素，譬如歷史、文化與傳統等。第一章專門介紹「公民社會」概念的歷史演進過程與各種意涵；第二章敘述俄羅斯歷史上三種可能有利於或不利於「公民社會」特殊傳統，包括集體主義、保守主義與專制主義；第三章探討蘇聯在戈巴契夫領導下所進行的「公民社會」制度創新；第四章續探討公民社會在蘇聯的實踐情況；第五章則對蘇聯末期萌芽的公民社會進行反省、檢討與比較，說明其特色；第六章為結論。 本論文得出的結論是，蘇聯雖然在一九八五年戈巴契夫上台前已有「公民社會」萌芽的「要素」，但當時的社會還不是真正的「公民社會」。真正的公民社會要等到戈巴契夫上台推行一連串改革開放的措施後，才算真正萌芽扎根。不過，不論是和同一時期西方抑或東歐的公民社會比較，蘇聯末期萌芽的公民社會都顯得相當薄弱與不穩，這主要是由於蘇聯暨俄羅斯長久以來的傳統文化不利於公民社會的發展。此外，民族主義浪潮也衝擊到公民社會的發展，凸顯民族主義與公民社會之間的深刻矛盾，這一點也說明了蘇聯公民社會所獨有的困境。 / Since South Europe, Latin America and the Soviet bloc began the democratization in 1970s, civil society has become the focus of the politics and sociology of academic circle. Civil society depends on the assurance of the association freedom, speech freedom, public participation freedom and political participation freedom, implying that the state and society are being or have been liberalized. Because liberalization always goes ahead of democratization, civil society happens to be used as a starting point of research of post-Communist transition. The USSR’s case seems so different with others, not only it as a multi-nation empire, but also it as the first and long-enduring socialist country in the world. The thesis adopts the approach of new institutionalism to discuss the process of an emerging civil society in late USSR. Instead of the modernization theory or elite approach that are often used, the new institutionalism, especially in informal institution, seems to be the most persuasive in explaining the USSR’s case. The first chapter introduces the historical evolution and various meanings of civil society’s idea. The second specifies three historical traditions in Russia that may help or damage the development of civil society, including collectivism, conservatism and absolutism. The third talk about the institutional innovation of civil society by Mikhail Gorbachev. The fourth pays attention to the real situation in USSR’s civil society. The fifth reconsider, review and compare the USSR’s civil society with the East European and the west ones. The sixth is my conclusion. My conclusion is that although the USSR has had the “elements” of an emerging civil society before Gorbachev appeared on the stage in 1985, the society has not been a “real” civil society yet. A real civil society has not taken root until Gorbachev put a series of reforms into practice. Nonetheless, being compared either with the west or the East European ones, the USSR’s civil society seems very fragile and unstable, because the Russian particular tradition and culture prohibit the civil society from development and consolidation. In addition, the nationalist wave put impact on the development of civil society, highlighting the deep contradiction between nationalism and civil society. This point also underlines the dilemma of the USSR’s civil society.

本文試圖以鄂豫皖蘇區的例子來說明，共產黨最初必須藉由與地方菁英的合作來深入地方與動員農民，當地方菁英後來成為了共產黨建立群眾政權的阻礙時，張國燾藉由肅反解決了那些桀驁不馴、尾大不掉的地方菁英。但是，這並不意味著共產黨自此之後能夠建立一個真正的群眾政權，由於大多數的群眾對於共產黨仍是缺乏認識與信仰，因此，共產黨依舊必須透過地方菁英來控制群眾與掠奪地方資源。只不過，與前一階段的地方菁英不同，這一批由張國燾所培育的新的地方菁英（有的仍是由舊的地方菁英轉化而來，有的則是自下層群眾提拔上來），較前一階段的地方菁英更為馴服。這就說明了，事實上，共產黨政權與國民黨政權最大的不同，並不在於前者是群眾政權，而後者不是；相反的，兩者其實都必須藉由地方菁英來進行統治，只不過，共產黨比國民黨更懂得如何去控制地方菁英罷了！整個說來，這是一個從合作到控制的過程。

本文的研究主軸是從哈薩克與俄羅斯雙邊外交互動的情形，來探討哈薩克俄羅斯人的歸屬問題，並以族群政治衝突的模式，分析哈薩克的俄羅斯人其處境。 哈薩克的俄羅斯人數，僅次於前蘇聯各加盟共和國的拉脫維亞，居中亞各國之首，且在哈薩克獨立之前或獨立初期，俄羅斯人的人口數都還遠超過哈薩克族，佔國內總人口數的半數以上，使其境內的俄羅斯人問題成為俄羅斯與哈薩克雙邊關係運作的一個重要變數，是雙方政府在其外交與內政問題上，必須同時面對並保持密切互動與接觸的議題。 因此在探討中亞的民族問題時，除了受「911」事件影響，重視伊斯蘭教的宗教極端主義之外，我們也不能忽視「俄羅斯人」這個受政治變遷所造成的民族問題。這些俄羅斯人在蘇聯解體後，失去其原有的優勢地位，且因為哈薩克有計畫的自境外移入哈薩克人，使俄羅斯人在哈薩克境內的人口數降到總人口數的50%以下，變成少數民族，如此政治社會上的情況轉變，引起俄羅斯人在哈薩克的適應問題與族群間的緊張關係。 本文從歷史、制度與現實三個層面來分析哈薩克境內的俄羅斯人，瞭解何以蘇聯時期出現大規模的移民現象？而蘇聯的蘇維埃化政策對移民地區的政社經濟情勢的變化有何影響？在哈薩克獨立後的國情變遷，以及此過程中，哈薩克政府如何處理其內部的俄羅斯人問題，以及此問題所引發與俄羅斯雙邊關係發展上的變化為何？俄羅斯政府如何在其對哈薩克的外交與內部的民族政策運作上取的協調？以及哈薩克國內的俄羅斯人在俄哈雙邊的外交運作中如何自我定位與調適？最後本文希望藉由探討1991年至1999年俄羅斯人與俄哈政府三邊的歷史互動，除了瞭解上述幾項問題之外，還能夠思考出對族群之間政治衝突解套的方法，以做為未來台灣族群政治問題研究之借鏡。 / This thesis focuses on the Russian who reside in Kazakhstan and on foreign relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan. The approach that the author takes is an Ethnopolitical Conflict model which analyzes the status of Russian-Speaking population in Kazakhstan. Among the former republics of Soviet Union, the Russian population in Kazakhstan is next to that in Latvia, and is the largest in Central Asia area. Moreover, in the beginning stage after Kazakhstan’s independence, the Russian, which is the ethnic majority, outnumber the Kazakh. So this issue becomes an important variable to bilateral relationship between Russia Federation and Kazakhstan in political, economic and social levels. When exploring the ethnic problems in Central Asia, in addition to the Islam religious extremism, we could not neglect the influence of Russian ethnic problems caused by political transition. After the collapse of Soviet Union, those Russian lost their advantages because of Kazakh immigrants so that the Russian became minority instead. With the change in political and social situation, it roused the Russian adaptation problems and racial tense. In order to study the mass migration phenomena in Soviet Union period, the author intends to analyze the Russian in Kazakhstan in historical, institutional and realism aspects. Besides, the author examines what impact the Sovietization policy might have on the political, social and economic changes in migration area. Moreover, it would be detailed that, after Kazakhstan’s independence, how Kazakhstan government deals with the Russian -Speaking Population issue, which affects the diplomatic change in the relation with Russian Federation. In addition, the author depicts how the Russian government strikes a balance between its diplomatic and ethnic policy. Accordingly, it is also examined how the Russian -Speaking Population in Kazakhstan define and accommodate themselves in Russia-Kazakhstan bilateral interaction. Finally, by exploring the context of trilateral relations among Russian-Speaking Population, Russian government and Kazakhstan government from 1991 to 1999, the author seeks a resolution for the racial disputes, and hopes it might be a lesson for studying Taiwan’s racial problems.

本論文旨在透過歷史、戰略理論的哲學層次、以及海軍戰略等角度，藉由分析歷史文獻，研究德國與蘇聯在第一次世界大戰後的海軍思想發展過程，並比較兩者的異同。本文的目的在探討地理位置極為不利的陸權國家海軍思想特色所在，瞭解德蘇海軍發展的動機、矛盾、關鍵、結果，並發現兩者的異同。 本論文認為，德蘇海軍思想雖因國情與時代不同，使其內涵有所差異，但是受惡劣地理與艦隊數量劣勢兩因素的影響，使德蘇海軍思想的發展過程與其實際結果很類似，不過蘇聯海軍對傳統海軍戰略理論比德國海軍有較好的理解，也沒有受到基本性質不同的陸戰觀念的太大影響，再加上核武的幫助，因此其對傳統海權強國造成的威脅也就比德國更為嚴重；此外，兩者的結束方式不同，係因核武的嚇阻效果阻止了雙方真正爆發全面性衝突的緣故。 上述假設命題可以進一步解析為下列邏輯相關的子命題： (一)戰略思想的發展，與該國的地理位置有密切關係，陸海軍皆然。 (二)與假想敵軍事力量的強弱對比，可決定一國採取戰略攻勢或戰略守勢。 (三)古典海軍戰略理論雖有部分過時，但精華部分仍有永恆的價值，若不予重視，新戰略思想的發展容易往錯誤的方向邁進： 海軍戰略理論的重點在「制海權」這一至今仍為世界各國海軍尊奉的觀念，古典制海權理論經歷了近現代科學技術對戰爭造成的巨大變動仍為海軍界奉為圭臬，證明具有重要性與不可替代性，在發展新理論時必須對其有正確的瞭解，才有助於理論的正確性。 (四)陸戰觀念應用於海軍戰略理論的方向與程度，對於海軍戰略理論發展的正確性有很大的影響： 陸海軍戰略理論確有共通之處，但並不表示二者完全相似。過份應用陸戰觀念於海戰理論只會導致錯誤的結論，有害海戰理論的發展。

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(人間・環境学) / 甲第23584号 / 人博第1016号 / 新制||人||240(附属図書館) / 2021||人博||1016(吉田南総合図書館) / 京都大学大学院人間・環境学研究科共生文明学専攻 / (主査)教授 小島 泰雄, 教授 小方 登, 教授 山村 亜希, 准教授 小原 丈明 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Human and Environmental Studies / Kyoto University / DFAM

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences. / Department of Government and Public Administration