La tesi doctoral Responsabilidad civil y deporte analitza el marc regulatori esportiu i, en particular, les normes aplicables als accidents esportius, així com els criteris d'imputació emprats pels tribunals a l'hora de resoldre aquests supòsits.S'examina en detall la jurisprudència del Tribunal Suprem i la jurisprudència menor espanyola i també, encara que de forma menys exhaustiva, la jurisprudència de les diferents jurisdiccions dels EUA. En ambdós casos es parteix del subjecte responsable de l'accident.Les conclusions bàsiques del treball apunten a què el criteri d'imputació central als accidents esportius és l'assumpció dels riscs inherents a la seva pràctica per part dels esportistes. Així mateix, la diligència exigida als esportistes és menor que la diligència del bon pare de família prevista a l'art. 1104 CC, mentre que a les institucions encarregades d'organitzar o allotjar l'esdeveniment, se'ls exigeix un nivell de diligència superior. / La tesis doctoral Responsabilidad civil y deporte analiza el marco regulatorio deportivo y, en particular, las normas aplicables a los accidentes deportivos, así como los criterios utilizados por los tribunales para resolver estos supuestos.Se examina en detalle la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo y la jurisprudencia menor española y también, aunque en menor medida, la jurisprudencia de las diferentes jurisdicciones de los EEUU. En ambos casos se parte del sujeto responsable del accidente.Las conclusiones básicas del trabajo apuntan a que el criterio de imputación central en los accidentes deportivos es la asunción de los riesgos inherentes a su práctica por parte de los deportistas. Asimismo, la diligencia exigida a los deportistas es menor que la diligencia del buen padre de familia prevista en el art. 1104 CC, mientras que a las instituciones encargadas de organizar o albergar el evento se les exige un nivel de diligencia superior. / The PhD dissertation Responsabilidad civil y deporte explores the regulatory framework of sports and, above all, the rules governing sports accidents, as well as the criteria used by courts in order to solve litigation in this area.It provides a detailed survey of the case-law by the Spanish Supreme Court and other Spanish courts, as well as the decisions delivered by courts from different U.S. jurisdictions. In both discussions, the standpoint used to sort out the different cases concern the subject who is held liable for the accident. The basic conclusions of the research assert that proximate causation in sports accidents resorts to the idea of assumption of the activity's inherent risks by the sportsmen. Sportsman's duty of care is less than the "good father's standard of care" set forth in Section 1104 of the Spanish Civil Code, whereas a higher level of care is demanded to sports events organizers.

En matière de responsabilité civile des professionnels du chiffre et du droit, l’indemnisation est intégralement réalisée par l’assurance privée. Il existe donc, à cet égard, une nette différence entre l’indemnisation dans le domaine de la responsabilité médicale et dans le domaine objet de la recherche entreprise. Pourtant, les enjeux économiques y seraient d’importance supérieure. Une mutualisation optimale est souvent réalisée par les instances professionnelles du chiffre et du droit. Celles-ci ont souscrit des contrats d’assurance collective créés et proposés dès le dix-neuvième siècle par un même assureur, à présent en situation de quasi monopole de fait.De 2001 à 2010, plus de 100 000 sinistres ont été déclarés par des professionnels du chiffre et du droit auprès de cet apériteur dominant. Un échantillonnage approfondi a permis de constater que l’indemnisation n’a pas toute l’efficacité espérée, étant elle-même contrecarrée par l’action du système assurantiel de défense professionnelle fédéré autour de comités de gestion concertée. Ce système aurait ainsi pris le contrôle de l’indemnisation, de sorte à réaliser une forme d’écrasement des préjudices indemnisables, notamment par le jeu des règlements extrajudiciaires prédominants. En même temps, ce système ne serait pas toujours en mesure de protéger pleinement cette incroyable mutualisation qu’il a pourtant réalisée avec succès. En effet, une altération de la responsabilisation des professionnels assurés pourrait être à la fois la cause et la conséquence de cette importante sinistralité pour laquelle les techniques assurantielles d’autodiscipline semblent être tombées en léthargie, au détriment de l’indemnisation. / In the field of the civil liability of law and accounting practitioners, the compensation of victims is entirely carried out by a private insurer. There is, therefore, in this respect, a plain difference between compensation in the field of medical liability and compensation in the area addressed in this research. Nevertheless, the economic stakes would be rather higher. An optimal mutuality is often done by law and accounting professional bodies. They have entered into collective insurance contracts created and proposed as from the nineteenth century by a sole insurer, today in an almost situation of de facto monopoly. From 2001 to 2010, more than 100 000 claims have been declared by law and accounting professions together with the dominant insurer. A detailed sampling has enabled us to notice that the compensation does not have its entire hoped efficiency, itself being thwarted by the insurance system’s action of professional defense federated around concerted management committees. This system has therefore taken control of the compensation process, in a way to conceive a form of crushing of the prejudices entitled to compensation, mainly through amicable settlements. At the same time, the abovementioned system is not always in a position to fully protect this incredible mutuality that it has however carried out with success. The impairment which affects the responsibilization of insured practitioners could be at the same time the cause and the consequence of this important sum of claims for which the self-disciplined methods used by insurance seem to have faded, to the detriment of compensation.

O presente trabalho analisa a teoria da assunção do risco, que se originou no Direito francês com influência do commow Law, aplicável na atividade desportiva à luz dos princípios e valores do Direito Civil-Constitucional. O risco é estudado a partir dos conceitos de liberdade e dignidade, demonstrando que a liberdade não é absoluta, limitada pela dignidade. Nesta acepção, surge o risco, inerente à natureza humana, que é fruto da liberdade, portanto, também, pela dignidade. Na atividade desportiva, o risco é inseparável, o atleta na busca pela superação o assume naturalmente. Assim, a teoria da assunção do risco só se legitima, se presentes o respeito aos valores e princípios constitucionais, principalmente, a dignidade e aceitabilidade social, fatores vitais no estudo dos danos causados na prática desportiva. Por fim, se legítima a aceitação do risco, haverá exclusão do nexo causal. / This study analyzes the theory assumption of risk, which originated in French law with influence of commow law, applicable in the sporting activity base of the principles and values of the civil law-Constitutional. The risk is studied based on the concepts of freedom and dignity, showing that freedom is not absolute, limited dignity. In sports, as the risk is inseparable from the athlete in the pursuit of overcoming the naturally assume.

Submitted by Marcio Emanuel Paixão Santos (marcio.santos@ucsal.br) on 2017-02-18T12:04:59Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertação 17 out 2012.pdf: 43382411 bytes, checksum: 54819efd81f3a0fe4c55508efec49591 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Emília Carvalho Ribeiro (maria.ribeiro@ucsal.br) on 2017-02-22T18:16:53Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao 17 out 2012.pdf: 43382411 bytes, checksum: 54819efd81f3a0fe4c55508efec49591 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-22T18:16:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao 17 out 2012.pdf: 43382411 bytes, checksum: 54819efd81f3a0fe4c55508efec49591 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-03-18 / Com base na linha de pesquisa, analisa-se a contaminação por chumbo em Santo Amaro da Purificação na Bahia, decorrente da poluição causada pela indústria COBRAC – Companhia Brasileira de Chumbo e as conseqüências para a saúde dos trabalhadores e da população residente no entorno desta. Enfoca-se, ainda, o passivo ambiental representado por cerca de quinhentas toneladas de escória de chumbo deixadas para trás, após o fechamento da fábrica, em 1993. Aborda-se a questão da responsabilidade da empresa poluidora no sentido de reparar os danos causados ao meio ambiente, aos trabalhadores e à população, bem como, procurase demonstrar a responsabilidade subsidiária do Estado, para responder pelos prejuízos, em caso de negligência no uso dos meios legais para punir os poluidores forçando-os a repararem os danos causados. Em seguida, demonstra-se as formas de responsabilidade civil e a atuação da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos nos casos em que atuou condenando o estado brasileiro quando este foi negligente ao deixar de punir os infratores dos direitos ínsitos à personalidade humana. Posteriormente se faz, uma análise dos processos ajuizados pelas vítimas e da resposta dada pelo Poder Judiciário e pelo Estado. Em síntese, busca-se mostrar as formas de solução postas pelo direito pátrio e internacional, no sentido de reparar os sofrimentos das vítimas pela contaminação por chumbo. / It intends to analyze cases of victims of lead contamination in Santo Amaro, Bahia, caused by the company pollution COBRAC – Brazilian Company Lead and the effects to the health of workers and living population around the Industry. Also shows the environmental damages caused by five hundred tons of lead slag, left behind after the shutdown of the industry in 1993 and its consequences for the environment and the health of the population. It addresses the responsibility of polluting company to repair the damage caused to the environment, to workers and to the population, and, at the same time, tries to demonstrate the State subsidiary responsibility to respond for those damages, in case of negligence in the use of legal means to punish polluters for the damage, forcing them to repair it. Next, shows the kinds of liability and participation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the cases that condemned the Brazilian State, when it was negligent to punish the infractors of the human personality rights. Finally, analyzes the lawsuits brought by the lead contamination victims and what response was given by the Judiciary and the State. In synthesis, it is intended to show the ways of solutions in national and international law, in the direction to repair the sufferings of the victims of lead contamination

Esta pesquisa se caracteriza, em termos metodológicos, na combinação dos métodos, analítico e dialético. Tem o enfoque voltado à discussão da imputação objetiva penal e sua possível tipificação, para os casos de lesões permanentes e óbitos nos acidentes de trabalho. O objetivo geral foi discutir a doutrina e a legislação pertinentes ao ambiente do trabalho nos campos da área civil e previdenciária, para, a partir da conceituação específica das condutas, verificar a imputação objetiva das responsabilidades pela ocorrência dos eventos danosos no ambiente do trabalho. Neste sentido esta pesquisa apóia-se no princípio do risco, através da teoria do risco permitido e do risco proibido. E se complementa na teoria do aumento do risco para discutir pela imputação objetiva das responsabilidades dos acidentes do trabalho ao administrador e de seus órgãos. / Submitted by Marcelo Teixeira (mvteixeira@ucs.br) on 2014-05-29T16:52:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Silvio Inacio Renner.pdf: 973581 bytes, checksum: 461dc72e40562f59f59cf1f1f8bf575c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-05-29T16:52:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Silvio Inacio Renner.pdf: 973581 bytes, checksum: 461dc72e40562f59f59cf1f1f8bf575c (MD5) / This research is built in a combination with the analytic and dialetic methods. It has the approach directed to a discussion of charging criminal objective and his tipificacion, for the cases of permanent injuries and deaths in work accidents. The general objective was to argue the pertinent doctrine and the legislation to the environment of the work in the fields of the civil and warfare area, therefore, from the specific conceptualization of the behaviors, to verify the objective imputation of the responsibilities for the occurrence of the harmful events in the work environment. In this sense this research is based on the principle of risk through the theory of the allowed risk and the forbidden risk. And it complements the theory of increased risk to objectively discuss the allocation of responsibilities of occupational accidents and employment-related accidents to the administrator.

O presente trabalho analisa a teoria da assunção do risco, que se originou no Direito francês com influência do commow Law, aplicável na atividade desportiva à luz dos princípios e valores do Direito Civil-Constitucional. O risco é estudado a partir dos conceitos de liberdade e dignidade, demonstrando que a liberdade não é absoluta, limitada pela dignidade. Nesta acepção, surge o risco, inerente à natureza humana, que é fruto da liberdade, portanto, também, pela dignidade. Na atividade desportiva, o risco é inseparável, o atleta na busca pela superação o assume naturalmente. Assim, a teoria da assunção do risco só se legitima, se presentes o respeito aos valores e princípios constitucionais, principalmente, a dignidade e aceitabilidade social, fatores vitais no estudo dos danos causados na prática desportiva. Por fim, se legítima a aceitação do risco, haverá exclusão do nexo causal. / This study analyzes the theory assumption of risk, which originated in French law with influence of commow law, applicable in the sporting activity base of the principles and values of the civil law-Constitutional. The risk is studied based on the concepts of freedom and dignity, showing that freedom is not absolute, limited dignity. In sports, as the risk is inseparable from the athlete in the pursuit of overcoming the naturally assume.

Esta pesquisa se caracteriza, em termos metodológicos, na combinação dos métodos, analítico e dialético. Tem o enfoque voltado à discussão da imputação objetiva penal e sua possível tipificação, para os casos de lesões permanentes e óbitos nos acidentes de trabalho. O objetivo geral foi discutir a doutrina e a legislação pertinentes ao ambiente do trabalho nos campos da área civil e previdenciária, para, a partir da conceituação específica das condutas, verificar a imputação objetiva das responsabilidades pela ocorrência dos eventos danosos no ambiente do trabalho. Neste sentido esta pesquisa apóia-se no princípio do risco, através da teoria do risco permitido e do risco proibido. E se complementa na teoria do aumento do risco para discutir pela imputação objetiva das responsabilidades dos acidentes do trabalho ao administrador e de seus órgãos. / This research is built in a combination with the analytic and dialetic methods. It has the approach directed to a discussion of charging criminal objective and his tipificacion, for the cases of permanent injuries and deaths in work accidents. The general objective was to argue the pertinent doctrine and the legislation to the environment of the work in the fields of the civil and warfare area, therefore, from the specific conceptualization of the behaviors, to verify the objective imputation of the responsibilities for the occurrence of the harmful events in the work environment. In this sense this research is based on the principle of risk through the theory of the allowed risk and the forbidden risk. And it complements the theory of increased risk to objectively discuss the allocation of responsibilities of occupational accidents and employment-related accidents to the administrator.

L’UES constitue un outil de recomposition du cadre de l’entreprise. Le recours à l’UES permet en effetde considérer que plusieurs entités juridiquement distinctes constituent, en droit du travail, uneentreprise unique. La reconnaissance de l’UES facilite alors la mise en oeuvre de normes déterminéespar le juge ou le législateur, parmi lesquelles figurent en premier lieu celles relatives à la représentationcollective du personnel. L’évolution de son utilisation a façonné son périmètre en un cadre d’exercicedes droits collectifs des salariés. Toutefois, si le recours à l’UES correspond à la recherche de l’entrepriseen droit du travail, son régime demeure à l’état de « construit jurisprudentiel » élaboré à des fins utiles.Il laisse un sentiment d’inachevé. Les conséquences de la reconnaissance d’une UES ne peuventatteindre les relations individuelles de travail. Les salariés demeurent contractuellement liés à leursemployeurs respectifs. La constatation d’un pouvoir de direction unique entre les entités juridiques nepermet pas considérer l’UES comme étant l’employeur unique de l’ensemble des salariés, ni même queses membres sont autant de coemployeurs. L’absence de personnalité morale reconnue à ce type degroupement représente incontestablement une limite dans la construction d’un régime juridique. Lessolutions applicables dans un groupe d’entreprises peuvent également l’être dans l’UES. Cependant,elles ne représentent que des alternatives limitées à l’attribution de la personnalité morale. Or, dans lecadre de la théorie de la réalité de la personne morale, il apparaît que l’UES pourrait être considéréecomme telle. La reconnaissance de la personnalité morale aurait pour effet de rendre solidairementresponsables ses membres à l’égard de l’emploi des salariés qui contribuent au déploiement de l’activitééconomique dans ce périmètre. / UES constitutes a tool used to recompose the framework of the company. UES permits to consider thatseveral legally distinct entities constitute, in fact, a unique company. The recognition of an UESfacilitates the application of norms determined by the judge or the legislator, and especially normsrelated to collective representation. The evolution of its use has shaped its perimeter in a framework forthe exercise of the employees’ collective rights. However, if the UES corresponds in the search of thecompany in labor law, its regime stays at the state of "built case law" developed for useful purposes. Itleaves a feeling of unfinished. The consequences of the UES recognition cannot reach the individualworking relations. The employees remain contractually bound to their respective employers. Theobservation of a unique direction power between the legal entities doesn't permit to consider UES asbeing the unique employer of the set of the employees, nor even that its members are as much coemployers.The absence of moral personality of this type of grouping represents incontestably a limit inthe construction of its legal regime. The applicable solutions in a group of companies can also beapplicable in the UES. However, they only represent alternatives limited to the assignment of the moralpersonality. However, in the setting of the theory of the reality of the moral person, it appears that UEScould be considered like such. The recognition of the moral personality would have the effect of makingjointly responsible its members towards the employment of the employees who contribute to thedeployment of the economic activity in this perimeter.

ALes instances civile et pénale parallèles suscitent des risques de contrariétés que le droit positif prévient traditionnellement par l'utilisation de la règle de l'autorité du pénal sur le civil et du sursis à statuer de l'article 4 du Code de procédure pénale. Or ce double mécanisme de la primauté du pénal sur le civil est tout à fait singulier. Il assure en effet une cohérence entre les motifs des décisions concernées, dont le droit positif ne se soucie guère au sein des autres contentieux. Il est de plus unilatéral, puisqu'il ne joue qu'au bénéfice des décisions pénales. Justifié initialement par l'importance et les garanties de vérité des décisions pénales, il s'avère cependant, à l'analyse, largement discutable. Quant à ses fondements d'abord, ce mécanisme assure certes une certaine cohérence des choses jugées, mais maintient une apparence de vérité plus qu'il ne la garantit. Or précisément, la cohérence entre motifs de jugements distincts n'est légitime qu'autant qu'elle sert l'objectif de vérité. Quant à son régime, ensuite, l'autorité du pénal sur le civil entrave la liberté du juge civil et viole, par son caractère absolu, le principe du contradictoire, tandis qu'une application systématique du sursis à statuer est source de lenteur des procédures et contrevient à l'objectif de célérité. Afin de pallier ces inconvénients, le législateur et la jurisprudence se sont d'abord efforcés de restreindre les effets les plus néfastes de ce principe, en dissociant les concepts civils et répressifs, puis en le cantonnant étroitement. Néanmoins, l'objectif de célérité l'a finalement emporté, et le législateur, par la loi du 5 mars 2007, n'a maintenu le caractère obligatoire du sursis à statuer de l'article 4 qu'à l'égard de l'action civile en réparation du dommage né de l'infraction. Le nouveau dispositif consacre désormais le principe d'une indépendance des procédures parallèles, au risque de l'incohérence, même si pour l'heure les juridictions du fond tiennent compte du risque de contrariété et maintiennent la règle de l'autorité du pénal sur le civil. Il conviendrait néanmoins de revenir sur cette dernière règle, et d'attribuer aux énonciations qui constituent le soutien nécessaire de la décision pénale, la valeur d'une présomption réfragable de vérité. Il serait ainsi tenu compte des spécificités des décisions pénales, de même que seraient préservées les exigences, parfois antagonistes, d'autonomie des juridictions, de cohérence des choses jugées, et de recherche de vérité. / AWhen civil and penal proceedings occur in parallel, there is a risk of conflicting judgments, which positive law traditionally precludes by making penal proceedings paramount and by deferring adjudication on article 4 of the Criminal Code. This double mechanism, which ensures supremacy of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings, is quite singular. Indeed, it guarantees that the justifications for the decisions made are coherent. In other contentious matters, positive law pays little attention to such concerns. Moreover, it is unilateral, since it exclusively favours criminal law decisions. Though this supremacy was initially justified by the notion that criminal law decisions guaranteed truth, analysis has shown that this is largely debatable. First of all, with regard to the foundations themselves, this mechanism of course ensures a certain coherence of the matters judged, but maintains an appearance of truth rather than a guarantee of truth. Yet, precisely, the coherence of the justifications for distinct judgments is only legitimate insofar as it seeks to determine the truth. Then with regard to the system itself, the supremacy of criminal over civil proceedings interferes with the freedom of the civil judge, and violates by its absolute nature, the adversarial principle, while the systematic deferral of adjudication slows down procedures and undermines the objective of celerity. In order to remedy these drawbacks, legislators and jurisprudence have made an effort to limit the most damaging effects of this principle, by dissociating civil from repressive concepts, then by compartmentalising each within strict limits. Nevertheless, the objective of celerity finally won the day and legislators, through the law of 5th March 2007, retained the compulsory nature of the deferral of adjudication of article 4, but only with regard to civil action for damages resulting from the offence. The new law now establishes the principle of independence of parallel proceedings, even though it carries a risk of conflicting results. For the time being, however, the jurisdictions take into account the risk of conflicting results and have maintained the supremacy of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings. It is nonetheless desirable to revise the recent law, and to incorporate in the reasons which are necessary support for the criminal decision, the value of a refragable presumption of truth. The specific nature of decisions in criminal proceedings would thus be taken into account, and the sometimes antagonistic requirement of autonomy of the different jurisdictions, the coherence of the matters being judged, and the search for truth would thus be preserved.

La responsabilité civile est traditionnellement attachée à la réparation des préjudices individuels. Pour sa part, le droit pénal est présenté comme la branche du droit qui assure la protection de l’intérêt général par la sanction de comportements attentatoires à un socle commun de valeurs sociales. Cette distinction de finalités justifie une hiérarchie des disciplines qui se traduit par une primauté accordée au droit pénal. Pourtant, on se propose de démontrer que le législateur, au même titre que le juge d’ailleurs, semble s’engager dans une direction contestable en considérant qu’il y a une différence de degré entre droit civil et droit pénal là où existe en réalité une différence de nature. De ce postulat inexact naît une confusion généralisée qui conduit chaque discipline à s’approprier les considérations de l’autre : le droit civil devient punitif tandis que, dans le même temps, le droit pénal accorde une place sans cesse accrue à la réparation du préjudice. Ce mouvement nous semble porteur d’un double danger : en premier lieu, le droit pénal délaisse sa fonction protectrice de l’intérêt général lorsqu’il s’attache à réparer des préjudices purement individuels ; en second lieu, le droit civil punitif, délié des garanties fondamentales dont est assortie la matière répressive, peut se révéler être une menace pour les libertés individuelles. Ce mouvement croisé des deux disciplines met en péril la cohérence de leurs régimes respectifs : leurs influences réciproques doivent être révélées afin de mieux cerner les faiblesses du droit de la responsabilité et de proposer des remèdes en vue d’assurer un agencement cohérent et complémentaire des responsabilités civile et pénale. / Studying two separate disciplines, such as Civil and Criminal liability, it would not be expected to find any interactions between them: Civil Law repairs the damage caused to private interests; while Criminal Law punishes, thereby ensuring public interests. These differences in purpose justify a hierarchy of disciplines resulting in the supremacy of Criminal Law over Civil Law. However, it will be shown that the legislature and the judge are going in the wrong direction by considering that there is a difference of degree between Civil Law and Criminal Law where there is actually a difference in nature. This incorrect assumption has given rise to a widespread confusion where each discipline takes ownership of the considerations of the other: Civil Law becomes punitive, while, at the same time, Criminal Law becomes increasingly compensatory. The present work aims to denounce a double danger: first, Criminal Law abandons its protective function of public interests when it attempts to repair purely individual damages; second, a punitive Civil Law, detached from the fundamental safeguards that are attached to criminal matters, may prove to be a threat to individual freedoms. This cross-movement between the two disciplines jeopardizes the consistency of their respective systems: reciprocal influences must be revealed in order to better understand the weaknesses of legal liability and to propose remedies that ensure a consistent and complementary arrangement of legal rules.