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In recent decades, changes in land use and land cover (LULC) arising from socio-economic development, coupled with climate change, have severely undermined and compromised the environmental sustainability of the upper part of Dong Nai (UPDN) river basin. Assessing the long-term impacts of climate change and changes in LULC on hydrological conditions and water balance in the UPDN river basin is essential for sustainable watershed management. In the present study, Landsat images and SWAT (Soil and Water Assessment Tool) model were used to assess water balance changes due to changes of climate and LULC at three different intervals: 1994, 2004, and 2014. The results of Landsat images classification indicated that forest land was the main LULC type in the basin. In 1994 the forest cover was 706,803 ha (72.68% of the total landmass). In 2004 the forest area dropped to 520,359 ha (53.51%). In 2014 the forest area dropped further to 485,908 ha (49.97%). The change in LULC has caused changes in the annual and peak water flows. The analysis of the results revealed that the effect of historical climate variations on water yield was greater than the LULC change. With the scenario of LULC 2014, the consumption of irrigation water was the highest and mainly in the dry season. The findings can provide useful information for decision-makers in planning and formulating policies for sustainable watershed management and climate change adaptation. / Trong những thập niên gần đây, sự thay đổi về sử dụng đất và thực phủ (LULC) do những hoạt động phát triển kinh tế - xã hội cùng với biến đổi khí hậu đã đặt ra những thách thức cho sự bền vững về môi trường ở lưu vực thượng nguồn sông Đồng Nai (UPDN). Đánh giá các tác động lâu dài của biến đổi khí hậu và những thay đổi trong LULC đến điều kiện thủy văn và cân bằng nước là việc cần thiết cho quản lý bền vững nguồn nước. Trong nghiên cứu này, các ảnh vệ tinh Landsat, công cụ đánh giá đất và nước (SWAT) được sử dụng để đánh giá sự thay đổi cân bằng nước do sự thay đổi khí hậu và LULC tại ba thời điểm khác nhau 1994, 2004 và 2014. Kết quả phân loại các ảnh Landsat cho thấy rừng là loại thực phủ chính trong lưu vực. Diện tích rừng của năm 1994 là 706.803 ha (72,68%). Diện tích rừng của năm 2004 đã giảm xuống còn 520.359 ha (53,1%) và đến năm 2014 chỉ còn 485.908ha (49,97%). Thay đổi sử dụng đất và thực phủ đã làm thay đổi chế độ thủy văn và dòng chảy đỉnh. Phân tích kết quả đã xác định rằng những sự thay đổi về điều kiện khí hậu trong quá khứ có ảnh hưởng đến lượng nước lớn hơn so với thay đổi về thực phủ. Với kịch bản LULC năm 2014, nhu cầu sử dụng nước tưới cho cây trồng là lớn nhất và chủ yếu trong mùa khô. Những kết quả đạt được trong nghiên cứu này sẽ cung cấp thông tin hữu ích cho các nhà hoạch định trong lập kế hoạch và ban hành chính sách cho quản lý lưu vực bền vững, thích ứng với biến đổi khí hậu.

鄧小平提出「具有中國特色」的社會主義作為中國大陸現階段社會主義建設的口號， 希望能為中共奉行貳的馬列主義與現實環境之間的矛盾，提供一個可能的解決方案。 本篇論文的主旬就是從「革命理論」（由資本主義社會過渡到共產主義社會的理論） 以及「發展策略「（達成社會主義生產方式的方法、手段）兩個面向，來觀察中共如 何在一個「半殖民、半封建」的社會，建立起社會主義。中共在歷經蘇聯模式、毛澤 東的「大躍進」模式式二種發展策略後，體會出中國大陸的社會主義建設依舊無法解 決生產力和生產關係之門的矛盾，因此在鄧小平上臺後便實行「經濟體制改革（，以 發展生產力作為關鍵。但是為了解決僵硬的意識形態影響改革的問題，而對馬克思主 義採取「發展」的態度終必使得「革命理論」本身也產生修正或改變的現象，仗得發 展策略與革命理論發生辯證的關係。 「中國特色」的社會主義本身就還是一項不斷在發展的體，它未來的走向是一項耐人 尋味的問題。由於中國大陸社會主義本身繼承了史達林主義以黨和國家控制一切的特 質，因此它處處顯示出「國家主義」的色彩，雖然中共也採行某些市場機制以搞活經 濟，但是基本上具有中國特色的社會主義仍然是局限於「國家主義」模式的範疇；這 是由於在資本主義盛行的世界體系之下，社會主義建設本身還是得利用國家機器以爭 取世界分工秩序下一個較有利的地位。中國特色的社會主義一方面要求堅守社會主義 的原則，而另一方面則要求快速現代化。打破這種僵局的方法，還是在於找尋生產力 和生產關係在某一歷史階段的平衡點。

本論文共計六章十一節，約五萬五仟字，其扼要內容如下﹕ 第一章 緒論 本章在說明撰寫本論文的動機與書寫論文的方法。另外對各章節內容做一概要性解釋 與說明，使閱讀論文者能對全部內容有著基本瞭解。 第二章 共黨統戰的內涵 本章分兩節，目的在釐清對統戰紛雜的解釋與說法。 第一節 統戰的定義一從中共自己對統戰的解釋與其他各具代表性的人物中，各自對統戰的觀 點加以融合，最後再過濾出作者本人對統戰的定義解釋，以求瞭解統戰的基本定義。 第二節 統戰的思想根源。從馬克思、恩格斯、列寧、史達林與毛澤東等從上到下一路探討整 個統戰的思想，以求對其一貫性與差異性之瞭解。 第三章 「武力」與「和平」口號交錯運用時期中共對台統戰。本章分三節，其內容從一九四 九至一九七八年的三十年間將中共對台統戰做一追溯性的說明，以求瞭解到各階段統 戰方式有何異同。 第四章 現階段中共對我運用之統戰策略一兼論一國兩制。本章分三節。 第一節 一國兩制蘊釀時期中共對台之統戰策略一從一九七八年中共十一屆三中全會後到一九 八四年一國兩制口號正式提出前，將中共統戰攻勢做一解釋與分析。 第二節 後一國兩制時期中共對台之統戰策略一從一九八五到一九八六年的新情勢做一解釋與 分析。 第三節 一國兩制的析評，對中共所提出的一國兩制口號做一內容分析，以求瞭解真相。 第五章 兩航談判一本章分三節，從兩航談判的背景與經過做一說明後進而對整個談判做一檢 討，從檢討中來判斷談判本身是否為純粹統戰型式。 第六章 結論 本章除將中共對台統戰做一總檢討與整理外，也將預估未來中共對台之統戰走向及嚐 試著提出些因應之道的建議。

李允協. / 論文(碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院音樂學部, 1995. / 參考文獻: leaves 129-143. / Li yunxie. / 鳴謝 --- p.´þ / 前言 --- p.(3) / Chapter 1 --- 侗族概況與音樂述略 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- 侗族概況 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- 地理環境及人口分佈 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1.2 --- 語言 --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1.3 --- 簡史與族源 --- p.10 / Chapter 1.1.4 --- 家庭和社會組織 --- p.17 / Chapter 1.1.5 --- 信仰和崇拜 --- p.21 / Chapter 1.1.6 --- 風俗習慣 --- p.28 / Chapter 1.1.7 --- 節會要覽 --- p.32 / Chapter 1.2 --- 音樂述略 --- p.37 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- 民間歌曲 --- p.37 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- 樂器與器樂 --- p.45 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- 侗戲音樂 --- p.52 / Chapter 1.2.4 --- 曲藝 --- p.56 / Chapter 2 --- 侗族大歌概貌 --- p.58 / Chapter 2.1 --- 分類 --- p.58 / Chapter 2.2 --- 唱大歌的場合 --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3 --- 大歌的结構 --- p.62 / Chapter 2.4 --- 歌詞韵律结構 --- p.66 / Chapter 3 --- 侗歌的傳承與社會功能 --- p.68 / Chapter 3.1 --- 承傳 --- p.69 / Chapter 3.2 --- 社會功能 --- p.73 / Chapter 4 --- 多聲部民歌曲目研究分析 --- p.78 / Chapter 4.1 --- 田野工作簡況 --- p.78 / Chapter 4.2 --- 多聲部民歌曲目分析 --- p.84 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 曲目介紹 --- p.84 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 曲目綜合分析 --- p.89 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- 譜例個案分析 --- p.112 / Chapter 5 --- 總结 --- p.123 / 附錄 / Chapter 1 --- 參考書目 --- p.129 / Chapter 1.1 --- 外文參考書目 --- p.129 / Chapter 1.2 --- 中文參考書目及論文目錄 --- p.130 / Chapter 2 --- 附圖 / 附圖一中國民族分佈概圖 --- p.144 / 附圖二 侗族的分佈 --- p.145 / 附圖三 侗語方言區域圖 --- p.146 / 附圖四 侗族蘆笙 --- p.147 / 附圖五 侗族蘆笙筒 --- p.147

毛澤東的文藝思想主要包含了馬克思主義,中國傳統文化,以及二十世紀中 國革命思潮三個來源,這三者之間並非全無扞格,但是毛澤東卻是採取一種 相當實用的態度來處理這些不同的思維.其間的判準並不全是基於推動革 命事業的需求,還包括了毛澤東相當個人化的忖度與反應,包括他的世界 觀,他的欣賞情趣,以及他對權力地位的佔有欲望.這使得在毛澤東文藝思 想宰制下的中國文藝歷史,呈現出一種多變的,不穩定的,壓抑且扭曲的面 貌.除了歷史情境的因素,以及與毛澤東個人因素之間的互動探討之外,筆 者也指出了馬克思主義文藝觀演變之下,文藝的革命性被政治實踐要求扭 曲,以及革命文藝對於文藝歷史扭曲的結構性因素.於是,文藝的實用性從 事實認定轉變為本質認定,其極至的結果,使得文藝淪為政治的宣傳工具. 中共在新時期主導中國大陸的文藝思想,與毛澤東文藝思想的最大區別,在 於知識份子的地位從工農兵文藝原則下的尷尬地位解放出來,這對於中國 大陸文藝的多元發展,起著根本的正面作用.但無論如何,文藝的首要價值 仍是受到非文藝的因素決定,在中共政權之下,加在文藝工作者身上的束縛 仍是存在的.

戴東原嘗分古今學問之途有三：曰義理、曰考證、曰文章。 本書分上下兩篇。上篇述東原之生平、著作與治學，下篇分論東原之學術。 上篇第一章：東原之生平。以東原年譜為主，並述其家世。 第二章：東原之著作。東原治學之範圍甚廣，舉凡經、哲、小學，以及天文曆算、地 理方志、機械物理等，無所不窺，故其著作，包羅宏富。失所憑依。本章搜集東原著 作，自撰者四六種，纂校者二十種，並附東原遺墨一種，計六七種，視前人所集者為 獨多。乃詳考各書之著作動機、經過、成書年代、以及版本。章末並附「東原著作互 見表」、「東原著作繫年」二表，俾便檢覽。又本書中費篇幅最多者，厥為水經注一 段，其書有關東原人格甚巨，故歷來正反兩面之辯論，極為激烈。 第三章：東原之治學。東原一生論學，可分為三階段。自其早歲持義理第一，考證第 二，文章第三之觀點頗力。唯此所謂義理，乃指程朱之義理而言。 下篇第一章：東原之經學。 第二章：東原之哲學。東原論學之依歸，厥在義理──經過訓詁考證得之六經孔孟之 義理，既已如前述，則義理固為東原學術之最具價值者可知，故近世治戴學者，大多 用心於斯，皆能深知東原學術之大本者也。東原哲學著作，以「原善」與「孟子字義 疏證」為最重要。其整個思想系統，即建立於「生生者化之原，生生而條理者化之流 」之認識上。 第三章：東原之小學。其論文字、聲韻、訓詁三者未始相離，且尤以聲韻為之樞紐， 建立清代小學之系統，而弟子相傳，更造成一代顯學。其論六書，一以許敘為主，謂 其次第名目當為指事、象形、形聲、會意、轉注、假借。又謂指事、象形、形聲、會 意四者，字之體也；轉注、假借二者，字之用也，所謂「聖人復起不易斯言」也，其 論至今猶有從之者。蓋東原以互訓釋轉注，雖嫌於泛濫無歸，而以引申解假借，則正 為許叔重「令長」之原意也。在古音學上，東原初分古韻為七類二十部，繼改為九類 二十五部。其說有下列三特點，第一：二十五部全用喉音字標目。第二：入聲九部之 獨立成部及其與平聲諸部之分配。第三：祭部獨立及脂微諸□去入之分配。 第四章：東原之天文曆算表。天算學在東原治學系統中，亦為基礎學科之一。故欲通 經明道，自不得不措意於此。 第五章：東原之地理方志學。東原之校水經注，乃生平大事業之一。 第六章：東原之文學。義理、考證、文章三者，在東原之心目中，文章始終未能超出 於義理、考證之上，此乃東原一貫之論學態度。 第七章：其他。本章所述，包括東原之校讎學與物理學。東原在校讎學上之成績，大 抵即表現於乾隆三十八癸已入四庫館以後所校成之官書上。 此論東原學術始末，最有見地，而「歸於自得」四字，尤為不易之論。大抵言之，惠 、戴之別，即在一求其古，一求其是，而「古」與「是」之間，高下遂分，戴學之優 於惠學，二百年來，固早有定評矣。然則數乾嘉學者，端以東原為首，可謂確論也。 /

研究董仲舒之政治思想，以春秋繁露、史記、漢書及其對策、書論、賦頌、文集為主 要資料，並參佐當世及以前與其政治思想有關之記載，與後人著作之引申和評述。為 力求研究態度之客觀及無所偏失，多方旁徵博引，以使理論與史實兼顧。其中雖偶語 涉稱羨或評騭，亦皆出自內心對其思想之體認，非敢故意抑揚損益，妄加臆斷。 本論文之內容分為導論、第一章至第六章、結論。 導論：主要說明董仲舒政治思想之性質與義蘊，俾對其思想先有一概括性之認識。 第一章：董仲舒之牛平與著作。仲舒生於鈿漢初，據考證約在惠帝與呂后年間。景帝 時為博士，善治春秋，學士多師尊之。武帝即位參與賢良對策，任江都相，從此為武 帝所重，位未鼎足，知在公卿之上。中廢為中大夫。因為人廉直，公孫弘嫉之，乃薦 為膠西相，恐久獲罪，病免歸家，以修學著書為事，年老以壽終於家。仲舒所著，皆 明經術之意，及上疏條教，凡百二十三篇，而說春秋事得失，聞舉、玉杯、蕃露．清 明、竹林之屬，復數十篇，十餘萬言。而今所傳者，除漢書所載等外，要為春秋繁露 一書。春秋繁露之真偽問題，論者頗多，惟莫衷一是。吾人以為其書為後人收輯而成 ，縱或非全由仲舒所著，然中多根極理要之言，作為研究其政治思想之用，當無不可 。 第二章：董仲舒政治思想之時代背景與淵源。四漢初七十餘年間，正為中央集權君主 專制形成之過程，亦正是道、法、儒三家思想爭勝之時期。道家思想之全盛是在高祖 至文帝時期，其間採「清靜無為」，與民休養生息之政策，府庫充盈後，思圖以振作 ；文景時代申韓刑名之學興起，法家得勢。及自武帝即位，遂採「罷黜百家，獨尊儒 術」之政策，儒家自此定於一尊，成為中國學術思想之主流，仲舒處於道法儒爭勝之 時代，自亦深受時代之影響，而其思想淵源卻以儒家及陰陽家者為主，故漢書謂仲舒 為「始推陰陽，為儒者宗」。 第三章：董仲舒論人性與正名。仲舒論政以人性為起點，從人性論可了解其論政之態 度。孟子主張性善，於為政重明倫教；化荀子主性惡，其論政重體法制度；仲舒謂性 有善質而未全善，故重仁義禮。 /

蔣中正和毛澤東，同為二十世紀中國的重要領導人物，其影響不僅是在政治上，更在軍事上。兩人都是偉大的戰略指導者和軍事理論家，或者至少他們的追隨者如此宣稱。在超越領袖崇拜的今天，這個形容仍是事實嗎？ 蔣、毛第一次在軍事上對決是在江西第三次圍剿。毛澤東已取得前兩次反圍剿的勝利，他發展出一個理論應付國軍的圍剿：集中兵力各個擊破國軍分散的各路。加上共產黨的動員力量，國軍的圍剿相當困難。蔣中正有鑑於此，做出了戰略上的轉向，新的戰略結合碉堡戰術、封鎖、「三分軍事七分政治」等方針。最終對贏得了第五次圍剿。毛澤東在長征中重新取回領導權，他馬上面對的是國軍在貴州的新一波圍剿。由於遠離蘇區戰鬥，因此只有很少的補給和援助。會戰展開也不順利，土城、魯班場之戰戰敗，而僅以慘勝贏得遵義之戰。但毛終究設法逃出蔣的包圍圈，並離開貴州與紅四方面軍會師。由於毛澤東和張國燾的戰略歧見，毛澤東獨自帶領紅軍北上抵達陝北與當地紅軍會合。紅軍東征入晉，宣稱要到華北抗日。但為蔣增援山西的中央軍所擊退。在紅四方面軍北上之後，為了在甘肅、寧夏打通蘇聯援助路線，紅軍渡過黃河。但為蔣中正命令下的國軍所切斷，這個行動最終導致了西路軍的潰滅。 在剿共戰爭當中，蔣中正和毛澤東各自研發出他們的理論與對中國戰爭的認知。他們的共識是中國的戰爭是不同於外國的戰爭的。此階段可以視為他們的軍事思想奠基時期。毛澤東所寫的「中國革命戰爭的戰略問題」成為以後他的軍事著作的先聲。另一方面，蔣中正對此的經驗則比較是方法上的，以軍官訓練團訓練軍官及幹部、親自編撰各式「手本」等戰術教材，這些方法的延續持續到抗戰之後，甚至到臺灣時期。 / Chiang Kai-Shek and Mao Ze-Dong, two great leader of 20th century China, not only politically but also militarily. Both man are, or so claim separately by their followers, are great stretegist and military theorist. Beyond the worship of both man, is that true? Chiang and Mao’s first military encounter was the third encirclement campaign of Jiang-Xi. Mao already won the first two, he develop a theory to counter Nationalists’ encirclement by concentrating strength and attack the enemy detachment separately. Along with the mobilizational power of Communists, Nationalists’ encirclement campaign turns out very difficult. Chiang realize that, and making a dramatic turn of strategy, combine with bunker tactics, blockade, and political mobilization of people. Chiang eventually won the fifth encirclement campaign over the Mao-absence Communists. Mao took back his command during the Long March. He soon faces the Nationalists’ encirclement again in Guizhou. This time he is not fighting on a soviet area, therefore gain little support and reinforcement. The battles are not quite well either, Lost two of them and won one costly. But he still manage to escape from Chiang’s encirclement, and leave Guizhou to rendezvous with other Red Army. Because of strategy difference between Mao and another Communist leader Zhang Guotao, Mao leads his troop go north to Shaanxi, rendezvous with local Red Army. Mao attacks Shanxi by claiming they want to fight Japanese evasion at North, driven back by Chiang’s reinforcement to local warlord Yan Xishan. To fulfill the strategy goal of reaching USSR to get supplies, Communists launch another campaign in Ningxia and Gansu and crossed Yellow River. But the Red Army been cut off by Chiang’s nationalist army, this later leads to the elimination of the west side detached Red Army. During the war, Chiang and Mao both develop their own theory and knowledge of War in China, which they both believe in common is different from foreign wars. The period of first Chinese civil war, can be seen as their military thought’s foundation. Mao wrote “Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War” to conclude this war, became the pioneer of his military works later on. Chiang, on other hand, took the experience most in method way: retrain officers in special facility, write tactic handbooks.These methods cotinuely used by Chiang on later wars against Japan, even in Taiwan in his late years.

The aim of this research is to bridge the correlation of peace and foreign investments through the lens of North et al.’s (2013) Limited Access Orders (LAOs). The research seeks to engage in the discussion of LAOs by providing a perspective from analyzing Chinese investments under the context of New Silk Road policy with the case of Tasang Dam. Current discussion of LAOs does not involve how foreign investments affect institutional transition in LAOs. Therefore this research is a humble attempt to engage in the existing literature from a different perspective.         Tasang Dam is designed to be built in southern Shan State, Myanmar, an area that has encountered continuous armed conflicts. The conflicts between the local armed group SSA-S/RCSS and the Tatmadaw continue even after a ceasefire agreement was signed in 2011. Chinese investors acting under the context of New Silk Road project have tried to involve in creating stability in the area to reduce costs.         According to the LAOs logic, if the access to rents is open to armed organizations, there will be motivations for rival parties to avoid violence. In order to redistribute the resources, there should be an institutional transition. In Tasang Dam’s case, the rents created by Chinese investments are not available to SSA-S/RCSS, but with the Chinese investments as the democratization of Myanmar goes on, there are opportunities to alter the story of repeated violence.