再保險之目的，在於提供保險人保險保障。其方式乃再保險人就原保險人在原保險契約中所負之給付責任，予以部份或全部的補償。再保險契約就再保險人之再保險給付責任所為之約定，最常見者為「同一命運原則」之約定。依「同一命運條款」之字面解釋，此條款係指再保險人須與原保險人「同一命運」，於原保險人對被保險人為保險給付後，補償原保險人因對被保險人為保險給付所生之損害。 依據損害補償原則，須保險人之保險給付在保險契約及再保險契約之承保範圍內，再保險人始負再保險給付之責任。為了避免嚴格依據損害補償原則解釋再保險人之責任，造成保險人無法取得再保險保障之結果，並提高對於保險人之保障，再保險契約雙方乃藉由同一命運條款的相關約定，約定保險人只須證明其已向被保險人為補償給付且其給付係依「誠信」所為，再保險人即須同其命運，向保險人為補償給付。再保險人此一契約義務，乃再保險契約雙方當事人基於契約自由，於再保險契約中特別加入同一命運條款的結果。 保險人之「誠信」乃同一命運原則適用之基石，此為法院所共同肯認。然而，對於同一命運原則於個案中之具體適用，法院之看法似乎並無足夠的一致性。究竟，決定再保險契約雙方當事人權利義務的同一命運原則，法院如何解釋其適用上發生之爭議？又，法院對於抽象的誠信原則如何解釋？在同一命運原則的背景下，再保險人是否可以提出何種抗辯以免除其保險給付責任？最後，是否這些問題的解答可以有某程度的預測可能性，以供日後再保險契約雙方草擬同一命運條款之參考？ 針對保險人對被保險人所應為之補償，再保險人與原保險人可能有不同解釋，前者認為再保險人與保險人同一命運之範圍，應以原保險及再保險約定之範圍為限；後者則認為凡保險人所給付與被保險人者，再保險人皆須與其同一命運，負擔給付責任。縱使再保險契約雙方皆主張其以再保險契約之約定為給付責任範圍之界定基礎，然基於利益彼此對立之立場，雙方對於「契約約定」往往有不同詮釋。再保險契約雙方間之爭議，實務上常見者如，原保險人對被保險人所給付之通融賠款（Ex-gratia payment）、懲罰性賠償（Punitive damages）等，是否屬於再保險人與保險人同一命運之範圍？將此類爭議一般化，須探究者為，同一命運條款何種程度限制了再保險人對原保險人之給付表示異議的權利？ 另外，倘若再保險契約中沒有同一命運條款的約定，是否可認為此條款為再保險契約所「默示」（Implied）？此問題涉及同一命運原則的歷史背景，與再保險市場的運作實務息息相關，對於契約的解釋方法也有重要啟示。 同一命運原則為再保險交易發展史上，最常受到爭議的問題之一。現今之再保險交易環境已然愈趨複雜，不僅是所保危險之價額日趨提高，投入再保險交易之保險人數增加且交易類型複雜化，皆使得再保險交易雙方之風險分配及責任分擔，不再可以全然依賴保險人對於誠信原則之遵守。反之，應同時強調再保險與保險之不同，亦即，前者係由專業之保險人為交易雙方而進行之交易，故再保險人應可依其專業，對所保危險主動向保險人提出詢問，此亦顯示了保險人及再保險人間彼此合作愈趨重要，為再保險人負擔再保險給付責任之正當性基礎。本文嘗試處理以上提出的爭議問題，並對可能之解決提出建議。 / The reinsurance loss settlement clause, which appears in a variety of forms of wordings, historically has been one of the most difficult aspects of reinsurance law and practice. In recent days, more and more litigation has arisen as a result of such clauses. This study centers upon the interesting and oftentimes confusing issue of the scope and effect of such clauses, and how they define both the reinsured’s and the reinsurers’ liability. The purpose of reinsurance is to provide insurance protection by the reinsurer for the reinsured, namely, the insurer. At the beginning of reinsurance history when there were only a small number of insurers operating in the insurance market, insurers were fairly familiar with one another, and that resulted in a minimum of formality in doing business. In terms of reinsurance, reinsurers, when asked to pay by their reinsured, normally did not go out of their way to initiate a de novo review or assessment of the risk insured. The main reasons for such practice were, for one, insurers were so familiar with their business partners that they did not see the need for such re-assessment of the risk, and for another, in the past, the nature of the risks insured was not as complicated as those we are faced with nowadays. With a view to enhancing business efficiency and providing better protection for insurers, the parties that engaged in a reinsurance agreement oftentimes would insert into the agreement a “follow the fortunes” or “follow the settlements” clause. Such clauses bound the reinsurers to follow the fortunes/settlements of their reinsured without the reinsured’s liability having been proved, and restrained the reinsurers from refusing to indemnify the reinsured on the ground that liability did not exist under the original policy, provided that the reinsured had acted in a bona fide and businesslike way. In a word, the existence of the loss settlement clause was a logical consequence of the purpose of reinsurance, and the reinsurers’ obligation under such clauses was conditioned on the reinsured’s good faith. Reinsurance loss settlement clauses have been interpreted by the court rather favorably for the reinsured. Courts would normally find coverage for the reinsured, once they decided that the reinsured had acted in good faith in settling with the insured, even if they held that the reinsured had not been legally liable. This fact highlights the importance of the reinsured’s duty of utmost good faith in reinsurance law and practice. However, what exactly is good faith, and what are the reinsured’s obligations under the good faith requirement? Is there a general rule that the courts have developed to justify their finding of the reinsured’s good faith? If good faith, being abstract in itself and susceptible to courts’ subjective discretion, serves as the “standard” to evaluate or define the liability of the parties to a reinsurance agreement, how does it usually function? Does it at times seem so abstract and variable that the reinsurance agreement parties have a hard time predicting their liability under such a standard? Also, in this study, the questions of the implication of loss settlement clauses and the scope or effect of such clauses are explored. The former question asks, where the reinsurance contracts do not contain any “follow the fortunes or settlements” provisions, does the law, custom or practice read into the contracts any obligation on the reinsurer to follow its reinsured’s fortunes or settlements? This question is important in that it deals with the applicability of loss settlement clauses, and thus has a fundamental impact on how reinsurance contracts are interpreted. The latter question aims at clarifying how loss settlement clauses are applied to pertinent areas such as ex gratia payments, punitive damages, reinsurers’ liability caps, payments related to the Wellington Agreement and claims cooperation clauses. Specific examples are given here in order to better understand how loss settlements clauses are put to practical use. Discussion concerned with this question also demonstrates how a loosely worded loss settlement clause could give rise to disputes between the parties. To better define the parties’ rights and obligations under a reinsurance agreement, a more detailed review of how the reinsurance environment as a whole is functioning and how the courts interpret reinsurance loss settlement clauses is required. This issue will be even more worth pondering now that we are seeing a more complex reinsurance market where the parties’ interests are potentially conflicting, which is per se a challenge to the general view that the reinsurers should follow the fortunes or settlements of the reinsured.

公共工程於政府採購之履約過程中常因政策性考量、實際施作問題、法令修改、民意反映、使用單位需求等因素，而須適當辦理變更設計、追加減預算，此時機關辦理程序除應依工程採購契約之規定，確認機關得辦理契約變更之內容及範圍；並應依行政院公共工程委員會令頒「採購契約變更或加減價核准監辦備查規定一覽表」，確認該採購之核准、監辦及備查程序。 惟機關辦理工程採購實務上，對於工程契約變更的意義，以及何種情形可以構成契約的變更，得以調整契約之金額或工期，可說是最常見的工程爭議。而國內之工程契約，對於工程契約之變更，原則上均設有簡繁不一之契約條款，而這些條款對於工程契約變更之意義、內涵或態樣，在實務上究應如何解釋或適用，對於機關工程人員而言常生困惑。 因此本文首先就實務上常用得為契約解釋及漏洞填補之法律原則作說明。並透過民法第247條之1說明有關契約之規制，乃在防止契約自由之濫用，以避免契約淪為一方當事人剝奪他方權利之工具，而造成利益顯失平衡之狀態；而契約如發生非具體生活經驗所得預料之障礙或分配風險之契約條款因法律規定而無效時，則應依民法第227條之2第1項規定，透過契約之調整以維契約之公平。 其次，對於機關辦理之工程採購而言，為防範得標廠商不自行履行契約之轉包行為，政府採購法對於契約主體之變更或契約之轉讓有嚴格之限制。惟對於機關辦理之工程採購而言，如絕對禁止契約主體之變更或轉讓，在若干情形下並非當然符合機關之利益，此時仍有契約主體之變更或轉讓之可能。故本文除就契約主體變更之意義略作說明外，亦將對實務上可能發生契約主體變更之情形作一探討；另就工程契約客體變更部分，本文將以常見工程契約變更之原因及相關契約條款規定作說明。並就工程契約變更之範圍與限制、機關指示契約變更的必要性與容許性進行探討。 最後，依契約變更的內容，以新增契約工作項目、刪減契約工作項目、工作數量增減及工作性質與內容等四種變更情形分別討論之，期能理出工程契約變更相關爭議之處理方式，減少機關人員與廠商對於履約管理實務上之認知落差，進而降低政府採購履約階段糾紛之發生，並藉此提高政府整體之採購效率及經濟利益。

英國哲學家帕費特（Derek Parfit）在《理由與人格》（Reasons and Persons）中主張人格存活中重要的不是同一性，而是有正確原因的心理持續性與聯繫性（關係R）。這樣的化約主義式觀點，帕費特強調這不是西方國家才有的論點，他主張佛陀本來也會同意化約主義的觀點。佛陀「本來也會同意」的意思是指帕費特把佛陀所闡釋的無我思想視為比化約主義更極端的「消除式的化約主義」。在人格的本質上，帕費特反對笛卡兒的獨立精神實體，主張只有當我們是離開大腦、軀體以及各種心物理事件而單獨存在的實體，我們的同一性才是確定的。初期佛教為否定婆羅門教的「梵」，同樣是否定有常住、獨存的靈魂。在這相類似的理論基調上，是否真如帕費特所言佛教無我思想是「消除式的化約主義」的代表。又，帕費特這樣的主張是否顯現出其對佛教無我思想的理解與佛陀闡述的無我思想有所出入。這些問題將是本文所要釐清的重點。本論文的研究方向是從帕費特關於人格同一理論的化約主義式觀點切入，來審視佛陀無我思想。 / Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons (1984) claims that in survival personal identity is not what matters, what matters is psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the right kind of cause (Relation R). He asserts this reductionist view of persons that Buddha would have agreed. It means that the Buddha’s view of persons is Eliminative reductionism. Regarding the nature of persons, Parfit denies the Cartesian View (a Cartesian Ego), he says that only if we are separately existing entities can it be true that our identity must be determinate. To against ‘Brahman’, Buddha denies a permanent, separately existing Self as well. The question arises at the gap between Buddha’s view of persons and Parfit’s so-called Eliminative Reductionism. This paper starts with Parfit’s Reductionist view of persons and discusses no-self theory in Early Buddhism.

本論文題旨為：「論代間正義：一個羅爾斯式的觀點」。代間正義是晚近三十年來新興且益愈受到重視的倫理學議題之一，其主要關切的核心問題，乃在於追問「當代之於後代所應擔負的責任」。本文透過當代政治哲學與倫理學家羅爾斯（John Rawls）有關社會正義理論的設計與主張，分兩部分處理此問題。 / 第一部份所處理的問題為由帕菲特（Derek Parfit）所深化之「後代人格不同一問題」（The Non-Identity Problem），旨在探究「代間正義是否可能」。帕菲特指出，前代不同的行為選擇，將造成不同後代的存在，而這使得現存既有之各種權利與責任相對應的理論，無法合理地適用於代間關係。帕菲特主張，可以採取「忽略特定人格的比較（品質）原則」以解決此後代人格不同一問題。然而，帕菲特此舉卻陷入「不特定人格的後代無法追究前代之行為責任」的理論困境。本文主張，透過羅爾斯原初位置（original position）的理論設計啟發，即便在代間存在著「前代不同的行為選擇，將造成不同後代的存在」的後代人格不同一疑慮，當代仍可採納原初位置的理論啟示，區分人的屬性（properties）與獨特性（particular）的差異，在後代存有人格不同一問題（獨特性）的情形下，針對「屬性」而確立追問當代之於後代所應擔負責任之正當性。 / 第二部分主要處理羅爾斯有關代間正義觀點的內部論證問題，並進一步藉此說明「代間正義如何可能」。羅爾斯以「正義的儲蓄原則」（just savings principle）說明代間的分配正義問題，並《正義論》（A Theory of Justice）中將它納入正義二原則之中，成為建構社會基本體制的基本原則之一。然而，羅爾斯早期解釋與證成儲蓄原則的相關理據如動機假定（motivation assumption）與家族模式等，卻可能與其他理論假定如締約者的理性等相衝突、衍生解釋融貫上的困難，而遭到眾多學者們的質疑。羅爾斯在一九九三年的《政治自由主義》（Political Liberalism）中對此做出回應，並將關切下一代的動機假定，修正為「要求前代也承諾遵守他們所遵守的儲蓄原則，無論向前或向後追溯多遠」。除此之外，羅爾斯於《正義論》以外的其他著作，在提及正義二原則時，皆不再表述「正義的儲蓄原則」。本文認為羅爾斯後期所提出的證立主張，不僅整合了代內分配正義（差異原則）與代間分配正義（儲蓄原則）的論證理據（小中取大規則的應用），更與其主張「社會作為一世代相繼之公平的合作體系」時所標舉之「相互性理念」（the idea of reciprocity）的核心概念相符應。本文認為，在論證理據得到順利整合的前提下，羅爾斯仍可在後期表述正義二原則時，將「正義的儲蓄原則」放回其中，並可據此呼應當代永續發展理念「既滿足當代人的需求，又不對後代人滿足其需求的能力造成危害」的核心主張。 / The topic “Intergenerational Justice” is one of the newest but getting more important ethics problems to contemporaries. One of the key points of this issue is how to make sense of our obligations to the posterity (include future people) if possible. In this dissertation, I intend to clarify this problem by Rawls’s theory of justice into two parts. / The first part is “The Non-Identity Problem” held by Derek Parfit. This problem shows that “in the different outcomes, different people would be born”, and it seems inactive the traditional theories of rights. Parfit suggests that we can through it by the priinciple Q: “if in either of two outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it would be bad if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived.” But this principle makes new difficulties about this problem. According Reiman, I argue that we can adjust this non-identity problem by the theory hypothesis “Original Position” of Rawls’s theory of justice, and that there are obligations from contemporaries to the future people. / The second part is about the arguments of Rawls’s theory of justice between generations. According to early Rawls in 1971, the theory of justice between generations represented by the “just savings principle” and was one part of the Two Principles of Justice in A Theory of Justice. But there are some argument troubles about the assumptions that makes the theory of justice between generations difficultly, especially on the “motivation assumption” and the family mode and so on. In 1993, Rawls changed his arguments about the theory of justice between generations, but he also take off the just savings principle from the Two Principles of Justice in other books or articles besides A Theory of Justice. I argue that latter arguments seem more reasonable to the theory of justice between generations, and they also makes the whole theory of social justice comprehensive. Then I argue that Rawls can still presents the just savings principle when he says about the Two Principles of Justice.

勞動基準法、勞工退休金條例課予雇主於成就一定要件下，有給付勞工退休金、資遣費之責，以保護照顧勞工。然時至今日，為因應全球化趨勢，經營者透過交互協力的經營網絡，使人事調動亦趨於頻繁，產生多法人格經營組織形態下的調職。惟勞工退休金與資遣費係本於勞動契約之請求，故其求償對象為「勞動契約上雇主」，當事人一方(事業單位)改變，工作年資重新計算，將衍生應以誰承擔雇主責任及工作年資併計、平均工資計算等債權範圍問題。甚或雇主透過關係企業交叉控制，濫用公司法人格、掏空資產，導致關廠歇業，勞工之債權求償無門。 勞動基準法各條文所規範之雇主(責任主體)，須斟酌各該法條的立法意旨與目的予以審酌認定，且未包含多重勞動關係之處理。我國公司法第154條第2項規定引進揭穿公司面紗原則，惟勞工如係因關係企業、家族企業調動，導致工作年資中斷或勞動條件不利益變更，損及其權益，尚難逕以該法條要求控制股東負清償之責，以擴張雇主責任。又104年2月4日修正公布勞動基準法第28條規定，提升退休金與資遣費之受償順位，並納入墊償，該條文對勞動債權之保護及施行以來之適用問題，亦為本文關切之重點。 　　本文將從雇主範圍、跨法人格企業調動、經營主體消滅等變動因素下，探討勞工退休金及資遣費之求償對象、求償範圍及債權保護等，並透過檢視現行勞動法制、公司法關係企業債權人保護之規定，介紹美國「揭穿公司面紗原則」、日本「法人格否認理論」、我國實務發展「實體同一性」概念等，試圖描繪擴充退休金與資遣費求償與保護法制之輪廓，並對於擴張勞工退休金與資遣費追償對象之可能，提出相關建議以供參考。

不可分效力存在我國實務上達百年之久，日本法上在第二次世界大戰前亦存在。但二戰後，日本法上有許多改變，最大者為引進訴因制度，宣告揚棄不可分效力，但在一事不再理或訴因變更上，又可看到不可分效力的影子存在。 雖然訴因制度國內向來已經有許多介紹文獻及支持者。可惜所引用之文獻似乎稍舊，觀察日本法上這十幾年的平成年間裁判，日本法上有許多標竿性的判決存在，尤其這兩則：最高裁平成13年4月11日第三小法庭決定（訴因拘束力）、最高裁平成15年10月7日第三小法庭判決（一事不再理效力），都沒有在國內的中文文獻上看到介紹過，著實可惜（目前國內文獻可以看到介紹標竿裁判的是昭和37年的白山丸事件）。再者，日本法上這十幾年發展出的「爭點顯在化措施」也未在國內文獻看到為文介紹。 針對不可分效力的不合理，新進學者已經多有批評，大致上批評點也都直指病灶。但拆除這座百年城堡後，要如何在這平地上建設或開墾？自然的歷史進程或一句盡量特定，可與其他犯罪事實區別即足，並不足夠。 因為，刑事審判犯罪事實之特定，本質上就因人力有其極限，刑事審判犯罪事實是被篩選過的，並非真正的完整呈現過往的事實。訴訟之三方法院、檢察官、被告均非神人，應該允許作為控訴者的檢察官考量立證之難易、爭點之複雜化等，只取一部分作為刑事審判犯罪事實，這並具有「拘束力」。 這經過篩選的刑事審判犯罪事實，即為被告之防禦範圍、法院之審判範圍，也是既判力範圍。而為了更明確指出刑事審判犯罪事實範圍，也應該包含法律評價（罪數），要丟棄的為不可分效力，而非罪數論。 日本法上的訴因制度及新發展而出的爭點顯在化措施有其魅力所在，可惜均有過於複雜的分類與變化，有些概念在我國也無意義。總體而言，可借鏡的為承認拘束力，並如爭點顯在化措施的要求，強調審、檢負有爭點說明及形成之責任，如使檢察官言詞或書面提出，被告表示意見並記明筆錄或行辯論，使得該爭點在審判言詞辯論程序上顯示出等。 過往的實務或學理發展出過多複雜概念（如併案審理、補充犯罪事實、訴之變更、擴張縮小等），其實，只需要「追加起訴」與「變更起訴法條」兩者即可。超出起訴書所記載之犯罪事實，即為追加起訴；如只是改變起訴書記載之犯罪事實，即為變更起訴法條。 因此，本文認為，為落實上開理念，現行法上的第264條、第265條、第267條、第300條此四條文有調整修正之必要。並提出案例實際操作及說明。

本文嘗試以和平問題與暴力問題為焦點，重新理解列維納斯道德形上學之梗概，並解決其政治蘊義所造成的疑難。列維納斯的哲學基本上是一種和平哲學，其所論之和平乃被界定為對暴力的非暴力抵抗，並在其前期作品中具體展現為倫理學對政治學的抵抗。但此一抵抗關係隨著列維納斯的思想進程而逐漸呈現出一種兩歧性，從而引發其思想是否前後不一致的批判，亦產生對和平之純粹性的質疑。筆者的努力即在於說明此一疑難的成因並構想一調和方案。筆者主張，應將列維納斯的思想進程視為一條闡發其倫理學之政治蘊義的思路，但這條從倫理學走到政治學的和平之路，須途經社會學的迂迴方才可能，而如此一種中介性的社會學之建構，惟在列維納斯的他勒目詮釋中獲得。因此，本文綜觀列維納斯的哲學作品與宗教作品，先是闡述責任倫理學的和平蘊義，再從其宗教詮釋學對以色列社群的刻畫得到那基於倫理學之社會學的基本模式，最後參照解構主義的批判，在對質疑政治學與回答社會學的構想中，統括列維納斯的倫理思想與政治思想。 / Peace, as the non-violence resistance to violence, is one of the main topics of Levinas's philosophy. In this dissertation, I attempt to summarize Levinas's moral metaphysics and reflect its political implications by investigating the relation of peace and violence. The relation which in Levinas's early works could be seen as an opposition between ethics and politics has some ambiguity in his later works that emerges in a dialectical way: ethics both opposes and demands politics. My opinion is that this problem can be solved by referring to his religious works, especially his interpretations of the Talmud. In brief, the path of argument is from ethics to politics through sociology. First, I describe the basic principles of Levinas's ethical metaphysics by illustrating the typology of the other and the genealogy of the same, i.e. the phenomenology of the face of the other and the transformation from the same in itself to the same for the other. Second, I find the basic political model in terms of the hermeneutics of Talmud, especially the texts about the people of Israel. Final, I try to appeal to the postmodern thoughts in order to reconcile the risk of violence in Levinas's religious works, and integrate Levinas's ethical thoughts and political thoughts by constructing the politics of questioning and the sociology of response.