本研究分析各類型機構投資人持股份額及持股變動，與企業併購長短期績效的關聯性，藉以探討各類型投資人在公司治理中所扮演的角色。本研究結果發現，機構投資人持股對企業監督的功能在短期不明顯。然而就長期而言，外資持股對併購長期績效有正面影響。無論由法人、機構投資人及總持股等層面來看，外資持股皆與併購企業長期績效有顯著的正相關。 進一步將各類型投資人持股拆解為細項，發現外資信託基金持股與併購長期績效的關係由負轉正;反觀本國方面，本國信託基金持股對長期績效則有非常顯著的負向影響；而包含職工福利會及基金會持股的本國其他法人持股及證券自營商持股則對長期績效有顯著的正向影響。 由持股變動也能觀察到一致性的結果。機構投資人持股變動與對併購績效的影響，於短期多為不顯著且方向不一致；長期而言，雖然包含外資機構投資人在內的多數持股變動變數皆未有顯著結果，但本國信託基金的持股變動與併購績效仍然存在非常顯著的負相關。 由公司治理及外部監督的角度而言，本研究結果顯示外資整體投資人在企業中扮演著重要的監督者角色。以細項來看，外資信託基金、本國其他法人及證券自營商較能有效地監督企業決策，為企業帶來長期的價值提升；反觀本國信託基金則非良好的企業監督者，且帶來顯著的負向影響。 / In this paper, we examine the relationship between different types of institutional ownership and acquiring firms’ performance on M&A activities. We found that the monitoring effect is weak in the short-term horizon; however, there is a significantly positive relationship between foreign institutional ownership and long-term performance on M&A activities. More specifically, the result shows that the ownership of foreign mutual funds, domestic foundations and securities dealers is positively related to M&A performance, while the ownership of domestic mutual funds has a significantly negative relation with M&A performance. At the same time, we have a consistent result from change in institutional ownership. While the relationship between change in most kinds of institutional ownership and long-term M&A performance is weak, the change in domestic mutual funds’ ownership has a strong negative relation with M&A performance. This paper shows that foreign investors’ monitoring has a positive influence on firm’s M&A decision. On the contrary, domestic mutual funds is not a good monitor that their holdings lead to poor M&A performance.

本研究採1992年至2002年首度上市的樣本公司為研究樣本，並依據同產業規模相當且上市五年以上的原則挑選配對公司，檢驗公司治理、經營績效與機構投資人投資行為之關聯性。與先前研究不同之處在於，本研究深入探討公司治理對經營績效的影響，解釋在不同經濟條件與公司特性下，將影響公司治理機制效率的發揮，使公司治理與績效呈正相關。 本研究利用樣本公司上市當時的公司治理變數，檢驗公司治理對上市後半年的會計績效影響與上市後30天、90天與180天的市場報酬，再進而驗證經營績效對上市後一年機構投資人投資行為的影響，此外，並比較有價證券上市審查準則規定前後的公司，在公司治理與經營績效上是否有差異。透過相關分析、T檢定、迴歸分析與聯立方程式，檢驗三大研究假說，實證結果獲得以下主要結論： 1.樣本公司與配對公司的特性 樣本公司的公司治理機制較健全，會計績效表現也較佳。 2.公司治理程度不同的公司特性 公司治理程度高的公司其市場績效表現較佳，且年齡較小。 3.景氣與產業，對公司治理與經營績效關聯性的影響 產業特性會加強公司治理程度對會計績效的影響；經濟景氣，會加強公司治理程度對市場績效的影響。 4.當經濟景氣差、代理成本高與轉投資家數多時，更突顯公司治理的重要性，公司治理對績效有正向的影響 5.無參與管理的公司，更突顯公司治理的效果，公司治理對績效有正向的影響 6.機構投資人持股比例與週轉率呈正相關 7.經營績效與機構投資人投資行為呈正相關 市場績效對機構投資人持股比例有正向的影響；會計績效對機構投資人週轉率也有正向的影響，顯示績效與機構投資人投資行為呈正相關。 8.法令規範後，公司治理與經營績效表現較佳 9.金融業的公司治理表現較佳 / This paper examines the relationship between the corporate governance, firm performance, and institutional behavior of Taiwanese TSE-listed companies from 1992 to 2002. This paper approves the positive effects of corporate governance to firm performance, and firm performance to institutional behavior as well. Different from the previous studies, this paper addresses the importance of corporate governance under poorer economic conditions, higher agency costs, and a more complicated company structure. Corporate governance mechanism could work effectively when the executives of companies realize the importance of the corporate governance.

隨著企業經營規模日趨複雜、專業化，股東因人數眾多、股東意見不一，在面臨公司所有與經營分離所產生的代理成本控制上，實有困難。一般小股東因持股過低，對於公司經營事務只能消極以待，若對公司經營成果不滿意，只能選擇華爾街準則(Wall Street Walk or Vote with Feet)，而賣掉股票，甚難對管理階層進行更進一步的影響。相較之下，機構投資人基於其人力及資源優勢，能深入參與公司治理、監督管理階層，進而提昇公司經營績效，增進股東投資價值，此即為機構投資人積極主義。 本篇論文探討機構投資人行使股東權以促進公司治理發展。首先討論機構投資人積極主義之兩大基礎支柱－其一，良好公司治理確能對公司績效表現有所助益，其二機構投資人促進公司治理乃其善盡受託義務之體現。 由於美國機構投資人主義高度成熟發展，而國內機構投資人積極主義仍屬起步階段，本篇論文即以比較研究法，探討美國機構投資人行使股東權如股東提案、委託書投票、直接與管理階層溝通、發布黑名單、團體訴訟與股東提名董事草案等，及分析說明我國公司治理相關條文與機構投資人行使表決權時所會遭逢之困境。 此外，本論文經由案例研究，深入蒐集資料並訪談兩個在促進公司治理領域夙負盛名的退休基金-美國威斯康辛州投資委員會與加拿大安大略省教師退休計畫，從而細膩地觀察美國及加拿大機構投資人積極主義之發展、瓶頸與挑戰。 最後，本論文提出促進機構投資人提出公司治理及表決權行使政策、鼓勵機構投資人於股東提案權與表決權等議案進行合作及建置對機構投資人餐與公司治理友善之法規環境等建議，期能對於我國機構投資人積極主義之發展有所助益。 / The increase in institutional funds has been extraordinarily rapid. Comparing with the minority shareholders, the institutional shareholders’ size and expertise can minimize the collective choice problem and agency costs. Their resources enable them to investigate and monitor management in corporate governance field. This is the “Institutional Shareholder Activism“. This article discusses the institutional shareholder’s enhancement of corporate governance. It explores from the two backbones of the Institutional Shareholder Activism: Firstly, the correlation between corporate governance and corporate performance, and secondly, fiduciary duties of the Institutional Shareholder. It makes two conclusions: Good corporate governance certainly helps protect shareholder interests, and contributes to superior long-term economic performance, and institutional shareholders can comply with fiduciary duties by enhancing corporate governance. Furthermore, due to America institutional shareholder activism is highly developed, while Taiwan institutional shareholder activism is not developed. This paper compares America institutional shareholder activism with Taiwan’s. It discusses America institutional shareholder activism in many aspects, such as shareholder proposal, proxy solicitation, vote, direct negotiation with the corporate management, focus list, class action, security holder director nominations bill etc. Then, it analyses some of Taiwan’s corporate governance related articles such as shareholder proposal and security holder director nominations, and some difficulties which the pension fund and the security investment trust fund face when they vote as shareholders. Moreover, through case study, this paper analyses two prestigious pension funds: State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) and The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP), and investigates their stages of development and current operation and future challenges in the corporate governance field. At last, this paper provides some suggestions and inspirits the institutional shareholder activism in our country.

現今，世界經濟脈動迅速，科技發展日新月異，如何在瞬息萬變的趨勢洪流中掠取先機，端賴自身競爭力強弱而定。然而管理當局短視行為的發生，卻易損及企業的競爭優勢，甚至對企業未來有不利影響。造成管理當局短視之因源於多方面，來自資本市場投資人的影響即為其一。而資本市場中，機構投資人往往是大家注目的焦點，因此本研究乃對機構投資人持股比例與管理當局短視行為的關係進行探討，並期望能對公司治理制度的擬定上有所助益。 本研究以民國八十四年至民國九十年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司研究其管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例間的關係，並探究在電子與非電子產業間兩者關係是否相同。此外，本研究亦比較機構投資人與個人投資者，各自持股比例與管理當局短視行為的相關情形，進以探尋真正能發揮監理機制的投資人類別。 實證結果顯示：(1)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例高低有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例間則有顯著的正向關係。(2)在非電子產業中，機構投資人持股與管理當局短視行為呈顯著負向關係，而電子產業中兩者則無顯著關係。(3)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例變動的幅度有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例變動則有顯著的正向關係。(4)在非電子股產業方面，機構投資人持股比例變動幅度與管理短視行為間無顯著關係；但在電子產業中，則兩者間呈現顯著之負向關係。 / Nowadays, the economy situation is changing so fast and the development of new technology has altered with each passing day. To be ahead of their competitors, firms must sharpen their competitive edge. However, management myopia often damage their competitive advantages and would do harm to the firms in the future. The phenomenon of management myopia is derived from many reason, one of them is the effect of the investors in the capital market. Furthermore, participants in the capital market always pay attention to the behavior of institution investors. Thus, this research explores the relationships between the ownership of institution investors and management myopic. We hope it would be beneficial to the enactment of the system of corporate governance. This research focuses on the relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors of the listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2001. It also explores if the relationship is the same in both electronic industry and non-electronic industries. Besides, the study also compares the effect of the ownership of individual or institution investors on the management myopia in order to point out the type of investors that can provide monitory function clearly. The empirical study indicates that (1) there is a significant negative relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors. Conversely, there is a significant positive relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of individual investors. (2) In the electronic industry, the relationship between the ownership of institution investors and the myopic behavior of management is not significant. However, it is significant negative in other industries. (3) The change of percentage of ownership of institution investors has significant negative relationship with the management myopia. However, it is opposite to the individual investors. (4) No significant relationship between the institution investors and the management myopic in non-electronic industries. But in the electronic industry, it is significant negative.

本研究探討外國機構投資人交易行為及其對股票市場的衝擊，參考 Chan and Lokonishok(1995)的交易期間(trading package)觀念，分析外國機構投資人的持股內容及易行為，以了解其選股決策，並驗證其交易行為是否存在正向回應現象；及研究外國機構投資人的交易行為所產生的市場衝擊，以了解外資進出對國內股票市場穩定性的影響，並進一步研究交易完成後的股價回復現象及短期績效表現。 本研究的樣本期間為包括民國 84 年至民國 86 年底，樣本資料包含每日股價資料、每日外國機構投資人的持股明細、以及所有上市個股的財務資料。經實驗後發現，可能是基於風險控管和模擬臺灣股價指數的考量，外國機構投資人傾向買賣大型績優個股；在相同交易行為上，通常有持續十日的現象，且每一次交易的張數並不大。此外，明顯存在著正向回應情形、顯著的市場衝擊和短暫的股價回復現象，如同國外相同的研究結果，本研究亦發現外國機構投資人在買和賣不同的交易行為上，存在著不對稱的影響。 / The study is to Investigate the trading behavior of foreign institutional investors and its market impact on stock prices. The purposes of the study are as follows: First, to analyze the holding characteristics and trading behavior of foreign institutional investors in order to understand their stocks selection decisions and test if positive feedback behavior exists. Second, to analyze the market impacts on Taiwan stock market stability. Finally, after finishing each trading behavior, to observe the trend of stock prices in order to test if price reversion exists and how their short-term performance are. Form empirical studies, foreign institutional investors tend to hold stocks of large-size firms probably because of controlling investment risk and simulation Taiwan stock index. Besides, analyzing their trading activities, positive feedback bahavior, market impacts and price reversion really exist and are significant. According to our study, we found that buying and selling activities have asymmetric impact on stock prices. The conclusion is the same as foreign studies.

本研究主要針對目前企業績效不佳，董事會成員坐領高額董監酬勞之情況進行研究。本研究首先從權力與監督兩構面分析目前影響董監酬勞水準之因素，並進一步從權力與監督構面探討執行業務董監領取員工分紅產生之激勵或稀釋效果對公司價值與股東權益之影響。 實證結果顯示，董事會成員之權力擴張會導致較高水準之董監酬勞，尤其是執行業務董監之員工分紅部分，且執行業務董監領取員工分紅對於公司股東權益及公司未來價值具有負向之影響。家族企業之董監酬勞並不會隨著權力擴張而有較高的水準。在內部監督機制方面，獨立董監之監督效果較不明顯；在外部監督機制方面，主動機構投資人相較於被動機構投資人，具有抑制董監酬勞自利行為之效果。 / Based on a sample of Taiwanese companies listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange over the period of 1996-2004, this thesis examines the determinans of compensation of board directors from the power and monitoring perspectives. In addition, this thesis investigates the effect of equity-based compensation of executive directors on firm value and return on equity. The empirical result indicates that the entrenchment of managerial power determines the level of directors’ pay, especially on equity-based compensation. The more powerful the board of directors, higher the level of compensation, lower the company value and the return on stockholders` equity. However, as compared to non-family-controlled firms, the directors of family-controlled firms tend to have lower level of compensation. Moreover, we find that active institutional investors have greater monitoring effect on the compensation level of board of directors.

本篇研究試圖探討半導體產業供應鏈上游的IC設計業者召開法人說明會後，基於我國半導體產業供應鏈緊密連結之特性，同屬半導體供應鏈的其他中、下游製造和封測廠之機構投資人的交易行為是否將受到IC設計業者宣告之法人說明會資訊影響，亦即證明法人說明會資訊在半導體供應鏈中是否具有垂直資訊移轉效果。實證結果發現在法人說明會召開訊息首次見報日時，供應鏈上游公司之法人說明會訊息確實會影響其中、下游公司之機構投資人的持股變化，於宣告好(壞)消息時買進(賣出)，顯示機構投資人藉由其專業團隊和私有資訊能早一般大眾提前調整其交易策略，而此資訊移轉效果也會隨著公司在供應鏈上之距離而逐漸稀釋。此外，結果亦顯示外資由於地緣限制，相較於投信和自營商更會倚賴法人說明會宣告之資訊調整其持股策略，於宣告好(壞)消息時買進(賣出)。 / This research examine the conference call which hold by the IC design companies will transfer useful information to the institutional investors of IC manufacturing and packaging companies in the supply chain downstream. I am interested in if there is a vertical information transfer in the semi-conduct industry. The empirical results show that the conference call information is significantly influence the holding percentage of the institutional investors of the downstream supply chain companies after the information of conference call first reported in the newspapers. The institutional investors will increase the holding percentage after the good news released and vice versa. It is showed that the institutional investors can gather more information before the conference call and adjust their invest strategy in advance. Furthermore, this vertical information transfer effect will dilute by degrees as distance increases. Lastly, the result also shows that the foreign institutional investors more rely on the information released from the conference call to adjust their invest strategy than native institutional investors.

本文以公司治理作為開場，簡述百餘年來我國公司法的濫觴，以及近十年最大的變革為引入獨立董事制度。更指陳國內相關法條中，已將長期以來的股東會中心改變為董事會中心，而企業營運由追求股東最大利益轉換為公司最大利益。旋而，說明公司治理之定義及原則，進而應用公司治理之概念，作獨立董事必要功能之論述。接著闡述監督公司經營者之方式，整體而言，監督方式可分為內部監督和外部監督，然後依OECD之架構，探討公司內外部監督型態。 由於各界對公司治理實務現狀仍嫌不足，更有殷切期待。值此新政府財經團隊上路之際，財經法條、辦法、規章有待變革，甚而已計劃逕行全面翻修現行公司法。當此之時，由金融監督管理委員會全力推動，代表相當比重社會價值之上市上櫃公司營運監理，業已由傳統董監事之雙軌(二元)制，變更為董事會全面主導營運及監控。國內以公司治理之名，全面單軌(一元)制似已成必然之路。 鑑於獨立董事制度施行必要性，本文說明單軌制的美國獨立董事現狀，並將傳統監董雙軌制的德國作整理。兼而比較鄰近與我國互為影響的日中之獨立董事制度實行現狀和法律規範，期待在台灣未來再定位獨立董事，能有更多思考空間。其間，分別介紹各國獨立董事(或內部監理)制度之發展，包括該國特殊監理之原因和制度。在此加強說明其獨立董事制度之功能、獨立董事制度實踐之情形、獨立董事之重要資格和針對獨立董事制度各界提出可能之問題。 面對我國獨立董事的實務與挑戰，探討我國獨立董事制度現階段發展情形，分析討論我國獨立董事制度之利弊得失，進而指出目前制度應改進之處。於此之時，針對我國獨立董事的缺點提出建議，並針對各國的特色優點作引用，以提高本文建議調整規範之妥當性。更進一步，將董事會興利除弊的天職，提出兼具各利害關係人權益，與國際接軌的理想性公司治理藍圖。 由於本文多項結論建議與現行證券、公司等法規定未盡相同，未來實行將可預期以專章修法為必要。其中側重在提高獨立董事的權利和義務，力求在獨立董事與一般董事間作區別對待，奠定獨立董事制度效能開展之基石。具體內容包括，主張強化外部稽核的獨立董事占董事會比重，由現行不低於五分之一，提高至不低於三分之一。推動董事會治理長(祕書)為常設單位、依陽光透明為最佳殺菌劑原理，增設吹哨者條款、基於股東行動主義，賦與一定投資比重和持股期間之專職投資法人(以下稱機構投資人)定額法定提名權，以吸引長期且穩定的國內外機構法人和基金的加入，提升長期投資法人股東的比重。並課與揭露相關訊息，以突顯其推介客觀獨立價值。 鑑於長期以來，獨立董事不獨立，甚而有之淪為大股東的護航配角。本文希望藉由保護其貞操(忠實義務)之實，進而促建其完整執行功能與例行和不定期權責，並設定歸責條件及規避原則下，得由其他獨立董事及法定訴追機構如投資人保護中心，行使較目前更嚴格的競業禁止、歸入權及有限連帶賠償責任等，以專章立法更進一步推動法治與專業獨立董事的公司治理制度，將可蔚為世界典範。

Sloan（1996）研究指出，投資人無法完全地分辨出應計項目與現金流量間盈餘持續性的差別，導致對應計項目資訊反應過度，而對現金流量資訊則反應不足，因此公司擁有相對較高（低）的應計項目使用金額，預期會有負（正）的未來股票異常報酬率，此種存在於應計項目與未來來股票異常報酬率間之負向關係，即本文所稱之「應計項目異常現象」。 投資人方面，本研究依資訊取得優勢，區分為內部關係人、機構投資人（外資、投信、自營商）與自然人；投資人持股行為則分別以持股比例與持股比例變動代表。此外，並將應計項目分別以總應計項目與總應計項目組成要素下之個別營運資金應計項目（應收帳款變動數、存貨變動數與應付帳款變動數）作衡量。首先測試應計項目異常現象是否存在於我國，再利用應計項目異常現象建構之套利投資組合，買進最低應計項目金額的投資組合而賣出最高應計項目金額的投資組合，探討應計項目異常現象與投資人持股行為之關聯性。 實證結果顯示，應計項目異常現象存在於我國，亦存在於個別營運資金應計項目。持股比例方面，外資與內部關係人似乎能利用應計項目異常現象形成之套利投資組合；當總應計項目的金額愈低，持股比例會愈高，但在不同應計項目的衡量方法下會有不同的結果。持股比例變動方面，除內部關係人與自然人稍佳之外，本研究設計之迴歸模型並無對應計項目與投資人持股比例變動間之關聯性有足夠的解釋能力。此外，第二年度的內部關係人持股比例變動雖與總應計項目、存貨變動數有負向的關聯性，惟統計結果並不顯著。 關鍵字：應計項目異常現象、投資人、持股行為、應計項目、機構投資人、內 部關係人、自然人、套利投資組合 / Sloan（1996）results indicate investors failing to distinguish fully between the different properties of the accrual and cash flow components of earnings. This leads to overreaction of the information contained in the accrual components of earnings and underreaction of the cash flow components of earnings.Consequently,firms with relatively high (low) levels of accruals experience negative (positive) future abnormal stock returns. The negative relationship between accounting accruals and subsequent stock returns calls the “Accruals anomaly” in this paper. With repect to the investors, I distinguish them from the advantage of obtaining the information into insiders, institution investors (QFII, mutual funds, security dealers), and individual investors; then use the percentage of the investors’ holding and the percentage of the investors’ holding change to represent the investors’ holding behavior. Besides, I use the total accruals and individual working capital accruals（change in accounts receive, change in inventory, and change in minus accounts payable）to measure accruals. Firstly, I test whether the accruals anomaly exists in our country or not, then exploit the hedge portfolio formed by accruals anomaly,by taking a long position in the stock of firms reporting relatively low levels of accruals and a short position in the stock of firms reporting relatively high levels of accruals generates positive abnormal stock returns to probe into the association between accruals anomaly and investors’ holding behavior. The results suggested that accruals anomaly indeed exists in our country and the individual working capital accruals. With regard to the percentage of the investors holding, QFII and insiders seems to capable of exploiting the hedge portfolio formed by accruals anomaly; when firms with relatively low levels of total accruals experience the percentage of the high investors holding,but there have different results of using dissimilar measurement of accruals. For the percentage of the investors holding change, this paper’s regression model doesn’t have enough capability of explaining the association between accruals and percentage of the investors holding change except insiders and individual investors. Furthermore, although the percentage of the insiders’ holding change in the second year is negatively correlated with total accruals and change in inventory, the empirical results are not significant. Key words: accrual anomaly, investors, holding behavior, accruals, institution investors, insiders, individual investors, hedge portfolio

公司治理的研究,其主要的目的是了解董事會組成,董事會規模,外部董事, 董事及CEO薪酬誘因,CEO改組,外部大股東,外國股東,機構投資人,控制權和股權集中性,併購,法律制度及執行,法源…等變數對以ROA,ROE,會計盈餘,Tobin’s Q和股市報酬率所代表的公司績效之影響。與公司治理有關的重要指標包括股份控制權,現金流量權,董監事席次的控制權,控制權與股權的偏離,次大股東,金字塔結構,交叉持股,優先投票權,外部董事比例等。 本論文共計8章40節,引述國外文獻約500篇並由國際公司治理的實證結果來探討我國五家金控：開發金、台新金、復華金、富邦金、兆豐金的公司治理,最後提出九點結論和建議。