近年來國內各項重大公共政策、公共建設的實施，使政府財政日益困難；相對於政府財政拮据情形，民間資本不斷累積，公部門遂逐漸有引進民間資金的意願，欲藉著結合公有土地與民間資金、技術、經營管理能力進行土地開發，來達到提昇全民利益的目的，於是「公私合營」土地開發方式形成。公私部門以訂定契約的方式，將雙方擁有的資源結合。在此過程中，雙方必須密切配合，才能達到合營的目的。但不論目的為何，皆需考量成本，過去從成本觀點探討土地開發方式的研究多侷限在以財務分析方式評估，而事實上在整個開發過程中因雙方交易行為而產生的交易成本對於開發過程的影響是不容忽視的，因此本研究試圖從交易成本理論來探討目前相關法令規定與實際運作中設定地上權、BOT模式、合作興建、委託開發這幾種「公私合營」土地開發方式。 　　本研究之研究內容如下： 　　（一）目前國內公私合營土地開發方式相關法令規定、案例之整理、歸納。 　　（二）以交易成本理論分析、比較公私合營土地開發方式。 　　（三）降低四種公私合營土地開發方式交易成本的方法。

都市更新權利變換運作過程中的土地權利人與實施者的關係，是現代經濟活動典型的專業分工委託代理關係。土地權利人與實施者基於都市更新法制下相關的權利義務契約，執行都市更新事業，由於訊息不對稱、目標不一致與風險偏好之差異，實施者基於機會主義的決策或行動，經常不利於土地權利人的利益，於是產生代理問題、增加代理成本，雙方無法產生高度互信的基礎，而成為都市更新延宕與成效不彰的主因。本論文從土地權利人與實施者之間，於都市更新條例機制下的互動契約中，探討分析雙方之委託代理關係，並從土地權利人的角度設計監督方式，以維護土地權利人的權益，促進都市更新事業之實施。 當土地權利人與實施者，共同於一都市更新單元，組成生產團隊時，土地權利人初期擁有較強的提議與同意之控制權，隨著實施者握有超過都市更新法定之同意書門檻後，實施者掌握較強的執行控制權，土地權利人擁有較弱的監督控制權。又現行都市更新權利變換的價值分配，是實施者投入共同負擔費用，並以更新完成後之土地與建築物部分折價抵付，其餘土地及建築物則分配與原土地所有權人，因此土地權利人得到大部分的剩餘索取權。這樣的控制權與剩餘索取權分離狀態下，其權利變換價值分配模式，是否為適當的產權安排？對於都市更新參與人能否有所激勵？能否促進都市更新之推動效率？是本論文主要的探討分析重點。 此外，同一更新單元之土地權利人與實施者，具有短期且為一次性合作的特性，依現行都市更新法律規範，交易雙方以簽訂同意書做為實施都市更新事業的關鍵契約，由於契約簽定後，交易雙方所投入的特殊投資比例不相同，因而普遍引起期初契約簽署的遲疑，甚而契約簽定後，仍有權利義務不明確之爭議。本論文透過不完全契約理論的思維，探討分析土地權利人與實施者的契約關係與特殊投資關係，並建議一個新的交易契約模式，以降低雙方之機會主義行為，進而希能促進都市更新事業之推動。 / In the process of rights transformation of urban renewal, the relationships between land owners and the implementers are the typical Principal-Agent Relationship in modern economic activities. Based on the related rights and obligations under the regulations of urban renewal, land owners and the implementers execute urban renewal business. Due to the differences of asymmetric information, inconsistent goals, and risk preference, the decision-making and/or actions of implementers based on the opportunism, will often unfavorable to the benefits of land owners. Therefore, the problem of Principal-Agent Relationship arises that increases agent cost. Both sides cannot generate the foundation of highly mutual trust, and thus creates the major reason of delaying and inefficiency for urban renewal. This paper studies and analyzes the Principal-Agent Relationship of both land owners and the implementers from both sides with their interaction of contract under unban renewal regulation mechanism, and further from the land owners perspective to design ways of monitoring to protect rights and benefits of land owners, to facilitate the implementation of urban renewal business. When the land owners and the implementers organize as a「Production Team」on a very urban renewal unit, the land owners initially hold stronger control rights on both proposing step and agreement step; along the implementers hold agreement letters exceeding the official threshold of urban renewal regulations, they will control better execution rights, and the landowners hold weaker surveillance control rights. The current value allocation of rights transformation for urban renewal employs common sharing of expenses with the implementers. After deducting the common sharing of the discounted price substitute payment of the land and buildings after the rights transformation, the remaining lands and buildings shall be allocated to the original landowners according to the rights value proportion before each piece of land rights was transformed. In so doing, the land owners obtain most of the residual claim. Under such separation of the control rights and the residual claim, whether the value allocation of the rights transformation is as suitable arrangement for property rights? Will it be the incentives to the urban renewal participants? Whether it will facilitate the efficiency of urban renewal promotion? These are the main points of the analysis of this paper. Land owners and the implementers with the same Renewal Unit retain a short-term and once-for-all cooperative nature. According to the regulations of current Urban Renewal Act, both parties of the transaction by signing an agreement as the key contract of implementing urban renewal business. After signing up the contract, due to the different ratio of specific investment input by both sides of the transaction, the initial contract thus normally has been delaying or doubtfully signed. Even worse, after eventually signing the contract, there are still uncertain disputes on rights and obligations. Via the thoughts of Incomplete Contracts Theory, this paper not only analyzes the contractual relationship and the specific investment relationship of land owners and the implementers, but also recommends a new transaction contract model to decrease the opportunism behaviors of both sides, and further more, to facilitate the implement of urban renewal business.

我國於94年6月22日公布修正後之公司法，正式賦予公司召開股東會時，得採行書面或電子方式供股東行使表決權之法律依據，期能使我國之公司治理與股東權益維護能與國際接軌；惟「股東會電子投票」制度，歷經元大京華證券股份有限公司、台灣總合股務處理股份有限公司及台灣集中保管結算所股份有限公司三個平台之建置，仍然未被各上市、櫃公司廣為採用，即使偶有採用者，其投票總權數占總股份之比例多數未及1%，顯示成效不彰。另2010年10月的亞洲公司治理協會(Asian Corporate Governance Association)年會，提出了最新一份的「CG Watch」報告，在這份報告中，ACGA指出我國推動股權權益的狀況上較前次調查類似，並未有太大改善，比如公司對國外投資人「通訊投票」、「分割投票」權益的行使，相關法規及配套仍不夠完備，而針對「通訊投票」得分，在歷次的評分中，我國都是敬陪末座，可以說，這幾年來此一核心問題並未被重視並獲得具體的改善。 基此本研究將以股東會通訊投票之法令、制度為經，佐以實務之見解為緯，參考外國經驗，藉由分析現行之問題並勾勒未來推動之建議供各界參考。本研究除分析我國股東會之基本概念、表決權行使方式、委託書之使用，並藉由對美、日兩國股東會制度及實務之探討，一窺國際之現況及未來發展之趨勢。另針對我國股東會通訊投票制度與現況進行背景說明，並介紹我國通訊投票下書面投票與電子投票之架構及現況，最後分析我國電子投票採用率偏低之原因。 此外，針對美、日、台三國股東會通訊投票制度分別由法規制度面、股東權益面、公司執行面及電子投票實務面進行比較，最後並提出對相關主事者之建議及對後續研究者未來研究方向之建議，以期經由各界之腦力激盪，共同為我國的資本市場國際化而努力。 / The amendment of Taiwan Company Act in June 22nd, 2005, upon its release, granted each shareholder the legitimate right to cast his/her vote by both written and electronic means in shareholders’ meetings. This amendment is menat to bring Taiwan’s corporate governance and shareholder rights in line with the international practice. However, with the limited use of no more than 1% voting rights of most listing and over-the-counter (OTC) companies on the three voting forums established by Yuanta Core Pacific Securities Co., Ltd., Taiwan Integrated Shareholder Service Company and Taiwan Depository & Clearing Corporation, the attempt has been proven unsuccessful. In addition, the latest “CG Watch” report, submitted during the 2010 Asian Governance Association annual conference held in October, has suggested that, similar to the previous reports, shareholder rights of Taiwan-based companies have not been improved outstandingly. For instance, the exercise of “postal voting” and “vote splitting” upon foreign investors of Taiwan-based companies has been restricted due to the flaws in the domestic voting system and regulations. Also, in the report, a constant low rating in “postal voting” for the Taiwan-based companies simply hints that the core issue has never been properly valued nor concretely improved. Based on the suggestions in the previous paragraph, this research paper provides an overview of the laws and the regulations of the postal voting system. The paper also includes opinions on practical needs and comparison from foreign experiences. By means of analyzing our current issues, the research draws an outline of the propositions for trends of the future development. Apart from analyzing the basic concepts of shareholders’ meetings held by some Taiwan-based companies, exercise of voting rights, and use of proxy forms, the research also peeks into the current situation around the globe and the future trends by consulting the system and the practical needs of shareholders’ meetings in the U.S. and Japan. As for the postal voting system and the current situation in Taiwan, the research provides a background illustration by introducing the structure and the current status of printed ballot voting and electronic voting under our postal voting framework. In conclusion, the paper points out the reasons for limited use of electronic voting in Taiwan. Finally, the research measures postal voting systems in the U.S., Japan and Taiwan from aspects of the laws and regulations, the shareholder rights, the corporate execution and the practical needs. In the end, in order for the effort of internationalization upon domestic capital market, the research eventually proposes the solutions for the related personnel in charge and the follow-up research direction for future researchers.

近年來，國際間政府推動資訊公開蔚為風潮，伴隨著資訊通信科技的發展，電子化政府和政府網站更普遍被各界視為一個低成本且高效率的透明化途徑。台灣的政府網站長期受到國際間高度評價，在發展中國家更是名列前茅。然而，既有的研究與調查大多數僅片面側重於政府供給面的探究，通常以化約且可標準化的指標來評鑑特定政府網站的介面資訊功能。相形之下，鮮少有關注民眾的需求認知、機關政策執行以及網站內容評估等較全面的研究成果供參。因而無法更深入地釐清政府網站、法制和政策執行績效不彰等困境與透明化治理之間的關聯。 在委託代理理論的運用之下，本研究兼顧政府治理中委託方民眾的認知以及代理方政府機關的經驗與成效。目的在於釐清網站資訊公開供給和需求的現況與問題，並更具體地檢證政府網站資訊公開對機關施政資訊揭露、績效衡量和政府課責的影響。爰此，研究者參與多項網站資訊公開相關研究，以蒐集多元化次級資料，包括：量化的網路民眾問卷調查，各級機關的跨年度問卷調查，機關網站內容評估比較，以及質性的個別訪談、焦點團體座談。藉由理論聚焦與多重研究方法的交叉檢證分析，以達研究綜效。 研究結果分為網站資訊公開對政府施政資訊揭露，施政績效衡量，以及政府課責的影響三個部分來討論。首先，相較於法制，網站資訊公開更有助於揭露政府施政資訊，特別是網站資訊公開實施過程可呈現出政府治理內、外部的多重代理關係及代理問題，甚至可緩和部分的代理問題。其次，網站資訊公開可具體地呈現並衡量施政績效，以因應傳統官僚體系內各層代理績效難以衡量的困境。但囿於目前整體制度缺乏績效誘因設計，而限制了此效益。最後，因整體資訊公開績效制度的匱乏，也使得網站資訊公開對政府課責的效益備受限制。 整體而言，本研究揭示了代理理論應用於政府治理的價值，並檢證政府資訊公開、績效和課責等三項治理要件的關聯。研究成果可彌補實務與研究的落差，並對相關文獻做出貢獻。 / In recent years, governments from around the world have adopted Freedom of Information Act to increase transparency in their governance. With advancements in information and communication technologies (ICTs), e-Government has been seen as a cost-effective and possible mean to promote openness and transparency. Taiwan’s efforts to develop e-Government services have been well-recognized; especially, have made remarkable advantages among developing countries. Nevertheless, most of the existing researches in evaluating e-Government service are based on supply-side indicators and often assess websites alone; as yet, little information is available on the demand aspect of e-Government. The paper aims to explore the potential and practice of government website information disclosure in terms of the perspective of end user and government agencies. The results show the significance of three aspects in information disclosure of Taiwanese government websites through the application of quantitative and qualitative methodology, including self-administered questionnaire, website evaluation, individual interview, and focus group interview. First, government website information disclosure benefits the revelation of government information, manifestation of multi-agent relationships in internal and external governance of government, and alleviation of partial ageny problems. Second, government website information disclosure enhances revealing and measuring the performance of government agencies; nevertheless, in which the effectiveness is limited due to the absence of institutional incentives. Third, under the circumstances of unsound institution, the effectiveness of accountability has difficulties to be thoroughly realized through government website information disclosure. In sum, the finding contributes to a valuable reference for other countries in implementing information transparency of e-Government, and has significant implications for policy makers, government agencies, and system designers.

集村興建農舍制度是2000年農地政策劇烈轉變的重要一環。制度執行涉及代理關係，以往集村農舍相關文獻大多偏重於特定地區個案及建築景觀或住宅功能的探討，也缺乏探討政府內部執行分工及互動對制度執行成效的影響，而代理理論中的多重委託多重代理觀念，不僅更貼近社會的真實情況，也能解析集村農舍制度的執行結構與執行結果間的關係。因此本研究從中央主管機關的委託及地方政府的執行代理結構，就集村農舍制度設計初始農地政策目標，分別探討制度執行規則與政府同一層級及不同層級的委託代理安排，調查分析整體執行現況及不同區域案例對農地利用與管理的影響，以釐清制度執行的問題真相，期望作為農地政策與農舍制度執行相關研究之基礎。 傳統的委託代理研究途徑，都描述了一部分制度或政策執行的現象。多重委託多重代理理論可以更完整作為分析階層政府推動政策或制度執行過程中複雜的互動與回應基礎，而政府內部多重委託代理及複雜的訊息問題，也比模型化的理論更加複雜。除了制度環境以外，也因為集村農舍制度執行分工安排不當，致使組織職能目標及資訊傳遞太過複雜，且未建立協商平台，加深執行結果偏離維護完整農業生產環境之政策目標。本研究建議必須回歸集村興建農舍制度原本立法目的調整中央農業主管機關內部制度安排，並透過多重委託代理雙方協商平台機制，促進正確資訊流通及共同合作。最後，如果執行一再偏離農地政策目標且陷於無效率狀態，也必須考慮制度予以廢除。 / The Concentrated Farmhouses Institution was an important part in the drastic change of Farmland Policy in 2000. As the institution implementation was conceded involved agency relationship, previous literatures mostly only focused on explorations of specific regional cases and structure landscape or residential functionalities. Furthermore, it also lacked explorations on the influence of institution implementation effects from government internal implementation of work diversification and interaction. Therefore, from principal of the central government authority to implementing agency structure of the regional government, and by basing on the initial Farmland Policy aim of the Concentrated Farmhouses Institution plan, this study explored on the institutional implementation regulation and principal agent arrangement within same-level and different levels of government. It investigated the entire implementing status and cases in different regions that influence on farmland utilization and management, and expected to clarify the actual problems of institutional implementation. The outcome seeks to be the foundation of relevant studies on Farmland Policy and farmhouses institution implementation. The approach of traditional principal agency studies all described a part of institution or norms of policy implementation. The concept of Multi-Principal and Multi-Agent could be more complete in analyzing various levels of the government in promoting the policy, or the complex interaction and response basis of institutional implementation process. In addition, the problem of governmental internal multi-principal agency and complicate messages were more complex in comparison to the model theory. Despite of the institutional environment, inappropriate diversification of work in implementation of the Concentrated Farmhouses Institutional has led to over-complexity of organizational function aim and message transmission. As there was no establishment of consultation platform, the implemented outcome has intensified the deviation on policy aim of maintaining a complete agriculture production environment. This study suggested that the internal institution arrangement in agriculture authority of the central government was required to readjust its original legislative aim of the Concentrated Farmhouses Institution. Through multi-principal agency of consultation platform mechanism of both parties, it would encourage accurate information circulation and cooperation. Lastly, if the implementation deviated constantly from Farmland Policy aim, it would fall into an ineffective status, and eventually the consideration of institution abolishment would be required.

政府隨時更新建設以因應各式公共建設及政策，但並非所有建設都能如預期 使用，審計機關適時扮演著監督者之角色，因此，行政機關與審計機關在決算時 的互動，成為可以適時督促政府的管道。在過去文獻中，鮮少有人討論審計機關 與行政機關在決算互動之情況，本研究先探討良好的決算為理論基礎，共分三層 次：決算目標、決算使用審計方式及審計人員能力為架構，以探討行政與審計兩 者間互動時之反應，並以我國頂尖大學計畫為例，運用訪談法及二手資料分析， 以解釋決算的過程、成果之重要性，及雙方互動後的結果。 本文藉由訪談頂尖大學及審計機關，針對研究問題提出下列實務上之政策建 議： 一、放寬法規上之規定：頂大計畫之經費之流用應加寬彈性，畢竟頂大計畫僅是 達成計畫的手段。 二、決算進行時，審計機關與行政機關開拓新溝通管道：利用電子化溝通平台減 少審計與行政機關溝通之時間。 三、審計機關與行政機關嘗試以和平互惠角度共存：本研究認為在往後之行政審 計互動關係應嘗試以和平互惠之關係進行，而此使兩者之間能夠以互惠面合 作的前提 四、重視頂大計畫工作圈意見：在未來工作圈會議時，將以頂大辦公室及會計人 員共同進行討論，有利於雙方之瞭解。 / The administrative organizations renew infrastructures based on public and policy, but now all infrastructures can be anticipated to use. The audit plays the supervisor to the administrative organizations. Therefore, the reaction of financial statement will be a good way to surprise the administrative organizations. The documents seldom discuss this issue in the past. This research discusses how to attain the theory of good financial statement with three levels: the goal of financial statement, the way audit organizations to use and the ability of the auditors. This research takes “The Aim for the Top University Project” for example to discuss the reactions of two organizations, and use In-depth interviews and researching secondary materials to explain the process, the importance and the outcome after reactions. First, broaden the rules: the expenditure should be more flexible. The project is just a method approach to the goal. Second, the two organizations should explore new communication channel: use E-communication medium to decrease time. Third, the two organizations should try to stay in peace for collaborating. Fourth, respect the opinion form the teams of top universities. Let staffs of both sides discuss, which will make them understand each other.

公司治理之發展是國際注目潮流，OECD已指明「保障股東權益」是公司治理一項重要內容，而公司治理原則下的「股東行動主義」，是鼓勵股東參與公司治理。近年經營權之爭，公司派「依法」操控股東會之特殊現象時有耳聞，而架空股東會議事的亂象，使得維護股東權益變成空談。 有鑒於此，筆者擬在探究公司派架空股東會議事的內容後，分別由股務作業、股東會議事程序、委託書統計驗證與表決票(選舉票)封存作業與證據保全等方面，進一步提出改良股東會議事的策略，以求實踐公司治理的願景。 / It is an international trend to pay much attention to corporate governance. OECD identified that a corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights. One of the shareholders’ rights is to participate in, and to be sufficiently informed on, decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes. Shareholders’ activism exists only while legal and regulatory requirements that affect corporate governance practices should be consistent with the rule of law, transparent and enforceable. However, many controlling shareholders “legally” manipulated agendas and resolutions of shareholders’ meetings for the past years. In this way, shareholders’ rights could be nothing and there were little corporate governance remained. Therefore, after analyzing how controlling shareholders manipulated in shareholders’ meetings, this thesis proposed strategies to improve the law on shareholders’ meetings. Such strategies included the aspects of (1) stock affairs, (2) procedures for shareholders’ meetings, (3) proxies tally and verification and (4) perpetuation on used voting slips or ballots. The author was expecting that there will be better legal basis to push ahead corporate governance for public companies in Taiwan.

本文主要探討公司治理體系下控制權市場所發揮之功能，內容大致上分為四個部分。第一部分先就公司治理理論以及不同體系加以介紹，從Ronald H. Coase交易成本理論、Berle & Means五種公司類型，以及代理理論說明公司治理的理論基礎，再分別介紹OECD以及World Bank的公司治理架構，而控制權市場則是公司治理體系下，外部治理機制的一項重要工具，最後就美國、日本與我國的公司治理體系加以介紹。 第二部分則是說明企業併購促使控制權市場發揮治理成效之主要活動，因此，分別就美國、日本與我國企業併購之概況加以闡述。美國歷經了五次併購風潮，有其經濟、文化等結構性因素，而日本與我國過去並未發生併購風潮，然而隨著結構性因素的改變，再加上全球化的浪潮，日本與我國併購活動有逐漸加溫之趨勢。 視敵意併購為控制權市場之主要利器，這是因為企業雖然有可能因為善意併購後，改善效率進而增加股東權益，有助於公司治理，但敵意併購活動更兼具威嚇現任經營者之效果，因此，敵意併購活動於公司治理體系上，一方面可汰換不適任經營者，另一方面亦可對現任經營者造成威嚇使其不敢進行有礙於股東權益之情事。而主併者進行敵意併購，主要可行的途徑有二：一為收購股權，另一為委託書徵求。就法制面而言，則見諸公開收購以及委託書管理相關規定。 第三部分開始探討敵意併購法制，本文分別介紹了美國、日本以及我國公開收購制度，目前我國已從事先核准制修正為事先申報制，與美國、日本之申報制相近。但對於公開收購定義則大相逕庭，美國採八項要素判斷，日本與我國則加以明確定義。另外股東平等原則部份，美國、日本與我國同採「比例分配制」，關於禁止變更收購條件的範圍，則是美國最寬鬆因此有利於主併者，而日本最嚴格。至於美國州法下的反併購條款在我國與日本並未出現。而關於我國引進強制公開收購制度，本文分別引述支持與反對者之意見，並基於促進併購活動發生有利於公司治理此一面向，說明強制公開收購制度可能之影響。 第四部份探討美國、日本與我國關於委託書徵求相關制度，就資訊公開的內容而言，美國、日本與我國相關規定大同小異，但徵求人資格限制以及徵求股份總數限制為我國獨有，況且因公司派掌握紀念品的製作權以及發放權，加上相關規定使投信事業必須支持符合持股成數之之公司董事會提出之議案或董事、監察人候選人，且又就使用股東名冊的難易程度而言，我國委託書徵求相關規定實對現任經營者較有利。 而關於委託書價購與否之爭論，本文分別就正反兩方之理由加以介紹，後從公司治理之角度出發，認為收購委託書可能使管理者有更多經濟上誘因進行舞弊，有礙於公司治理，故應禁止之。 最後比較公開收購制度與委託書徵求制度二者，分別從所需資金、成本風險控制、實施之便宜性以及公司治理角度，希冀我國未來公開收購制度能善加運用，發揮公司治理之功效。文末並提出相關建議，以供將來之研究或主管機關作為參考。 / This dissertation mainly discusses the role of control market in the framework of corporate governance. It is composed of four parts. The first part introduces relevant theories of corporate governance, including Ronald H. Coase’s “transaction cost theory”, Berle & Means’ “five types of corporation”, and agency theory. Then the diverse frameworks of corporate governance including OECD, World Bank, in which control market is indicated as a significant external mechanism, are illustrated. At last, the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan's frameworks of corporate governance are introduced respectively. The second part explains that the merges & acquisitions (M&A) is one of the major activities that make control market operate effectively. Then the general situations of the M&A in the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan are introduced. Taken as a main mechanism of control market, hostile takeover not only strikes inefficient managers but menaces the incumbent from fraud. Two major feasible approaches of hostile takeover are purchasing stocks and soliciting proxies. The rules of tender offer and proxy contest are relevant. The third part discusses the legal institution of hostile takeover. The rules of tender offer of U.S., Japan, and Taiwan are introduced. Then the similarities and dissimilarities between the rules from the definitions of tender offer, equal treatment to shareholders, and anti-takeover strategies are detailed. At the end of this part, different points of view about mandatory tender offer and its relation with corporate governance are discussed. The fourth part explores (investigates) the rules of proxy contest of the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan. They are similar in the disclosure principle, but only Taiwan set limitations on the qualification of solicitors and the amount of proxies. In addition, the incumbent in Taiwan have the control over the manufacturing and delivery of the tokens for shareholders in annual meetings. What’s more, regulations force the institute-investors to support the incumbent. In conclusion, the proxy rules in Taiwan favor the incumbent. Also, the arguments over proxy purchase and its relation with corporate governance is mentioned. At last, this paper compares tender offer with proxy soliciting in several aspects: the fund needed, risk control, convenience, and corporate governance. In the end, the conclusion provides some suggestions for legislators and future studies.

Kyoto University (京都大学) / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(工学) / 甲第18976号 / 工博第4018号 / 新制||工||1619 / 31927 / 京都大学大学院工学研究科建築学専攻 / (主査)教授 加藤 直樹, 教授 門内 輝行, 教授 髙田 光雄 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当

【研究動機與目的】「公私協力」已成為當代政府運作與學術研究風潮，然協力研究實際上忽略一重要議題，即公私部門管理者對於協力究竟抱持著什麼樣的態度。由於態度會決定人的行為模式，對於在制度與組織層面提出各項能左右協力成效的要件，但也不能忽略運用這些遊戲規則的卻是代表組織的公私部門管理者。再者，對於公私協力的研究多採單一經濟途徑，較缺乏整全跨學科領域的實證模型。基於上述，本研究主要分從公私部門管理者角度，建構融合經濟與社會-心理的理論途徑，探究公私部門管理者在契約管理上的態度意向「為何」與「如何」對協力行為產生影響(正式契約與關係治理)。並以目前公私協力中最具爭議且重要的長期照顧制度做為研究個案。 【研究設計】本研究主要研究目的有二，其一，探討現階段長期照顧制度中，公私部門管理者對於委託代理的預期、協調運作機制以及對於績效的看法。這個部份將透過質化訪談方式進行資料蒐集；其二，藉由結構方程模式循證公私部門管理者對於委託代理的態度，及此態度如何影響管理者的契約管理行為(正式契約與關係治理)，及此行為如何影響協力成效。而本研究實證模型將整合經濟與社會心理途徑，希冀涵容跨學科及實務現象。 【研究結果】本研究主要貢獻在於以公私部門管理者為分析單位，建構融合經濟與社會途徑的公私協力成效模式。同時以質量化方式驗證協力成效理論模式與實務間的契合度。主要研究發現如下：1、官僚體制在面對行政變革時會產生心態與行為上的不一致性；2、公部門希冀透過正式契約作為契約運作機制；然私部門則較偏向於關係治理機制；3、影響契約研擬因素中以社會心理因素較重要於經濟因素的影響；4、從質量化資料驗證正式契約與關係治理是互補關係而非抵換關係；5、居家服務委外呈現公私部門雙方的資源互賴，在互動中也透過社會交換行為以維繫互賴關係的穩定。針對以上發現，在未來實務建議上，可透過組際信任的培植，來厚植公私協力的理想治理情境；建議將長期照顧管理中心定位為正式機關而非臨時的任務編組；透過組織文化的潛移默化調整官僚體對於去人性化的本質，而從重視正式契約轉向關係治理的培植；為求關係治理機制的培育與應用，契約規範應跳脫交易成本的假定。在未來研究上，建議以時間遞移為主軸，縱貫式解構協力的動態過程；官僚體制中的組織文化，對於協力本質與行為的影響將是值得深入討論的議題。