La dialectique de l’ordre public et des libertés sillonne la pensée juridique depuis le XVIIIème siècle. Généré par de nouvelles formes de délinquance et de criminalité, le renforcement des exigences de l’ordre public impose de s’interroger sur la limitation des droits fondamentaux constitutionnels. En dépit de la place névralgique qu’il occupe entre ordre public et libertés, le processus de limitation demeure indéterminé en droit français. Cette recherche, organisée autour de la détermination des limites aux droits garantis, de l’identification des « limites aux limites » aux droits fondamentaux, puis de la redéfinition des droits fondamentaux par les limites, permet de préciser ce mécanisme, mais aussi de cerner les restrictions apportées à l’exercice des droits et libertés. L’autolimitation du Conseil constitutionnel marque un infléchissement progressif de la protection des droits fondamentaux. Ce constat invite à réfléchir sur l’encadrement supra-législatif de la limitation des droits garantis, et conduit à se positionner en faveur de l’insertion d’une clause de limitation des droits fondamentaux dans la Constitution. / The dialectics of public order and freedoms has been traveling throughout legal thought since the 18th century. Sparked by new forms of delinquency and criminality, the strengthening of public order requirements leads to questioning the limitation of fundamental constitutional rights. Despite its crucible place between public order and freedoms, the limitation process remains undetermined in French law. This research, which aims at determining the limitations to protected rights, identifying the limitations to those limitations themselves, and then redefining fundamental rights through those limitations, not only helps to specify this mechanism, but also to identify the restrictions brought to the enjoyment of rights and freedoms. The Conseil constitutionnel self-restraint reveals a gradual shift in the protection of fundamental rights. Acknowledging the former leads to considering a supra legislative framework to the limitations to protected rights, and advocating in favor of the constitutional entrenchment of such a clause.

La liberté religieuse est une liberté fondamentale reconnue dans les démocraties. Elle est invoquée devant la Cour européenne par des religions mais aussi par des individus. Les nouveaux cultes et leurs adeptes acquièrent des droits collectifs et individuels plus étendus. En France, des principes fondamentaux conduisent le législateur et le juge à consacrer et garantir le pluralisme religieux : toutes les croyances ont la même valeur. Chacun est libre de pratiquer sa religion en public ou en privé, notamment dans sa famille. Le juge garantit le respect de la conscience de l’individu lorsqu’il est saisi. Mais la libre pratique religieuse des membres de la famille connait certaines limites qui sont purement objectives et non fonction du type d’appartenance religieuse. Pourtant, la perception du phénomène religieux par les autorités n’est pas toujours égalitaire. Le traitement politique, social et judiciaire des religions minoritaires notamment, remet parfois en cause le pluralisme. Si l’appréciation in concreto des situations par le juge est le principe, le manque d’homogénéité de la jurisprudence, qui met en exergue certains préjugés, ajouté aux réticences des juges du droit à contrôler plus avant les motivations des juges du fonds, entament la garantie du pluralisme. Les condamnations de la Cour européenne le montrent. Les difficultés concernent notamment les questions de l’appréciation de la faute, cause de divorce, ou de l’intérêt de l’enfant. La référence à un standard, étalon d’une bonne pratique religieuse, est parfois latente. En la matière, l’analyse souveraine des juges du fond est souvent sacralisée, ce qui peut poser des difficultés, tout comme le manque d’ouverture de certains experts qui rendent des avis qui peuvent, in fine, avoir un impact fort sur le juge. L’absence de pré-majorité religieuse et l’application stricte du principe de laïcité à l’école posent aussi certains problèmes. Les solutions étrangères sont intéressantes sur ces questions. / Religious freedom is a fundamental freedom recognised by democracies. Not only religious groups, but also individuals, bring it up before the European Court. New religious groups and their members are granted more collective and individual rights. In France, fundamental principles bring legislators and judges to define and guarantee religious pluralism: all beliefs are equal. Everyone is free to practice his or her religion in public or in private, especially within the family. Judges referred to guarantee that the individual conscience will be respected. Nevertheless, the free religious practice of family members has objective limits, regardless of the religion one belongs to. Still, the way the authorities view the religious practice is not always the same. The political, social and legal treatment of minority religions in particular puts sometimes religious pluralism in question. Even if usually the judge appreciates situations in concreto, pluralism sometimes fails to be guaranteed due to a lack of homogeneity in the jurisprudence, tainted with prejudice, as well as the reticences of the ordinary judges to check more in depth the motivations of the trial judges. The condemnations of the European Courts are proof to this. The difficulties concern for the most part the appreciation of the fault, cause for divorce, or of the interest of the child. The reference to a standard of good religious practice is sometimes latent. In this matter, the expertise of the trial judges is often considered as sacred, and this can lead to some difficulties, as well as the lack of open-mindness of some experts who give opinions that can, in fine, influence the judge. The absence of religious age pre-majority and the strict application of the principle of secularism at school also pose some problems. Foreign solutions on this matter are interesting.

Participant d'une nature mixte, contractuelle par sa source, juridictionnelle par son objet, la transaction permet ainsi aux parties de terminer une contestation née ou prévenir une contestation à naître. Elle présente une utilité remarquable pour la matière administrative. La transaction, notion de droit civil empruntée par le juge administratif, a donné lieu à des interprétations prétoriennes diverses. Le droit n'étant pas figé, le juge administratif, sous couvert d'une philosophie propre, a oeuvré pour la préservation de ses intérêts en se détachant progressivement des principes civils du contrat de transaction. L'expression de « transaction administrative » vise le fait que la transaction est conclue par ou au nom d'une personne publique. Celle-ci peut cependant être un contrat de droit privé ou un contrat administratif. Certes, l'expression « matière administrative » peut être entendue au sens large et au sens strict. Le contentieux de la transaction est en plein essor. Depuis longtemps déjà le droit public emprunte les règles civiles du contrat de transaction relevant de régimes juridiques différents. Des difficultés sérieuses subsistent cependant. Aussi, il convenait de démontrer pourquoi et comment le juge administratif a entrepris une clarification de l'état du droit de la transaction en matière administrative. L'étude a été l'occasion de distinguer la fonction d'adaptation et de systématisation du juge administratif, là où cette différenciation n'était que rarement envisagée. / Participant of a mixed nature, by its contractual source, legal in its object, the transaction and allows the parties to end a dispute arising or prevent future litigation. It has a remarkable usefulness for administrative matters. The transaction, civil law concept borrowed by the administrative judge, gave rise to various interpretations praetorian. The law is not static, the administrative judge, under cover of a personal philosophy, worked to preserve its interests gradually detaching civilians principles of contract transaction. The term "administrative transaction" refers to the fact that the transaction is entered into by or on behalf of a public entity. This can however be a private contract or an administrative contract. Admittedly, the term "administration" can be interpreted broadly and narrowly. Litigation of the transaction is booming. Has long been public law borrows the civil rules of contract transaction subject to different legal regimes. Serious difficulties remain. Also, it was necessary to demonstrate why and how the administrative judge undertook a clarification of the law of the transaction in administrative matters. The study was an opportunity to distinguish the function of adaptation and systematization of administrative courts, where this differentiation was rarely considered.

No description available.

Le dommage causé à soi-même a très longtemps constitué un sujet hors du droit, synonyme de stigmatisation morale ou de fatalité. Depuis la fin du XXème siècle, c’est un enjeu essentiel des politiques publiques qui fait encore aujourd’hui l’objet d’un débat éthique et juridique. D’une part, la volonté de se causer un dommage exprime les aspirations de l’homme contemporain à obtenir la maîtrise de son corps, qu’il s’agisse de choisir le temps et les conditions de sa mort, de revendiquer des pratiques masochistes ou bien de faire don de ses organes. D’autre part, cette prise de risque dommageable pour soi révèle très souvent une opposition de l’État et de la société en général, en raison de l’atteinte susceptible d’être portée aux valeurs sociales et aux équilibres budgétaires. En tant que sources croissantes de préoccupation, les manifestations et les limites du dommage causé à soi-même méritent d’être soumises à l’étude de leur contexte historique, social et juridique. / The damage caused to oneself was for a very long time a topic outside the law, as a synonym for moral stigmatization or for fate. Since the end of the XXth century, it is an essential public policy issue that is the object even today of an ethical and legal debate. On the one hand, the will to harm oneself reflects the aspiration of the contemporary man to have the control of its body, that it is a question of choosing the time and the conditions of its death or claiming masochistic practices or donating organs. On the other hand, this harmful risk-taking for oneself reveals frequently an opposition of the State and more generally of the society, because of the potential violation of the social values and the budget balances. As increasing sources of concerns, the manifestations and the limits of the damage caused to oneself deserve to be subjected to the study of their historic, social and legal context.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Katia Aparecida Mangone.pdf: 1801839 bytes, checksum: 209f3da22f5be3927f496609852c2716 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-25 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The present work examines the prequestionamento and, principally, analyses if matters of public order could be known in the judgement of Extraordinary Appeals to the Supreme Court and Special Appeals to the Superior Court of Justice. Firstly, it is studied the Constitutional Model of these Extraordinary and Special Appeals, talking about the history of the High Courts and how these appeals came out and were defined by the Brazilian Federal Constitutions. The general theory of the Extraordinary Appeals is analysed with its requirements of admissibility. The devolutive and transferable effects are studied to show that Extraordinary and Special Appeals do not have the last one. The idea of the complete motivation of the decision is an important topic of the work. The appeal of requesting clarification of a decision is studied in this context. The preclusion, definition and examples of matters of public order are examined too. It was possible, after this work, to verify that the constitutional rules must be observed and they determine that it must exist decided cause about the issue at the appealed decision. The knowledge of matters of public order by the High Courts depends on it, because the Constitution does not make exceptions. The function and the purpose of the Supreme Court and the Superior Court of Justice, the objectives of the Extraordinary Appeal and the Special Appeal, their requirements and the importance of the uniform interpretation of the Federal Constitution and the Federal Laws are topics to which special focus was given / O presente trabalho examina o prequestionamento e, principalmente, analisa se questões de ordem pública poderiam ser conhecidas no julgamento de Recursos Extraordinários para o Supremo Tribunal Federal e Recursos Especiais para o Superior Tribunal de Justiça. Primeiramente, é estudado o Modelo Constitucional desses Recursos Extraordinário e Especial, falando sobre a história dos Tribunais Superiores e como esses recursos surgiram e foram definidos pelas Constituições Federais Brasileiras. A teoria geral dos Recursos Extraordinários é analisada com seus requisitos de admissibilidade. Os efeitos devolutivo e translativo são estudados para mostrar que Recursos Extraordinário e Especial não possuem este último. A idéia da motivação completa da decisão é um tópico importante do trabalho. O recurso de Embargos de Declaração é estudado neste contexto. A preclusão, definição e exemplos de questões de ordem pública também são examinados. Foi possível, depois deste trabalho, verificar que as regras constitucionais devem ser observadas e elas determinam que deve existir causa decidida sobre o tema na decisão recorrida. O conhecimento das questões de ordem pública pelos Tribunais Superiores depende disso, porque a Constituição não faz exceções. A função e a finalidade do Supremo Tribunal Federal e do Superior Tribunal de Justiça, os objetivos do Recurso Extraordinário e do Recurso Especial, seus requisitos e a importância da interpretação uniforme da Constituição Federal e das Leis Federais são tópicos aos quais especial enfoque foi dado

Le Tribunal arbitral du sport (TAS), organe de résolution des litiges sportifs par la voie de l’arbitrage, rend des sentences qui, grâce à la pratique du précédent, acquièrent la cohérence nécessaire à la formation d’une jurisprudence. À travers cette jurisprudence, le TAS contribue à l’édification d’un ordre juridique sportif global et autonome. Cette contribution est le résultat d’un double apport, normatif et structurant. D’abord, les règles prétoriennes produites par le TAS et formées essentiellement des principes généraux constamment appliqués par les arbitres, constituent une source de droit à l’intérieur de l’ordre juridique sportif. Certains de ces principes, principalement ceux permettant de protéger la sincérité des compétitions et les droits fondamentaux des athlètes, se démarquent par leur caractère intangible pour former l’ordre public sportif. La mise à l’écart du droit étatique au profit de l’application de ces principes, mais aussi des règlements sportifs, permet d’assurer l’autonomie de l’ordre juridique sportif. Ensuite, ces principes sont un facteur de structuration de l’ordre juridique sportif, dans la mesure où leur intervention favorise la cohérence du système. Cette structuration est le résultat de l’application de ces principes pour contrôler l’exercice par les organisations sportives de leurs compétences réglementaires et disciplinaires et pour délimiter les pouvoirs de chacune des composantes du mouvement sportif. Dans les deux cas, ces principes deviennent des standards communs qui s’imposent à l’ensemble de la communauté sportive / The Court of arbitration for sport (CAS), an arbitration body in sport disputes, passes sentences which, thanks to the practice of the precedent, get enough coherence to constitute a jurisprudence. Through this jurisprudence, CAS contributes in the erection of a global and autonomous sports legal order. This support is the result of a double contribution, normative as well as structuring. First, the pretorian rules generated by CAS and formed mainly by the general principles commonly applied by the judges, constitute a source of law within the sports legal order. Some of these principles, namely those aimed at protecting the fairness of the competitions and the fundamental rights of athletes, stand out with regards to their intangibility to form the sport public order. Discarding state law in favor of the application of these principles as well as of sport regulations, guarantees the autonomy of the sports legal order. Thereafter, these principles are considered as a structuring factor of the sports legal order, in that their intervention favors the coherence of the system. This structuring results from the application of these principles in order to monitor the practices by the sport organizations of their regulatory and disciplinary competences and also to confine the power of each of the components of the sport movement. In both cases, these principles become common standards for the whole sport community to abide by

Questa ricerca si propone di contribuire ad una prima analisi storiografica del ciclo di protesta esploso in Italia nel 1977. A nove anni dal ’68, la contestazione tornò ad agitare le università e le piazze, lottando sul terreno della creatività e dell’ironia, ma esprimendo contestualmente una forte carica violenta. L’illegalità di massa e la guerriglia diffusa finirono infatti per ingrossare le fila del «partito armato» e del terrorismo. Il ‘movimento’ degli indiani metropolitani e delle P38, proprio in ragione di questa ambiguità, fatica ancora a trovare una descrizione esaustiva, mentre la sua escalation violenta è ancora in attesa di un’eziologia convincente. Questo studio tenta quindi, in primo luogo, di ricostruire un’immagine unitaria e realistica di quel fenomeno socio-politico, a partire dalle fonti del ‘movimento’ e dalle cronache. In secondo luogo, integra la variabile istituzionale nello studio della protesta, al fine di verificare quale grado di influenza ebbe lo Stato sui processi di riattivazione della mobilitazione e, soprattutto, sulla radicalizzazione dello scontro. Il focus dell’analisi è rappresentato dall’azione assai controversa del ministero dell’Interno, allora guidato da Francesco Cossiga, che viene qui ricostruita sulla base di documenti provenienti dagli archivi di Stato. Il policing of protest è infine messo a confronto con quello della Francia dei primi anni dopo il maggio ’68, quando l’estrema sinistra minacciò una deriva violenta ma si arrestò prima di passare all’atto. / his research aims to contribute to a first preliminary historiographical analysis of the cycle of protest which spread out in Italy in 1977. Nine years after 1968, revolts started again on in the streets and inside universities. This new wave of protest was characterized by the use of creativity and humour but also by the acceptance of the violence: illegal action and urban guerrilla warfare became quite common and contributed to the expansion of the red terrorism. As a matter of fact, this ‘movement’ shows an inherent ambiguity: it put together political emulators of Dadaism with old-styled armed revolutionaries. Therefore, it is still hard and an open challenge to find an inclusive description of it and the escalation of political violence is still waiting for a convincing aetiology. The objective of this is research is twofold. On the one hand, it tries to rebuild a coherent and realistic picture of this phenomenon under analysis, adopting insider sources of the ‘movement’ and chronicles. On the other hand, it aims at integrating the institutional variable in the study of the protest, in order to verify to which extent the State was can be held responsible for the mobilization processes and, especially, for the radicalization of the social conflict. The analysis is centred on the action of the ministry of Interior and based on records from State archives. The Italian policing of protest is finally compared with to the case study of France during the first years after May 68. At that time, extreme-left activists threatened a similar escalation of violence, but they came to a halt before shooting.

Malgré les reproches qui lui ont souvent été adressés, les nombreuses tentatives de réforme qui ont émaillé son histoire, la vieille loi sur les aliénés n’a pas empêché une évolution remarquable des soins vers plus de liberté, notamment par le biais de la sectorisation. L’inadaptation de la loi monarchiste a justifié l’intervention du législateur en 1990, mais elle était toute relative car la loi n°90-527 n’a fait que reprendre, certes en les rénovant, les moyens de contraindre aux soins fondés sur les exigences de l’ordre public. Or, l’application de la loi nouvelle, destinée à l’amélioration des droits et de la protection des personnes hospitalisées en raison de troubles mentaux, a eu un résultat paradoxal : une extension et un renforcement de la contrainte psychiatrique, qui ont fait ressurgir les critiques du dualisme juridictionnel auquel est soumis le contentieux de l’hospitalisation psychiatrique. Le Tribunal des conflits n’a jamais cessé de réaffirmer le principe de séparation des autorités administratives et judiciaires, écartant l’idée d’une unification du contentieux de l’hospitalisation sans consentement au profit du juge judiciaire. Mais par une décision du 17 février 1997, le Haut tribunal a opéré une rationalisation des compétences contentieuses qui a permis au dispositif juridictionnel de révéler son efficacité : l’administration, aujourd’hui, est contrainte de veiller au respect des procédures d’hospitalisation, la certitude d’une sanction lui est acquise en cas de manquement (Première partie). Toutefois le haut niveau de garantie des droits de la personne hospitalisée sans consentement est menacé. Depuis 1997, une réforme de la loi est annoncée comme imminente. Les propositions avancées par de nombreux rapports et études, qu’elles soient d’inspiration sanitaire ou sécuritaire, suscitaient des inquiétudes. Les dispositions relatives à la déclaration d’irresponsabilité pénale pour cause de trouble mental dans la loi n°2008-174 ne pouvaient que les entretenir, préfigurant une aggravation de la situation des personnes contraintes à des soins psychiatriques. Le projet de loi déposé sur le bureau de la Présidence de l’Assemblée nationale le 5 mai 2010 en apporte la confirmation. Le texte en instance devant les institutions parlementaires révèle une finalité sanitaire, mais le droit individuel à la protection de la santé parviendrait à justifier une contrainte que les motifs d’ordre public ne pourraient fonder ; l’obligation de soins psychiatriques ne serait plus uniquement fondée sur les manifestations extérieures de la maladie du point de vue de la vie civile. En outre, si les exigences récemment dégagées par le Conseil constitutionnel à l’occasion d’une question prioritaire de constitutionnalité portant sur le maintien de la personne en hospitalisation contrainte constituent une amélioration, la présence accrue du juge judiciaire dans les procédures n’apporterait aucun supplément de garantie dès lors que les dispositions nouvelles opèreraient une profonde transformation de la fonction du juge des libertés en la matière, notamment en l’associant à la décision d’obligation de soins. Contre toute attente, l’objet sanitaire de la mesure, lorsqu’il devient une fin en soi et n’est plus subordonné à l’ordre public, se révèle liberticide (Deuxième partie) / The old law on insane people has often been criticized but none of the numerous attempts of reform, that it has met throughout its history, has prevented the outstanding move of cares towards more liberty, notably through sectorization. The lack of adaptation of the monarchist law made the legislator act in 1990, but the action was very relative as 90-527 law only rephrased, with some updates, the means to constrain to a treatment abiding by public policy. But, the new law, intended for the improvement of liberty and the protection of hospitalized insane persons, had paradoxical results: an extension and a reinforcement of psychiatric constraint, which made reappear the criticisms of jurisdictional dualism, which psychiatric hospitalization is subjected to. The court relentlessly reaffirmed its attachment to the principle of separation of administrative and judiciary authorities, while it was rejecting the legal argument’s unification of the psychiatric hospitalization without agreement in favor of the judicial judge. The High Court, with an adjudication dated from February 17th, 1997, made a rationalization of disagreement’s skills which allowed the jurisdictional plan to reveal its efficiency : administration, nowadays, has to make sure the hospitalization is respectful of procedures, it would be compulsorily sanctioned in case of a breach of the rules (First part). Nevertheless, hospitalized persons without acceptance should worry about the high-level of guarantee of their rights. Since 1997, an imminent reform of this law has been expected. Numerous reports and studies have led to sanitarian or security order proposals, which sparked concern. The measures about the statement of penal irresponsibility due to mental disorder, and tackled in 2008-174 law, kept feeding these concerns making the situation of persons forced to psychiatric cares worse. The bill submitted to the President of the national assembly on May 5th, 2010, confirmed this evolution. The text pending the parliamentary institution has a sanitarian aim, but the individual right to health protection would justify a constraint that public order can not establish ; the necessity of psychiatric cares would not only be based on the external manifestation of the disease as an aspect of civilian life. Moreover, even if the constitutional Council’s requirements, defined during a major questioning of the constitutionality of the maintenance of constrained hospitalization, are an enhancement, the increased presence of a judicial judge during the procedure would not ensure better guarantee as long as the new disposals operate a deep transformation of judges' duties, notably if they are associated with the decision of constrained cares. Against all expectations, the sanitarian aspect of the measure, when it turns to be an end in itself and is not dependent on public order, is dwindling liberties (Second part)

Souvent prônée au regard de l’abondant discours politique et juridique dont elle fait l’objet, mais en même temps fréquemment et subtilement « torpillée », « combattue », la transparence des élections est l’une de ces notions-méridien des temps modernes.La présente thèse lève ainsi le voile sur ce que, quelle qu’en soit la forme, cette notion est tout logiquement reprise − et tant bien que mal consolidée ou en voie de consolidation − dans l’ordre juridique interne des différents États, notamment africains et tente de faire prendre conscience que, à l’analyse, une telle consécration, ou le cas échéant une telle consolidation, apparait bien plus embarrassée. En sus de cela, d’un point de vue de théorie et de pratique juridiques, naissent des incertitudes, au double regard de sa nature et de sa portée juridiques, instaurant ainsi un climat d’insécurité juridique dont il devient donc impérieux de sortir. Sans doute est-ce parce que, assez récente dans un domaine lui-même en quête d’autonomie : le droit électoral, cette notion se révèle très redoutable à cerner. Cette modeste contribution tente-t-elle justement de répondre à l’ensemble de ces préoccupations. Dans cette perspective, le travail pionnier de la Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin qui a érigé la transparence électorale en un principe à valeur constitutionnelle mérite d’être poursuivi. Elle est donc davantage un « construit » qu’un « donné ». En tout état de cause, un tel approfondissement assurerait une cohérence au droit public et renforcerait la sécurité juridique. Cette exigence est donc un terreau fertile à l’éclosion et au triomphe de la démocratie libérale. À y voir de près, elle est à même de réaliser la révolution juridique chère à Montesquieu et que n’a pu, malheureusement, pérenniser le principe de séparation des pouvoirs : la modération du pouvoir politique dans l’État. / Often advocated in view of the abundant political and legal discourse of which it is the object, but at the same time and often subtly "torpedoed", “fought”, transparent elections are one of these meridian notions of modern times.Whatever form it may take, this Thesis is lifting the veil on this notion which is logically repeated, and somehow not well consolidated or being consolidated - in the internal legal order of the various States, particularly African States and which tries to make people aware that, in the analysis, such a consecration, or if any such consolidation, appears more embarrassed. In addition to this, a point of view of legal theory and practice, uncertainties arise, the double view of its nature and scope of legal, thus creating a climate of legal insecurity that it becomes imperative to quit Without any doubt, this recently field is seeking itself autonomy, and this concept , electoral law proves to be very formidable to understand. This modest contribution, consequently tries to answer all these concerns. In this perspective, the pioneering work of the Constitutional Court of Benin which erected electoral transparency principle to a value worth pursuing. Therefore, it is more of “a constructed” than a "given”. In any event, such a deepening should ensure coherence to public law and enhance legal certainty. This requirement is a fertile ground for the emergence and triumph of liberal democracy. A close look at it, it is able to perform the legal revolution dear to Montesquieu who could not, unfortunately, perpetuate the principle of separation of powers: the moderation of political power in the state.