Domestic violence around the world increased, especially during the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. The Swedish Democrats' however state that the increasing violence in Sweden is a result of the migration flow and an import of mediaeval values. The Swedish Democrats' claim they have the solution to develop the prevention of violence further.  The view of the Swedish Democrats' in their agenda is analysed within this thesis. Political statements, debates, and interviews, as well as information about the political party and their ideology is extracted from books, former scientific research reports and newspapers articles. The social construction of gender and men´s violence towards women is investigated using a combination of philosophical assumptions and specifically chosen theories to women´s subordinated position in the gender order in society.  The Swedish Democrats' fear that state feminism is pushing hatred of men that threatens individual Swedish men, nuclear families, and western civilisation. They are also worried about the change of men and masculinity. However, their understanding is influenced by the ideological beliefs on how the gender order should be organised.

Society must defend openness and respect for human rights as well as the fundamental values of democracy, which is threatened by terrorism. The purpose of the thesis is to elucidate and analyze whether there has been a change in Sweden's internal security policy with regard to combating terrorism, the terror legislation more specifically. This will be done by studying different positions in a new terrorist legislation. The essay will be based on realism and liberalism. In this essay, the scientific starting point will be qualitative content analysis in order to be able to analyze the work in the best possible way in order to be able to categorize the positions that partition before. Terrorism is one of the more serious threats to democracy and human rights. The terrorist act that took place in April 2017 has shown that we are not spared an attack, that the terror threat is real. The current situation in Sweden means that new political priorities and initiatives are needed to overcome the terrorist offenses.

The aim of this study is to investigate ideology and discourses of nationalism in the election posters by the Swedish democrats. The purpose is to determine which type of political ideologies and if the posters showed signs of a nationalistic discourse in the Swedish democrats digital and traditional election posters for the general elections in 2018. The method used is qualitative content analysis based on semiotics. In the study, the verbal and visual elements of election posters are analyzed. The study reveals that the election posters used by the Swedish democrats showed signs of a nationalistic discrouse although to a varied degree. The digital posters contained a lot more signs of the nationalistic discourse than the traditional posters did. Ideology is present in both types of the election posters, although the traditionally printed ones showed more signs of socialism than the digital posters.

I takt med den allt eskalerande våldsvågen i Sverige, som i allt högre grad letat sig ner i åldrarna har ungdomsbrottsligheten målats fram som ett allvarligt samhällsproblem. Det har medfört ett ökat intresse och fler debatter gällande vilka kriminalpolitiska åtgärder som anses vara lämpliga för att komma till bukt med problemet. Under de senaste åren har flera tuffa lagreformer gjorts och efter riksdagsvalet 2022 har ytterligare straffskärpande lagförslag presenterats. Straffskärpningarna har gett uttryck för ett skifte i hur unga lagöverträdare betraktas inom det kriminalpolitiska fältet. Det är därför viktigt att synliggöra och fördjupa förståelsen kring vilka antaganden och uppfattningar som ligger till grund för dessa förslag. Syftet med föreliggande studie är att belysa hur Sveriges tre största partier, Socialdemokraterna, Sverigedemokraterna och Moderaterna, rättfärdigar straffskärpningar gentemot unga lagöverträdare. Forskningsfrågan besvarades genom en reflexiv tematisk analys av 10 interpellationer med tillhörande debatt samt 8 motioner. Studien förankras i de teoretiska begreppen ansvariggörande, moralpanik och straffpopulism. Analysen av de politiska dokumenten visade att rättfärdiganden bakom straffskärpningar grundar sig i en påstådd alarmerande samhällsutveckling, där ungdomsbrottsligheten beskrivs vara ett hot mot välfärdssamhället. Det handlar vidare om att tillgodose såväl samhället som brottsoffrens intressen, som tydligt ligger i framkant för de kriminalpolitiska prioriteringarna. En dubbelhet i framställningen av barn förblir också noterbar, där straffskärpande åtgärder både straffar dem för den samhällsfara de beskrivs vara men även skyddar dem från vidare exploatering från kriminella gäng. Dessutom visar analysen att lagstiftningen bör spegla brottets straffvärde, eftersom unga lagöverträdare idag begår allt grövre brott. Samtliga tre partier ställer sig bakom ett hårdare straffande men det finns en viss skillnad i nivå och sättet som de framför sin politik på.

The purpose of this study is to examine the party leader of the Swedish democrats, Jimmie Åkesson. The aspects that we look into is if there are any rhetorical differences in his speeches at Almedalen the year of 2011 and 2018. Along with the rhetorical side the other aspect that will be examined is the differences in ideas and ideological roots that shines through at the two different speeches at Almedalen. In order to point out differences we used two different methods. The method used in the rhetorical spectrum is based on Bo Rhenbergs steps to analyse political speeches. For the part that focuses on what ideas that mediates and which types of ideological roots his speech derives to, we used Mats Lindbergs analysis to identify values and an own constructed model based on literature regarding ideologies for the ideological analysis.  What we find in the rhetorical analysis is that Åkesson's rhetoric has changed marginally. It appears that he uses more of ethos' argumentation at the number 2018 than at 2011. Åkesson thus uses much of all the three rhetorical aspects. It also appears that the shift between the different styles Åkesson uses to convey the speech to the audience changes something between them both years. ​In the idea and ideological analysis, here too, the differences are relatively small. The actual differences in which values ​​the speech contains are few, but they exist. Differences are not based on the fact that the party or Jimmie Åkesson has changed values ​​and started to lean more to the right or to the left, instead the differences lie on which topics are in focus.

Studien “Vi gör det för att vi älskar Sverige” syftar till att belysa hur en politikers diskurstillämpning i en svensk valrörelse kan exkludera etniska och kulturella grupper. Specifikt studeras hur Sverigedemokraternas partiledare Jimmie Åkesson tillämpar en etno-nationalistisk diskurs i sina tal på Långholmen, i Almedalen och i Sölvesborg under valrörelsen 2018. Studien undersöker därmed hur etno-nationalism kommer till uttryck i Åkessons tal och hur den etno-nationalistiska diskursen förändras utifrån kontexterna rumslig dimension, målgrupp och historia. Det teoretiska ramverket utgår från kritisk diskursanalys (CDA) där även begreppen diskurs, nationalistisk diskurs samt den retoriska aspekten förklaras. Studiens metod och analysbegrepp utgår från CDA och Norman Faircloughs tredimensionella modell, som gör det möjligt att identifiera underliggande maktstrukturer och bidra till kritisk språkmedvetenhet kring exkluderande diskurser i svensk politik. Samtliga tal analyseras på Norman Faircloughs textnivå, för att sedan jämföras på den diskursiva och sociala nivån i hans tredimensionella modell. Analysresultatet visade att Åkessons etno-nationalistiska diskurs förändras efter vilken kontext talen gavs i. Gemensamt för samtliga tal var att Åkesson förespråkar assimilering eller exkludering när han tillämpar en tydlig etno-nationalistisk diskurs. Resultatet visade också att en etno-nationalistisk diskurs inte nödvändigtvis behövde uttryckas tydligare inför en redan ideologiskt övertygad publik.

The political party Sweden democrats became Sweden’s third largest party in 2014 after entering the Swedish parliament back in 2010 for the first time. During this time discussions about the party background and ideology have increased both from other parties and in the society. The controversy surrounding the party can partly be traced back to its foundation and the period before the party entered the national parliament in 2010. Sweden democrats was founded in 1988 by the remains of two right wing extremist movements, today the party has distanced itself from Nazism and calls itself a social conservative party. According to studies Sweden democrat’s ideology is considered as right-wing radical populism. This difference of identification is a problem, because it creates questions why it exists. Are the Sweden democrats really a social conservative party or is the party rendering a false image, and why. In this essay I will use ideal types of the two ideologies social conservative and Right-wing radical populism to evaluate which ideal type can describe the ideology in the party materials of the Swedish democrats most adequate. Additionally this essay will compare the ideal types to see how different the two ideologies are. The analysis and conclusion shows that the two ideologies differs from each other, but they share a few aspects. The evaluation of Sweden democrats party material does show that the party shares the fundamental value of right-wing radical populism and contains attributes from that theory, including etno-nationalism and etno-pluralism. The essays conclusion is therefore that Sweden democrats appears to be a right-wing radical populist party. That creates a question for future research, why the party identify itself as a social conservative party.

<p>The purpose of this study is to present populism as a political phenomenon and to impose focus on the rightwing populist parties that are active in Scandinavia. This essay begins with a presentation of the three rightwing political parties in Scandinavia. The rightwing populist parties have successfully developed their rhetoric and effectively influenced the political establishment in Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The parties that the essay focuses on are the</p><p>Swedish democrats (SD), the Norwegian Progress party (FRP) and the Danish People`s party (DF). These parties are interesting in the sense that they share many opinions and are active in comparable political atmospheres, but also that they use approximately the same rightwing populist rhetoric as a way of exerting leverage on political policy.</p><p>The theoretical segment is constructed on a descriptive historical background of populisms three different phases. It begins with the classic populism then the “dissatisfaction party” and in conclusion, today's rightwing populism. The theoretical segment also addresses populisms ideological foundations and its contents. This includes the country of birth, the people, welfare “chauvinism” on ethnic national grounds, targeted dissatisfaction, criticism against representative democracy, populisms dynamic structure, hostility to foreigners and stranger distrust. The empirical analysis of the political parties is based on seven starting points: basic values, views on peoples worth, most important unit in society, method for social change, political forms of managing, economic organization and utopia. To illustrate these points a comparison between the average parties is done, by examining their respective party agendas.</p><p>The conclusion is drawn that there are few resemblances between the political parties examined; the differences considered are clearly stronger than the resemblances. The</p><p>differences lie mostly in basis values, most important unit in society and political forms of managing. Furthermore are the resemblances only partial. The parties were most similar in</p><p>relation to the family’s position in the society. SD and DF can be said to have similar ideologies while FRP’s ideology differs somewhat. SD and DF can be described as conservative nationalist parties, while FRP is a mixture of neoliberalism and conservatism. After studying each party’s principle agendas it can be established that all three parties utilize</p><p>rightwing rhetoric.</p><p>Keywords: rightwing populist parties, Swedish democrats, Norwegian Progress party and Danish People`s party, theoretical and analytical structure, empirical analysis.</p>

I valupptakten hösten 2010 fick Sverigedemokraternas två valfilmer oerhört genomslag i media, och hade inte mindre än en halv miljon visningar på Youtube, på bara några få dagar. Denna här uppsatsen undersöker vilka strategier som ligger bakom ett sådant genomslag i media. Frågeställningen försöker besvara vilka verklighetsbeskrivningar som TV4 respektive Sverigedemokraterna (SD) ger i sitt pressmaterial angående lanseringen av SD:s två valfilmer, och vad de får för effekter. Uppsatsen analyserar nyckelord som används, vilken ram de sätter på situationen och om SD använder sig av anti-etablissemangsstrategin. Den diskuterar också omkring problemformuleringsprivilegiet, det vill säga att den som formulerar frågeställningen alltid äger tolkningsföreträdet till den. Uppsatsens slutsats är att SD:s strategi vid lanseringen av valfilmen var att synliggöra och förstärka avståndet mellan SD och etablissemanget, såväl till politiska partier som till media. SD använde sig av de egna problemformuleringarna massinvandring och censur, som i sin tur skapade egna ramar, till vilka enbart SD hade tolkningsföreträde. SD:s ramar stämmer tydligt överrens med vilka kriterier ett politiskt parti måste ha för att använda sig av anti-etablissemangsstrategin. / In the fall of 2010 during the election, the Swedish Democrats launched two election movies who got a enormous breakthrough in the media. They got over half a million views on Youtube in just a few days. This essay investigates what strategies that lays behind the breakthrough in the Swedish media. The inquiry tries to answer what description of reality that TV4 and the Swedish Democrats leaves in their press material concerning the launch of the Swedish Democrats two election movies and following effects. The essay analyses keywords in these movies, the frame of the situation and if the Swedish Democrats uses the anti-establishment strategy. It also discuss the problem formulation privilege, which means that the person who formulate the inquiry always own the right to interpret the inquiry. The conclusion of the essay is that the Swedish Democrats strategy during the launch of the election movies, was to expose and strengthen the distance between the Swedish Democrats and the establishment. As well as between other political parties and media. The Swedish Democrats formulate their own problem formulation using words as “mass migration” and “censorship”. With these two words they create their own frames that gives the Swedish Democrats the total interpret of the words. The frames that the Swedish Democrats are using, agrees with the criteria of what a political party must contain to use the anti-establishment strategy.

AbstractMedia presents hate crimes and nationalism as phenomenon that has increased both internationally and nationally in recent years. Further media largely pair these phenomenon together. The groups mostly exposed to hate and nationalism are people of different ethnic origin and LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bi, trans and queer) people. In Sweden's general election in 2010 a RHP-party, Sweden Democrats, made it in to Parliament. The purpose of this study was to examine how hate crimes and nationalism, in the form of the Sweden Democrats, has increased in Sweden and if there was any link between them. By mapping the proportion of reported hate crimes and the proportion of eligible voters who voted for the Sweden Democrats in Sweden between 1997 and 2009 the study's main aim was to investigate whether there was any link between the proportion of reported hate crimes and the proportion of voters for Sweden Democrats in Sweden. The results question whether an actual increase of hate crime occurred due to methodological changes in the Swedish Security Service, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention and the police. Also the dark figure is large regarding this crime. Sweden Democrats has had strong success in recent years, but whether this is a sign of increased nationalism can’t be impugned. 1998 and 1999 revealed a relationship between hate crime complaints and voting on the Sweden Democrats, but after 1999 the relationship is weak.