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P2P 網絡借貸的法律風險與規制 =Legal risk and regulation of P2P lending / Legal risk and regulation of P2P lending蔣東霖 January 2016 (has links)
University of Macau / Faculty of Law
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政治景氣循環現象對房地產價格影響之研究 / A Study of the Impact of Political Business Cycles on Housing Prices張慈佳, Tzu-Chia Chang Unknown Date (has links)
為瞭解地方縣市長選舉期間,候選人所爭相開立之競選支票對於地方經濟的影響,本研究將過去僅以中央政府為研究對象的政治景氣循環理論延伸至地方層級,期能藉此彌補相關文獻僅考量政治層面的不足。而關於政治景氣循環理論自Nordhaus(1970)正式提出至今,較具爭議之實證結果分歧的部分,本研究試圖以「執政者操控經濟之能力」的差異予以解釋。
另一方面,基於地方政府彼此間的競爭性,地方層級之政治景氣循環現象對於地方經濟的影響,應有別於中央層級。本研究遂以此現象對房地產價格之影響為焦點,藉以瞭解當政治景氣循環現象可能因執政者操控能力之有無而不必然出現時,各地方之經濟狀況是否將因此而有所差異。
經由理論模型之探討,以及蒐集台灣地區民國74年至87年各縣市之相關年資料以進行實證分析之後,本研究得到下列結論:
1. 就本研究的實證資料而言,我國地方層級存在政治景氣循環現象;而執政者為達成其連任目的而於選前採取擴張政策時,將同時考量其財政自主程度,顯示執政者之操控能力對於政治景氣循環現象的發生有相當的影響。
2. 地方層級之政治景氣循環現象,將伴隨房地產價格的過度資本化,而使房地產價格有相對上較高的傾向;由台灣地區相關資料所得之實證結果亦是如此。由此,可推論此一現象對於地方經濟發展有相當影響。
3. 由於政治景氣循環現象的存在,使得都市發展程度較高、財政自主程度較高的縣市,其房地產價格偏高的現象,似乎是現今民主政治制度下一種難以避免的趨勢。
4. 地方政府贏得選舉的動機,應是中央政府制訂相關政策目標或策略時所不容忽略的,特別是那些須經由地方政府所執行者,如促進區域均衡、促進城鄉發展之策略等。
此外,基於研究結果與限制,關於如何改善在總體經濟變數、政府支出等方面因政治景氣循環現象所引發之人為波動,乃是未來值得進一步探究之課題。或是突破資料之限制,改以季資料或月資料進行實證分析,應能使研究成果更為清晰。再者,關於中央政府對於地方政府行為的影響,亦可為後續研究方向。
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究方法 4
第三節 研究範圍 5
第四節 研究限制 5
第五節 研究流程 8
第二章 文獻回顧 9
第三章 理論模型 15
第一節 政治景氣循環理論之討論 15
第二節 結合政治景氣循環理論之資本化模型 17
第四章 地方層級政治景氣循環現象探討與實證分析 22
第一節 地方政府操控經濟之誘因與工具 22
第二節 地方政府執政者操控能力之差異 30
第三節 實證分析 36
第四節 小結 49
第五章 地方層級政治景氣循環現象對房地產價格之影響實證分析 51
第一節 各縣市房地產價格概況分析 51
第二節 實證分析 62
第三章 小結 70
第六章 綜合分析與檢討 72
第一節 中央補助款角色之探討 72
第二節 地方層級之政治景氣循環現象與區域均衡發展 74
第三節 實證資料之限制 76
第七章 結論 78
第一節 結論 78
第二節 後續研究方向 80
參考文獻 82
附錄 92
表目錄
表4-1:選民的政黨偏好與改變,1983-1992 23
表4-2:第十屆至第十三屆縣市長選舉當選人名單與得票率 25
表4-3:第十二屆至第十四屆縣市議會之多數黨及該黨籍議員比例 31
表4-4:各縣市之自有財源比例 33
表4-5:各縣市自有財源比例之ANOVA分析結果 35
表4-6:實證資料來源 39
表4-7:選舉循環之虛擬變數設計 40
表4-8:平均每人歲出之選舉循環估計結果 43
表4-9:每年新闢與維護之道路面積之選舉循環估計結果 45
表4-10:地價稅收之選舉循環估計結果 47
表5-1:各縣市房地產報酬率之ANOVA分析結果 57
表5-2:變數定義與資料來源說明 65
表5-3:OLS估計結果 68
表5-4:Parks法估計之結果 69
表a-1:「平均每人歲出」迴歸分析之基本統計量 92
表a-2:「每年新闢與維護之道路面積」迴歸分析之基本統計量 93
表a-3:「地價稅收」迴歸分析之基本統計量 94
表a-4:「房地產報酬率」迴歸分析之基本統計量 95
圖目錄
圖1-1:研究流程圖 8
圖5-1:北部區域縣市之歷年平均區段地價 52
圖5-2:中部區域縣市之歷年平均區段地價 53
圖5-3:南部區域縣市之歷年平均區段地價 54
圖5-4:東部區域縣市之歷年平均區段地價 55
圖5-5:北部區域縣市歷年之房地產報酬率 58
圖5-6:中部區域縣市歷年之房地產報酬率 59
圖5-7:南部區域縣市歷年之房地產報酬率 60
圖5-8:東部區域縣市歷年之房地產報酬率 61
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我國財政收支對所得分配之影響楊素玲, Su-Lin-Yung Unknown Date (has links)
我國財政制度是否具有公平性往往是財政學者們注意的焦點,國內只單獨探討租稅面之文章非常多,而同時考慮整體財政收支制度文章較少,而且所採用的方法幾乎皆是「有效稅率」、「有效受益率」及「有效淨負擔率」。這些指標主要是判定財政制度是累進抑或累退,其較無法直接判定所得分配改善效果。因此本文最主要是透過租稅及公共支出歸宿假設將各類政府財政收支分攤至每一十分位家庭之所得,求出吉尼係數,利用比較吉尼係數大小來判斷我國財政制度是否會改善所得分配。利用18年資料作分析,以幫助我們更進一步地瞭解我國財政收支對所得重分配影響,所得出的結論和國內一些文章比較。首先在只考慮租稅面情況之下:直接稅具有改善所得分配效果,而間接稅反使所得分配更加惡化,整體賦稅制度具有所得重分配效果,但並非很顯著。其次再單獨考慮支出面情況下:首先對耗源性支出做家庭人口數調整,並將支出對家庭所得影響區分為三組,均顯示我國移轉性支出具有所得分配效果,而耗源性支出會使所得分配惡化,正的移轉性支出效果大於耗源性負效果,所以我國公共支出會使所得分配改善。再者,作整體考量,亦即同時探討租稅面與公共支出面之相互影響,其結果說明財政收支會改善所得重分配,而改善效果最主要來自於支出面而非租稅面。
第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機與目的
第二節 研究方法與期間
第三節 研究限制
第四節 研究架構
第二章 文獻回顧
第一節 國外文獻
第二節 國內文獻
第三章 理論介紹
第一節 吉尼係數的概念
第二節 Suits Index
第三節 Kienzie Index
第四節 本章小結
第四章 實證程序與估計方法
第一節 預算歸宿之概念
第二節 資料來源限制與處理過程
第三節 所得之定義
第四節 租稅與支出分類
第五節 預算歸宿模型
第五章 實證結果與分析
第一節 賦稅制度對所得分配之影響
第二節 公共支出對所得重分配效果之影響
第三節 財政收支制度對所得重分配之影響
第六章 結論與未來發展
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西部大開發政策後中國大陸西部地區地方政府效率之分析-兼論財政地方分權的角色 / The local government efficiency in the western area of china after the implementation of the grand western development program呂暉鵬, Lu, Hui Peng Unknown Date (has links)
中國大陸在近幾十年來的經濟成長舉世矚目,卻也造成了中國大陸東西部發展不平均的隱憂。有鑑於此,江澤民在1999 年的「中央扶貧開發會議」上首次提出了「西部大開發」戰略概念,期能縮小區域發展不均衡的差距。西部大開發預計進行50 年分三個階段進行,截至2010 年已經完成了第一階段。在這十年間,整個西部地區有著巨大的改變。
因此,本文的研究目的在於,利用大陸西部12 個省、市、地區自2000 至2010年的追蹤資料,再運用Tobit實証模型進行實證分析。其實證結果顯示,財政地方分權程度、人口密度、地區生產總值、地方政府規模以及地區開放程度等因素,對地方政府效率值之影響為正向;而財政地方分權程度之平方項與地方政府規模之平方項,則對地方政府效率具有負向影響,即財政地方分權與地方政府規模對於地方政府效率之影響可能呈現非單調性。 / The economic growth of China has increased rapidly in recent several decades, but thisgrowth has resulted in the imbalance between the eastern and western region. According tothis situation, Zemin Jiang first proposed the “Grand Western Development Program” in the“central poverty alleviation and development conference” in 1999, hoping to reduce the imbalance in the regional development gap. After carrying out the Grand Western Development Program, the growth ranges of GDP per capita in some of regions have risen quickly. Therefore, the research purpose of this literature is to analyze the empirical estimation of the Tobit model with the panel data which include 12 provinces, cities, and regions in China western area from 2000 to 2010. The empirical results show that the degree of fiscal decentralization, the density of population, gross regional product, the scale of local government, and the degree of openness all have positive influences on the efficiency of local governments. However, the quadratic terms of the degree of fiscal decentralization and the scale of local government have negative influences on the efficiency of local governments. That is to say, the degree of fiscal decentralization and the scale of local government probably have non-monotonic effects on the efficiency of local governments.
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淺析中國金融控股公司的風險控制 = Research on risk control of China's financial holding companies / Research on risk control of China's financial holding companies宋晨 January 2010 (has links)
University of Macau / Faculty of Law
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捷運建設財務規劃管考機制之研究 / A Study on Supervision and Evaluation Mechanism of Mass Rapid Transit Financing Planning鄭淳方, Cheng, Chun Fang Unknown Date (has links)
當前我國各級政府財政因窘、公共建設財源短缺,地方期盼興建捷運建設,惟捷運建設成本高昂,國家發展委員會參考美國租稅增額財源機制(Tax Increment Financing, TIF)制度核定「跨域加值公共建設財務規劃方案」,該方案廣泛用於配置捷運建設經費,主要係結合創新財源及「自償率」機制促使地方政府善盡財政努力,改善早期建設外部效益未能內部化的缺點,由中央及地方依自償率共同分擔捷運建設經費。本研究發現中央為減少財政負擔設置自償率門檻作為補助依據,恐造成地方為求計畫核定,將配合中央或自行美化財務參數,導致未來財政上的道德危機,觀之美國爭議個案,發現以未來的租稅增額挹注公共建設時隱含道德危機及財政排擠,相關問題管制措施不足,我國援用美國相關制度時應特別注意其制度上的缺點,然目前國內制度及相關研究尚未就捷運建設營運期之自償性經費提出對應的管考措施。
依財政分權理論,捷運建設自償性經費可按財政總量管制的理念進行管考。本研究分析美國管考機制爭議案例後續處理方式,再歸納愛荷華州管考機制相關作法,發現該州管考措施多元,不僅明訂資訊公開項目,亦限制制度運用範圍,可作為我國管考道德危機及財政排擠問題之參考。然而,美國制度與我國「跨域加值公共建設財務規劃方案」未完全相同,為設計適合我國之管考機制,本研究邀請曾經參與該方案之中央及地方相關人員,以及國內大眾捷運系統學者參與焦點團體座談會及個別訪談,針對現況課題進行深入的探討。經分析訪談意見,發現捷運建設財務規劃現況問題包含中央面臨地方違背財務承諾道德危機,地方則可能出現財政排擠問題,故管考機制應發揮財務預警、資訊透明功能。
本研究建構一套管考機制,以計畫、執行、檢查、改進(Plan-Do-Check-Act)的實施程序進行下列管考措施:(1)審議期間由中央依捷運建設貢獻審議各計畫租稅增額投入建設經費比例,並制定財務監督及輔導原則、資訊公開原則,供地方據以制定相關配合辦法。(2)建設期間中央給予補助前,監督地方檢討非自償性經費執行情形。(3)營運期間由地方主管機關每年向地方公共債務管理委員會提報自償性財源收益績效,中央每5年檢核地方綜合成效。(4)配套措施包含由中央擴充、開放資訊系統供地方及民眾運用,落實財政透明及公共課責,輔助推動管考機制。同時運用彈性獎勵策略,促使地方政府提升財務績效,促使地方自我改善地價評議制度,以充分反映公共建設貢獻,達成外部效益內部化。 / Currently, government is facing financial difficulty on all levels and is short of public funds for public works. Local governments are looking forward to the construction of MRT facilities. However, the costs of these are very high. Referencing the tax increment financing (TIF) system in the U.S., the National Development Council approved the “Project for Cross-Field Value-Adding in Public Works Financial Planning,” which is widely used for the allocation of the MRT construction funds. By combining innovative financial resources and a “self-liquidation ratio” mechanism, local governments are encouraged to make financial efforts to overcome the failure to internalize the external benefits of early construction. Central and local governments share the MRT construction funds based on the self-liquidation ratio. In the present study, we summarized the literature related to self-liquidating public works and found that during the process of reviewing MRT construction plans, in order to reduce the financial burden and increase the self-liquidation ratio of local governments. However, to seek approval for their plans, local governments beautify their financial indicators, resulting in a moral hazard in finance. By analyzing disputes in the U.S., we found that this system implies moral crises and financial exclusion. Control measures on related issues are inadequate. When borrowing related systems from the U.S., the Taiwanese government should pay special attention to their shortcomings. Neither the current domestic system nor related research has proposed appropriate measures to supervise and evaluate self-liquidation funds during MRT construction and operation.
According to the theory of fiscal decentralization, self-liquidating funds for MRT construction can be supervised and evaluated as per the framework of growth control quotas. After analyzing subsequent settlements of disputes on supervision and evaluation mechanisms in the U.S. and summarizing practices related to these mechanisms in the state of Iowa, we found that the state has diverse supervision and evaluation measures, which not only clearly stipulate the disclosure of project information, but also set limitations for the scope of applying the system. This can be used as a reference for the Taiwanese government to handle the moral hazard and financial exclusion of the supervision and evaluation system. However, the systems in the U.S. and the “Project for Cross-Field Value-Adding in Public Works Financial Planning” in Taiwan are not entirely the same. To design an appropriate supervision and evaluation system for Taiwan, those who had participated in the development of the plan from central and local governments as well as scholars of the domestic mass transit system were invited for focus group and individual interview. In-depth discussion on current issues was carried out. After analyzing their opinions from the interview, we found that the current situation of financial planning for MRT construction is as follows: the central government is facing the moral hazard that local governments may violate financial commitments and local governments may experience financial exclusion. Thus, the supervision and evaluation system should perform the functions of financial forecasting and information transparency.
In this study, we constructed a supervision and evaluation mechanism to implement the following measures through the plan-do-check-act procedure: (1) During the reviewing phase, the central government considers the ratio of tax increment invested into the construction funds for each proposed plan according to the contribution of MRT construction while developing financial supervision and counseling principles and information disclosure principles to serve as a basis for local governments to formulate supporting measures. (2) During the construction phase, prior to granting subsidies, the central government should supervise the review of the implementation of the non-self-liquidating funds by the local governments. (3) During the operation phase, each local authority should report annually to the local Public Debt Administration Committee its earnings from self-liquidating resources and the central government should inspect the overall performances of the local governments every five years. (4) The supporting measures include the central government expanding and opening information systems for local governments and the people, implementing fiscal transparency and public accountability, and prompting the promotion of supervision and evaluation mechanism. Simultaneously, the central government may use flexible incentive strategies to encourage local governments to improve their financial performance and land appraisal systems to reflect fully the contributions of public works and to internalize the external benefits.
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租稅與經濟成長,地方政府財政與技術效率論文集王肇蘭, Wang ,Chao Lan Unknown Date (has links)
人類慾望無窮而資源有限,所以如何將資源做最有效的使用一直是經濟學所追求的課題。有關效率的規範分析中,巴瑞圖最適(Pareto optimality)為接受度最高的準則。基於巴瑞圖效率的觀點,不論是營利組織或非營利組織其經營之基本理念皆是希望以最少的投入獲得最大的產出,因此衡量投入與產出間之相對表現即為效率的評估。非營利組織及公共部門因為有許多產出、投入不易量化,故其效率不易評定。此一情況一直到DEA(Data Envelopment Analysis;資料包絡分析法)發展才逐漸改善。另外,有關DEA的運用幾乎都集中在個別決策單位的效率衡量,將之應用在衡量總體經濟的表現上非常少見。所以論文第肆章是按傳統方式以DEA衡量我國地方政府的效率並分析造成效率差異的原因,第參章則將DEA的概念應用於經濟成長上,探討使經濟成長達到極大化之租稅負擔及租稅結構。又效率的追求為經濟學的主軸,但中央政府的效率目標與地方政府並不相同,由於目標不同,因此彼此所訂的租稅政策亦不相同。本文第伍章試圖提出一理論模型說明中央政府在面對異質地區的垂直外部性下如何有效率的訂定其租稅政策。 / The human desires are infinite but resources are scarce. Using resources effectively is the topic of the economics. In efficient analyses, the Pareto optimality is the highest criterion to accept. Based on Pareto efficiency, the basic idea is to obtain the most outputs by the least inputs. Therefore the efficiency measurement is to calculate the relative performance of inputs and outputs. The nonprofit organization and the public agencies have many outputs and inputs not easy to be quantified; hence, their efficiency is not easy to evaluate. This phenomenon doesn’t improve until DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) was developed. However, the application of DEA concentrates nearly on the efficiency measurement of individual policy-making unit; the application is be rarely used in measuring the performance of the macro-economy. Chapter 4 of this dissertation measures and explains the variation in cost efficiency of the local governments in Taiwan area. Chapter 3 deals with the application the DEA to economic growth, estimating a combination of the tax burden(the ratio of tax revenue to GDP)and the tax structure(the ratio of indirect taxes to direct taxes)which would maximize the rate of growth of GDP of Taiwan. Efficiency is the core of economics, but the national government’s efficient goal is not as same as the local government’s. Because their goals are not consistent, thus the tax policies are different. Chapter 5 attempts to propose a theoretical model to explain how a national or federal government decides its tax policy in the vertical externalities happening in heterogeneous states.
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反饋法則下財政政策之總體效果 / The Macroeconomic Impact of Fiscal Policy with Feedback on Debt莊汜沂, Chuang, Szu Yi Unknown Date (has links)
思及當前捉襟見肘的財政窘境,無可避免地,債台高築的臺灣實陷入飲鴆止渴般以債養債之無限迴圈中,導致政府政策效能不彰、社會福利運作生弊亦無可厚非;於『公共債務法』之財政規範下,臺灣業已瀕臨法定舉債門檻,故不論是對短期政府支出之排擠、扭曲性稅率之稽徵抑或對長期經濟成長的斲傷,皆是身為中華民國國民真正惶悚不安之所在。
職是之故,本研究係採用一納入政府財政部門及貨幣當局之擴充『實質景氣循環模型』,藉以Sidrauski(1967)所提出的貨幣效用函數為出發點,將實質餘額引進理論模型,並透過計量操作捕捉實證期間起於西元1971年第一季迄至2007年第四季之政府政策函數,過程中,我們不難發現政府購買性支出及稅率皆存在相當的持續性,且對政府未償公債餘額之高低作出某種程度的反應。亦即,若政府實施公債融通政策,俾使期初公債餘額較高之際,則本期甚或往後各期的政府支出將遭受抑制和排擠,尤有甚者,政府勢必擬以提高未來稅率以茲挹注該債務之還本付息所造成的財政缺口;是以,本研究著眼於引進公債餘額對政府支出及稅率存在反饋作用下,財政政策與貨幣政策之總體效果及各總體變數之動態調整過程的風貌。即便公債發行或賒借為政府提供一財務週轉工具以裨益財政政策保有更靈活之彈性,然據模型所產生的結果顯示,就長期而論,政府必須維持一穩定之未償公債餘額,即公債水準具備『均數復歸』性質,而該財政目標係透過削減未來政府支出、調整扭曲性稅率及鑄幣稅融通政策方得以達成預算平衡,準此,該設定將造成公債融通之減稅政策對經濟體系具有實質效果,『公債融通』管道亦『非中立性政策』,從而傳統『李嘉圖等值定理』於本模型中無法成立。
就政策面層次而言,本研究試圖放寬『反饋法則』與政策係數之設定,以檢視透過不同程度之政府支出、稅率甚至貨幣供給途徑的改變來平衡因增加公債發行所造成的財政赤字,對經濟體系之長短期效果有何迥異處;是文亦藉由衝擊反應函數分別探討於政府支出增加、減稅措施及貨幣擴張之下,政策的傳遞機制與各總體變數之動態性質,顯然地,就高債務比率前提下,當政府戮力於刺激景氣而欲積極實施立竿見影的總體經濟政策之際,卻常因狃於急效而欲速不達,非但政策效果有限,亦可能使體系落入更為不景氣的田地,從而,財政惡化不啻為經濟危機的導火線也就不言而喻。再者,貨幣政策對體系之實質變數具有一定程度的作用,是故,本模型於短期內無法一窺『貨幣中立性』之堂奧,唯長期始得以復見。總括言之,政府亟須奉『健全財政』為圭臬,擬定政策時更得戒慎恐懼,並適切權衡利弊得失,以茲裨益有更具信心的經濟表現。
此外,本研究亦透過『效準』實驗以評估模型『配適度』之良窳,即便於反覆疊代法下,該模擬表現係瑕瑜互見而不盡完美,卻也大抵符合景氣循環之『典型化特徵』;然就實質景氣循環模型所為人詬病之勞動市場一隅而論,引進公債之反饋法則下的財政政策操作,無疑地改善了傳統工時與工資率動輒高度正相關之本質,從而獲致相對較低之理論相關係數,亦朝實證資料所呈現工時與工資率存在幾近零相關甚或低度負相關之表徵更邁進一大步。 / With current financial difficulties beyond government capability, it is inevitable that the already deep-in-debt Taiwan opted for momentary relief by paying debt through debt financing and ended up in an infinite loop, causing spiral-down performances in government policies and faulty operations of social welfare instruments. Taiwan has been on the verge of reaching the statutory upper limit of debt financing according to “The Public Debt Act” regulations and all nationals are becoming anxious about such impacts as crowding out of short-run government spending, levying of distorting taxes, and damages on long-run economic growth.
To better understand the debt’s impacts, this research uses the “Real Business Cycle Model” extended by taking government treasury agency and monetary institution into account. Starting with Money In Utility Function (MIUF) as proposed by Sidrauski (1967) to introduce real money balance into the theoretical model and, in the process of econometric manipulation, to detect empirical governmental policy functions in the period between the first quarter, 1971 and the fourth quarter, 2007, it is not hard to discover that there are considerable persistence in both government purchases and tax rates, with manifestation of certain degree of responses to the total amount of outstanding bonds the government has yet to pay. In other words, a governmental bond financing policy designed to render high initial bonds outstanding tends to cause suppression and crowding out of government spending in current and even later periods. Furthermore, the government is bound to plan on raising taxes in the future in order to cut financial deficit gap caused by paying back the principles and interests of the debt. Therefore, this study focuses on presenting the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policies and monetary policies, as well as the dynamic adjustment processes of macroeconomic variables based on the impact of feedback effect of bonds outstanding on government spending and tax rates. Even thought public bonds issuance or debt financing serves as a governmental fiscal instrument for financial turnover to ensure flexibility of fiscal policies, our model shows that the government should, from a long-run perspective, maintain a stable amount of bonds outstanding. Put in a different way, the level of bonds outstanding shows “mean-reverting” characteristics which rely on future government spending cut, distorting tax adjustment and seigniorage financing policy to achieve balance of budget. As a result, such setup would cause the bond-financing backed tax deduction policies to create practical effects on economies and, as the bond financing instruments are “Non-Neutrality” policies, would render the “Ricardian Equivalence Theorem” invalid in our model.
In the policy aspect, this study tries to relax both “feedback rules” and setup of policy parameters for investigating the differences between long-run and short-run effects on the economy by different degrees of changes in government spending, tax rates and even money supply channels which are used to balance the fiscal deficit caused by increased bond issuance. This article also studies, through the impulse response function, the policy propagation mechanism and the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables under the situation of government spending increase, tax deduction and monetary expansion. It is obvious that the government, in the case of high debt ratios and when making all endeavors to spur economy by implementing macroeconomic policies aimed for instant results, is accustomed to seeking quick fixes only to achieve very limited effects, sometimes even to drive the economy into further recession. It is therefore evident that fiscal degradation could lead to economic disaster. Moreover, as the monetary policies have certain degrees of influence on real variables of the economy, this model will not be able to clearly analyze the “neutrality of money” in such a short period of time. The effect will only reveal in the long run. In summary, the government should keep “sound finance” as the highest guiding principle and be extremely cautious in formulating policies in order to weigh all pros and cons discreetly, thus help to achieve a benefiting economic performance that generates more confidence.
Furthermore, this study assesses “goodness of fit” of the model through a “calibration” experiment. Although the simulation results show, under recursive method, intermingled good and poor occasions that are beyond satisfaction, they generally agree with the “typical characteristics” of business cycles. However, in the aspect of long-criticized labor market of the real business cycle model, the fiscal policy operation under feedback rules with introduction of public debts for sure has greatly improved on the conventional intrinsic property of high correlation between labor hours and real wage rates, by delivering a relatively low theoretical correlation coefficient, which is a big step towards the empirical results of almost zero or even weakly negative correlation between labor hours and real wage rates.
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ゆうちょ銀行の諸問題の本質と地域金融論宇野, 輝 23 March 2021 (has links)
京都大学 / 新制・論文博士 / 博士(経済学) / 乙第13393号 / 論経博第404号 / 新制||経||297(附属図書館) / (主査)教授 岩本 武和, 教授 砂川 伸幸, 教授 徳賀 芳弘 / 学位規則第4条第2項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM
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私企業に対する租税優遇措置等の裁判所による統制の研究 : アメリカ、スペイン及びメキシコの比較制度研究 / シキギョウ ニタイスル ソゼイ ユウグウ ソチトウ ノ サイバンショ ニヨル トウセイ ノ ケンキュウ : アメリカ スペイン オヨビ メキシコ ノ ヒカク セイド ケンキュウ / 私企業に対する租税優遇措置等の裁判所による統制の研究 : アメリカスペイン及びメキシコの比較制度研究アラス モレノ ナンシー エウニセ, Nancy Eunice Alas Moreno 20 March 2019 (has links)
財政援助をコントロールする仕組みは、国によって様々であり、立法的な統制、行政的な統制又は司法的な統制等があるが、本稿では、特に、裁判所による財政支出の統制に焦点を当て、アメリカ合衆国、スペイン及びメキシコ合衆国について検討する。本稿においては、主として、アメリカ合衆国、スペイン及びメキシコ合衆国の裁判所が、私企業に対する財政支出をどのような場合において違憲又は違法とするのか、又はどのような場合において合憲又は適法とするのかということを検討し、これらの国々の裁判所がその結論に到達するために、どのような要件又は判断基準に基づいて、財政支出を統制するのかということについて考察する。 / The mechanisms for controlling fiscal assistance vary from one country to another. Legislative, executive and judicial controls can be mentioned as broad examples of these mechanisms. This research will focus on the judicial control of fiscal expenditure in the United States of America, Spain and Mexico. It primarily examines in which cases financial expenditure on the private sector is declared unconstitutional or illegal and in which situations it is declared constitutional or legal by the American, Spanish and Mexican judiciary. It will also focus on an investigation of the legal requirements for fiscal stimulus, as well as in the judging criteria developed and used by the court of those countries to reach to those conclusions. / 博士(法学) / Doctor of Laws / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University
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