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11	金融控股公司法下子公司收購機制及個案之研究 / Study on mechanism and cases regarding mergers and acquisition of subsidiaries of financial holding company 楊之婕, Yang, Jhih Jie Unknown Date (has links) 我國於2001年通過金融控股公司法（以下簡稱金控法）以來，迄今已逾十年，金融控股公司（以下簡稱金控）之家數已達16家，其中所整合的金融機構型態包含銀行、證券、保險、投信等相關事業等，多達9 0家以上，子公司之總數量高達100家，顯見金控為增加其股東及公司利益、擴展事業體等目的，而對於併購活動日益頻繁。依據金控發動併購時是否已取得目標金融機構的同意，可區分為合意收購或非合意收購之屬性，然金控是否均適合兩種屬性？本文藉由金控收購的相關法制深入研究本議題。金控收購子公司之法制歷經三次重大修訂，爰將歷次更迭區分為三個階段分別論述，配合實務上真實發生之個案進行研析，論究金控收購子公司之成敗因素，亦即，本文藉由法制演繹、文獻整合、案例分析之研究方法，探究我國金控法收購子公司之法制，並提出結論與建議。金融控股公司併購非合意併購 Financial Holding Company Mergers and Acquisition Hostile Takeover
12	敵意併購下採取防禦措施對主併公司股東利益之影響 / The Effects of Shareholders’ Value of Acquiring Companies on Hostile Takeover Defenses 鄭亦珺, Cheng, I Chun Unknown Date (has links) 循著時光的隧道，自二十世紀初以來，全球企業併購的熱潮方興未艾，時至今日「併購」已為一般人所熟知，併購的型態更演變出多種樣貌。本文以敵意併購為基調，蒐集全球2000年至2015年樣本，研究結果顯示，敵意併購之宣告對主併公司股東短期有不利之影響，若目標公司採取防禦策略時，對主併公司股東而言亦不利。故如果一公司欲發動敵意併購時，需考量目標公司是否有防禦措施的設置，惟此結果未達顯著水準。此外本研究亦針對敵意併購下主併公司股東的異常報酬，探討影響股東異常報酬的原因，實證結果得知，併購溢價越高，對於主併公司股東顯著不利，驗證「贏家的詛咒」理論，亦即併購溢價越多，將使得主併公司持股人的財富移轉至目標公司身上，對主併方股東有不利之影響。 / The trend of Merger and Acquisition is booming as of 20th century and the pattern has become variable and complicated. In this study, hostile takeover, one of the focal point on the subject of M&A, is to be discussed. Samples are collected from 2000 to 2015 globally by SDC platinum. Result shows that hostile takeover activity does not benefit shareholders’ interest of the acquiring firm. If the target firm adopts defensive tactics, situation will be worse. Therefore, as the bidding firm, it has to considered whether there are defensive tactics against hostile takeover in the target. While these aren’t significant result. Furthermore, this paper attempts to find the factors which would affect shareholders’ abnormal return under hostile takeover, and result shows M&A premium significantly does. The higher of M&A premium, the more unfavorable to the shareholders’ interest of the acquiring firm. It supports the theory of “winner’s curse”. That is, as M&A premium increases, shareholders’ wealth of the acquiring company is expected to transfer to the targets more which is adverse to the shareholders of the acquiring one. 敵意併購反併購防禦措施股東財富贏家詛咒 Hostile Takeover Anti-takeover Defenses Shareholders’ Wealth Winner’s Curse
13	股東行動主義與惡意併購個案之研究 / Case study on the shareholder activist and hostile takeover in Taiwan 賴燕玲, Lai, Yen Ling Unknown Date (has links) 股東權益與意見在公司治理中屬重要一環，否則少數公司決策者（例如董事會或公司的CEO）會過度左右企業資源的分配，甚至發生浪費、貪污等代理問題，進而損及小股東權益，甚至勞工權益。本論文以公司治理的基本概念及架構為基礎，並以惡意併購的個案作為案例，探討並說明股東行動主義的經濟與法律意涵。其中，主要就「金融控股公司依金融控股公司法申請轉投資審核原則」法規設計，選擇具代表性個案，探討個案公司於股東治理的基礎規範與相關運作程序，包括非合意併購、委託書爭奪戰等相關法律問題。若根據目前台灣上市/櫃公司，其公司治理的實施狀況，許多法律學者均認為職業股東屬必要之罪，委託書是在目前公司所有權與經營權不分下，可能的外部監督力量。目前台灣委託書的相關規定過於保護大股東、公司派，導致小股東的權益受到一定程度的損害。若能自由化委託書收購，並且讓委託書可以在自由市場買賣，如此所創造的市場機制，據委託書的價格及外部市場機制，對於台灣過度依賴大股東或管理階層的公司治理結構會產生顯著改善效果，有效提升公司治理。本論文所選擇的個案公司，可以充分顯現上述這些方面的法律與經濟意涵。另外一個好的金融控股公司合併政策有賴一個健全之法律制度加以配套。針對金控公司是否得以所謂非合意併購達成合併之目的，金管會僅以行政命令「金融控股公司依金融控股公司法申請轉投資審核原則」與「公開收購公開發行公司有價證券管理辦法」作為主要法源，在法律上之位階上似乎有將行政命令之位階提高至法律位階之必要，本文以個案公司為例探討其相關法律問題。關鍵字：公司治理、委託書、非合意併購、代理理論、價購委託書 / Shareholder’s interests play an important role in corporate governance. Otherwise, few decision-makers (ex. Board members, directors, etc) might misuse corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions in which interests of minority shareholders and employees will be jeopardized. This thesis will explore synergies of shareholder’s activism based on basic concepts and framework of corporate governance. In particular, case studies will focus on related regulations and practicable mechanisms of corporate governance in which certain legal issues, such as hostile takeover and proxy battle, will be elaborated based on ‘Principles of supervising investment application from financial holding companies’. Related regulations of proxy rights in Taiwan tend to protect interests of major shareholders and result in negative impacts of minority shareholders. If purchase offers of proxy could be freely traded in public, marketing mechanisms will balance the distortion of major shareholders and enhance the essence of corporate governance effectively. Case studies in this thesis therefore will reflect the above-mentioned legal and business implications. In addition, merge policies of financial conglomerate need supplementally sound regulations. In Taiwan, legal sources in financial holding companies are based on “Principles of supervising investment application from financial holding companies “ and “Regulations Governing Tender Offers for Purchase of the Securities of a Public Company “ issued by Financial Supervisory Committee of Executive Yuan. Positions of legal sources, in which case studies will be reviewed, seemingly need to be upgraded from administrative to legal level. Key word: Corporate Governance, Proxy,Hostile takeover,Agency Theory, Proxy Buying 公司治理委託書非合意併購代理理論價購委託書 Corporate Governance,,,, Proxy Hostile takeover Agency Theory Proxy Buying
14	公司治理體系下控制權市場之定位 / The Role of Control Market in the Framework of Corporate Governance 林俊宏, Lin ,Chun-Hung Unknown Date (has links) 本文主要探討公司治理體系下控制權市場所發揮之功能，內容大致上分為四個部分。第一部分先就公司治理理論以及不同體系加以介紹，從Ronald H. Coase交易成本理論、Berle & Means五種公司類型，以及代理理論說明公司治理的理論基礎，再分別介紹OECD以及World Bank的公司治理架構，而控制權市場則是公司治理體系下，外部治理機制的一項重要工具，最後就美國、日本與我國的公司治理體系加以介紹。第二部分則是說明企業併購促使控制權市場發揮治理成效之主要活動，因此，分別就美國、日本與我國企業併購之概況加以闡述。美國歷經了五次併購風潮，有其經濟、文化等結構性因素，而日本與我國過去並未發生併購風潮，然而隨著結構性因素的改變，再加上全球化的浪潮，日本與我國併購活動有逐漸加溫之趨勢。視敵意併購為控制權市場之主要利器，這是因為企業雖然有可能因為善意併購後，改善效率進而增加股東權益，有助於公司治理，但敵意併購活動更兼具威嚇現任經營者之效果，因此，敵意併購活動於公司治理體系上，一方面可汰換不適任經營者，另一方面亦可對現任經營者造成威嚇使其不敢進行有礙於股東權益之情事。而主併者進行敵意併購，主要可行的途徑有二：一為收購股權，另一為委託書徵求。就法制面而言，則見諸公開收購以及委託書管理相關規定。第三部分開始探討敵意併購法制，本文分別介紹了美國、日本以及我國公開收購制度，目前我國已從事先核准制修正為事先申報制，與美國、日本之申報制相近。但對於公開收購定義則大相逕庭，美國採八項要素判斷，日本與我國則加以明確定義。另外股東平等原則部份，美國、日本與我國同採「比例分配制」，關於禁止變更收購條件的範圍，則是美國最寬鬆因此有利於主併者，而日本最嚴格。至於美國州法下的反併購條款在我國與日本並未出現。而關於我國引進強制公開收購制度，本文分別引述支持與反對者之意見，並基於促進併購活動發生有利於公司治理此一面向，說明強制公開收購制度可能之影響。第四部份探討美國、日本與我國關於委託書徵求相關制度，就資訊公開的內容而言，美國、日本與我國相關規定大同小異，但徵求人資格限制以及徵求股份總數限制為我國獨有，況且因公司派掌握紀念品的製作權以及發放權，加上相關規定使投信事業必須支持符合持股成數之之公司董事會提出之議案或董事、監察人候選人，且又就使用股東名冊的難易程度而言，我國委託書徵求相關規定實對現任經營者較有利。而關於委託書價購與否之爭論，本文分別就正反兩方之理由加以介紹，後從公司治理之角度出發，認為收購委託書可能使管理者有更多經濟上誘因進行舞弊，有礙於公司治理，故應禁止之。最後比較公開收購制度與委託書徵求制度二者，分別從所需資金、成本風險控制、實施之便宜性以及公司治理角度，希冀我國未來公開收購制度能善加運用，發揮公司治理之功效。文末並提出相關建議，以供將來之研究或主管機關作為參考。 / This dissertation mainly discusses the role of control market in the framework of corporate governance. It is composed of four parts. The first part introduces relevant theories of corporate governance, including Ronald H. Coase’s “transaction cost theory”, Berle & Means’ “five types of corporation”, and agency theory. Then the diverse frameworks of corporate governance including OECD, World Bank, in which control market is indicated as a significant external mechanism, are illustrated. At last, the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan's frameworks of corporate governance are introduced respectively. The second part explains that the merges & acquisitions (M&A) is one of the major activities that make control market operate effectively. Then the general situations of the M&A in the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan are introduced. Taken as a main mechanism of control market, hostile takeover not only strikes inefficient managers but menaces the incumbent from fraud. Two major feasible approaches of hostile takeover are purchasing stocks and soliciting proxies. The rules of tender offer and proxy contest are relevant. The third part discusses the legal institution of hostile takeover. The rules of tender offer of U.S., Japan, and Taiwan are introduced. Then the similarities and dissimilarities between the rules from the definitions of tender offer, equal treatment to shareholders, and anti-takeover strategies are detailed. At the end of this part, different points of view about mandatory tender offer and its relation with corporate governance are discussed. The fourth part explores (investigates) the rules of proxy contest of the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan. They are similar in the disclosure principle, but only Taiwan set limitations on the qualification of solicitors and the amount of proxies. In addition, the incumbent in Taiwan have the control over the manufacturing and delivery of the tokens for shareholders in annual meetings. What’s more, regulations force the institute-investors to support the incumbent. In conclusion, the proxy rules in Taiwan favor the incumbent. Also, the arguments over proxy purchase and its relation with corporate governance is mentioned. At last, this paper compares tender offer with proxy soliciting in several aspects: the fund needed, risk control, convenience, and corporate governance. In the end, the conclusion provides some suggestions for legislators and future studies. 公司治理控制權市場企業併購敵意併購公開收購委託書徵求 corporate governance control market merges and acquisitions M&A hostile takeover tender offer proxy solicitation
15	從實證觀點探討我國敵意併購之法制 / Regulating Hostile Takeovers in Taiwan : From an Empirical Study 陳思穎, Chen, Szu-Yin Unknown Date (has links) 全球併購浪潮下，敵意併購向來是併購議題中備受矚目的焦點，許多國家均針對敵意併購設有明確的法規範，而我國自2002年通過企業併購法以來，已歷經十五年，在敵意併購相關法制的建構上卻顯有不足，導致實務上面臨許多問題。蓋我國近年來引發高度關注的敵意併購案件，幾乎皆以失敗收場，且雙方攻擊防禦的過程中往往演變為經營權惡鬥，不僅兩敗俱傷，亦使公司及股東利益蒙受損失。有鑑於前述情況，本文擬從實證觀點探討我國企業環境與文化脈絡對於敵意併購之影響，並透過國內曾發生過的案例、主管機關的態度與法院見解，對我國現行法制進行反思。另外，本文亦藉由美國、英國、德國、歐盟和日本之比較法研究，從目標公司採行防禦措施之相關規範、對於股東之資訊揭露以及少數股東權益保障等面向，討論出可能且適合用於我國之規範方向，以作為建構我國敵意併購法制之參考。 / In the wave of global mergers and acquisitions, hostile takeover has long been a focal point on the issues relating to mergers and acquisitions. Many countries have already built up more transparent regulatory regimes specifically for hostile takeover activities. However, since Taiwan promulgated the Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act in 2002, the relevant laws and regulations were not sufficient to govern hostile takeover activities during the past fifteen years and a number of issues arose in practice. In recent years, the well-known hostile takeover cases in Taiwan all ended up in failure. The actions taken by the party initiating hostile takeover and the target company often led to corporate control contests, making both parties and the shareholders suffer losses. This thesis examines the influences of Taiwanese culture and corporate environment on hostile takeover. It also marks the deficiencies of the current regulatory regime in Taiwan by reviewing the hostile takeover cases, the opinions of the competent authority and the judicial judgements. In addition, this thesis introduces the legislations of the United States, England, Germany, European Union, and Japan on anti-takeover tactics, information disclosure as well as the protection of minority shareholders’ rights and interests. The thesis then analyzes whether these legal systems are suitable as a reference for Taiwan to establish relevant laws and regulations in the future. 敵意併購實證研究防禦措施受託義務資訊揭露強制收購制度 Hostile takeover Empirical research Defensive tactics Fiduciary duty Information disclosure Mandatory offer
16	企業併購的動態競爭分析 ─ 以台灣半導體封測廠商日月光與矽品合併為例 / Dynamic Competition Analysis in M&A – A Case Study of ASE-SPIL Merger 賴品中 Unknown Date (has links) 2016年全球半導體產值約 3,270 億美元，台灣半導體產值佔全球的23%，繼續蟬聯全球第二大半導體產業大國，排行僅次於美國。此外，台灣以出口為導向，根據我國財政部統計，2017上半年積體電路出口金額占整體出口總值的27.6%，是我國最主要的出口產品，可見半導體產業對台灣的影響力不言而喻。近年來半導體併購浪潮興起，台灣廠商也無法置身事外，最受矚目非日月光與矽品的非合意併購案莫屬。一般學術論文對於非合意併購案的探討，著重於併購前的動機與併購後的綜效，鮮少討論雙方在併購過程中的攻防。故本研究欲以動態競爭觀點，並考量政府對併購成敗的影響，來找出矽品最後同意日月光共組控股公司之提案的原因，並分析此合併案對全球封測產業所造成的影響。本研究發現雙方在合併前，應用產品及地區的市場共同性，分別呈現上升及下降趨勢，透過收購矽品，日月光不僅能追趕其主要競爭對手在車用電子的領先地位，更可以降低營收過度集中於北美的風險。另外，雙方在台灣及中國的專利申請數量有下降趨勢，但在美國專利的申請數有明顯增加且資源相似性也呈上升趨勢，故推論日月光收購矽品可鞏固其在北美市場的領導地位。總而言之，雖然日矽合併案被外界視為雙贏結果，但客戶轉單、中國商務部的限制條件及收購溢價偏高可能使得此合併綜效有限。在面對中國封測產商崛起、封測產業的市場集中度上升及半導體產業中下游界限越來越不明確的情況下，雙方合併為必然之勢。 / The worldwide semiconductor market grew 1.1% in 2016 to $338.9 billion USD, in which Taiwan accounts for 23% of the total output. Taiwan continues to rank as the world's second largest semiconductor industry, with the first being America. Taiwan is export oriented, and from the statistical data provided by the Ministry of Finance, the shipment of integrated circuit exports accounted for 27.6% of gross export value in the first two quarters of 2017. This indicates that integrated circuit is an important export product and that the semiconductor industry is of great importance to Taiwan. The recent and unprecedented M&A waves in the semiconductor industry caused major changes and created impact on Taiwanese semiconductor firm. The recent case that drew most attention is the M&A between ASE (Advanced Semiconductor Engineering, Inc.) and SPIL (Siliconware Precision Industries Co., Ltd). While most academic theses focus on the acquiring firm’s motive and post-M&A synergy, the offense and defense strategies during the M&A process are rarely explored. This research aims to focus on reasons why SPIL agreed on ASE’s proposal to form a joint venture holding company and the impact on the global OSAT (Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test) industry after this M&A. This thesis utilized the dynamic competitive perspective and identifies government’s impact on M&A. The study finds that before the merger, the commonality of product shows an upward trend while the commonality of region market presents a downward direction. This merger not only assists ASE to catch up with its leading competitors in the automotive electronics sectors, but also reduce the revenue concentration risk, given that its major sales is in North America. In addition, the number of patents filed by both companies in Taiwan and China has declined, but the number in the United States has increased significantly along with an escalating resource similarity. Therefore, the research concludes that the acquisition of SPIL can consolidate ASE’s leading position in the North American market. To sum up, the merger of ASE and SPIL is regarded as win-win outcome. However, the M&A has risks, such as customer attrition, restriction from The Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) and merger overpayment. Such uncertainties may reduce synergy. Nevertheless, in the face of the rise of China's OSAT business, the market concentration of OSAT industry, and the increasingly unclear boundary between the middle and downstream firms, the merger of the two firms is inevitable. 動態競爭市場共同性資源相似性察覺 - 動機 - 能力觀點高階經營團隊非合意併購封測產業 Dynamic competition Market commonality Resource similarity AMC theory Top management team Hostile takeover OSAT industry
17	Převzetí společnosti skrze insolvenční řízení (SAZKA, a.s.) / Takeover of through insolvency proceedings (SAZKA, a.s.) Nedvědová, Nikola January 2012 (has links) This thesis deals with takeovers in the Czech environment according to the Insolvency Act No. 182/2006 Coll., which passed an amendment to the 1. 1. 2008. There are methods of resolving insolvency of the debtor and principles of insolvency proceedings which should be followed during the insolvency process. Work distinguishes friendly and hostile takeover. The theoretical part provides an overview of possible ways of takeover, the reasons that motivate new owners to think about a possible takeover and globally applicable defense strategies. Another theoretical starting point is consideration of the reorganization of the company, which may be conducted by both the debtor and of the creditor(s). The practical part describes the hostile takeover of SAZKA from its history, through description of the key moments of crisis to insolvency proceedings which resulted in the bankruptcy of the debtor. Subsequent hostile takeover was directed by PPF and KKCG, which bought up commitment wagers and therefore became important creditors (controlling the betting and lottery activities) and later winner of the tender for the sale of the entire company. This case is a textbook example of takeover of the company, which had fallen into financial distress. The battle for the largest lottery company in the country was very hard, long and eventually resulted in a very profitable business, which fell into the arms of a single owner.
18	Les moyens de défense contre les OPA hostiles / Antitakeover defenses Maouche, Samia 27 November 2017 (has links) Opérations particulièrement complexes, les offres publiques d'acquisition ne cessent de faire parler d'elles, plus particulièrement lorsqu'elles présentent un caractère hostile pour la société visée. De nombreux efforts législatifs ont été mis en œuvre en vue d'encadrer les OPA et de lutter contre les prises de contrôle rampantes. L'analyse du droit positif permet de mettre en lumière ces différents efforts ainsi que leur mise en œuvre à travers diverses techniques par les sociétés visées. Ces dernières ont par ailleurs développé un certain nombre de mécanismes de défense anti-OPA particulièrement efficaces, mais se révélant le plus souvent insuffisants face à l'ingéniosité dont peut faire preuve l'initiateur. Le droit positif montre ainsi ses limites face à des pratiques qui ne cessent d'évoluer. L'analyse prospective du droit anti-OPA permet d'observer les nouvelles mutations que subit le droit positif au regard des nouveaux enjeux économiques. Elle permet également d'envisager de nouveaux modes d'appréhension des OPA hostiles. Il est ainsi possible d'observer que le gouvernement d'entreprise prend une place considérable dans la vie des sociétés cotées. De même, la montée en puissance de la régulation et l'interventionnisme de l’État sont de plus en plus marqués ; et les salariés s'impliquent de plus en plus dans la gestion de l'entreprise. L'ensemble de ces paramètres marquent un glissement progressif vers une réorganisation du mode de fonctionnement des sociétés, ce qui a amené au développement du soft law, un droit à la frontière du droit positif et des pratiques des sociétés. Le soft law constitue à ce titre une approche inédite des OPA hostiles, dont l'analyse permet de cerner les apports liés à la mutation du droit positif et d'envisager l'émergence de nouveaux moyens de défense. Celui-ci doit toutefois demeurer complémentaire au cadre législatif et réglementaire existant. / No abstract Prise de contrôle Offres publiques d'achat Prise de contrôle hostile Offre obligatoire Offre amicale Sociétés cotées Moyens de défense Actions Initiateur Société cible Franchissement de seuils Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) Actionnaires Droits de vote Action de concert Salariés Conseil d'administration Comité d'entreprise Augmentation de capital Transparence Chevalier blanc Bons bretons (pilules empoisonnées) Droit souple Gouvernement d'entreprise Contre-OPA Sanctions Takeover bid Hostile takeover bid Mandatory bid Amicable bid Listed companies Antitakeover defenses Shares Raider Target company Crossing of shareholding thresholds Amf Shareholders Voting rights Concert Employees Board of directors Works council Increase of capital Transparency Wight knight Poison pills Soft law Corporate governance Pacman Sanctions 330
19	員工持股計畫中受任人義務之研究 / A study of fiduciary duty under employee stock ownership plan 李松諺 Unknown Date (has links) 員工持股計畫是由財經律師Louis Kelso所創，在美國已行之多年，廣為美國企業所採。最早的員工持股計畫是一種為了和平地從資本家手中移轉資本給員工、縮減貧富差距的工具。為了使這個計畫可以持續有效地運作下去，立法者將員工持股計畫為退休金計畫的一種，使員工必須長期持有股票，直到退休。然而在實務運作上，員工持股信託經常被運用為防止敵意併購的工具。尤有甚者，某些公司內部人會利用員工持股計畫為自己取得大量資金、移轉投資風險,但仍可保留對於公司的控制力。這些行為都有可能對股東及員工造成不利的影響，但在現行法制下，只能仰賴司法者透過判決保護這些經濟及資訊上的弱勢族群。在台灣，員工持股計畫雖然已廣為許多企業所採用，但是發展了將近20年，只能成為另一種員工持有股票的工具。員工擁有的股票數量並不足以使其在股東會上贏得一個受公司內部人重視的地位，也不足以倚賴這些股票作為退休金之用。這種規模上的差異是台美員工持股計畫最關鍵的不同點。小規模雖然使員工持股計畫帶來的優勢少了許多，但相對地也減低許多代理成本，至今未有員工持股計畫侵害大量員工利益的事件爆發。然而這不表示員工持股計畫在台灣就是個可以被忽略的問題，若能在未來建立一套有效率的立法制度，使員工持股計畫的規模擴大，員工將可因此享受到更多公司盈餘，並且使其退休生活受到保障。相對地，參考美國員工持股計畫的問題後，也可以預先設想未來可能發生的弊端，未雨綢繆。本文相信，一個有效率的員工持股計畫，可以實現解決貧富不均的理想。 / Employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) which is created by Louis Kelso is brought to practice for many years. Many enterprises use it as their retirement pension plan. The earliest employee stock ownership plan to transfer the capital frome capitalists to labors and reduce the disparity between the rich and the poor.In order to make the plan work out continueously and effectively, the legislator devise ESOP as a pension fund which makes employee own stock chronically until they retires. However, in practice, ESOP is usually exercised for preventing hostile takeover. Moreover, some company insiders may use ESOP TTO get a great deal of capital and transfer the investment risk, but still own the controlling power to their company. This behaviors will cause some harmful effects to the shareholders and the employees, but in the current legal system,the only one we can depend is the judge who can protect the minority in the economic and the information. ESOP is exercised by many enterprises in Taiwan. But after 20 years, it can only become one of the tools which assist employees to acquire company stocks.The number of shares which employees owns can’t make them have a posi-tion which let the company insiders take account in the shareholder committee and have enough amounts for their retirement pensions.This disparity in scale is the keypoint what is different between Tiwan and the U.S. ESOP. Althoygh small scale makes the adventage of ESOP decrease, it reduce lots of agency costs. To this day, there’re not any events which injure the interests of employees by ESOP. Never-theless, it doesn’t mean that ESOP in Taiwan is a issue which can be neglected. If we can establish an efficient legal system and extend the scale of ESOP, employees can obtain more company interests and have a security of their retirement life.In the opposite, after researching the problem of the U.S. ESOP, we can assume the culpably misconduct which will happen in the future and repair the house before it rains。Ｉ believe that a efficient ESOP can realize the ideal to solve the problem of uneven distribution of the wealth. 員工持股計畫受任人義務員工退休金保障法內地稅法唯一利益原則謹慎義務多元化投資義務經營判斷法則敵意併購確定提撥計畫確定給付計畫穿越投票原則一人一表決權原則鏡像表決 Employee stock ownership plan Fiduciary duty Employee retirement income security act Internal revenue code Exclusive benefit rule Duty of prudence Duty of diversification Business judgement rule Hostile takeover Defined contribution plan Defined benefit plan Pass through voting 1 person per share Mirror voting
20	Le droit français des OPA - un modèle pour le droit brésilien ? / The French law of takeover bids, a model for the brazilian law ? Mendia Twardowsky, Bianca 29 November 2017 (has links) L'objectif de cette thèse est d'analyser le système juridique français et brésilien concernant les stratégies de défense contre les offres publiques d'acquisition visant à prendre le contrôle des sociétés cotées en bourse. Les offres publiques d'acquisition font l'objet d'un vif débat, plus particulièrement lorsqu'elles présentent un caractère hostile pour la société cible. En France, de nombreux efforts législatifs ont été mis en œuvre en vue d'encadrer les OPA et de lutter contre les prises de contrôle rampantes. L'analyse du droit positif permet de mettre en lumière ces différents efforts ainsi que leur mise en œuvre à travers diverses techniques par les sociétés visées. Grâce à l'analyse juridique des stratégies anti-OPA en France, le système brésilien peut prendre connaissance de cette expérience et trouver la meilleure approche juridique pour les sociétés cotées ayant un capital flottant important. Au Brésil, la récente vague d'IPO a été possible grâce à la réforme dans la bourse BM&FBOVESPA. Dorénavant, la BM&FBOVESPA présente le scénario idéal pour prendre le contrôle des sociétés cotées. Ainsi, l'importance de ce thème est le résultat de la dispersion de l'actionnariat après la première vague d'introduction en bourse dans le marché de capitaux brésilien, et en France, elle se traduit par l'évolution dans environnement légal des défenses anti-OPA face à des pratiques qui ne cessent d'évoluer. / The objective of this thesis is to analyse the French experience and the Brazilian legal environment concerning the defense strategies against hostile corporate takeovers aimed at taking control over public companies. Through the analysis of the French legal system of the anti-takeover strategies, the Brazilian system will be able to acquire this experience and find the best legal approach for Brazilian public companies with dispersed ownership. The importance of this theme is the result of the ownership dispersion following the first IPOs in the current Brazilian securities exchange market, which provides the ideal scenario for taking control of these publicly-traded companies, as well as the changes and the evolution in the French legal environment. Prise de contrôle Offre publique d'acquisition Prise de contrôle hostile Offre obligatoire Offre amicale Sociétés cotées Stratégie de défense anti-OPA Sanctions Actions Société cible Raider Franchissement de seuils Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) Cvm Cade Bm&fbovespa Nivel 1 Nivel 2 Novo mercado Ipo Capital flottant Actionnaires Droits de vote Action de concert Salariés Conseil d'administration Comité d'entreprise Augmentation de capital Transparence Chevalier blanc Bons bretons Poison pill Gouvernement d'entreprise Takeover bid Hostile takeover bid Ownership dispersion Securities exchange commission Mandatory bid Listed companies Anti-takeover defenses Sanctions Shares Raider Target company Amf Cvm Cade Bm&fbovespa Nivel 1 Nivel 2 Novo mercado Initial public offering Free float Shareholders Voting rights Board of directors Transparency White knight Poison pills Corporate governance 346.44

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