Reprendre contact avec les réalités de l’âme, rouvrir la source où l’être rejaillit éternellement : tel est l’idéal occulte, inavouable, d’où procède la poétique d’Hubert Aquin. Depuis sa jeunesse, Aquin s’emploie clandestinement à défaire les mailles de la conscience et à rebrousser chemin vers les arrière-plans ténébreux du Moi, vers le Plérôme de la vie nue. Il manœuvre pour se mettre au service de l’intentionnalité impersonnelle inscrite au plus profond de sa psyché, pour devenir l’instrument du vouloir aveugle « qui opère en lui comme une force d’inertie ». Son œuvre ne s’accomplit pas dans le texte, mais à rebours du texte, voire à rebours du langage ; elle se déploie sur le terrain d’une confrontation enivrée avec le Négatif — avec la Parole sacrée issue de l’abîme. En d’autres termes, elle prend la forme d’une Gnose, c’est-à-dire d’un exercice de dé-subjectivation, de destruction de soi, consistant à réaliser la connaissance participative de l’empreinte imaginale scellée derrière les barreaux de la finitude. Essentiellement consacrée à l’analyse de la dimension gnostique de l’œuvre d’Hubert Aquin, cette thèse vise à montrer que la connaissance du hiéroglyphe mystérieux gravé au fond de l’âme n’est pas une sinécure. Il s’agit plutôt d’un opus contra naturam qui comporte bien des risques (en tout premier lieu celui d’une inflation psychique). Pourtant, ce travail est aussi, aux yeux de l’auteur, le seul véritablement digne d’être accompli, celui qui donne à l’homme le moyen de se soustraire à l’engloutissement de la mort et la possibilité de renaître. Comme l’écrit Aquin dans un texte de jeunesse, l’ouverture inconditionnelle au Négatif (la destruction de soi) est « une façon privilégiée d’expérimenter la vie et un préalable à toute entreprise artistique » ; elle correspond à « un mode supérieur de connaissance », à un savoir « impersonnel » qui offre immédiatement le salut. / To reestablish contact with the realities of the soul, to reopen the source from which Being eternally resurges: such is the occult and unspeakable ideal from which Hubert Aquin’s poetics proceeds. From his youth onwards, Aquin secretly seeks to unravel the mesh of consciousness, in order to retrace the path leading back towards the dark nether regions of the Self, towards the Pleroma of the naked life. Thus he operates exclusively in the service of the impersonal intentionality inscribed in the depths of his psyche, as the instrument of the blind will that acts inside of him “like an inertial force”. His work does not fulfill itself in the text, but rather runs counter to the text, even counter to language itself; it deploys as an exhilarating confrontation with the Negative, with the sacred Word issuing from the abyss. In other words, Aquin’s work takes the form of a Gnosis: an exercise in de-subjectivization and self-destruction that consists in attaining participative knowledge of the imaginal seal imprinted behind the bars of finitude. This thesis, principally devoted to an analysis of the gnostic dimension of Hubert Aquin’s œuvre, aims to show that to decipher the mysterious hieroglyph engraved in the depths of the soul is no simple task: it is rather an opus contra naturam, involving great dangers (of which the first is the risk of psychic inflation); yet, to the author’s eyes, only this task is really necessary and truly worthy of being undertaken, for only by this means can the human being escape from engulfment in death – by being reborn. As Aquin writes in an early work, to open oneself unconditionally to the Negative (i.e., self-destruction) is “a special way of experiencing life and a prerequisite to any artistic enterprise”; it is equivalent to “a superior mode of knowledge” of an “impersonal” kind, promising immediate salvation.

Par-delà la dispersion thématique et aphoristique de l’œuvre du philosophe colombien Nicolás Gómez Dávila (1913-1994), un spectre hante sa pensée : le spectre du gnosticisme. Quel lien ce courant religieux ou para religieux né au sein de l’Empire romain entre le Ier et le IIIe siècle de notre ère, peut-il avoir avec notre monde moderne ? Quel rapport entretien ce courant avec la philosophie ? En effet, la connaissance philosophique est totalement différente de la « connaissance » gnostique (gnosis). Alors que la philosophie, d’une part, se fonde sur une recherche de la vérité à partir d’un questionnement sur la réalité, la gnose est étroitement liée à une expérience de révélation, de sorte que la réception de la vérité, par illumination intérieure, remplace la théorie et l’argument rationnel. D’autre part, elle a pour objet la voie du salut, sans enseignement théorique, par transformation ou destruction de la réalité. On ne peut donc que s’interroger sur les coïncidences entre la gnose ancienne et ce que le philosophe austro-américain Éric Voegelin (1901-1985) a nommé « la modernité sans frein ». Ne pourrait-on pas voir dans les idéologies modernes (communisme, socialisme, nationalisme, libéralisme, etc.) à l’instar d’Éric Voegelin, des « religions politiques » ou, comme il le développera ensuite dans son œuvre une résurgence et excroissance du gnosticisme cherchant ici-bas le salut par la divinisation de l’homme ? C’est la thèse de Gómez Dávila qui radicalise celle de Voegelin en faisant de la gnose l’origine de la religion démocratique et de ses dérivations dans l’ordre théologico-politique (athéisme, progressisme, relativisme, étatisme et totalitarisme) et anthropologico-juridique (égalitarisme, jusnaturalisme et individualisme). / Beyond dispersion set of themes and aphoristic of the work of the Colombian philosopher Nicolás Gómez Dávila (1913-1994), a spectrum haunts his thought: the spectrum of the Gnosticism. Which link this current religious or para religious born within the Roman Empire between 1st and the 3rd century of our era, can it have with our modern world? Which maintenance report this current with philosophy? Indeed, philosophical knowledge is completely different from gnostic “knowledge” (gnosis). Whereas philosophy, on the one hand, is based on a research of the truth starting from a questioning on reality, the gnosis is closely related to an experiment of revelation, so that the reception of the truth, by interior illumination, replaces the theory and the rational argument. In addition, it has as an aim the way of the salvation, without theoretical teaching, by transformation or destruction of reality. One can thus only wonder about coincidences between the old gnosis and what the Austria-american philosopher Éric Voegelin (1901-1985) named “modernity without restraint”. Couldn’t one see in the modern ideologies (communism, socialism, nationalism, liberalism, etc.) following the example of Éric Voegelin, “political religions” or, as it will then develop it in his work a resurgence and growth of Gnosticism seeking here below salvation by the deification of the man? It is the thesis of Gómez Dávila which radicalizes that of Voegelin by making gnosis the origin of the democratic religion and its derivations in the theologico-polical (atheism, progressism, relativism, statism and totalitarianism) and anthropologico-legal order (egalitarianism, jusnaturalism and individualism).

Quelle qualification morale peut-on attribuer aux criminels nazis ? Sont-ils des fous ? Peut-on leur imputer sans réserve la responsabilité de leurs actes ? Si on ne peut rendre le mal totalitaire imputable comme le mal gnostique, l’assimilation du totalitarisme à une récidive gnostique par Eric Voegelin invite à réfléchir à nouveaux frais à la problématique de la responsabilité des criminels de masse. D’une part, le "situationnisme", qui implique que c’est la situation qui transforme des individus en meurtriers de masse et le "dispositionnisme" qui désigne l’importance que peuvent revêtir les dispositions individuelles chez les criminels de masse, et d’autre part l’illusion et l’idéologie caractérisées, l’une et l’autre par la mise à l’écart de la réalité, rendent complexe la question de l’imputation des criminels génocidaires. Si ces derniers ne peuvent être disculpés, la complexité de la question de leur imputation est indéniable. Cette complexité est peut-être une invite à reconsidérer la cause sous-jacente à ce type de mal : le dualisme gnostique du bien et du mal dont le propre est de vouloir en finir avec le mal. Or la rage d’en finir avec le mal conduit souvent à la barbarie. / What moral qualification can be attributed to Nazi criminals? Are they crazy? Can we blame them unreservedly for their actions? If we can not make totalitarian evil imputable like the gnostic evil, the assimilation of totalitarianism to a Gnostic recidivism by Eric Voegelin invites us to think freshly about the problem of the responsibility of mass criminals. On the one hand, "situationism", which implies that it is the situation that transforms individuals into mass murderers and "dispositionalism" that designates the importance that individual dispositions can have for mass criminals, and On the other hand, the illusion and the ideology characterized, both by the exclusion of reality, make the question of the imputation of genocidal criminals complex. If the latter can not be exculpated, the complexity of the question of their imputation is undeniable. This complexity is perhaps an invitation to reconsider the underlying cause of this type of evil: the gnostic dualism of good and evil, whose own is to want to put an end to evil. But the rage to end evil leads often to barbarism.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcos Fleury de Oliveira.pdf: 1739750 bytes, checksum: bdede1f9fae46b5453477a6e8f542e27 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-30 / The main objective of this study is to deepen the religious thought of C. G. Jung as a possible expansion of knowledge in the field of Religious Science. Within the subdiscipline of Psychology of Religion, Jung can be considered as one of its main representatives and its most significant theoretical contributions covered a wide field of dialogue with philosophy, Christian theology, mythology and history of religions. However, his work needs further studies so that we can overcome a range of misunderstandings, besides interdisciplinary, theoretical and epistemological disputes. To achieve this end, we propose here to investigate the distinct layers of meaning of religious experience - the object of this work - in order to reflect the uniqueness and centrality of this notion in his theory and his worldview. Our hypothesis is that there is in Jungian thought a significant theoretical development from the time that Jung deepens the study of religions, which would allow us to recognize a new level in reference to what is traditionally called a religious experience, particularly within the Christian tradition. Jung seeks to move away from the atheistic reductionism of Freud, and also from the opposite position of the "omnipotence" and "omniscience" of theological discourse, trying to create a reserved niche of "knowledge" (gnosis / science) about the religious experience. In other words, Jung proposes and seeks to demonstrate that one could speak of the experience of God, validly and efficiently, without the corsets of metaphysics and theology. In support to our research we resorted on the canonical work of Jung, the work of commentators and letter-writing materials available / O objetivo principal deste trabalho é o aprofundamento do pensamento religioso de Carl Gustav Jung como possibilidade de ampliação do conhecimento no campo das Ciências da Religião. Dentro da subdisciplina da Psicologia da Religião, Jung pode ser considerado como um de seus mais expressivos representantes e seus aportes teóricos cobriram um amplo campo de diálogo com a filosofia, a teologia cristã, a mitologia e a história das religiões. Contudo, sua obra ainda precisa ser mais estudada a fim de que possamos superar uma gama de mal-entendidos, controvérsias interdisciplinares, teóricas e epistemológicas. Para tanto, propomo-nos, aqui, a pesquisar em sua obra os sentidos da experiência religiosa objeto deste trabalho de modo a tentar refletir a especificidade e a centralidade dessa noção dentro de sua teoria e de sua visão de mundo. Nossa hipótese é de que há no pensamento junguiano um significativo desenvolvimento teórico a partir do momento que Jung aprofundou-se no estudo das religiões, o qual nos permitiria reconhecer um novo patamar em referência ao que tradicionalmente se chamou de experiência religiosa , sobretudo no âmbito da tradição cristã. Jung procurou afastar-se do reducionismo ateísta de Freud, afastando-se, também, da posição contrária da onipotência e onisciência do discurso teológico, tentando, assim, criar um nicho reservado de saber (gnose / ciência) acerca da experiência religiosa. Em outras palavras, Jung propôs e procurou demonstrar que seria possível falar da experiência de Deus, de forma válida e eficiente, sem os espartilhos da metafísica e da teologia. Para fundamentar nossa pesquisa recorremos à obra canônica de Jung, ao trabalho de comentadores e ao material epistolar disponível

Le Druzisme représente un courant philosophico-religieux qui peut être considéré comme une doctrine d'apparence religieuse, de pensée philosophique et systématique, de référence gnostique dans l'histoire de l'Islam. Ses adeptes vivent en communauté hermétique, ses sages (šeiẖs) se retirent dans des réclusions (ẖalwāt) en s'isolant comme des mystiques, ils se livrent à une retraite spirituelle sans pratique religieuse, ils ne se réfèrent à aucune tradition précédente des religions monothéistes, de par leurs écrits ou leurs pratiques. Ils conservent une tradition et une éthique avec un code de conduite et des interdits culinaires. En revanche, le Druzisme est né au sein de l'Isma`ilisme, il établit un lien intellectuel et spirituel avec la philosophie antique et avec le néoplatonisme tout en assimilant des éléments des religions d'orient avec des éléments grecs helléniques. Peut-on alors parler d'une secte de l'Islam, du moment où il n'y a aucun lien avec ce dernier sinon le milieu historique dans lequel celle-ci est vu le jour? Peut-on parler de religion, quand il n'y a aucune religiosité ou pratique religieuse exprimée ou vécue? S'agit-il de dire que l'on est face à une théosophie alors que le lien entre les membres de la communauté n'est pas fondé sur la philosophie et que le commun des Druzes n'est pas philosophe? Comment qualifier ce phénomène d'une communauté dont le lien est une foi qui n'est pas exprimée religieusement, et une doctrine dont le contenu n'est pas révélé, à laquelle s'attachent des membres qui ne le connaissent qu'une fois initiés? En somme, qui sont les Druzes et qu'est-ce que le Druzisme? Existe-t-il un lien entre cette doctrine et la gnose? / Druzism is a philosophico-religious movement which may be considered primarily as a doctrine but with a religious appearance, a systematic and philosophical thinking, with some reference to Gnosticism in the history of Islam. Its adherents live in a community of hermits, its wisemen (šeiẖs) retire in seclusion (ẖalwāt) by isolating themselves like mystics, as they deliver themselves to living in a spiritual retreat, without any religious practice ; they refer to no previous religious traditions even among the monotheistic ones, whether in reference to their sacred writings or religious practice. The Druze adheres to a tradition and a code of ethics and behaviour, as well as to culinary prohibitions. Druzism itself however, was born in the heart of Ismailism, while establishing an intellectual and a spiritual link with both ancient philosophies and neoplatonism, all the while assimilating various element of mid and far-eastern religions, mixed with Greek and Hellenistic ideas. Can we therefore speak of the Druze as if forming a sect of Islam? Can we even speak of a religion where in fact there is no trace of religiosity or religious practice either expressed or lived? Is it possible that we are facing theosophy where the link between the members of the community is certainly not founded on a philosophy? How can one qualify this phenomenon of a community where the main tenet is that of a faith which is not expressed in a religious manner, and a held doctrine the contents of which are not revealed, to which its members adhere, not knowing it fully unless once initiated? In summary, who are the Druzes, and what is Druzism? Is there a link between its doctrine and that of Gnosticism?

Nous menons une analyse des forces qui structurent l'œuvre littéraire d'Anatole France sous le jour original d'un concept-clé, le Désir. Celui-ci, central, renégocie catégoriquement le sens et l'architecture des textes franciens : cette instance encore peu étudiée organise toute la pensée de l'auteur, rendant une nouvelle cohérence à son œuvre. Le Désir détermine par l'écriture une morale, une herméneutique et une interprétation du monde particulières, qui engendrent une philosophie pressentant l'inconscient freudien et la phénoménologie de Husserl. La contribution francienne à l'histoire littéraire du XXème siècle demeure donc fondamentale. Par une poétique inédite, malgré son apparent classicisme, et structurée par les finalités existentielles, sociopolitiques et éthiques issues du Désir, cette philosophie du monde est directement issue d'une écriture qui replace l'homme au centre de l'univers par la phénoménologie. L'entropie du temps, l'immensité de l'espace, la mort ainsi que tous les dogmes inébranlables et terrorisants, entraînent une révolte ontologique de notre auteur. Anatole France, par le Désir de connaître le sens de l'existence humaine au-delà des voiles mensongers du monde, va recréer un univers signifiant et analysable par le mythe. Dialectiquement, cet univers dépassera les désespoirs issus de l'évolution darwinienne et donnera naissance à une philosophie du monde. Par un scepticisme lucide issu du Désir, et non l'inverse comme il est traditionnellement admis, Anatole France nous emmène au cœur du monde par l'écriture d'un logos original et rendant à l'homme son honneur d'exister.

Ce qui arrive à l’homme du XXIe siècle en prison est en partie analogue à ce qui arrive àl’homme tout court. Nous avons perdu l’innocence (seuls les enfants ne l’ont pas encore perdue), ettentons de la récupérer en nous revendiquant victimes. Présumés coupables, isolés, observés, voilà ceque nous sommes devenus. L’homo carceralus est une sorte de type qui hante notre cultureoccidentale. Fruit du nihilisme et de la gnose. C’est pourquoi il est pertinent de chercher à penser sonépreuve, non de l’extérieur, mais comme ce qui peut nous arriver à chacun, et d’en repérer ce quil’empoisonne ou ce qui la libère. Car la gnose, qui est peut-être sophisme ou nihilisme, est menteuselorsqu’elle fait croire que l’on sort de l’épreuve par “en haut”, par la fuite hors des conditions de viehumaines, dans le scientisme naturaliste, le savoir statistique ou la technique. La résignation et la fuiteen avant ont le même visage, celui de la fatalité : ni l’une et ni l’autre n’aiment ce monde, ni ce temps.Or, ce n’est pas ailleurs que du sens peut advenir. Si la prison est un pharmakon, remède etpoison, c’est qu’elle reste une institution humaine. La grandeur de l’homme est d’être puissance descontraires, capacité de surmonter tout déterminisme, capacité de ne pas se résigner à la fatalité, aucoeur même de sa misère. Encore faut-il ne pas être abandonné seul dans l’épreuve, tant il est vrai quec’est l’autre, et particulièrement l’autre ébranlé, grâce à qui la traversée est possible, par “en bas”. Lesoin en prison s’enracine dans cette « solidarité des ébranlés ». Pour naviguer entre les différentsdispositifs pénitentiaires et sanitaires qui visent à contrôler et à prévoir le comportement des captifs, lemédecin doit faire preuve de mêtis, cette intelligence des interstices, au service de son patient. Et enmême temps, il doit garder de façon catégorique le secret médical, au nom de ce que l’homme restetoujours opaque à toutes les sciences et les techniques, plus grand que lui-même, en sa fragilité. Cesavoir « de nuit » n’est autre que le savoir socratique : « je sais que je ne sais pas ». / That which is happening to XXIst century man in prison is, in part, similar to what ishappening to all of us. Our innocence lost, (innocence is retained only by the child), we try to regain itby claiming to be the victim. We are presumed guilty, isolated, observed. Homo carceralus hauntsour Western culture; fruit of nihilism and gnosis. It is the reason we should reflect on his ordeal, notfrom the outside, but as something that could happen to each and every one of us, and in which todiscover where the poison lies and what the remedy could be. For gnosis, (either sophism ornihilism), is false when we are led to believe that we exit an ordeal by escaping our human conditionin the ‘upward’ direction of the natural sciences, statistical knowledge or technique. Resignation andheadlong pursuit share a characteristic, that of a predestined tendency towards disaster. Neither theone nor the other sits comfortably in this world or our times.But meaning does not have to come from elsewhere. If prison is pharmakon, both remedy andpoison, it is because it is a human institution. Man’s greatness is his conflicting authority : having thecapacity to overcome determinism, the ability not to resign himself to his fate, even at his lowestpoint. But it is imperative not to be left alone through this ordeal, for it is true that it is the other,particularly the ‘weakened other’, thanks to whom the crossing is possible from ‘below’. Care inprison is rooted in this ‘solidarity of the weak’. To navigate the different penitentiary and healthsystems, which seek to control and foresee the captives’ behaviour, the medical doctor must exertmêtis, become complicit with the patient in order to serve the patient. And at the same timecategorical medical confidentiality must be maintained, in the name of which the patient in his or herfragility, remains invisible to all sciences and techniques which are yet greater than he or she is. This‘secret’ knowledge is none other than Socratic knowledge: ‘I know that I do not know’.

Sob o signo do aprofundamento e da intensificação da consciência de si, o ato filosófico de Pierre Thévenaz se define como uma filosofia radicalizante. E porque não abre mão e nem elide o lócus de resposta do qual seu ato filosófico toma sua consistência própria que é o da tradição protestante pode receber o complemento (protestante). Assim, uma filosofia radicalizante (protestante). Isso porque a secularização da filosofia, a que seu método de radicalização leva de modo conseqüente, já pressupõe a assunção da própria contingência que é consciência de condição. Consciência de que se fala de algum lugar; consciência de que o pensamento se encontra previamente engajado em um específico hic et nunc que, por conta da condição, recebe sua densidade própria e não pode mais ser cotado no trato das formas abstratas do tempo e do espaço. O que já é um dos índices da superação thévenaziana da redução da filosofia à epistemologia, tal como se tem estabelecido após Kant. Nesse sentido, a abertura plena à contingência pela radicalização forçará a mudança do problema do sentido, ligado pela fenomenologia à consciência intencional, para o problema da hermenêutica histórica. Quer dizer, para o da compreensão dos eventos significativos que têm poder de reorganizar em torno de si o movimento da história. Com a epoché do sentido, lançada sobre o núcleo mesmo do que a fenomenologia husserliana descobrira como a atividade própria da consciência intencional, assim, um passo decisivo no movimento de radicalização thévenaziana, só restará à razão filosófica (ao ser humano) tomar o sentido como tarefa por se fazer, inacabada e não garantida. Esse passo negativo, todavia, não recebe, em Pierre Thévenaz, o tom de palavra final, de última palavra. Pois se assim fosse, serviria ainda como álibi para a instauração de uma nova instalação. Desta vez tão segura no negativo quanto o era na ingenuidade otimística do sentido garantido. O qual permanecia na consciência intencional como ainda um último bastião de força e de atração, exercido sobre a consciência ingênua da atitude natural, sem ser superado. Isso porque agora a razão, já tendo alcançado um nível profundo de consciência de sua condição humana, de sua contingência, de sua fraqueza e equívoco sempre possíveis, para continuar sua atividade crítica costumeira, sua vocação mesma, deverá aprender a tirar força de sua fraqueza. A razão terá de se desdivinizar; de parar de tentar falar por Deus, ou pelos olhos de Deus; de parar de postular reduplicações de si como razão juiz ou razão instância não tocada pela crítica. Ela deverá assumir-se como estando em crise: assumir-se como humana, e humana só. Ora, esta possibilidade inusitada que se abre à própria razão pela radicalização, como vemos, não surge do nada. Ela representa, no inverso mesmo, outra possibilidade que à que Hegel estabeleceu na linha do horizonte e cuja atração exercida no interior do pensamento contemporâneo é bem mais sutil e presente do que parece. Por isso, será preciso desvencilhar a metafísica de certos comprometimentos históricos que a têm desacreditado, para se chegar ao seu mais autêntico núcleo afim à radicalização. Pelo que o signo da defesa da especificidade e da singularidade contra as categorias gerais continentes; o signo da defesa das irredutibilidades aos reducionismos, espiritualistas ou materialistas, será o que caracteriza, para Thévenaz, o movimento mais interno à metafísica ocidental. Este signo é o do espaço ontológico que a metafísica, descoberta por Platão, esclarece a necessidade de que seja mantido entre as grandezas em relação. Todavia, para ativar o que esta descoberta, neutralizada sob a lógica auto contida de uma razão autista, poderia auferir em termos de aprofundamento da consciência de condição, será necessário um apoio externo à razão. E este ela o recebe da experiência choque de imputação de loucura sobre ela que a fé cristã primitiva lançou. E não sendo possível à razão avaliar a justeza de tal imputação, pois não se trata de mais um argumento lógico com o qual ela jogar o seu jogo, a razão é levada a verificar por si mesma a pertinência de tal possibilidade. E assim, nessa nova disposição, um campo insuspeito e infinito, sobre o qual ela pode retomar sua atividade crítica, inesperadamente se abre. Só que agora esta atividade já não poderá mais ser exercida sob o selo de sua inconsciência e do seu autismo tradicional, mas sob o novo índice de uma consciência de condição aprofundada que muda o registro do cumprimento de sua vocação para o de uma atividade intelectual responsável no aqui em baixo, neste mundo / The philosophical act ofPierre Thévenaz, that takes the sign of thedeepening and intensification of self-consciousness, it is here defined as a radicalizing philosophy. Because he doesnt abandon and doesnt hides the locus of his answer,of which philosophical act takes its consistence whereas it is the protestant tradition his philosophical act can to receive the following complement: protestant. So, a (protestant) radicalizing philosophy. It is because a secularization of philosophy, for which his method of radicalization leads consequently, alreadypresupposes the accepting of selfcontingence that is consciousness of condition. Consciousness of speakingfrom somewhere; consciousness of the thought has finding prior engaged in a specific hic etnunc. Because of condition receives its characteristic density and so it cant be quoted in the rank of abstract forms of time and space. It is one of the evidences of thévenazian overcoming of reduction of philosophy to the epistemology, as it has been fixed after Kant. This way, the full overture to the contingence by radicalization will compel the change of the problem of sense, connected by phenomenology to the intentional consciousness, to the problem of historical hermeneutic. I mean, to the understanding of meaningful events that have capacity to reorganize around themselfs the movement of the history. Theepoché of sense putson kernel of husserlian phenomenology, it founded as the specific activity of intentional consciousness, so a conclusive step in the motion of thévenazian radicalization, only rest to philosophical raison (namely, the human being) to take a sense as a task to be make unconcluded and no guaranteed. This negative step, however, no receive in Pierre Thévenaz the hue of last word. So this way serve or it would be serve still as an alibi for the setting of a new ideological fixed. This time, such certain on the negative as it were on optimistic naivety of secure sense. This remained in the intentional consciousness as still the last bastion of power and attraction, exerted on the naïve consciousness of natural attitude, that is, without overcoming.This is because now the raison had already reached the deep level of consciousness of its human condition, (its contingence), of its weakness and misunderstanding always possible. Then, for it to continue its usual criticism activity, its calling, it must to learn to take advantage from its weakness. The reason must be undivinize by itself; to stop to try speaks instead eye God; or by Gods eyes. It must be to stop to claim self-reduplications as judge or instance raison never touched by criticism. It must looks like being in the crisis condition; to admit yourself as human, only human. However, this unused possibility that appers the own reason, through radicalization, as we can see, it doesnt emerge from nothing. This typify, in the exact converse, another possibility that Hegel sets up on horizon line whose appeal, inner of the contemporary thought, is more subtle and present than it seems. So, it would be necessary to separate the metaphysic from certain historical commitments that made its discredit, to reach to its more authentic pith related with the radicalization. So, the sign of defense of specificity and singularity against the continent general categories; the sign of defense of no-reductive quality to the reduction, spiritualistic reductions or materialistic reductions, will be the main character, for Pierre Thévenaz, the more internal movement of occidental metaphysic. This sign is from ontological space, that the metaphysic founded by Plato clarifies the need to keep on among the magnitudes in relation. However, to start activing this discovery, which has been neutralized about the self-contained of an autistic reason, it might obtain in terms of deepening of consciousness of condition, will be necessary an external support to the reason. And the reason receives it from shock-experience of imputation of madness on the reason that ancient Christian faith launched. But, it not been possible for the reason to evaluate the right of that imputation, because it wasnt the most logical argument for the reason to play its game. So, the reason is conducted to checking itself the relevance of such possibility. And so, in this new arrangement, an unsuspected field open to the reason, on which the reason can to retake its criticism activity, suddenly open. But, now, people can`t practice this activity anymore about its traditional unconsciousness and its autism. But about the new evidence of a consciousness of conditiondeepening that changes the key of the perform of its calling, now as responsible intellectual practice on the hereunder, in this world

Sob o signo do aprofundamento e da intensificação da consciência de si, o ato filosófico de Pierre Thévenaz se define como uma filosofia radicalizante. E porque não abre mão e nem elide o lócus de resposta do qual seu ato filosófico toma sua consistência própria que é o da tradição protestante pode receber o complemento (protestante). Assim, uma filosofia radicalizante (protestante). Isso porque a secularização da filosofia, a que seu método de radicalização leva de modo conseqüente, já pressupõe a assunção da própria contingência que é consciência de condição. Consciência de que se fala de algum lugar; consciência de que o pensamento se encontra previamente engajado em um específico hic et nunc que, por conta da condição, recebe sua densidade própria e não pode mais ser cotado no trato das formas abstratas do tempo e do espaço. O que já é um dos índices da superação thévenaziana da redução da filosofia à epistemologia, tal como se tem estabelecido após Kant. Nesse sentido, a abertura plena à contingência pela radicalização forçará a mudança do problema do sentido, ligado pela fenomenologia à consciência intencional, para o problema da hermenêutica histórica. Quer dizer, para o da compreensão dos eventos significativos que têm poder de reorganizar em torno de si o movimento da história. Com a epoché do sentido, lançada sobre o núcleo mesmo do que a fenomenologia husserliana descobrira como a atividade própria da consciência intencional, assim, um passo decisivo no movimento de radicalização thévenaziana, só restará à razão filosófica (ao ser humano) tomar o sentido como tarefa por se fazer, inacabada e não garantida. Esse passo negativo, todavia, não recebe, em Pierre Thévenaz, o tom de palavra final, de última palavra. Pois se assim fosse, serviria ainda como álibi para a instauração de uma nova instalação. Desta vez tão segura no negativo quanto o era na ingenuidade otimística do sentido garantido. O qual permanecia na consciência intencional como ainda um último bastião de força e de atração, exercido sobre a consciência ingênua da atitude natural, sem ser superado. Isso porque agora a razão, já tendo alcançado um nível profundo de consciência de sua condição humana, de sua contingência, de sua fraqueza e equívoco sempre possíveis, para continuar sua atividade crítica costumeira, sua vocação mesma, deverá aprender a tirar força de sua fraqueza. A razão terá de se desdivinizar; de parar de tentar falar por Deus, ou pelos olhos de Deus; de parar de postular reduplicações de si como razão juiz ou razão instância não tocada pela crítica. Ela deverá assumir-se como estando em crise: assumir-se como humana, e humana só. Ora, esta possibilidade inusitada que se abre à própria razão pela radicalização, como vemos, não surge do nada. Ela representa, no inverso mesmo, outra possibilidade que à que Hegel estabeleceu na linha do horizonte e cuja atração exercida no interior do pensamento contemporâneo é bem mais sutil e presente do que parece. Por isso, será preciso desvencilhar a metafísica de certos comprometimentos históricos que a têm desacreditado, para se chegar ao seu mais autêntico núcleo afim à radicalização. Pelo que o signo da defesa da especificidade e da singularidade contra as categorias gerais continentes; o signo da defesa das irredutibilidades aos reducionismos, espiritualistas ou materialistas, será o que caracteriza, para Thévenaz, o movimento mais interno à metafísica ocidental. Este signo é o do espaço ontológico que a metafísica, descoberta por Platão, esclarece a necessidade de que seja mantido entre as grandezas em relação. Todavia, para ativar o que esta descoberta, neutralizada sob a lógica auto contida de uma razão autista, poderia auferir em termos de aprofundamento da consciência de condição, será necessário um apoio externo à razão. E este ela o recebe da experiência choque de imputação de loucura sobre ela que a fé cristã primitiva lançou. E não sendo possível à razão avaliar a justeza de tal imputação, pois não se trata de mais um argumento lógico com o qual ela jogar o seu jogo, a razão é levada a verificar por si mesma a pertinência de tal possibilidade. E assim, nessa nova disposição, um campo insuspeito e infinito, sobre o qual ela pode retomar sua atividade crítica, inesperadamente se abre. Só que agora esta atividade já não poderá mais ser exercida sob o selo de sua inconsciência e do seu autismo tradicional, mas sob o novo índice de uma consciência de condição aprofundada que muda o registro do cumprimento de sua vocação para o de uma atividade intelectual responsável no aqui em baixo, neste mundo / The philosophical act ofPierre Thévenaz, that takes the sign of thedeepening and intensification of self-consciousness, it is here defined as a radicalizing philosophy. Because he doesnt abandon and doesnt hides the locus of his answer,of which philosophical act takes its consistence whereas it is the protestant tradition his philosophical act can to receive the following complement: protestant. So, a (protestant) radicalizing philosophy. It is because a secularization of philosophy, for which his method of radicalization leads consequently, alreadypresupposes the accepting of selfcontingence that is consciousness of condition. Consciousness of speakingfrom somewhere; consciousness of the thought has finding prior engaged in a specific hic etnunc. Because of condition receives its characteristic density and so it cant be quoted in the rank of abstract forms of time and space. It is one of the evidences of thévenazian overcoming of reduction of philosophy to the epistemology, as it has been fixed after Kant. This way, the full overture to the contingence by radicalization will compel the change of the problem of sense, connected by phenomenology to the intentional consciousness, to the problem of historical hermeneutic. I mean, to the understanding of meaningful events that have capacity to reorganize around themselfs the movement of the history. Theepoché of sense putson kernel of husserlian phenomenology, it founded as the specific activity of intentional consciousness, so a conclusive step in the motion of thévenazian radicalization, only rest to philosophical raison (namely, the human being) to take a sense as a task to be make unconcluded and no guaranteed. This negative step, however, no receive in Pierre Thévenaz the hue of last word. So this way serve or it would be serve still as an alibi for the setting of a new ideological fixed. This time, such certain on the negative as it were on optimistic naivety of secure sense. This remained in the intentional consciousness as still the last bastion of power and attraction, exerted on the naïve consciousness of natural attitude, that is, without overcoming.This is because now the raison had already reached the deep level of consciousness of its human condition, (its contingence), of its weakness and misunderstanding always possible. Then, for it to continue its usual criticism activity, its calling, it must to learn to take advantage from its weakness. The reason must be undivinize by itself; to stop to try speaks instead eye God; or by Gods eyes. It must be to stop to claim self-reduplications as judge or instance raison never touched by criticism. It must looks like being in the crisis condition; to admit yourself as human, only human. However, this unused possibility that appers the own reason, through radicalization, as we can see, it doesnt emerge from nothing. This typify, in the exact converse, another possibility that Hegel sets up on horizon line whose appeal, inner of the contemporary thought, is more subtle and present than it seems. So, it would be necessary to separate the metaphysic from certain historical commitments that made its discredit, to reach to its more authentic pith related with the radicalization. So, the sign of defense of specificity and singularity against the continent general categories; the sign of defense of no-reductive quality to the reduction, spiritualistic reductions or materialistic reductions, will be the main character, for Pierre Thévenaz, the more internal movement of occidental metaphysic. This sign is from ontological space, that the metaphysic founded by Plato clarifies the need to keep on among the magnitudes in relation. However, to start activing this discovery, which has been neutralized about the self-contained of an autistic reason, it might obtain in terms of deepening of consciousness of condition, will be necessary an external support to the reason. And the reason receives it from shock-experience of imputation of madness on the reason that ancient Christian faith launched. But, it not been possible for the reason to evaluate the right of that imputation, because it wasnt the most logical argument for the reason to play its game. So, the reason is conducted to checking itself the relevance of such possibility. And so, in this new arrangement, an unsuspected field open to the reason, on which the reason can to retake its criticism activity, suddenly open. But, now, people can`t practice this activity anymore about its traditional unconsciousness and its autism. But about the new evidence of a consciousness of conditiondeepening that changes the key of the perform of its calling, now as responsible intellectual practice on the hereunder, in this world

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigo Inacio Ribeiro Sa Menezes.pdf: 1734759 bytes, checksum: c1bc6f6f7284e9e3da24350e1be4f158 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-08-08 / Focusing on the works of the Rumanian philosopher Emil Cioran (1911-1995), this study proposes an anthropological approach in order to elucidate the author s conception regarding human being. Cioran s writings portrait man as an essentially infirm being, idea from which this study takes off so as to explain what lies behind his anthropological pessimism. For such, it takes gathering, analyzing and interpreting the reflections offered by him on human being his origins, condition, history and destiny and that are spread out throughout his books. Besides, some of his critics will contribute to sustain the hypothesis: more than just a philosopher, Cioran is a religious thinker, whose pessimistic conception regarding human condition is rooted in gnostic soil. As it is intended to be demonstrated, his connections with gnosticism go way beyond a mere intellectual affinity, involving as well a kinship with the bogomils, a gnostic sect which settled in the Balkans during the Middle Ages and which is supposed to have had a significant role in shaping Rumania s cultural identity. Furthermore, it intends to argue that the crisis of insomnia endured by Cioran in his youth period has a cognitive and spiritual character allowing her to be interpreted as a gnosis. At last, this study commits itself with sustaining the following thesis: much more than his readings, it is rather his insomniac experience that turns out to be the decisive event responsible to shape his thought from then on, including his world and man view / Tendo a obra do filósofo romeno Emil Cioran (1911-1995) como objeto, este estudo parte de um recorte antropológico cuja intenção é lançar luzes sobre sua concepção de ser humano. Está presente em sua obra a idéia do homem como um animal enfermo por natureza, sendo este o ponto de partida que nos levará à compreensão do que está por trás do seu pessimismo antropológico. Para tanto, busca reunir, analisar e interpretar as diversas reflexões que o autor desenvolve sobre o ser humano sua origem, condição, história e destino e que se encontram espalhadas através de seus livros. Além de contar com alguns comentadores que contribuem para sustentar a hipótese: mais do que um filósofo, Cioran é um pensador de cunho religioso, cuja concepção pessimista acerca da condição humana encontra raízes no pensamento gnóstico. Conforme pretende demonstrar, sua relação com o gnosticismo vai muito além de uma mera afinidade intelectual, envolvendo também um parentesco com os bogomilos, seita gnóstica que habitou os Bálcãs durante a Idade Média e que teria influenciado profundamente a alma romena. Além disso, tentará mostrar que a crise de insônia sofrida por Cioran na juventude possui um sentido cognitivo e espiritual profundo que permite interpretá-la como uma gnose. Por fim, este estudo se compromete a sustentar a seguinte tese central: mais do que suas leituras, é a experiência de insônia o acontecimento decisivo que determinará todo seu pensamento posterior, sua visão de mundo assim como de ser humano