Ma thèse intitulée “Gouvernance d'entreprise et concurrence sur le marché des produits” est composée de trois chapitres théoriques relevant essentiellement de l'Économie Industrielle. L'objectif principal est d'étudier comment le marché des produits interagit à la fois avec l'intérêt des parties prenantes lorsque l'information est parfaite et avec les incitations managériales (statiques et dynamiques) lorsque l'information est imparfaite.Le premier chapitre porte sur les interactions entre le mode de concurrence sur le marché des produits (Cournot vs. Bertrand) et les relations (conflictuelles ou conciliantes) entre les principaux acteurs (actionnaires, consommateurs et employés) lorsque l'intérêt des consommateurs est pris en compte dans la fonction objectif de la firme. Nous considérons un duopole symétrique où les firmes négocient préalablement avec les syndicats sur le salaire versé aux employés et puis se concurrencent entre elles sur le marché des biens. Nous montrons que l'orientation client (mesurée par le degré de prise en compte du surplus des consommateurs) peut inverser la hiérarchie traditionnelle entre les équilibres de Cournot et les équilibres de Bertrand. Une concurrence en prix (par rapport à une concurrence en quantité) est à même d'atténuer les conflits entre les actionnaires et les consommateurs et entre les actionnaires et les employés.Le deuxième chapitre examine comment les incitations managériales pourraient interagir avec la concurrence sur le marché des produits dans un contexte de sélection adverse et d'aléa moral. Nous considérons un oligopole de Cournot composé de n firmes identiques dont le coût marginal initial est une information privée du manager. L'effort du manager, qui est non observable, réduit indirectement le coût marginal initial. Dans un tel contexte, nous montrons qu'à l'optimum les paiements incitatifs versés aux managers ne sont pas nécessairement influencés par la concurrence sur le marché des produits.Le troisième chapitre étudie comment le contrat optimal entre l'actionnaire et le manager (résolution d'aléa moral répété) peut influencer la stabilité d'un cartel. Nous considérons un cartel composé de deux firmes identiques et dans chaque firme un actionnaire neutre à l'égard du risque offre un menu de contrats à un manager averse au risque. L'effort du manager influence le coût marginal de la firme (comme au chapitre 2) à chaque période. Nous montrons que, contrairement au cas où l'information est parfaite, le degré d'aversion au risque du manager n'impacte pas la stabilité du cartel lorsque le contrat optimal à long terme est mis en place. Le contrat optimal résout le problème d'aléa moral répété et limite également le pouvoir discrétionnaire du manager sur la décision de conduite du marché (collusion, déviation, ou compétition). / My thesis entitled « Corporate governance and product market competition : three essays » is a theoretical research in industrial organization. The primary objective is to investigate how product market (competition or collusion) interacts with the top-level design of corporate governance, which concerns specifically the stakeholders' relationships and managerial incentives (static and dynamic) under imperfect information. It is mainly based on three chapters dealing with different subtopics of this theme.The first chapter examines how social concern and product market competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand) may influence the relationships (conflicting or conciliating) between main stakeholders (shareholders, consumers and employees). We consider two identical firms, both taking care of the interests of consumers in their objective functions and allowing their employees' wages be negotiated with labor unions. We show that social concern may reverse the traditional ranking between Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. Our model also shows that price competition (compared to quantity competition) can to some extent attenuate the shareholders' conflicts with both consumers and employees.The second chapter investigates how managerial incentive payment under both adverse selection and moral hazard might interact with product market competition. We consider a Cournot oligopoly market consisting of n identical managerial firms, of which the initial marginal cost is the manager's private information and his unobservable effort indirectly reduces the initial level of marginal cost. We show with this setting that the optimal incentive payment solving informational problems is not necessarily influenced by product market competition.The third chapter studies how the optimal contract between shareholder and manager (solving repeated moral hazard) may influence the stability of a cartel. We consider a cartel consisting of two identical firms, within each a risk neutral shareholder offers a menu of contracts to a risk-averse manager who may shirk in each period. The manager's unobservable effort influences the firm's marginal cost (as in chapter 2). We show in contrary with the benchmark case (under perfect information) that the degree of risk-aversion plays no longer a role upon the stability of collusion: when the managerial compensation is independent of gross profit, the implementation of the optimal long-term contract solves repeated moral hazard but also constrains the manager's discretion over the decision of market conduct (collusion, deviation, or competition).

This research provides a comparative study of the Japanese and German nursing home sectors. Faced with aging populations, both countries share similar long-term care policies based on social insurance. However, descriptive statistics indicate significant differences in the outcomes and costs in their respective nursing home sectors. This research aims to identify the reasons for this state of affairs by examining demographic and policy differences between the two countries. To shed light on the subject from multiple angles, we conduct three types of empirical analysis—regression, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, and data envelopment analysis—on regional data from the past decade. Our findings indicate that the different outcomes are driven by both demographic and policy differences where policy relates to long-term care as well as to additional welfare aid. In terms of policy, a key difference is found in the designs of the welfare programs for low-income elders. In Germany, our results are consistent with moral hazard due to the generous design of the welfare program, while in Japan, our results do not indicate moral hazard, which may be due to strict nursing home admission rules for welfare recipients.

No description available.

Background: Managing credit risks is an integral part of the banking sector and is crucial for banks’ success. Effective risk management ensures stable and profitable operations, addressing challenges like information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. To combat these challenges, banks are shifting from manual methods to automated processes in credit assessment and credit risk management.Purpose: The purpose of the study was to investigate how the use of AI has contributed to credit risk management and the handling of risk assessments within Swedish banks. Additionally, the study explored the factors driving the use of AI in this area.  Methodology: An abductive research approach was employed within the framework of a qualitative research method. Four banks were included in the study: two major banks and two niche banks. Semi structured interviews provided the primary data for the study, while secondary data, such as articles and literature, were used to support and explain the findings during the analysis and discussion.  Theory: The study was based on two models and the theory of information asymmetry. The first model focuses on the credit assessment process, while the second addresses critical success factors for the implementation of AI. The theory of information asymmetry consists of moral hazard and adverse selection. Conclusions: The study’s conclusion indicated that AI has contributed to increased efficiency and precision in credit risk management. Furthermore, AI supports addressing information asymmetry by automating data collection, analysis, and fraud detection. The study concludes that effective AI usage necessitates a balanced combination of management support, strategic vision, organizational culture, and structure.

台灣自1994年首家廠商明基電通投入手機的研發，在1997年第一支自製手機問世，開啟手機產業嶄新的一頁，短短的十年間，成就「 手機代工王國」的美譽，並且在2006年攀上最高峰，手機整體出貨量終於突破1億支（黃建智，2007），全球市佔率也衝上13.8%（葉憶如，2007）。過去十年來，手機廠商的生存契機，主要來自於代工訂單的爭取。而基於各別公司生產策略之不同，自製與外包的程度差異頗大，一直以來釋單較積極的國際大廠只有美商Motorola。 台灣有研發及製造的實力，但是因為廠商過度集中於代工客戶的訂單，在代工大餅沒太大增加，但手機廠商家數直線成長的情況下，部份廠商乃積極轉型發展品牌並加強行銷管理。過去有關手機品牌發展的研究，大多是由競爭策略、整體通路之價值鏈活動等觀點著手，但專注於品牌策略，進行4C交換成本態勢分析之探討者，則尚不多見，因此，本研究乃有其先導性。 本研究以台灣地區的大學生手機市場為研究對象，期望所做研究結果可供台灣手機廠商，做為規劃手機品牌行銷策略之實務參考。本研究經由問卷調查以灰階層統計分析，並將其結果以4C交換成本理論的四個主要變數：外顯單位效益成本、資訊搜尋成本、道德危機成本、專屬陷入成本，進行大學生消費族群之消費偏好分析，並歸納出： 首先，台灣的手機品牌廠商在專利成本高於國際大廠而品牌知名度低於國際大廠的情況下，其「外顯單位效益成本」高。其次， 台灣的手機品牌在市場定位不是很清楚的情況下，它的「資訊搜尋成本」偏高。此外，與品牌歷史悠久的歐美品牌及積極擴張的韓國品牌比起來，台灣的手機品牌在消費者的心中屬於高「道德危機成本」風險的選擇。最後，在專屬資產的建立上面，台灣的手機廠商因為品牌的發展資歷較淺，經驗累積不足，在這一方面的操作略顯不成熟，因此對消費者而言也沒有很高的一般專屬陷入成本。 / In 1994, the first Taiwanese company –BenQ Corporation (former Acer Peripherals)– started the involvement on the research and development of mobile phone, and it was the beginning of the new era of mobile phone industry has been started since the launch of the first “Made in Taiwan” handset in 1997. After one decade, Taiwan became the “ODM Kingdom of mobile phone”, and reaching a historical high on 2006 of the overall shipping volume — 100M units, meanwhile achieved a 13.8% of the global market share. In the pass decade, the survival opportunity of Taiwanese mobile phone maker was from ODM orders。And Motorola was the only among the international brands, which released the ODM orders aggressively. However, as the source of ODM orders is not in an upward trend and the growing number of mobile pone makers are all concentrate on ODM business, as a result that part of makers try to move toward OBM business to look for a bigger room and better development. Most of the researches stood on the views about the OBM development on the competition strategies, value chain activities of the mobile phone channels, etc., but the point on the 4C exchange cost analysis has not been seen much, which is important for this research. This research is expected to provide the result for the practical reference of the branding marketing strategy to the Taiwanese mobile phone makers. This research is been developed by the survey of questionnaire and is been analyzed by Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) and Analytical Hierarchy Process（AHP）, and then through the four primary parameters of the 4C exchange costs, the cost： the external cost on utility, information searches, moral hazard and asset specificity. Finally, following important result have been pointed out: First of all, the patent cost is higher and the brand awareness is lower to the Taiwanese branded mobile phone makers compare to the international branded companies, and as a result of high external cost on utility. Next, due to the market positioning developed by most of the Taiwanese mobile phone makers is unclear; the cost of information searches is obviously high to consumers. In addition, compare to the well know western brands and the aggressive Korean brands, the choice of Taiwanese brands of mobile phone has high risk on morals hazard to consumers. Finally, as a new player for mobile phone branded business, the skill on branding manipulation requires more experiences, and the cost of asset specificity is low for consumers from the Taiwanese mobile phone brands.

金融危機是一種反常的金融現象，其共同的現象是資金外流、貨幣兌美元大幅貶值、股價重挫、經濟成長衰退、百業蕭條，這就是金融危機。而近代的金融危機趨勢不再只是單一區域的問題，就由這次1997下半年自泰國貨幣開始貶值的貨幣危機，經過一連串的蔓延效應後，影響所及不限於東南亞地區，更擴及俄羅斯、東歐、拉丁美洲等地，造成全球主要新興市場和新興工業國家的經濟遭受嚴重打擊，儼然已變成全球金融危機。 大部分過去經濟學者一開始均用傳統貨幣危機理論來分析金融危機，如Krugman在1979年提出標準的「第一代危機模型」，其中強調經濟基本面的持續惡化，導致維持固定匯率區間的制度遭到阻力，也因此產生了貶值的壓力，也就是由經濟的實質面去影響到金融面。但有鑑於這次亞洲金融危機並非以基本面因素來解釋即可令人信服，必須配合經濟趨勢的潮流，再加入金融面因素來探討以補基本面理論的不足，尤其再加入因金融恐慌的自我實現危機型態以及傳染蔓延因素，兩者互相配合以求能更完整分析為何這次金融危機能襲擊全球新興市場的原因。 此外，本文並描述各國因受金融危機衝擊所帶來的影響，以及各國政府採取何種因應措施，最後仍不敵國際投機客和市場預期心理下，紛紛請求IMF的支援。但IMF的援助貸款附帶有嚴苛條件，這些國家在實行IMF的政策後卻帶來經濟更加萎縮的事實。本文亦針對IMF的各項政策提出質疑與探討，並期研擬出更正確的政策方針。台灣在這次金融危機中雖相較受創較輕，但不容否認仍對台灣經濟社會帶來許多衝擊，本文亦分析台灣金融制度的問題，並且提出各項因應政策的比較分析。最後，匯總幾點本文研究結論與建議。 第一章 導論…………………………………………1 第一節 研究背景與目的…………………………………………1 第二節 研究內容與架構…………………………………………3 第三節 研究方法與流程…………………………………………5 第二章 金融危機發生的原因………………………7 第一節 第一代危機模型…………………………………………8 第二節 基本面因素…………………………………………….10 第三節 金融面實質現象的主要論點………………………….25 第三章 金融危機的原因--系統性風險的探討……46 第一節 系統性風險下的危機………………………………….48 第二節 第二代危機模型……………………………………….52 第三節 傳染蔓延……………………………………………….58 第四章 金融危機對世界各國的衝擊………………61 第一節 危機發生前的總體經濟條件………………………….62 第二節 1997上半年危機前的苦難……………………………65 第三節 1997年貨幣危機的蔓延效應…………………………67 第四節 金融危機的因應政策………………………………….70 第五節 與1930年代經濟大蕭條比較…………………………75 第五章 金融危機對台灣的影響……………………77 第一節 基本面優勢…………………………………………….78 第二節 金融危機的影響與台灣金融問題…………………….81 第三節 台灣所採取的因應政策………………………………86 第四節 金融危機的教訓和經驗萃取………………………….92 第六章 結論…………………………………………94 第一節 本文主要發現………………………………………….95 第二節 本文政策性意涵……………………………………….96 第三節 研究建議……………………………………………….98

近年來，在世界各地金融公司所謂的「指數股票型基金」已經成為主流投資標的。指數股票型基金讓投資人能夠將其資金直接投資於國外股市，同時避免匯率問題。目前，台灣投資人藉由所謂的中國指數股票型基金來直接投資中國股市。 身為中國指數股票型基金的先驅者，台灣匯豐中華證券投資信託股份有限公司於2009年夏天創造了第一恆生跨境指數股票型基金。就像其他服務業，匯豐中華必須向投資人推銷該指數股票型基金以及其他金融產品。有鑑於行銷對於資產管理公司的成敗扮演著很重要角色，因此本研究以策略行銷分析為主要研究基礎。並且，藉由公司訪談和邱志聖（2006)的四個成本分析架構(4C Analysis)，來探討台灣匯豐中華證券投資信託股份有限公司在台灣的行銷活動。所謂的4C分析包含外顯單外效益成本、資訊搜尋成本、道德危機成本及專屬陷入成本。本研究為台灣匯豐中華提供服務、媒體廣告、品牌形象及行銷策略的改善之道。 關鍵字：策略行銷、四個成本分斯、外顯單外效益成本、資訊搜尋成本、道德危機成本及專屬陷入成本、指數股票型基金 / Since the early 2000's, Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) have become a mainstream investment product in the portfolios of financial companies across the world. In recent years, ETFs have been created to allow investors to allocate their capital in the stock market of other countries while at the same time avoiding the currency exchange problem. Now, Taiwanese people can invest in the China stock market indexes via China ETFs. A pioneer in China ETFs, HSBC Global Asset Management Taiwan created the first Heng Seng cross border ETFs in the summer of 2009. As with any service-oriented business, HSBC Taiwan must advertise and promote these new investment products. In light of the fact that marketing plays a large role in the success of asset management companies, hence this thesis adopts strategic marketing analysis as the backbone of the research process. Utilizing professional interviews and Chiu's (2006) four cost (4C) analysis, this thesis examines HSBC Global Asset Management Taiwan's marketing activities via a constructively critical lens. These four costs include external unit costs, information search costs, moral hazard costs and firm-specific costs. This thesis focuses on providing solutions for enhanced customer service, media advertising, brand image as well as marketing strategies for HSBC Taiwan. Key Words: strategic marketing, four cost structure, information search costs, moral hazard costs, firm-specific costs, exchange-traded funds

<p>Sammanfattning</p><p>Vi har undersökt hur kreditprocessen påverkas ur kredithandläggarens perspektiv, av att det kreditsökande småföretaget använder sig av en extern rådgivare eftersom tidigare forskning tyder på att det blivit svårare för dessa företag ett erhålla finansiering från banker. Ändringen i förmånsrättslagen 2004 är en bidragande faktor till småföretagens prekära situation eftersom det försämrade bankens utdelning vid en eventuell företagskonkurs. När en småföretagares kunskaper inte räcker till, kan en extern rådgivare konsulteras för vägledning i kreditprocessen. Vårt syfte med uppsatsen var att beskriva kredithandläggarnas uppfattning om den externa rådgivarens olika funktioner i kreditprocessen samt att analysera hur kreditprocessen påverkas av att en extern rådgivare agerar i småföretagets intresse. Vi har genom en kvalitativ undersökning och studerat fyra kredithandläggare i fyra olika banker med erfarenhet av vårt ställda problem och fångat deras respektive betraktelser. Resultaten pekar på att respondenterna upplever problemet på ett liknande sätt och våra huvudsakliga slutsatser har framkommit efter att vi studerat den externa rådgivarens olika funktioner i kreditprocessen. Konsultation av extern rådgivning innebär att kunskap tillförs i kreditprocessen vilket leder till att ett mer genomarbetat beslutsunderlag kan presenteras för banken. Vidare ger en extern rådgivare legitimitet åt kredithandläggarens beslutsunderlag och ökar därmed förtroendet för småföretaget vilket kan förbättra relationen mellan de två sistnämnda parterna. En risk har belysts för kredithandläggaren med att den externa rådgivaren undanhåller viktig information eftersom denne har ett egenintresse av att småföretaget beviljas krediten då det kan leda till ett fortsatt framtida samarbete dem emellan. </p><p>Abstract</p><p>We have investigated the effect on the credit process out of the creditor’s point of view, when a small business consults an external adviser since earlier research indicates that it has become more difficult for these businesses to provide capital from banks. The alteration in the Law of priority in debtor’s property on credits 2004 is a contributory cause to the small businesses precarious situation since it deteriorated banks dividends in a possible liquidation. If a small businessman’s knowledge doesn’t ad up, an external adviser can be consulted as guidance in the credit process. Our purposes with this essay were to describe the creditor’s opinion regarding the external adviser’s different functions in the credit process and to analyze the effect on the credit process when an external adviser acts in the small business interest. Through a qualitative investigation we have studied four creditors in four different banks with experience from our named problem and captured their respective reflections. The result indicates that our creditors experience the problem in a similar way and our main conclusions have emerged by studying the external adviser’s different functions in the credit process. Consultation of an external adviser represents that knowledge provides the credit process which lead up to more thoroughly decision-making data to present for the bank. An external adviser also concedes legitimacy towards the creditor’s decision-making data and increases thereby the confidence towards the small business which can improve the relation between the two last mentioned parties. A risk have become elucidated for the creditor which means that the external adviser withhold important information due to ones own interest that the small business gets granted the credit since it can lead to a continuous future collaboration between them.</p>

Sammanfattning Vi har undersökt hur kreditprocessen påverkas ur kredithandläggarens perspektiv, av att det kreditsökande småföretaget använder sig av en extern rådgivare eftersom tidigare forskning tyder på att det blivit svårare för dessa företag ett erhålla finansiering från banker. Ändringen i förmånsrättslagen 2004 är en bidragande faktor till småföretagens prekära situation eftersom det försämrade bankens utdelning vid en eventuell företagskonkurs. När en småföretagares kunskaper inte räcker till, kan en extern rådgivare konsulteras för vägledning i kreditprocessen. Vårt syfte med uppsatsen var att beskriva kredithandläggarnas uppfattning om den externa rådgivarens olika funktioner i kreditprocessen samt att analysera hur kreditprocessen påverkas av att en extern rådgivare agerar i småföretagets intresse. Vi har genom en kvalitativ undersökning och studerat fyra kredithandläggare i fyra olika banker med erfarenhet av vårt ställda problem och fångat deras respektive betraktelser. Resultaten pekar på att respondenterna upplever problemet på ett liknande sätt och våra huvudsakliga slutsatser har framkommit efter att vi studerat den externa rådgivarens olika funktioner i kreditprocessen. Konsultation av extern rådgivning innebär att kunskap tillförs i kreditprocessen vilket leder till att ett mer genomarbetat beslutsunderlag kan presenteras för banken. Vidare ger en extern rådgivare legitimitet åt kredithandläggarens beslutsunderlag och ökar därmed förtroendet för småföretaget vilket kan förbättra relationen mellan de två sistnämnda parterna. En risk har belysts för kredithandläggaren med att den externa rådgivaren undanhåller viktig information eftersom denne har ett egenintresse av att småföretaget beviljas krediten då det kan leda till ett fortsatt framtida samarbete dem emellan. Abstract We have investigated the effect on the credit process out of the creditor’s point of view, when a small business consults an external adviser since earlier research indicates that it has become more difficult for these businesses to provide capital from banks. The alteration in the Law of priority in debtor’s property on credits 2004 is a contributory cause to the small businesses precarious situation since it deteriorated banks dividends in a possible liquidation. If a small businessman’s knowledge doesn’t ad up, an external adviser can be consulted as guidance in the credit process. Our purposes with this essay were to describe the creditor’s opinion regarding the external adviser’s different functions in the credit process and to analyze the effect on the credit process when an external adviser acts in the small business interest. Through a qualitative investigation we have studied four creditors in four different banks with experience from our named problem and captured their respective reflections. The result indicates that our creditors experience the problem in a similar way and our main conclusions have emerged by studying the external adviser’s different functions in the credit process. Consultation of an external adviser represents that knowledge provides the credit process which lead up to more thoroughly decision-making data to present for the bank. An external adviser also concedes legitimacy towards the creditor’s decision-making data and increases thereby the confidence towards the small business which can improve the relation between the two last mentioned parties. A risk have become elucidated for the creditor which means that the external adviser withhold important information due to ones own interest that the small business gets granted the credit since it can lead to a continuous future collaboration between them.

當前我國各級政府財政因窘、公共建設財源短缺，地方期盼興建捷運建設，惟捷運建設成本高昂，國家發展委員會參考美國租稅增額財源機制（Tax Increment Financing, TIF）制度核定「跨域加值公共建設財務規劃方案」，該方案廣泛用於配置捷運建設經費，主要係結合創新財源及「自償率」機制促使地方政府善盡財政努力，改善早期建設外部效益未能內部化的缺點，由中央及地方依自償率共同分擔捷運建設經費。本研究發現中央為減少財政負擔設置自償率門檻作為補助依據，恐造成地方為求計畫核定，將配合中央或自行美化財務參數，導致未來財政上的道德危機，觀之美國爭議個案，發現以未來的租稅增額挹注公共建設時隱含道德危機及財政排擠，相關問題管制措施不足，我國援用美國相關制度時應特別注意其制度上的缺點，然目前國內制度及相關研究尚未就捷運建設營運期之自償性經費提出對應的管考措施。 依財政分權理論，捷運建設自償性經費可按財政總量管制的理念進行管考。本研究分析美國管考機制爭議案例後續處理方式，再歸納愛荷華州管考機制相關作法，發現該州管考措施多元，不僅明訂資訊公開項目，亦限制制度運用範圍，可作為我國管考道德危機及財政排擠問題之參考。然而，美國制度與我國「跨域加值公共建設財務規劃方案」未完全相同，為設計適合我國之管考機制，本研究邀請曾經參與該方案之中央及地方相關人員，以及國內大眾捷運系統學者參與焦點團體座談會及個別訪談，針對現況課題進行深入的探討。經分析訪談意見，發現捷運建設財務規劃現況問題包含中央面臨地方違背財務承諾道德危機，地方則可能出現財政排擠問題，故管考機制應發揮財務預警、資訊透明功能。 本研究建構一套管考機制，以計畫、執行、檢查、改進（Plan-Do-Check-Act）的實施程序進行下列管考措施：（1）審議期間由中央依捷運建設貢獻審議各計畫租稅增額投入建設經費比例，並制定財務監督及輔導原則、資訊公開原則，供地方據以制定相關配合辦法。（2）建設期間中央給予補助前，監督地方檢討非自償性經費執行情形。（3）營運期間由地方主管機關每年向地方公共債務管理委員會提報自償性財源收益績效，中央每5年檢核地方綜合成效。（4）配套措施包含由中央擴充、開放資訊系統供地方及民眾運用，落實財政透明及公共課責，輔助推動管考機制。同時運用彈性獎勵策略，促使地方政府提升財務績效，促使地方自我改善地價評議制度，以充分反映公共建設貢獻，達成外部效益內部化。 / Currently, government is facing financial difficulty on all levels and is short of public funds for public works. Local governments are looking forward to the construction of MRT facilities. However, the costs of these are very high. Referencing the tax increment financing (TIF) system in the U.S., the National Development Council approved the “Project for Cross-Field Value-Adding in Public Works Financial Planning,” which is widely used for the allocation of the MRT construction funds. By combining innovative financial resources and a “self-liquidation ratio” mechanism, local governments are encouraged to make financial efforts to overcome the failure to internalize the external benefits of early construction. Central and local governments share the MRT construction funds based on the self-liquidation ratio. In the present study, we summarized the literature related to self-liquidating public works and found that during the process of reviewing MRT construction plans, in order to reduce the financial burden and increase the self-liquidation ratio of local governments. However, to seek approval for their plans, local governments beautify their financial indicators, resulting in a moral hazard in finance. By analyzing disputes in the U.S., we found that this system implies moral crises and financial exclusion. Control measures on related issues are inadequate. When borrowing related systems from the U.S., the Taiwanese government should pay special attention to their shortcomings. Neither the current domestic system nor related research has proposed appropriate measures to supervise and evaluate self-liquidation funds during MRT construction and operation. According to the theory of fiscal decentralization, self-liquidating funds for MRT construction can be supervised and evaluated as per the framework of growth control quotas. After analyzing subsequent settlements of disputes on supervision and evaluation mechanisms in the U.S. and summarizing practices related to these mechanisms in the state of Iowa, we found that the state has diverse supervision and evaluation measures, which not only clearly stipulate the disclosure of project information, but also set limitations for the scope of applying the system. This can be used as a reference for the Taiwanese government to handle the moral hazard and financial exclusion of the supervision and evaluation system. However, the systems in the U.S. and the “Project for Cross-Field Value-Adding in Public Works Financial Planning” in Taiwan are not entirely the same. To design an appropriate supervision and evaluation system for Taiwan, those who had participated in the development of the plan from central and local governments as well as scholars of the domestic mass transit system were invited for focus group and individual interview. In-depth discussion on current issues was carried out. After analyzing their opinions from the interview, we found that the current situation of financial planning for MRT construction is as follows: the central government is facing the moral hazard that local governments may violate financial commitments and local governments may experience financial exclusion. Thus, the supervision and evaluation system should perform the functions of financial forecasting and information transparency. In this study, we constructed a supervision and evaluation mechanism to implement the following measures through the plan-do-check-act procedure: (1) During the reviewing phase, the central government considers the ratio of tax increment invested into the construction funds for each proposed plan according to the contribution of MRT construction while developing financial supervision and counseling principles and information disclosure principles to serve as a basis for local governments to formulate supporting measures. (2) During the construction phase, prior to granting subsidies, the central government should supervise the review of the implementation of the non-self-liquidating funds by the local governments. (3) During the operation phase, each local authority should report annually to the local Public Debt Administration Committee its earnings from self-liquidating resources and the central government should inspect the overall performances of the local governments every five years. (4) The supporting measures include the central government expanding and opening information systems for local governments and the people, implementing fiscal transparency and public accountability, and prompting the promotion of supervision and evaluation mechanism. Simultaneously, the central government may use flexible incentive strategies to encourage local governments to improve their financial performance and land appraisal systems to reflect fully the contributions of public works and to internalize the external benefits.