Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:40:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Carl Douglas De Gennaro Oliveira.pdf: 1342470 bytes, checksum: 9868002de42872f20913eb856aa2b173 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-24 / The process of Brazil s compliance with the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) took a big step forward, definitively getting on the agenda of regulatory agencies, companies and auditing firms, when Federal Law 11.638 was signed in December 2007, altering the accounting chapter of Brazilian Corporate Law, 6.404/76. This study contributes to Brazil s process of compliance with the IFRS, specifically regarding the applicability of IFRS 2 Share-based Payment, or its Brazilian corollary CPC 10 Pagamento Baseado em Ações, and the impact on accounting and on the disclosure of a long-term compensation program for executives, characterized as phantom stock options. IFRS 2 was published in February 2002 and was required internationally from January 2005, as an outcome of the growing use of commercial transaction payments based on shares, and also the IOSCO´s report that pointed out the lack of an accounting standard dealing with this kind of transaction. The study found that IFRS 2 or CPC 10 can be appropriately applied to guide the accounting treatment given to a phantom stock option program, and was a more informative accounting practice than that which had been used in Brazil, before 2008. The study also found a wide-spread need of financial knowledge regarding the valuation of stock options, such as the Black-Scholes-Merton model, as well as statistical methods for appropriately account and disclose the fair value of share-based incentive plans. Furthermore, in order to understand more fully the economic event which is being accounted, it is highly important to understand its essence. In the case of long-term share-based incentives for executives, the essence of their existence can be found in agency theory / O processo de convergência do Brasil às Normas Internacionais de Contabilidade (IFRSs) deu um grande salto e entrou definitivamente na agenda dos órgãos reguladores, empresas e auditorias, com a sanção da lei federal 11.638 em dezembro de 2007, que alterou o capítulo contábil da Lei das Sociedades Anônimas, 6.404/76. Este estudo contribui para o processo de convergência brasileiro às IFRSs, especificamente quanto à aplicabilidade do IFRS 2 Share Based Payment, ou sua correlação brasileira CPC 10 Pagamento Baseado em Ações, e dos impactos contábeis e de divulgação decorrentes de um programa de compensação de longo prazo a executivos, com as características de phantom stock options, ou opções fantasmas. O IFRS 2 foi publicado em fevereiro de 2002 e requerido internacionalmente a partir de janeiro de 2005, como uma decorrência do crescente uso de pagamento das transações comerciais com base em ações e também do relatório da IOSCO, que identificou como falha a lacuna de norma contábil que tratasse deste tipo de transação. O estudo identificou que o IFRS 2 ou CPC 10 aplica-se adequadamente para orientar o tratamento contábil de um programa de phantom stock option e representou uma prática contábil mais informativa que aquela até então adotada no Brasil, antes do ano de 2008. O estudo também identificou a grande necessidade de conhecimento de finanças relacionado à avaliação de opções, tal como o modelo Black-Scholes-Merton, bem como de métodos estatísticos, para uma apropriada contabilização e divulgação do valor justo dos planos de incentivo baseados em ações. Além disso, para que se entenda com profundidade o evento econômico que se contabiliza, é de suma importância a compreensão de sua essência. No caso de incentivos de longo prazo para executivos, baseados em ações, a essência de sua existência pode ser encontrada na Teoria de Agência

Revisorn anlitas för att ge ett oberoende yttrande som ska säkerställa pålitligheten i företagensfinansiella rapporter. Denna tilltrosskapandande effekt kan endast uppnås om revisorn görsina bedömningar och fattar beslut utan att låta sig påverkas av andra personers viljor ellerönskningar. Att revisorn är oberoende är särskilt viktigt i de fall revisorernas arbete påverkarintressenters beslutsfattande. Diskussionen kring revisorns oberoende i samband medtillhandahållandet av fristående rådgivning har debatterats flitigt. Vissa menar att denfristående rådgivningen medför positiva effekter på revisionen, medan andra anser att denborde förbjudas då den utgör ett hot mot revisorns oberoende och påverkar förtroendet förbranschen. Genom införandet av revisionspaketet står revisionsbranschen inför nyaregleringar av oberoendet och den fristående rådgivningen. Denna uppsats ämnar fördjupadiskussionen och undersöka varför det kan upplevas som ett problem när en revisionsbyrå, irollen som oberoende kontrollorgan, erbjuder både fristående rådgivning och revision.Frågeställningen besvaras med hjälp av relevanta teorier, modeller och intervjuer medrevisorer, intressenter samt normgivande organ. Den fristående rådgivningen kan medföra attrevisorn inte uppfattas som oberoende och kan utmana förtroendet hos allmänheten. Vidarekan det upplevas som ett problem när den fristående rådgivningen sker på revisionsklienter.Medias skildring av debatten, att det verkar föreligga ett förväntningsgap samt en bristandetransparens kan även det vara bidragande orsaker till problematiken. Revisionspaketet kankomma att öka transparensen, minska förväntningsgapet samt stärka förtroendet för branschenoch kan således komma att minska problematiken med att ett oberoende kontrollorganerbjuder både fristående rådgivning och revision. / Program: Civilekonomprogrammet

Revisorns roll har på senare tid kommit att innefatta mer än att säkerställa de finansiella talensriktighet. En stor del av revisorns arbetsuppgifter handlar om att tillstå sina klienter med alltyp av rådgivning. En följd av revisorns utökade arbetsuppgifter är att det ställer krav pårevisorn att inneha kunskap om en rad olika ämnen. Denna utveckling har kommit attinnebära att allmänheten anses ha höga förväntningar på revisorn i dess yrkesroll.Tidigare forskning visar att bedrägerier inom organisationer har ökat på senare tid och att dethar kommit att bli ett ökat problem i samhället. I och med indikationer på att bedrägerier iorganisationer har ökat anses allmänheten också ha förväntningar på att revisorn skallupptäcka bedrägerier när de utför revision. Revisorerna själva anser däremot inte att det är ettsyfte med revisionen att upptäcka eventuella bedrägerier. Forskare menar dock attallmänhetens förväntningar är så pass höga att revisorerna måste ta hänsyn till detta krav.Tidigare forskning samt de tillfrågade revisorerna bekräftar att bedrägerier i företag är mycketproblematiska att upptäcka med hänsyn till det faktum att de inte enskilt har någon storpåverkan på de finansiella räkenskaperna för ett bolag.Meningsskiljaktigheter råder mellan revisorerna och användarna kring revisorns roll och bådetidigare forskning samt de revisorer jag har intervjuat i denna studie vittnar om att det råderett förväntningsgap mellan de olika parterna. En vanlig missuppfattning menar revisorerna imin undersökning är att allmänheten tror att revisorerna reviderar och kontrollerar pådetaljnivå. I både tidigare forskning samt empiriskt underlag finner jag uppfattningen attkunskapen kring revisorns roll måste öka. Tidigare forskning och de tillfrågaderespondenterna är överens om att information är huvudnyckeln till att minska deförväntningsgap som råder och som från revisorernas sida uppfattas som mycket olyckligt.Studien har gjorts i syfte att med kvalitativa semistrukturerade intervjuer med revisorerklargöra hur revisorerna själva ser på sin roll att upptäcka bedrägerier i organisationer.Studien består sammanlagt av åtta respondenter representerade på fyra revisionsbyråer varavtre stycken är stora revisionsbolag och en mindre revisionsbyrå. Resultatet av denna studievisar att revisorerna är överens om att upptäcka bedrägerier inte är ett huvudmål medrevisionen utan utgör endast en del. Revisorerna i studien menar att det är deras uppgift attgranska utifrån väsentlighet och risk. Samtliga respondenter menar att det är ledningensansvar att upptäcka bedrägerier men framförallt betonar de vikten av att förebyggabedrägerier med hjälpa av goda interna kontroller. / Program: Civilekonomprogrammet

Diversas teorias ao longo do tempo apresentam explicações sobre as estruturas de capital das organizações. As principais são a teoria Pecking Order, Teoria Trade Off e Teoria Free Cash-Flow, com base na teoria de Agência. Todas essas teorias apresentam relações teóricas entre alguns determinantes de estruturas de capital vinculadas a firma que poderiam interferir na decisão de financiamento. Uma segunda linha de estudos, vinculada a esta, apresenta que determinantes externas a firma também interferem nesta estrutura de capital, porém as variáveis de firma comportam-se de forma semelhante em diferentes cenários econômicos. (RAJAN e ZINGALES, 1995; BOOTH et. al., 2001; de JONG et. al., 2008; GURCHARAN, 2010; KAYO e KIMURA, 2011). Considerando as pesquisas anteriores, desenvolveu-se uma investigação para a confirmação desta hipótese, com o objetivo de identificar quais variáveis são mais importantes na tomada de decisão financeira e se há variabilidade em cenários temporais e ambientes econômicos distintos. Para tal foram analisadas 10.243 empresas sediadas em 61 países distintos no período de 2002-2011, totalizando o número de 58.423 observações firma ano, por meio de um modelo de regressão linear hierárquica de três níveis com medidas repetidas, verificando qual a importância das variáveis de firma e país no endividamento, se há variação das mesmas em países com diferentes contextos econômicos e em períodos de crescimento e retração econômica. Foram analisadas cinco determinantes clássicas de firma (lucratividade, tangibilidade, proteção fiscal não advinda da dívida, tamanho e oportunidades de crescimento), e onze variáveis de país que possuem relação com o endividamento (PIB, inflação, taxa de impostos, volume negociado em ações, liquidez de bolsa, capitalização das empresas listadas, índice risco país, taxa de juros, enforcement jurídico, nível de proteção ao investidor e nível de disclosure de negócios). A partir das análises realizadas, foi identificado que o endividamento está ligado em maior grau a características das firmas e ao tempo, e em menor grau, porém significante, às características do ambiente. Foi identificado que não há mudanças extremamente significativas no comportamento das variáveis de firma entre economias desenvolvidas e em desenvolvimento, assim como entre períodos pré e pós-crise financeira de 2008. Em relação as determinantes de país analisadas, observa-se que as mesmas apresentam comportamento adverso em função da crise de 2008, perdendo capacidade explicativa, e não apresentam comportamento de mudança de sinal dos coeficientes quando comparados países com desenvolvimento econômico distinto. Identifica-se que características do desenvolvimento econômico ficam mais evidentes no processo de financiamento, como acesso a recursos em economias com menor desenvolvimento. Os resultados apresentam convergência com os estudos anteriores como os de Moore (1986), Rajan e Zingales (1995), Booth et. al. (2001), Kayo e Kimura (2011), Bebzcuk e Galindo (2011), Akbar et. al (2012), entre outros. / Several theories over time present explanations of the capital structures of organizations. The main theories are the Pecking Order Theory, Trade Off and Free Cash-Flow Theory, based on the Agency Theory. All these theories have some theoretical relationships between determinants of capital structures linked to firm that could interfere in the financing decision. A second line of studies, linked to this, shows that determinants outside the firm also interfere in capital structure, but the firm variables behave similarly in different economic scenarios (RAJAN and ZINGALES, 1995; BOOTH et. al., 2001; de JONG et. al., 2008; GURCHARAN, 2010; KAYO and KIMURA, 2011). Considering previous researches, we developed an investigation to confirm this hypothesis, identifying which variables are the most important in financial decision-making and there is variability in temporal scenarios and different economic environments. To this end, we analyzed 10,243 companies based in 61 different countries in the period 2002-2011, a total number of 58,423 firm year observations, through a hierarchical linear regression model of three levels with repeated measures, checking the importance of the variables firm and country in debt, if there is variation in the same countries with different economic contexts and periods of growth and downturn. We analyzed five firm classical determinants ( profitability , tangibility, non-debt tax shield , size and growth opportunities) , and eleven variables that are related to country debt ( GDP , inflation, taxes , trading volume in shares , stock liquidity , capitalization of listed companies, country risk index , interest rate , law enforcement , level of investor protection and disclosure level) . From the analysis, it was identified the debt is linked to a greater degree the characteristics of firms and time, and on a lesser degree, but significant, with characteristics of the environment. It wasn\'t identified very significant changes in the behavior of firm variables between developed and developing countries, as well as between pre-and post- 2008 financial crisis. Regarding the determinants of country analyzed, it is observed that they present adverse behavior due to the 2008 crisis, losing explanatory power, and have no behavior change in sign of the coefficients when comparing countries with different economic development. Characteristics of economic development become more evident in the funding process, such as access to resources in less developed economies. The results show convergence with previous studies such as Moore (1986) , Rajan and Zingales (1995) Booth et al. al. (2001) Kayo and Kimura (2011) , Bebzcuk and Galindo (2011) , Akbar et al. al (2012 ), among others

本文主要應用代理理論來評估建議目前全權委任契約的規劃草案。為深入瞭解全權委託契約的法律及經濟特性，本研究參考日本全權委託業務規範、及研究我國目前全權委託法令內容。藉實地訪談投顧業者以窺視業界對全權委託法令的真正看法，最後乃利用代理理論做為草案規範體系之基礎及進行評估。 在研究日本全權委託業務規範時，本研究發現日本的做法與目前我國草案的內容與精神大致上相同，因此難以日本作法來給我國全權委託規劃一些建議；至於規範台灣全權委託業務主要法規為「證券投資顧問事業管理規則」修正草案（重點內容請看第三章第二節），至本研究結束時還未經立法院三讀通過，為了要充分了解草案內容及業界意見，本研究在慎選二家投顧業者訪談後，發現相關法條中有許多不太合理的地方，例如為什麼在受託投資金額超過二十億元後，業者只要提存五千萬元的保證金就可以了，這樣是不是有圖利大型業者？以及對委託人而，開放業者投資國內開放型受益憑證似乎多此一舉了！（請看第三章第三節） 至於在應用 Holmstrom (1979) 代理理論方面，本研究認為此規範體系應具備以下特徵：1.在全權委託契約中不得採用固定佣金結構，否則主理人（投資者）將承擔所有全權委託契約的風險，如此代理人的道德危險會益加嚴重；2.應適當允許以績效為基礎的變動佣金結構，惟這種代客操作契約設計中的 F(x;a) 必具備一階強勢優勢的條件；3.要令 F(x;a) 的一階強勢優勢的條件在績效基礎的代客操作契約中能有效存在，則提出六個方法乃是必要條件（非充分條件）。（請看第四章第三節） 最後本文乃以先前所做的研究做為基礎，針對相關法條提出問題及建議方案，惟這部分的建議純粹是以本研究出發，完整的建議內容有賴各方面專家的共同參與才行。本文也希望對於此方面有興趣的研究者能參考本研究對後續研究者之建議部分，例如公會自律制度研究及歐美國家全權委託制度的研究均是十分值得繼續採所的領域。 / This study applies agency theory to assess the appropriateness of the regulatory framework of discretion account proposed by the Taiwan SFC (Securities and Futures Commission) which mainly imitates from Japan. This study considers investor as the principal and delegated investment company as the agent. Since the effort level of agent is unobservable, plus the interest conflict existing between the principal and agent, a rational agent would have moral hazard. If we plan to have an effective regulation of discretion account, it is necessary to design an efficient contract for eliminating or reducing agent's moral hazard. This study hypothesizes that Holmstrom's second-best agency contract could be the one for establishing an efficient regulatory framework of discretion account. Therefore, this study uses the propositions developed by Holmstrom (1979) to establish a proposed efficient regulatory framework for the business of discretion accout, including disclosure system and an incentive mechanism.

本文分別以訪問法、問卷調查法及文獻文件分析法，描述我國公營事業團 體協商過程、結果；從體制因素、環境因素、協商者特性及關係因素等四 方面解釋其對團體協商結果之影響；進而探討當公營事業民營化之後，團 體協商結果可能有什麼變化。全文共分七章，分述如下： 第一章為導 論：分別說明研究背景、研究目的、分析架構及研究限制。第二章為文獻 評述：分別從檢視過去理論、國內所做相關研究、美國所做實證研究；並 說明過去研究之空隙。第三章為研究方法：分別說明本研究之研究設計、 資料蒐集方法、抽樣設計、資料分析方法及研究檢核。第四章為團體協商 之描述：分別介紹團體協商當事人、協商過程與結果。第五章為團體協商 結果之解釋：分別從體制因素、環境因素、協商者特性及關係因素探討其 對公營事業團體協商結果之影響。第六章為前瞻性評估：分別從代理理論 、體制論、交易成本途徑等組織理論說明公營事業民營化後團體協商結果 可能的變化。第七章為結論與建議：分別從團體協商之描述面、解釋面及 前瞻性評估面歸納出數項研究發現，並針對勞工行政主管機關、雇方、工 會、後續研究者及勞動關係政策制定者分別提出建議。

近年來，隨著國內產業結構之轉變，以及金融自由化政策之推動，企業經營環境已隨著大幅改變。本研究的目的，主要在於探討這些轉變對於國內上市公司資本結構是否會造成重大的影響。 　　本研究資料乃取自教育部EPS資料庫與臺灣經濟新報社資料庫，樣本期間為民國78年到82年，共120家上市公司。研究方法主要採用變異成份模型(Variance Component Model)與誤差成份模型(Error Component Model)來研究上市公司資本結構的影響因素。並作共線性檢定、自我相關檢定及異質性檢定，若有異質變異數之現象產生，則以White [1980]之方法加以修正。 　　變異成份模型實證結果發現在分析資本結構的時候，以個別公司為分析單位較以假設個別公司同質的整個產業為分析單位為適當。 　　誤差成份模型實證結果發現（一）在全部產業方面：獲利能力、股利支付率與負債比率呈顯著負相關；資產抵押價值、成長機會、規模大小、稅盾利益、金融開放程度與負債比率呈顯著正相關；而營運風險、研究發展費用率、廣告費用率與負債比率雖不顯著，但是為負值。（二）在製造業方面：獲利能力、股利支付率、研究發展費用率與負債比率呈顯著負相關；成長機會、稅盾利益、金融開放程度與負債比率呈顯著正相關；而營運風險、廣告費用率與負債比率皆不顯著，但為負值，而資產抵押價值、規模大小與負債比率亦不顯著，但為正值。（三）在非製造業方面：獲利能力、廣告費用率、股利支付率與負債比率呈顯著負相關；資產抵押價值、規模大小、研究發展費用率、金融開放程度與負債比率呈顯著正相關；而營運風險與負債比率呈不顯著，但為負值，而成長機會、稅盾利益與負債比率呈不顯著，但為正值。

本研究的主要目的是在於了解台灣企業母公司內與大陸子公司的內部網路 關係，在結合代理理論之下，期望能提出一個適合的海外單位管理模式。 經過對相關文獻的歸納之後，本研究認為多國籍企業母子公司的網路關係 會影響代理型態，由於必須管理不同的代理型態，企業會有較適的內部控 制機制。經過歸納整理後，本研究以「網路間母子公司互動程度」及「子 公司相對重要程度」來區分母子以司網路關係，而「互動程度」與「資訊 不對稱」呈反向關聯；「相對重要程度」與「任務風險性」呈正向關聯， 而在其交互影響下區分代理型態。本研究係屬於探索性之研究，採取個案 研究法進行資料的收集與分析。試圖結合網路理論與代理理論而能對多國 籍企業之內部控制機制有更進一步了解。主要的研究對象是在大陸投資經 營的本國企業。研究結果發現，在由資訊不對稱與任務風險性所構成的四 種代理型態中，其所著重的問題都不太相同，在資訊不對稱高且任務風險 性高的代理型態型Ⅰ中面臨的是雙重的壓力，母公司會傾向採用「掌控代 理」型管理方式。此時公司會有較多的正式化機制；適度中等的授權；採 用社會化機制維持員工的忠誠度；選擇行為統治的績效制度，使員工的作 為能符合公司的目標。在資訊不對稱高但任務風險性低的代理型態型Ⅱ中 ，公司對子公司的控制是設法突破分離可能帶來的問題，母公司會傾向採 用「監控代理」型管理方式。因此公司會有較多的正式化機制；對於子公 司給予相當的授權；透過社會化機制的採行與產出的績效制度，以維持員 工的向心力與激勵員工。在資訊不對稱低但任務風險性高的代理型態型Ⅲ 中公司對子公司的控制應是使子公司能夠正確有效的運作以配合公司的策 略，母公司會傾向採用「主理掌控」型管理方式。因此公司會有較多的正 式化機制；較高的集權掌握子公司的運作；並有社會化機制維持子公司幹 部的向心力，能按步就班完成任務；選擇行為的績效制度來評定員工的貢 獻。在資訊不對稱低且任務風險性低的代理型態型Ⅳ中對子公司的控制應 是如何激勵小兵，使其充分發揮效能，母公司會傾向採用「代理自主」型 管理方式。因此公司並不需投入太多的正式機制；並會給予較高的授權； 主要是透過產出統治的績效制度來加以管理。

財務會計準則公報第39 號「股份基礎給付之會計處理準則」於2008 年起正 式實施，強制規定公司所發放之員工分紅必須認列為費用而非視為盈餘之分配，如此一來，公司管理階層是否會因此考量其盈餘報導之美觀性，導致減少發放員工分紅，以及員工分紅費用化後，是否仍會造成公司管理階層採行盈餘管理。此外，本研究以員工分紅費用化作為一重大事件，深入研究經理人對其分紅之行為模式是否會因而受到改變並趨向利益掠奪假說，並探討經理人持股與獎酬分紅兩者間之關係是否因公司治理程度不同以及發放對象為經理人與一般員工時是否有所不同。 實證結果發現，不論有無排除費用化前一年之影響，員工分紅費用化後公司 確實會考量其盈餘之美觀性而傾向減少發放員工紅利，另雖然過去研究指出，於費用化前，資本市場早已認知員工紅利為公司費用，但公司管理階層仍會考慮投資者間仍存在的功能固著現象，針對員工分紅費用化此一事件進行盈餘管理；然而，若以未預期盈餘將樣本公司加以劃分，則在未預期負盈餘之樣本公司中，無法證實其會利用負向之裁決性應計項目進行洗大澡；最後，在分紅費用化之後，經理人持股比例與分紅金額呈正比，顯示經理人在代理問題上從利益收斂趨向利益掠奪公司，並且在公司治理較差的公司中尤為明顯；此外，經理人會同時增加對於經理人與一般員工之分紅金額。 / Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No.39 has beening implemented since year 2008, and it is a mandatory requirement for the company to recognized employee bonus as an expense rather than as a surplus of assignment. Therefore, the management might consider company’s earnings performance and result in paying less employee bonus, as well as adopt the earnings management. In addition, this paper apply the employee bonus expense as a major event to study whether the patterns of managers’ behavior on their dividends will be affected and correspond to entrenchment hypothesis. Also, this paper investigates the relationship between manerger’s ownership and bouns under the different levels of corporate governance as well as different payment objectives (e.g. managers and staff). The empirical results indicate that whether excluding the effect of the previous non-expnsing year or not, the company did consider its earnings performance and tend to pay less employee bonus after expensing employee bonus. Although other studies point out the capital market has already seen employee bonus as an expense, the company will manage earnings due to functional fixation hypothesis. However, it can’t be verified that taking big bath would exist by using negative discretionary accruals. Finally, after expensing employee bonus, managers’ ownership is directly proportional to the amount of bonus and the companies with poor corporate governance is particularly significant. In addition, managers will also increase their own and staff’s dividend amount as well and it implies the angency problem towards entrenchment hypothesis from convergence of interest hypothesis.

為了探討與分析長期以來存在，關於行政院高階政務官、事務官員調動的「普遍說」與「特殊說」爭議，並且探究哪些制度性、組織性因素，對於行政院的高階政務、事務官員更替，會有所影響。本研究嘗試在制度的代理人理論架構，以及相關理論預設之下，以一九八八年第一季到兩千零一十年第四季，時序橫跨李登輝、陳水扁、馬英九等三位總統主政期間，包括行政院本部暨所屬三十二個部會的高階政務、事務官員，作為研究對象，進行實證的分析。 在本文的第一到第四章，我們分別說明了研究動機與背景、進行相關文獻回顧、探討研究理論，以及說明研究問題與模型。而在第五章則是分析、探討，台灣於一九九零年代初期，到一九九零年代中期，因為持續進行憲法增修條文的制訂，進而使得總統在憲法本文，以及憲法增修條文，所構成的憲政制度上，獲得了行政院高階行政官員的人事任免權。而且總統在取得了這個制度上的重要權力之後，行政院高階行政官員的任命、調動，就成為總統掌控行政體系的重要制度性工具，同時更是高階行政官員控制的重要手段。 此外，我們更進一步在第六章，分析了台灣從一九八零年代晚期，到兩千零一十年間，分別在不同階段，先後掌權的李登輝、陳水扁、馬英九等三位總統，對行政院高階行政官員，所採取以高階行政官員任命、調動，作為手段的控制模式，並且探討於第四章所提出的假設一、假設二、假設三，分別獲得實證資料支持的情況。至於第七章則是先透過總體資料的分析，探究假設四到假設十一，能否獲得實證資料的支持，同時更以部會為單位的季度別資料，建構縱橫資料的多元迴歸模型，用以分析哪些因素，對於行政院高階行政官員的更替，是有所影響的。 然而，在相關的實證分析之後，我們可以確切的認為，以往關於行政院高階行政官員控制上，所存在的「普遍說」與「特殊說」的爭論，是以普遍說可以獲得理論上，以及實證資料的支持。而就各種可能對於行政院的高階政務、事務官員更替，會有所影響的制度性、組織性因素而言，總統處在什麼樣的政治時機、面對哪些性質的部會，將會是關鍵。當總統必須更為重視行政體系的穩定，以及施政品質時，必然會選擇壓抑行政官員控制的強度。反之，當總統所面對的是，委託代理人難題疑慮的攀升，且有較大的空間容忍行政體系的不穩定時，那麼可以預期的是，大範圍、數量龐大的高階行政官員清洗，將會接踵而至。 最後，透過相關資料的分析，我們也發現了，在一次、二次政黨輪替，於西元兩千年到兩千零八年，相繼的發生，以及相應出現範圍廣泛、人數繁多，全面性高階行政官員清洗，也使台灣社會，在短期間之內，必須付出可觀的政治交易成本。這樣的情況，也使得台灣民眾的民主信念，是有所動搖，同時這也對於台灣的民主政治發展，是一個不容被忽視的隱憂。 / This reasearch offers an analysis of the long-standing discourse on transferal patterns of government officials in Taiwan, with the focus on the much-debated “general theory” vs. “special theory” approach. We will look at the systemic and organizational factors that influence the appointment, replacement, and transferal of both administrative and executive officers in the higher echelons of government. Specifically, this paper examines the time period from 1988 to 2010, employing a systematic agent framework in combination with related theoretical parameters to explore the concrete situation in the Executive Yuan and its 32 ministries, commissions, and other agencies under three consecutive administrations (i.e. presidents Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and Ma Ying-jeou). In the first four chapters, we will outline background and motive of this paper, give an overview of past research on this topic, scrutinize relevant theoretical approaches, and illustrate research problems and models. In the fifth chapter, we explore and analyze the period from the early to the mid-1990s, a time that saw repeated amendments and additions to the constitution that gave the president increasingly greater powers of appointment and removal of cabinet members. These powers have become one of the most important political tools the president wields, allowing the nation’s leader to exert highly effective and immediate control over the Executive Yuan, in particular over its highest-ranking officials. In the sixth chapter, we will cover the entire period from the late 1980s to the 2010. During this time, three presidents were successively at the helm (Lee from 1988-2000, Chen from 2000-2008, Ma since 2008), and we will scrutinize the different appointment and transferal modes applied during their terms, in particular as regards their use as a tool of political control. In addition, we will further discuss the first three hypotheses initially proposed in chapter four, and show if and how they are borne out by the data and facts assembled in this research. Chapter seven contains a comprehensive analysis of the entire set of data to facilitate our discussion of hypotheses four to eleven as first proposed in chapter four, and to determine whether or not these are supported by the empirical data. At the same time, we look at the quarterly figures from Executive Yuan ministries and commissions to create a multiple regression model of the cross-section data, which will help us to analyze which specific factors influence the substitution and transferal of high-ranking officials. After a thorough analysis of the empirical data, we will find that of the two theories usually applied to the problem of systemic and political control over the higher echelons of the executive, i.e. the general and the special theory mentioned above, the general theory is in fact better supported by the relevant set of data. As for which particular systemic and organizational factors may influence the replacement or substitution of high-ranking administrative and executive cabinet members, the crucial parameters affecting this question are the larger political climate that the president faces, as well as the type and political weight of the concerned ministries and commissions. At times when administrative stability and quality are the paramount considerations, the president will necessarily deemphasize his control over the executive and refrain from making too many personnel changes, while in times of political crisis, or when there is growing concern over the competence and suitability of his entrusted agents (i.e. leading members of the Executive Yuan’s subdivisions) and thus more tolerance for change, one will almost always see large-scale cabinet reshuffles as the president attempts to flush out unfit or unwanted elements. Finally, an analysis of the overall data also shows that the two transitions of power Taiwan has seen in 2000 and 2008 respectively were—as a matter of course—accompanied by extensive personnel changes as numerous high-ranking government officials were removed from office to make place for new faces. These far-reaching waves of “political purging” and complete reorganization of the cabinet within short periods of time have come at a considerable political cost for Taiwan’s society as a whole. This has somewhat shaken the population’s faith in democracy as a political system, and here lies a significant potential concern for the future development of Taiwan’s democracy.