1999年地方制度法施行以來，地方極力爭取自主權，中央與地方自治團體間衍生多次衝突，爭議之層面涵括地方財政權、立法權及人事權等地方自治核心領域。針對中央地方衝突，司法院大法官作出多號解釋，惟並未定紛止爭，突顯出建立中央地方衝突解決機制之必要性。 本論文選擇五個衝突個案，分別是財政衝突的統籌分配稅款及地方積欠健保政府補助款；立法衝突之行動電話基地台自治條例牴觸案及台北市里長延選案；人事權衝突之縣市警察局長任免案。先以府際關係理論進行鉅觀分析，分析其府際關係網絡圖，突顯其網絡利害關係人，如何進行聯合或對抗。次以賽局理分論析中央地方之賽局策略選擇過程，進而賽局及報酬模擬分析。 期望透過各類型中央地方府際衝突個案研究，提出解決下列問題。一、釐清中央地方府際衝突之影響因素？二、究竟何為中央地方權限爭議解決機制？三、台灣府際衝突之關係網絡圖像為何？四、府際衝突賽局中之博奕過程模式為何？ 本研究提出四項結論。一、法律與制度變遷與府際衝突交互運作影響；二、政黨對立為府際係衝突最關鍵影響因素；三、建立多元之協調解決機制，為解決府際衝突之有效措施。四、提出全觀型府際賽局理論，以詮釋我國府際關係衝突現象。 本研究並提出五項建議，有助於未來我國府際關係正向發展，一、釐清府際衝突深層網絡關係結構，二、擴大跨域合作府際關係，三、追求中央與地方府際之最適效益，四、邁向多層次之地方治理，五、體認「地方自治為憲法制度性保障」之真諦。 / Since the Local Government Act enacted in 1999, local governments strive for local autonomy; therefore some supervisory conflicts aroused between central and local government. Those conflicts related to law autonomous enactment, finance autonomous rights and personnel rights. Despite Judicial Interpretation No.550 and 553 had review above conflicts, disputes still remained unsolved, which proclaimed the importance of constructing the reconciliatory mechanism of conflicts. This study tries to analyze five conflict cases including tax redistribution fund, premium of National Health Insurance, cellular phone base management local act, the prolonged election of Taipei li-chairman and incumbency of police bureau chief. Four conclusions are drawn as below, first, legal and system change will affect the IGR conflicts mutually. Second, parties antagonism is a crucial factor for IGR conflicts. Third, multi reconciliatory mechanism of conflicts would be efficient, a holistic game theory could interpret those conflicts. The last chapter proposes recommendations such as to clarify the IGR networks structure, broaden the cross-boundary cooperation, pursuit the optimal payoffs, work towards a multi-level governance and comprehend the core meaning of “local autonomy as a system assurance”.

丹麥參與歐洲統合進程中，曾於1960年至1973年間參與歐洲自由貿易協會，並自1973年後從歐洲自由貿易協會轉型為歐體的一員，丹麥加入歐體之後其歐盟政策經歷了適應期（1973-1986）、高峰期（1986-1992）與調整期（1992-2000）。在各個時期之中，丹麥制訂歐盟政策經歷了一連串持續與轉變的過程，究其原因莫過於第一層次與第二層次之間相互影響與互動所致。在第一層次（國際層次）之中丹麥與各會員國在國際場合進行談判，透過不斷的磋商與讓步，與各會員國達成國際協議；在第二層次（國內層次）之中國會、歐洲事務委員會、政黨、利益團體及丹麥民眾，分別透過各種管道影響丹麥的歐盟政策之制訂。由於許多國際層次的歐盟條約都必須得到丹麥國內的批准，致使「批准」成為兩個層次之間的重要連結。 本篇論文以兩層次賽局作為分析架構，並以「勝利組合」作為分析工具，探討第一層次歐盟各會員國如何對丹麥作出施壓與讓步，以及第二層次國內各因素如何在歐盟政策制訂過程中發揮影響力，透過「勝利組合」的範圍變化，分析單一歐洲法與馬斯垂克條約等重要歐盟條約如何得到「批准」通過。在第二層次之中，尤其不可忽略公民複決對丹麥制訂歐盟政策所發揮的影響力，透過整理丹麥舉辦六次關於歐盟議題公民複決的經驗，可歸納出公民複決是影響丹麥制訂歐盟政策的關鍵因素。此外，第一層次的談判結果也會影響丹麥民眾對於某項議題的偏好。國際壓力是造成國內政策轉折的必要條件，相對地若缺乏國內對於國際壓力的回應，光憑國際壓力尚不足以達成國際協議。因此，這兩個層次是雙向影響與互動的過程，而非單向的影響過程， 兩層次賽局應用在丹麥歐盟政策制訂上，丹麥國內民眾不僅對條約本身（第一層次）做出衡量，也對於政府的表現做出評估（第二層次），使公民複決在兩層次賽局中具有決定性的作用。在歐洲統合過程中，丹麥相較於其他歐盟會員國，其國內因素對於歐盟政策之制訂，發揮了較大的牽制作用。一項重大歐盟條約的通過，必須得到國內第二層次的支持才得以批准，這使得決策者不敢擅作主張，必須將國內的意見充分表達於國際談判之中，且要得到國內的充分授權之後才能在國際談判桌上作出決定。因此，丹麥在制訂歐盟政策過程中持續地將民眾意見納入其中，丹麥對於民意的重視，益加凸顯出主權在民的精神。 丹麥雖只是身處於北歐地區的一個小國，但丹麥卻能善用自身的籌碼，在國際談判中爭取有利的條件。在歐洲統合過程中，丹麥持續將其理念帶入歐盟，進而影響其他會員國與整體歐盟政策之走向。展望未來歐洲統合的發展，歐盟擴充之後會員國數目增加，丹麥的統合經驗，特別是採取尊重民意的歐盟政策，將可作為其他新加入會員國的參考。故丹麥經驗在歐洲統合的歷程及未來發展上均具有重要性，而「兩層次賽局」也可供作其他會員國分析歐盟政策的架構，更可作為解釋其他內政與外交相關議題的分析工具。

在複雜動態競爭市場中，生產者的價格競爭行為一直是一個研究的重點，相較於生產者動態價格競爭，零售商的價格競爭行為鮮少被探討，因此本研究針對零售商價格競爭行為進行研究。針對零售商之間的價格競爭行為，除了考量零售商與對手零售商的價格互動，不可忽略的是上游供應商的競爭互動與下游消費者的學習行為在市場中與零售商端互動下錯綜複雜的動態影響，緣此，本研究以零售商端的角度，想了解供應商競爭與消費者學習行為對零售商競爭的影響，再以單一零售商角度，分析各情況下所應對的價格調整策略。 本研究將零售商、供應商及消費者互動形成之競爭市場視為一個複雜適應性系統（Complex Adaptive System ，簡稱CAS），應用代理人基塑模與模擬（Agent-based Modeling and Simulation，簡稱ABMS）方式建構考量供應商競爭與消費者學習行為之零售商價格競爭模式，將演化賽局理論應用於價格競爭中，探討不同的消費者學習及供應商價格競爭行為如何動態影響零售商價格競爭型態，以及不同價格調整策略之績效表現。 研究結果發現一，市場中消費者呈現不同的學習行為，對零售商競爭將造成不同的衝擊。「貨比三家無學習」型消費者將造成零售商端低價競爭，使其平均價格最低及獲利最低。「自我式學習」型消費者將造成零售商高價合作，使其平均價格最高及獲利最高。「群體式學習」型消費者同樣使零售商端偏向高價合作，且其平均價格及獲利相當接近自我式學習市場，雖然兩種學習行為具有近似的平均價格與獲利，「群體式學習」卻會導致零售商價格競爭之型態轉為劇烈，包括獲利領先轉換方式由漸進轉為瀑布，領先方式從勢均力敵轉為大幅領先，領先互換的頻率由低轉為高。另外，消費者購買決策之理性程度對零售商端競爭形態有影響，不論在何種供應商行為下，高理性購買決策在群體式學習下將導致零售商端價格競爭較激烈，在自我式學習下卻導致零售商端競爭行為較緩和。 研究發現二，市場中供應商的價格競爭行為會對零售商端的價格、獲利與競爭型態造成衝擊。供應商呈現價格競爭行為下，在「貨比三家無學習」之消費者行為市場中，將減緩零售商價格競爭，使零售商端之平均價格及獲利提高。在「自我」與「群體式」學習消費者市場中，將增強零售商價格競爭強度，使零售商端之平均價格及獲利降低。 研究發現三，不同的競爭市場中，零售商之最佳價格調整策略也將不同。基本上在供應商無競爭行為下，無論消費者呈現何種行為，零售商採取開放式價格調整策略具有明顯優勢。在供應商呈現競爭行為下，開放式價格調整策略在「無學習」及「群體式學習高理性程度」行為市場仍為優勝策略，在「自我式學習」及「群體式學習低理性程度」下，保守型價格調整策略則表現較佳。 在實務意涵上，若零售商可使消費者行為偏向自我或群體式學習，並穩定供應商價格競爭下，整體而言零售商端競爭可獲得最高的獲利，若當此刻競爭零售商採取保守型價格策略，而本身採取開放式價格調整策略，則獲利最大。然而面臨群體式學習消費者，由於競爭強度的增加，需留意市場動態，須隨時靈活調整本身價格策略，避免因價格策略的僵化，而成為虧損之零售商。 / The pricing competitive model traditionally assumes that consumers will buy from the firm selling the homogeneous product at the lowest price, thus discarding any possibility of learning behavior on the demand side. But if, as in real competition, consumers learn adaptively and competition is a dynamic process, then some attention should be paid to consumers' behavior. In a multiple supplier – multiple retailer supply chain, multiple price competitive forces interact to influence firm price decisions. These forces include: (1) the supplier level competition each supplier faces from others producing the same product, (2) the retailer level competition among the retailers selling the same set of goods, and (3) the vertical interaction competition between the retailer and supplier. We are interest in these questions: How does the consumer learning behavior affect the retailer pricing competitive model? How does the competition of supplier affect the retailer pricing competitive model? What is the optimal adaptive pricing strategy for retailer performance in such competitive market including retailers, suppliers and consumers. Therefore, this research study a version of the pricing competitive (Bertrand) model in which consumer exhibit dynamic adaptive learning behavior when deciding from what retailers they will buy. And we consider to join the supplier competitive pricing behavior into the retailer pricing competitive model and formulate their interaction as evolutional game and to analyze the competition of supplier effect and its impact on the pricing competition of retailers. This research uses a complex adaptive system perspective to construct a retailer pricing competitive model which considers both competitive supplier and learning consumer behavior. Using agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) to construct the competitive market include retailers, suppliers and consumers, and use the fuzzy logic, genetic algorithms to model the pricing decision and learning behavior of retailers and suppliers, and use reinforcement learning and swarm algorithms to model consumers’ learning behavior. The simulation results demonstrate that: The retailer level obtains the highest profit when the consumer behavior following reinforcement learning. When the consumer behavior displays swarm learning, the retailer level also obtains high profit near the highest profit. However swarm learning increases the competitive intensity on the retailer level. The competitive supplier increases the competitive intensity and decrease profit on the retailer level when the consumer behavior displays reinforcement learning and swarm learning. The performance of retailer following a closed adaptive pricing strategy (high exploitation low exploration) exceeds that of retailer following an open adaptive pricing strategy (low exploitation high exploration) when the consumer behavior displays reinforcement learning and supplier display competitive behavior. However when the consumer behavior displays swarm learning and supplier display competitive behavior, the performance of retailer following an open adaptive pricing strategy exceeds that of retailer following a closed adaptive pricing strategy. The proposed pricing competitive model with adaptive learning of consumer behavior and competition of supplier can help retailers to analyze pricing strategy and further discovery and design the more optimal pricing strategy.

臺灣的連鎖式便利商店密度居世界之冠，為數眾多的門市使得便利商店與臺灣人 民的生活息息相關，就直覺來說，便利商店門市的數量也影響了廠商設立新門市 的決策。本研究建構了一離散選擇的動態賽局，分析臺北市各個行政區便利商店 門市數量對不同廠商設立新門市的影響。實證結果顯示當競爭對手門市數量剛開 始增加時，門市數量對便利商店的利潤有正向的影響，但是當對手門市數量太多 時，此數量的增加對便利商店的利潤產生負向影響。這結果表示一開始門市之間 的互補效果大於替代效果，但是門市數量太多造成過度競爭，此時門市之間的替 代效果大於互補效果。而同品牌的門市數量對於廠商的總利潤也有類似的影響。 另外，本研究也估計便利商店歷年來在臺北市各行政區展店的機率，其中大安區 和中山區是便利商店廠商最想展店的行政區，相對而言，南港區、大同區和萬華 區則是展店機率較低的行政區。 / The density of convenience stores (CVS) in Taiwan is ranked as number one in the world. The highly concentrated market of convenience stores has dramatically changed the lifestyle of Taiwanese people. The number of existing outlets in a region is also an important factor in regard to the entry decisions of new outlets. In this study, we construct a model of the dynamic discrete game, and examine the influence of the rival outlet number on CVS entry decisions in Taipei, Taiwan. The empirical evidence we find is that the CVS profits first rise and then decline as the own or rival outlet number increases. This result implies that the complement and substitution effects vary with the number of the CVS outlets in a specific region. Furthermore, we estimate the probabilities that the CVS companies will set up additional outlets in any district of Taipei during the data period. The results show that it is most likely for the companies to enter the Da’an and Zhongshan districts, while Nangang, Datong and Wanhua are districts with low entry probabilities.

新品牌的崛起，一般的建議是1.建立起令人有豐富且深刻聯想的品牌識別系統；2.以強力的整合行銷傳播建立品牌高知名度，假以時日，就能成為強勢品牌。但以筆者多年擔任行銷顧問的觀察，按表操課的企業未必都能獲得成功，深究其原因，可發現從新品牌開始曝光，消費者就一直拿著放大鏡來檢視打造這個品牌的企業所有的一切作為，是否真的下定決心、義無反顧地想做好品牌。這篇論文正是研究企業究竟要做出什麼承諾，才有取信顧客，讓顧客心悅誠服願意建立關係。 本研究將品牌承諾定義為：「企業為打造品牌所做出重大投入或投資」，並認為品牌承諾的主要目的是為了將外部顧客鎖入內部，所以品牌承諾的作用就是促進顧客願意建立長久而穩定關係的意願。 由於品牌與顧客的關係是由一次次的接觸而建立起來，所以本研究由品牌接觸點切入，認為品牌接觸點就是顧客判斷品牌承諾可信與否的線索。並以關係意願取代購買意願來衡量顧客願意建立關係的強度，其原因為許多消費者在沒有能力消費某品牌前，可能已經成為該品牌的粉絲，這些粉絲常常為喜愛的品牌捍衛辨護，尤其在網際網路上。 本研究經實證分析得到以下的發現： 1.單一類型品牌承諾投入愈多，則顧客的關係意願愈高。 2.以品牌接觸點的觀點，將所有接觸點上的品牌承諾加總，承諾愈高，則顧客的關係意願愈高。 3.品牌印象會造成關係意願的顯著差異 4.品牌忠誠者的關係意願較未購買者高。

給定兩個隨機變數的條件機率矩陣A和B，相容性問題的主要課題包 含：(一)如何判斷他們是否相容？若相容，則如何檢驗聯合分配的唯一性 或找出所有的聯合分配；(二)若不相容，則如何訂定測量不相容程度的方 法並找出最近似聯合分配。目前的文獻資料有幾種解決問題的途徑，例 如Arnold and Press (1989)的比值矩陣法、Song et al. (2010)的不可約 化對角塊狀矩陣法及Arnold et al. (2002)的數學規劃法等，經由這些方法 的啟發，本文發展出創新的特徵向量法來處理前述的相容性課題。 當A和B相容時，我們觀察到邊際分配分別是AB′和B′A對應特徵值1的 特徵向量。因此，在以邊際分配檢驗相容性時，特徵向量法僅需檢驗滿足 特徵向量條件的邊際分配，大幅度減少了檢驗的工作量。利用線性代數中 的Perron定理和不可約化對角塊狀矩陣的概念，特徵向量法可圓滿處理相 容性問題(一)的部份。 當A和B不相容時，特徵向量法也可衍生出一個測量不相容程度的簡單 方法。由於不同的測量方法可得到不同的最近似聯合分配，為了比較其優 劣，本文中提出了以條件分配的偏差加上邊際分配的偏差作為評量最近似 聯合分配的標準。特徵向量法除了可推導出最近似聯合分配的公式解外， 經過例子的驗證，在此評量標準下特徵向量法也獲得比其他測量法更佳的 最近似聯合分配。由是，特徵向量法也可用在處理相容性問題(二)的部份。 最後，將特徵向量法實際應用在兩人零和有限賽局問題上。作業研究的 解法是將雙方採取何種策略視為獨立，但是我們認為雙方可利用償付值表 所提供的資訊作為決策的依據，並將雙方的策略寫成兩個條件機率矩陣， 則賽局問題被轉換為相容性問題。我們可用廣義相容的概念對賽局的解進 行分析，並在各種測度下討論賽局的解及雙方的最佳策略。 / Given two conditional probability matrices A and B of two random variables, the issues of the compatibility include: (a) how to determine whether they are compatible? If compatible, how to check the uniqueness of the joint distribution or find all possible joint distributions; (b) if incompatible, how to measure how far they are from compatibility and find the most nearly compatible joint distribution. There are several approaches to solve these problems, such as the ratio matrix method(Arnold and Press, 1989), the IBD matrix method(Song et al., 2010) and the mathematical programming method(Arnold et al., 2002). Inspired by these methods, the thesis develops the eigenvector approach to deal with the compatibility issues. When A and B are compatible, it is observed that the marginal distributions are eigenvectors of AB′ and B′A corresponding to 1, respectively. While checking compatibility by the marginal distributions, the eigenvector approach only checks the marginal distributions which are eigenvectors of AB′ and B′A. It significantly reduces the workload. By using Perron theorem and the concept of the IBD matrix, the part (a) of compatibility issues can be dealt with the eigenvector approach. When A and B are incompatible, a simple way to measure the degree of incompatibility can be derived from the eigenvector approach. In order to compare the most nearly compatible joint distributions given by different measures, the thesis proposes the deviation of the conditional distributions plus the deviation of the marginal distributions as the most nearly compatible joint distribution assessment standard. The eigenvector approach not only derives formula for the most nearly compatible distribution, but also provides better joint distribution than those given by the other measures through the validations under this standard. The part (b) of compatibility issues can also be dealt with the eigenvector approach. Finally, the eigenvector approach is used in solving game problems. In operations research, strategies adopted by both players are assumed to be independent. However, this independent assumption may not be appropriate, since both players can make decisions through the information provided by the payoffs for the game. Let strategies of both players form two conditional probability matrices, then the game problems can be converted into compatibility issues. We can use the concept of generalized compatibility to analyze game solutions and discuss the best strategies for both players in a variety of measurements.

摘要 本研究採用賽局理論 (stag-hunt model) 來推論假設南海海上交通線 (SLOCs) 安全合作的情形．根據結果顯示，爭奪南海的國家，其解決衝突最好的策略應以合作的方式來提昇無論是在石油進口、貿易活動以及該地區船隻航行等方面的安全性。 為縮短假設情境與現實情況的差距，一方面，我們找出海上交通線安全合作之難點：主權、資源、和軍事發展；另一方面，也提出能促進其合作的正面因素：舊有的海上聯合巡邏、非傳統安全合作相關領堿、以及未來的南海行為準則 (SCS COC)。 最後我們介紹了「南海太平島提案」，試圖建立與協調新的海上聯合巡邏來降低該地區的緊張關係，建立彼此之間的信任，並改善衝突的情況。 根據本研究結論表示，我們的研究發現以及一些政策將能協助實施南海海上交通線安全的合作。 / Abstract This research applies game theory (stag-hunt model) to a hypothetical situation of cooperation on Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) protection in South China Sea (SCS). The results indicate that, in theory, the best option for all disputant countries in the issue is to cooperate in order to increase the security of their oil imports, trade, and ships crossing the region. To overcome the gap between the theoretical model and the reality, we have identified those factors that will hinder the implementation of cooperation on SLOCs protection, sovereignty, resources, and military development; as well as those that can be used to counterbalance the effect of negative ones, previous joint maritime patrols, non-traditional security cooperation, and the future South China Sea Code of Conduct (SCS COC). Finally, we have presented the South China Sea Peace Island Initiative, a proposal to coordinate and create new joint maritime patrols in the region as a mean to reduce tensions, build confidence, and improve the relationship between disputants. We conclude presenting the main findings of this research, as well as those policies that will be useful to implement cooperation on SLOCs protection in SCS.