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The recourse of annulment of the arbitral award and the right to tantrum / El recurso de anulación de laudo y el derecho a patalearNúñez del Prado Chaves, Fabio 30 April 2018 (has links)
Is it advisable for a State to eliminate the annulment action of its Law of Arbitration? Can the parties, by virtue of their party autonomy, waive the annulment action?.In the present article, the author demonstrates that the annulment action has a psychological and a legal-political basis, since, on the one hand, it satisfies the psychological need to challenge or contradict, which is inherent of human beings and; on the other, within the framework of Constitutional State it constitutes a democratic tool that guarantees the control of power. / ¿Es aconsejable que un Estado elimine el recurso de anulación de su Ley de Arbitraje? ¿Pueden las partes en virtud de su autonomía privada renunciar al recurso de anulación?.En el presente artículo, el autor demuestra que el recurso de anulación tiene un sustento psicológico y un sustento jurídico-político, puesto que satisface, por un lado, la necesidad psicológica de impugnar o contradecir, la cual es inherente el ser humano y; por el otro, en el marco de un Estado Constitucional constituye una herramienta democrática que garantiza el control de poder.
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A jurisprudência eleitoral e seus reflexos no Estado democrático de direito / The electoral case law and its consequences to the democratic stateMilton Fernando Lamanauskas 10 May 2010 (has links)
A sociedade brasileira aguarda pacientemente e há anos uma real reforma que introduza a ética e a moral no meio político e faça valer a soberania de seu povo. De um lado, observa-se um Poder Legislativo com sérias dificuldades de quebrar sua inércia e cumprir o seu papel de concretizar a lei como expressão da vontade geral. De outro, um Poder Judiciário que busca suprir os anseios sociais dando efetividade aos direitos fundamentais colocados na Constituição Federal da República Brasileira de 1988. O presente estudo almeja analisar como o Estado brasileiro tem convivido com um intenso ativismo judicial ou judicialização da política e suas consequências para a democracia pátria. Para a eficácia de suas conclusões, limitou-se o campo de estudo à matéria eleitoral, dada sua cristalina correlação com o Estado Democrático de Direito. Foram selecionadas, deste modo, as recentes decisões dos Tribunais nacionais em temas eleitorais para averiguar os reflexos desta jurisprudência sobre as bases democráticas de nosso país. E, em assim procedendo, foram trazidos elementos para uma crítica fundamentada à tentativa do Poder Judiciário de moralizar as instituições políticas, buscando fornecer as bases para concluir se esse altivo movimento dos Tribunais logrou, de fato, o aprimoramento do regime democrático vigente, preservando a harmonia entre os Poderes, a unidade do ordenamento jurídico e a legitimidade das instituições da nação ou se, ao contrário, apenas soluções pontuais foram conquistadas, combatendo-se uma doença grave com remédios paliativos ao invés de atacar a real causa das mazelas que assolam o Estado Democrático de Direito brasileiro. / The Brazilian society waits patiently and for many years for a deep change that introduces ethics and moral to politics to renew the sovereignty of its people. On one hand, the Parliament presents serious difficulties in moving forward to fulfill its role of materializing the law as an expression of the general will. On the other hand, the judiciary tries to meet social expectations, providing effectiveness to basic rights constitutionally established. This study aims to analyze how the Brazilian State has been living with an intense judicial activism and a judicialization of its politics and its consequences to democracy. For the effectiveness of its conclusions, the object of the analysis was limited to electoral issue, due to its crystal clear relation with the Rule of Law. In this manner, some recent judicial decisions of the national Courts as regards electoral subjects were chosen to verify the consequences of this jurisprudence on the democratic foundations of our country. And, in so proceeding, many aspects were brought to enable a justified criticism to the judiciary attempt to moralize political institutions, trying to provide the basis for the following questions: have, in fact, this noble movement of the Courts succeeded in improving the current democratic Brazilian system, preserving the harmony between the Powers, the unity of the legal system and the legitimacy of the nation institutions?; or, on the opposite, only few hoc solutions have been conquered, fighting with a serious illness by ministering palliative drugs, instead of solving the real cause of the illness that plagues the State?
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A garantia institucional do Ministério Público em função da proteção dos direitos humanos / The institutional guarantee of the public attorney´s office and the protection of human rightsFernanda Leao de Almeida 11 June 2010 (has links)
Esta tese volta-se à análise crítica da garantia institucional de independência do Ministério Público brasileiro sob dois aspectos: de um lado, a sua independência em relação às esferas organizacionais dos poderes clássicos do Estado; e, de outro, os limites da independência funcional que visa a assegurar, para os seus membros, o livre desenvolvimento das funções institucionais. Sob o influxo do processo de reconhecimento universal dos direitos humanos a partir da Declaração de 1948, o valor da dignidade da pessoa humana representa o fundamento central do Estado Democrático de Direito da Constituição Federal de 1988, constituindo a fonte jurídica do vasto conjunto de direitos fundamentais dela constante. A proteção dos direitos fundamentais da pessoa humana é indissociável de um regime político democrático, que não pode prescindir de um sistema eficaz de controle do exercício do poder político para a persecução de tal desiderato. Daí a importância da efetividade dos mecanismos de controle recíproco entre os órgãos estatais, no comando do princípio fundamental projetado por Montesquieu que, atualmente, não mais se reduz à formula tríplice de distribuição das funções legislativa, executiva e judicial. É nesse contexto que se pretende introduzir a análise da garantia institucional de independência do Ministério Público, à luz, especificamente, de determinadas funções que lhe foram atribuídas para o controle de decisões de outros órgãos estatais, sobretudo do Executivo, envolvendo a tutela dos direitos fundamentais de proteção da dignidade da pessoa humana. A hipótese é a da existência de aspectos organizacionais condicionando o funcionamento do Ministério Público em dissonância de sua plena afirmação como novo ator político; quais sejam: a) a ausência de limites precisos à garantia de independência funcional no desenvolvimento de suas atividades; b) um sistema autocrático de gestão orientando as decisões sobre todas as políticas institucionais; c) a manutenção dos vínculos que prendem a instituição ao Executivo do Estado, concebido como o ramo hegemônico do regime político brasileiro. O trabalho pretende investigar as causas das incorreções, correlacioná-las e apontar os seus equívocos, para a identificação dos pontos relevantes sujeitos a uma pronta alteração de cunho organizacional, de modo a serem reproduzidos no funcionamento do Ministério Público brasileiro os valores republicanos e democráticos que devem informar um regime político como Estado Democrático de Direito. / This thesis offers a critical analysis of the institutional guarantee of independence of the Brazilian Public Attorney\'s Office regarding two aspects: on one hand, its independence concerning the organizational spheres of the classical branches of the State; on the other hand, the limits of the functional independence that aims at securing free development of the institutional functions to the members of the Public Attorney\'s Office. Due to the process of universal acknowledgement of human rights since the Declaration of 1948, the value of a human being\'s dignity represents the central basis of the Democratic Rule of Law of the 1 988 Federal Constitution, establishing a legal source for the vast set of fundamental rights contained in it. The protection of the fundamental rights of a human being is intrinsic to a democratic political system, which cannot dispense with an efficient procedure to control the use of political power for pursuing such desideratum. Hence the importance of the efficiency of the mechanisms of checks and balances among state agencies, in carrying out the fundamental principle proposed by Montesquieu that is no longer limited nowadays to the triple distribution formula of legislative, executive and judiciary functions. It\'s in this context that the present work intends to introduce the analysis of the institutional guarantee of independence of the Public Attorney\'s Office, specifically examining certain functions attributed to it for the control over decisions by other state agencies, particularly in the executive branch, that involve the safeguarding of the fundamental rights of protection of a human being\'s dignity. The hypothesis is the existence of organizational aspects stipulating the operation of the Public Attorney\'s Office in discordance with its full role as new political agent, such as: a) absence of precise limits to guarantee functional independence in the development of its activities; b) an autocratic ruling system guiding decisions on all institutional policies; c) maintenance of the bonds linking the institution to the executive branch, which is conceived as the hegemonic branch of Brazil\'s political system. This work intends to investigate the causes of those problems, correlate them and pinpoint mistakes, in order to identify the relevant points that would be subject to a swift alteration in terms of organization, so the republican, democratic values that ought to conduct a political regime as a Democratic Rule of Law may be reproduced in the operations of the Brazilian Public Attorney\'s Office.
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L’impact du chapitre 11 de l’ALÉNA sur la démocratie canadienneNormand-Couture, Érika 06 1900 (has links)
No description available.
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Le problème de la liberté dans le constitutionnalisme britannique / The problem of liberty in british constitutionalismRoynier, Céline 01 December 2011 (has links)
Le relatif échec que fut le Human Rights Act 1998 et les condamnations régulières du Royaume-Uni par la CEDH peuvent être considérés comme les symptômes, parmi d’autres, d’un problème de la liberté dans le constitutionnalisme britannique. Comment expliquer que cet Etat, membre fondateur du Conseil de l’Europe, résiste si fortement à l’application de cette déclaration de droits qu’est la Convention Européenne de Sauvegarde des droits de l’Homme et des libertés fondamentales ? Nous proposons dans ce travail une solution appuyée sur une étude de la culture classique de la common law, c'est-à-dire, essentiellement mais pas seulement, de la grande doctrine parlementaire anglaise du dix-septième siècle. Il nous semble en effet que cette doctrine a fixé la conception anglaise de la liberté et l’a définitivement envisagée comme devant relever de la common law. Nous suggérons que c’est par une redéfinition permanente de la common law que la liberté a été pensée en droit public anglais et que ce travail de redéfinition est encore à l’oeuvre aujourd’hui. Tout d’abord le problème de la liberté – qui s’est aussi posé en France et en Amérique par exemple – a pris une forme particulière en Angleterre : plutôt que de penser la source de légitimité du pouvoir, les juristes anglais ont réfléchi à ce que pouvait être les « marques » d’un droit acceptable pour tous. Cette réflexion a engendré des vagues de politisation du droit mais elle a rendu l’apparition d’un peuple sujet de droit beaucoup plus difficile. La première vague de politisation fait de la common law, le droit de la communauté, c'est-à-dire le droit commun à tous (Partie 1). La seconde vague de politisation de la common law correspond à un approfondissement de la première et fait de la common law un droit de la liberté en articulant le langage de la common law à l’individu par le biais d’une morale constitutionnelle (Partie 2). / Many are the signs revealing a certain difficulty with liberty or freedom in british constitutionalism. The relative failure of the Human Rights Act 1998 in terms of efficiency , the never-ending debate about the enactment of a british declaration of rights and the numerous sanctions taken by the ECHR against the UK, can be considered as symptoms of this problem. How, then, is it possible to explain the overwhelming role of the UK in the adoption of the ECHR in the 1950’s and this resistance of the UK towards the European Convention ? Our aim, in this work, is to provide an explanation which would be based on the study of the early modern common law tradition that is mainly (but not exclusively) the parliamentary Doctrine of the Seventeenth Century. We think that this doctrine or discourse established the english conception of liberty and considered this latter as originating in the common law. We suggest that liberty was and is thought as a permanent redefinition of the law itself (the common law) and that this idea gave birth to Public Law exactly at the same time. First of all, the above-mentioned problem of liberty – which appeared in America and France as well – arose in a particular way in England. Rather than focusing on power and its legitimacy, english state lawyers concentrated their work on the marks of a law which could be acceptable for all. This reflexion led to successive waves of politisation of the law itself but did not enable the apparition of a people which would be the source of both law and power. The first wave of politisation established that common law was the law common to all (Part 1). The second wave deepened the first one and enabled the common law to be « the law of liberty » by linking the language of the common law with the individual, through constitutional morality (Part 2).
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État de droit et lutte antiterroriste : étude parallèle des systèmes juridiques français et canadien quant à la collecte et au partage des renseignementsLoriato, Sarah 04 1900 (has links)
En 2015, deux lois relatives au renseignement entrent en vigueur simultanément au Canada et en France. Ces deux lois soulignent respectivement les failles des cadres juridiques canadien et français quant à la collecte et à l’analyse des renseignements. Malgré les différences indéniables existant entre les deux pays tant dans la forme d’organisation que dans les pratiques institutionnelles, les manquements relevés sont relativement similaires et soulignent un affaiblissement des principes de l’État de droit au nom de la sécurité et plus particulièrement de la lutte antiterroriste.
Les services de renseignement, disposant de pouvoirs plus importants, sont aujourd’hui amenés à contourner les mécanismes en vigueur sur le plan national destinés à protéger les droits fondamentaux des citoyens. Plus encore, dès lors qu’il s’agit d’un partage du renseignement au-delà des frontières, cette liberté, associée à l’absence de réglementation internationale dans ce domaine, conduit les actions des services de renseignement à de graves violations des droits humains.
Le présent mémoire a pour but d’étudier l’équilibre entre sécurité et droits humains dans le cadre de la lutte antiterroriste. Plus précisément, il s'agira de relever les défis existants dans les valeurs de l'État de droit, et ce, eu égard à la collecte et au partage des renseignements. / In 2015, two laws related to intelligence were simultaneously adopted in Canada and France. Both of these laws highlight major faults in Canadian and French legal frameworks regarding the collection and sharing of intelligence. Despite undeniable differences between both countries with regards to organizational frameworks and institutional practices, their legal breaches are relatively similar and emphasise a weakening of the rule of law’s principles in the name of the security and counterterrorism.
Intelligence services have greater powers than ever before and are more inclined to bypass national mechanisms designed to protect citizens’ fundamental rights. Moreover, when it comes to the sharing of information, these powers, combined with the lack of intelligence norms on an international scale, lead to numerous human rights violations.
This dissertation focuses on the balance between security and human rights in light of counterterrorism. We will outline the existing challenges faced by the principles of the rule of law in relation to the collection and sharing of intelligence.
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L’État de droit en transition : une amnistie pour le Bloody Sunday?Denicourt-Fauvel, Camille 10 1900 (has links)
Depuis la signature de l’Accord de paix du Vendredi Saint, l’Irlande du Nord a entamé son processus de transition après trente ans d’un conflit communément appelé les Troubles. Parmi les questions relatives à son cheminement se pose celle du Bloody Sunday. Lors de cet évènement tristement célèbre des Troubles, quatorze civils furent tués par des soldats britanniques, alors qu’ils prenaient part à une manifestation pour les droits civiques. Les soldats n’ont pas eu à faire face au processus judiciaire, malgré la volonté des familles des victimes d’obtenir justice. Une amnistie visant les soldats responsables fut proposée en mars 2014, à titre de mécanisme de justice transitionnelle pour accompagner la société nord- irlandaise dans sa démarche vers un état de paix. Entre droit et politique, plusieurs questions se posent relativement à un tel projet. La présente étude vise à examiner la validité de cette proposition d’amnistie eu égard aux valeurs de l’État de droit. / Since the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998, the Northern Irish society has embarked on its transitional process towards peace, attempting to leave behind thirty years of a conflict commonly known as the Troubles. This outcome brings to light many different issues, amongst which is that of the Bloody Sunday. This infamous event of the Troubles saw fourteen civilians killed by British soldiers as they were taking part in a civil rights demonstration. The soldiers were spared the judicial process despite the efforts deployed by the victims’ families to bring them to justice. In 2014, an amnesty was suggested as a transitional justice mechanism to further the society’s transition to the post-conflict era. This study examines the validity of such an amnesty in light of the underlying values of the Rule of Law.
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中共國防與軍隊改革下-軍事法制之研究蕭智文 Unknown Date (has links)
中共認為體制編制變革,既是武裝力量管理方法及作戰力量體系編組思路的體現,也是提升軍隊戰鬥力,引導軍隊現代化發展的重要措施,特別是習近平在中共十八大會後,藉反貪名義積極進行整風運動,改革已確定是習近平政權的重要施政目標,2015年9月,習近平於閱兵時公開宣布將裁軍30萬,更讓外界增添許多想像空間,在2016年裡逐步落實四總部的重整,軍委機關改制,二砲部隊改為火箭軍,及新成立戰略支援部隊,撤銷七大軍區,改設立五大戰區,完成推動領導指揮體制、優化結構規模力量編成與強化軍事訓練等,勢必對解放軍的體制與發展造成相當的影響。
中共歷任領導人都將掌握軍權視為權力穩固的基礎,上任之後安排信任者或同一派系擔任重要領導角色。本研究嘗試從中共中央軍委直轄體系與軍隊的變化,探討戰區改革現況,及軍事法治改革之意圖與目標,並從中分析改革對軍文職關係之影響。 / PLA thought that the change of armed forced‘structure and organization’is a good way to show the management and combat force system as well as the measure for power enhancement and leading the development of modernization, especially after the 1th CPC National Congress,‘reformation’has been determined to be an important policy objective of regime of Xi Jinping. Particularly in September of 2015, Xi Jinping announced at the parade that they will disarm 300,000 people, and leave a lot of imagination to outside world. And in 2016, it was gradually implemented in reforming of the four general departments, restructured the Central Military Commission, and reorganized the Second Artillery to the Rocket Forces and the new established strategic support units. The announcement of cancelling seven military regions to establish five war regions at same level. Already completed the leadership system change, forces and structure reform and improve the combat training , which is bound to cause a considerable impact.
Xi’s predecessors regarded securing military power as a basis for a stable authority. Therefore, they usually assigned major positions to people they trusted or from the same factions. This study attempts to discuss the change of the PLA Central Military Commission to the variation of the governance system to military, as well as practices of joint operations while seven MR integrate into war regions. And the intentions and objectives of military rule of law reform. And analyzes the influence of reform on military relations.
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La consolidation des standards constitutionnels européens par les juges constitutionnels nationaux / The consolidation of European constitutional standards by the national constitutional courtsArtemiou, Eleni 14 October 2016 (has links)
La thèse examine les influences horizontales entre les juges constitutionnels des États membres de l’Union européenne dans l’interprétation de la constitution. Si ces influences s’inscrivent parfois dans la ligne de la mise en œuvre des obligations supranationales communes, elles interprètent surtout l’existence de valeurs partagées entre les États que les juges constitutionnels sont appelés à protéger, voire l’existence d’une identité commune, d’un idéal de justice constitutionnelle qui s’articule autour de la protection de l’État de droit, et en particulier des droits fondamentaux. Ce sont en effet les principes attachés au constitutionnalisme moderne qui animent le plus les échanges entre les juges constitutionnels nationaux. Ce phénomène d’inspiration réciproque est intéressant car il demeure spontané, et souligne la volonté du juge de rejoindre un standard commun qui se consolide progressivement par des interprétations diverses, et traduit la reconnaissance d’une équivalence systémique dans la protection de l’État de droit. L’ordre juridique étranger inspire ainsi le juge national puisqu’il s’aligne au standard national du constitutionnalisme. / Once attached exclusively to their national constitution, nowadays constitutional judges of the member states of the European Union in particular apply norms from different legal systems,. Their openness to foreign law, whether voluntary or not, creates a network of constitutional principles that are common to all national systems and eventually harmonise their interpretation. The European constitutional standards represent the mutual acceptance between two legal orders of their capacity to adequately respect the fundamental values of the constitution, especially fundamental rights, and the convergence of their implementation.
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Les valeurs de l'Union européenne / The European Union’s valuesLabayle, Simon 12 December 2016 (has links)
L’Union européenne est, selon l’article 2 TUE, « fondée » sur des « valeurs » précisément identifiées. L’affirmation juridique de cette dimension fondatrice est d’autant moins neutre qu’elle est systématiquement revendiquée. Elle renvoie à une recherche d’essentialité laissant supposer que l’Union accorde volontairement une place centrale à ses valeurs. Ce choix s’exprime concrètement dans différentes dispositions issues des traités constitutifs. Les valeurs exercent notamment une influence décisive sur des questions aussi fondamentales que celles de la définition des objectifs de l’Union (article 3 TUE), du prononcé d’éventuelles sanctions à l’encontre d’États membres qui menaceraient leur intégrité (article 7 TUE), de l’orientation des relations qu’elle tisse avec son voisinage (article 8 TUE), ou encore des modalités de l’éventuelle adhésion d’un État tiers à l’Union européenne (article 49 TUE). Au-delà de la portée symbolique, juridique et politique de ces différents thèmes, les valeurs participent en réalité à déterminer l’identité spécifique de l’Union européenne. Il convient alors de s’interroger quant à la traduction concrète de cette dimension fondatrice. Afin de démontrer la consubstantialité et l’irréversibilité du lien que partagent l’Union européenne et ses valeurs, il est d’abord nécessaire de mettre en relief la vocation structurante et fonctionnelle des valeurs pour l’Union. Il reste ensuite à mesurer à quel point leur portée existentielle dépend de l’enjeu de leur protection, qu’elle soit politique, administrative ou juridictionnelle / The European Union is, according to Article 2 TEU, "founded" on "values" precisely identified. The legal affirmation of this fundamental dimension is systematically claimed. It refers to a research of essentiality suggesting that the Union voluntarily gives a central place to its values, which confirms the analysis of the main stages of its history. This choice is expressed in various provisions of the founding treaties. These values carry a decisive influence on fundamental issues such as the definition of the objectivesof the Union (Article 3 TEU), the imposition of any sanctions against member states that threaten their integrity (Article 7 TEU), the orientation of the relationships it forges with its neighbours (Article 8 TEU), and the terms of the possible accession of a state outside the European Union (Article 49 TEU). Beyond the symbolic, legal and political scope of these themes, the values determine the specific identity of the European Union. Thus, it is appropriate to question the concrete translation of the founding dimension of the values in the integration project and, therefore, to test the strength of community beliefs. The aim of the research is to determine whether a Union based on values can withstand the rigour of scientific analysis as well as the pressure of events. In order to demonstrate the consubstantial nature and the irreversibility of the link shared by the European Union and its beliefs, it is crucial to highlight the structural and functional vocation of the values for the Union. Lastly, their existential scope is yet to be assessed as this will depend from the level of their protection, whether political, administrative or judicial
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