Le différend entre la France et les Etats-Unis sur le règlement de la question irakienne a provoqué une crise diplomatique majeure entre les deux pays, jugée par certains comme la plus sérieuse dans l’histoire des relations bilatérales. Le dossier irakien a cristallisé les positions diplomatiques des deux alliés et mis en lumière deux lectures d’une grande question internationale. Pour la France, il a été l’occasion de défendre des principes, de faire entendre sa voix et de partager sa vision d’un monde multipolaire fondé sur la quête d’un règlement pacifique des différends. Pour les Etats-Unis, cette question relevait d’un enjeu de sécurité nationale, dans une Amérique profondément traumatisée par les attentats de septembre 2001. La rupture franco-américaine a résulté de facteurs structurels anciens : la concurrence entre deux modèles politiques et diplomatiques qui se veulent universels et le déséquilibre entre une puissance française, déclinante, qui aspire à préserver ses sphères d’influence sur la scène internationale, et une puissance américaine, ascendante, devenue, depuis l’effondrement du bloc soviétique, l’unique superpuissance à la tête d’un monde unipolaire. L’affrontement bilatéral du printemps 2003 a ainsi révélé les caractères intrinsèques qui opposent la diplomatie française et la diplomatie américaine et dévoilé leur conception très éloignée qu’elles se faisaient du nouvel ordre mondial et de la place qu’elles aspirent à occuper sur l’échiquier international / The disagreement between France and the US over the Iraqi issue led to a serious diplomatic crisis between the two countries, considered by many analysts as the most serious one in the history of bilateral relations. The Iraqi case crystallized the diplomatic positions of both allies and revealed two different reads of this major international issue. For France, this case was the opportunity to defend its principles, to get itself heard by the rest of the world and to share its vision of a multipolar world, where disputes would be peacefully settled through international organizations. For the US, that issue fell under a matter of national security, in a country deeply traumatized by ‘9/11’. The split between thetwo countries resulted from historical structural causes : (i) the competition between two political and diplomatic models that present themselves as universal, and (ii) the imbalance between France’s declining power aspiring to preserve its spheres of influence over the world and America’s ascending power that has become, since the end of the Cold War, the only superpower. The bilateral confrontation of 2003 revealed the distinctive patterns of both French and American foreign policies and exposed their different views and models of the new world order, as well as their ambitions on the international scene

During the UN World Summit 2005 all Member States of the United Nations unanimously accepted the Responsibility to protect- principle (R2P- principle), that each member state shall protect its own population from ethnic cleansing, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. During the set-up of the United Nations and the Security Council’s veto system in the San Francisco Conference 1945, the five permanent members of the Security Council promised that their right to veto would be used “sparingly” and in the “interest” of the world organization, to safeguard “the International peace and security”. Despite the united acceptance of the R2P- principle to avoid mass atrocities since 2005, China have been detaining up to one million Uyghur, including Kazakhs in detainment camps, in former East Turkestan since the beginning of 2018. Since the passage to invoke the R2P- principle is by the Security Council, the question arises if- the veto would serve as a deadlock on the R2P- principle if China could veto such decision. The purpose of the thesis have therefore been to analyze if the R2P- principle is inefficient against the Security Council’s veto system, by targeting China’s opportunity of vetoing the R2P- principle. The conclusion have been that the R2P- principle is inefficient against the Security Council’s veto system. This is because a permanent member can block the R2P- principle by either vetoing or double vetoing a draft resolution, which have been demonstrated by illustrating how China could veto the R2P- principle. Since the decisions of the Security Council cannot be appealed or dissent in terms of the veto card and UN Charter, it leaves the R2P- principle inefficient with a weak operational legitimacy against the Security Council’s powerful veto system, on the cost of human lives.

La lutte contre le terrorisme, ainsi que ses conséquences sur la sphère des droits de l'Homme, n'est pas un thème nouveau en Europe. Cependant, depuis les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 perpétrés sur le sol des Etats-Unis, «confirmés» par ceux de Madrid en 2004 et Londres en 2005, elle n'a jamais incarné une telle priorité. La majeure partie des mesures prises par l'Union européenne tombe sous le titre de la coopération en matière pénale, c’est-à-dire sousl’ex-troisième Pilier, parmi lesquelles la décision-cadre sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, la décision-cadre sur le mandat d'arrêt européen et les accords entre l'Union européenne et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique sur l'extradition et l'assistance juridique mutuelle. Sur base des mesures européennes, certains Etats, historiquement non concernés par ce phénomène, ont été pressés à adopter des mesures anti-terroristes alors que d’autres y ont vu une légitimation pour renforcer leur corpus juridique déjà existant. Quel est l'impact des mesures européennes et de celles prises par les Etats sur le délicat équilibre entre la sécurité et la liberté ? En d'autres termes, quel est le rôle de l'Etat de droit : une limitation à ces mesures ou, un principe visant au renforcement du combat contre le terrorisme? / The fight against terrorism, as well as its consequences in the field of Human Rights, is not a new theme for Europe. However, since the terrorist attacks of September the 11th 2001 in the United States of America, “confirmed” by the ones of Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, it has never embodied such a priority. The larger part of the measures taken by the European Union falls under the heading of cooperation in criminal matters, i.e. within the scope of the former Third Pillar, among which the framework decision on combating terrorism, the framework decision on the European arrest warrant and the agreements between the European Union and the United States of America on extradition and mutual legal assistance. On basis of the European measures, some States, not historically concerned by terrorism, have been compelled to carry out counter-terrorism measures whereas, others have seen a legitimation to reinforce their existing body of law. What is the impact of the European measures and the ones taken by States on the delicate balance between security and liberty? In other words, what is the role of the Rule of Law: a limitation to those measures or, a principle aiming to the strengthening of the fight against terrorism?

Vingt et un an après la création du Tribunal International pour le Rwanda et dix-sept ans après la signature du traité de Rome donnant naissance à la Cour pénale international, la fièvre dénonciatrice que connait cette institution n’est toujours pas apaisée. La CPI est-elle otage des idéaux qui justifient sa création et des forces politiques antagonistes auxquelles elle reste malgré tout liée ? Les africains commettraient-ils davantage de crime passibles de poursuites devant la Cour que les ressortissant d’autres continents ? Si l’étude des procédures judiciaires nées des crimes commis dans des conflits se déroulant sur le continent africain et l’analyse des procédures de mise en cause de certains Chefs d’Etats africains soulignent le très important travail de lutte contre l’impunité que réalise la Cour pénale internationale, le bilan de ce travail met toutefois en évidence la collision des procédures judiciaires avec des impératifs politiques internationaux. Ce travail de recherche montre que si la CPI se veut un prolongement de la sécurité collective, l’efficacité de son action et son universalisme sont aujourd’hui mise en doute, au point de cristalliser les rapports de l’organisme judiciaire international avec le continent africain. / Twenty-one year after the creation of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and seventeen years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome giving rise to the International Criminal Court, the whistleblower fever that knows this institution is still not appeased. Is the ICC hostage ideals that justified its creation and antagonistic political forces which it nevertheless remains bound? African they commit more crime prosecuted before the Court that the national of other continents? If the study of legal proceedings arising from crimes committed in conflicts taking place on the African continent and in the analysis of the party proceedings of some African Heads of States stress the very important work to fight against impunity that makes the International Criminal Court, the outcome of this work, however, shows the collision of legal proceedings with international political imperatives. This research shows that if the ICC is an expansion of collective security, the effectiveness of its action and universalism are now in doubt, as to crystallize the reports of the international judicial body with the mainland African.

Le génocide des Tutsi du Rwanda est singulier au regard des génocides du XXème siècle. Il l’est par le nombre de ses victimes, par sa rapidité, ses modes d’exécution et surtout par le nombre de ses auteurs. Ce sont plus d’un million de Rwandais (Hutu) qui ont pris part directement aux massacres. La sanction de ces crimes de masse dans une société en quête de reconstruction soulevait d’innombrables difficultés notamment dans l’appréhension d’une criminalité collective en termes de responsabilité individuelle. L’ampleur et le paroxysme atteint dans ce drame a nécessité un traitement spécifique. Trois instances de justice ont été activées de manière concomitante : les juridictions classiques rwandaises (relayées par des juridictions coutumières dites Gacaca), le Tribunal international créé par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies et enfin les juridictions nationales étrangères en application du principe de la compétence universelle. L’intérêt scientifique de notre démarche réside justement dans l’étude de ce traitement juridictionnel multiniveaux. Deux questions se posent : quelle est la pertinence de ce modèle de justice 20 ans après le drame rwandais ?Quel bilan provisoire peut-on tirer de tous les jugements rendus par ces différentes juridictions ? / The Tutsi genocide in Rwanda is singular in consider genocides of the XXth century. It is true by the number of victims, the speed and methods of implementation and, above all the number of the authors. These are more than one million Rwandan (Hutu) who participated directly in the massacres. Punishment of the massive crimes in a society in search of reconstruction, run into problems of group crime and individual responsibility. The scale and the speak of human tragedy needed specific treatment. Rwandan ordinary courts (replace by customary Courts called Gacaca), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (created by United Nations Security Council) and lastly, national foreign jurisdictions are also begin simultaneously in application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. The interest of our scientific approach lies in the study of multilevel constitutionalism. This raises two obvious questions: What is the relevance of this justice model twenty years after the Rwandan tragedy? What has been the interim review of all the judgments handed down by the different jurisdictions?

Depuis 2004 et la résolution 1559 appelant au retrait syrien, le Liban est l’objet d’une action internationale extrêmement intense. En effet, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (CSNU), face à la nouvelle configuration libanaise et levantine, a déployé des mécanismes issus de la sécurité collective afin de renforcer les attributs régaliens de l’État libanais. Le maintien de la paix, à travers le renforcement de la Force intérimaire des Nations unies au Liban (Finul), et la justice internationale, à travers la création du Tribunal spécial pour le Liban (TSL), sont les deux principaux outils visant à maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales par le prisme libanais. Dans les deux cas, la France, que ce soit militairement ou diplomatiquement, a été singulièrement active.Partant de ce constat, notre thèse vise, dans un premier temps, à déconstruire les mécanismes onusiens mis en oeuvre dans le cas libanais. Il s’agira, plus précisément,d’appréhender les différentes logiques qui sont constitutives de l’action du CSNU au Liban.Que ce soit en matière de maintien de la paix ou de justice internationale, les résolutions onusiennes et les organes qui en découlent font face à la souveraineté nationale et reflètent ainsi l’éternelle opposition entre les chapitres VI et VII de la Charte des Nations unies. Or,nous verrons que dans le cas libanais, le CSNU met en oeuvre une action hybride oscillant entre une logique coercitive et une logique consensuelle.Dans un second temps, notre thèse analysera la tension permanente de l’État libanais,qualifié de quasi-État, entre des dynamiques supra-étatiques traduites par les résolutions onusiennes et des dynamiques infra-étatiques incarnées par des acteurs communautaires et confessionnels, parfois transfrontaliers, et propres au système consociatif libanais. Nous tenterons alors de mesurer le degré de consolidation de deux des attributs régaliens du quasi-État libanais : la défense et la justice. Plus largement, il s’agira de s’interroger sur la possibilité pour l’action internationale, héritière du système westphalien, de remplir ses objectifs dans un environnement national et régional qui questionne plus que jamais la possibilité de maintenir et de conforter des États-nations.À l’aune de la régionalisation des conflits depuis 2004, et particulièrement depuis2011 au Levant, nous conclurons à la difficulté pour le CSNU de faire face à des États déliquescents ainsi qu’à des conflictualités d’interface qui non seulement sont en plein essor,mais qui sont par ailleurs de plus en plus liées les unes aux autres. / Since 2004 and Resolution 1559 demanding Syrian withdrawal, Lebanon has been subjected to an exceptionally intense international action. Facing a new configuration both in Lebanon and the Levant, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has indeed implemented mechanisms of collective security aimed at strengthening national sovereignty.Peace-keeping through United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) enhancement and international justice through the creation of the Special tribunal for Lebanon (STL) are the main tools for maintaining international peace and security in a Lebanese perspective. In both cases, France has been particularly active, be it militarily or diplomatically. Setting out from this premise, our thesis, to begin with, will aim at deconstructing the UN mechanisms implemented in the Lebanese case. More precisely, we shall try to apprehend the constitutive logics of the Security Council’s action in Lebanon. Whether in peace-keeping or in international justice, UN resolutions and the bodies created by them are faced with national sovereignty and, therefore, reflect the eternal opposition between chapters VI andVII of the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, it will be shown that, in the Lebanese case,the UNSC has developed a hybrid action, fluctuating between coercion and consensus.Then, our thesis will show how the Lebanese State, which we will describe as a “quasi-State”, has to face an ongoing tension between supra-State dynamics expressed by UN resolutions and sub-State dynamics embodied by communitarian and religious representatives, sometimes cross-border, which are specific to the Lebanese consociationalist system. We shall later determine the extent to which two of the Lebanese quasi-State’s attributes, defense and security, have been consolidated by international action. More broadly, we will wonder whether international action, as an heir to the Westphalian system,can achieve its goal in a national and regional environment that challenges, today more than ever, the possibility to maintain and support nation-States. In a context of regionalization of conflicts since 2004, and especially since 2011 in the Levant, we shall come to the conclusion that the Security Council still has problems indealing with deliquescent States and with what we will call “interface conflicts”, which not only are booming, but also are more and more inextricably connected to one another.

In 1948 the international community in reaction to the horrors of the holocaust sought to eradicate genocide forever by creating the 'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide'. This Convention criminalised the preparation and act of genocide by international law, making all individuals accountable irrelevant of status or sovereignty. But the Convention has not been enough to deter the act of genocide from occurring again, and again, and again. Worst, the international community has been slow to react to cases of genocide. The problem with preventing and punishing genocide is hindered by the power and right of veto held by permanent members of the UNSC. The UNSC has been given the responsibility to maintain international peace and security and is the only entity that can mandate an intervention that overrides the principle of non-intervention. The aim of this thesis is to show that the veto has been a crucial factor in stopping the prevention of genocide, thus it is imperative that the veto change. This study argues that to effectively prevent and punish genocide the veto needs to be barred from use in cases of genocide. It looks at different cases since the Armenian genocide during WWI through to the Darfur genocide which is still in process. The case of Armenia is significant because for the first time, members of the international community were prepared to hold leaders of another state accountable for their treatment of their own citizens. However the collective will to bring justice to those accountable waned coming to an abrupt end in 1923. The holocaust followed in WWII; six million Jews died, and numerous other groups were targeted under the Nazi's serial genocide. The shock of the holocaust led to the Genocide Convention. But thirty years later during the Cold War, Cambodia became embroiled in a genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge. The international community silently stood by. The USSR, China, and the US all had their reasons to stay out of Cambodia, from supporting a regime with a likeminded political ideology to war weariness from Vietnam. In the 1990s, genocides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo) followed. The former was neglected by the US's unwillingness to be involved in another peacekeeping disaster. The two genocides in the former Yugoslavia were affected by Russia and China's reluctance to use military force even after the clear failure of serial negotiations. Finally, in 2003 Darfur became the latest tragedy of genocide. Again, Russia and China have been timid of calling the conflict genocide thus avoiding any affirmative action to stop it. These cases all show that where one state is unwilling to be involved in stopping genocide, their right and power to the veto stops or delays the international community from preventing and punishing genocide, regardless of whether the veto is used or merely seen as a threat. Therefore, for future prevention of genocide, the veto needs to be changed to prevent its use in times of genocide.

<p>It is an unfortunate and cruel reality that both government and armed groups used child soldiers during armed conflict. Child soldiers have become an integral part of government forces as well as insurgent groups in Africa and elsewhere. Most of them are being exploited as combatants, while others perform functions, such as porters, spies who are able to enter small spaces, cooks, messengers, lookouts, and even suicide bombers. Some of the most disturbing aspects of child soldiering are that some of them are being forced to kill or are themselves killed, sexually abused and are exposed to drugs. The use of child soldiers in conflicts is not a recent phenomenon and has indeed become a common practice that characterises modern conflicts. Recruitment is usually carried out forcefully or voluntarily by both government and rebel forces. The difference between these two types of recruitment is not always clear since their decision to join is always influenced by external factors. Examples of such reasons for voluntary recruitment include the desire to revenge, adventure, peer pressure, and need for belonging and survival. Concerning the reason for survival, some argue that, the children do not actually choose freely to become combatants, but are rather forced by circumstances. There are numerous reasons for the continuous targeting of children by armed forces and armed groups. These include shortage of combatants, the fact that children are easy to train physically and psychologically, and also that children are obedient and are readily available. The recruited children are compelled to take part in brutal induction ceremonies, where they are threatened and forced to kill or witness the killing of someone they know.</p>

Le crime d'agression se veut etre un des quatre crimes internationaux sous la juridiction de la CPI. Lorsque les delegues a la Conference de Rome n'eurent point atteint de consensus sur une definition du crime, celui-ci resta, depuis, indefini en droit. En consequence, la CPI n'aura juridiction pour entendre des causes portant sur le crime d'agression qu'une fois la definition sera adoptee par l'Assemblee des Etats Parties au plus tot en 2009. Ce memoire traite trois problematiques liees au crime d'agression : la question de la responsabilite penale individuelle, le role du Conseil de securite de l'ONU, et les parametres du crime en tant que tel. La responsabilite penale individuelle est analysee, inter alia, du point de vue du principe des sources du droit international. Quant al'eventuelle implication du Conseil de securite dans le champ de competence de la CPI sur le crime d'agression, l'auteure soutient tel que suit: Si le Conseil de securite se voit accorde un pouvoir plus large que celui dont il est presentement dote en vertu des articles 13(b) et 16 du Statut de Rome, chaque membre permanent aura un veto sur toute situation d'agression qui serait autrement portee devant la Cour. Ceci aura pour consequence de politiser la CPI en ce qui a trait au crime et rendra hypothethique toute definition eventuelle. Si la definition est bien con9ue et redigee, on fait valoir, qu'il n' est point necessaire de limiter davantage la competence de la CPI. Les parametres de la definition du crime proposes par l'auteure sont etablis selon les conclusions d'une analyse des notions composantes de l'agression. L'essentiel du concept se veut un recours illegal et non-necessaire qui constitue une rupture ala paix. Amoins qu'il ne soit exerce en « legitime defence» ou en vertu d'un mandat du Chapitre VII, Ie recours ala force constitue prima facie une agression et s'il est suffisamment grave, il s'agira d'un crime d'agression. Ce memoire termine avec un projet de definition du crime d'agression en vue d'avancer Ie discours vers un consensus sur ces problematiques majeures. Non seulement est-il possible d'arriver aun consensus sur la definition, croit l'auteure, mais nous sommes plus que jamais al'aube d'y parvenir. / The crime of aggression is one of the four international crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. When delegates at the Rome Conference were unable to agree on the content of a definition, the crime was left undefined. As a result, the ICC can only begin prosecuting individuals for the crime of aggression once a definition is adopted by the Assembly of States Parties in 2009, at the earliest. This thesis examines three issues associated with the crime of aggression: the question of individual criminal responsibility, the role of the UN Security Council and the general scope of the definition of the crime of aggression itself Individual criminal liability is reviewed, inter alia, from the perspective of international sources doctrine. Regarding the role of the Security Council in relation to the crime of aggression, the author concludes: if the Security Council is vested with more powers than it already has under Articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute, each permanent member will have a veto over any situation of aggression that might otherwise be brought before the Court. This would result in a complete politicization of the ICC and render moot any future definition of the crime of aggression. If a definition for the crime of aggression is properly conceived and constructed, it is argued, there is no need to further limit the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. The author proposes general parameters for the scope ofthe definition based on conclusions reached in the analysis of the conceptual components of aggression. At its essence, the act of aggression is the unnecessary, unlawful use of force which constitutes a breach ofthe peace. Unless employed in "self-defence" or under a Chapter VII mandate, the use offorce constitutes prima facie an act of aggression, and if it is sufficiently grave, a crime ofaggression. This thesis concludes with a working definition ofthe crime of aggression to promote dialogue and ultimately a consensus on these core issues. Not only is a definition is within reach, the author believes, we are closer to it than we ever have been before. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des Études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LL.M. en Maîtrise en droit Option recherche"

L’autorisation de recourir à la force est une pratique par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité permet à des États membres des Nations Unies ou à des accords ou organismes régionaux, voire au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de recourir à la coercition militaire. Elle est l’une des circonstances excluant l’illicéité face à l’interdiction de recourir à la force dans les relations internationales dont la règle est posée à l’article 2,§ 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Il est évident que cette pratique ne correspond pas clairement à la lettre de la Charte mais elle tire sa légitimité du fait qu’elle permet au Conseil de sécurité de s’acquitter de sa mission principale de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant donné que le système de coercition militaire prévu par la Charte s’avère inapplicable dans la pratique. Il reste que cette pratique est empreinte d’ambiguïté : elle apparaît tantôt comme une intervention des Nations Unies, tantôt comme une action unilatérale au profit de certaines puissances capables de mener des opérations de grande envergure. Cette ambiguïté est encore exacerbée par le problème de l’autorisation présumée que certainsÉtats pourraient déduire des actes du Conseil de sécurité, pour intervenir dans divers conflits. Dans les faits, la pratique de l’autorisation de recourir à la force semble actualiser une tendance belliciste qui caractérisait les époques antérieures. Elle peut, si l’on n’y prend garde, refondre, par pans entiers, les legs du droit contre la guerre (jus contra bellum) issu du XXème siècle, droit qui a été le fruit de longues tribulations dans l’histoire des relations internationales. Le danger le plus grave est que des acquis chèrement négociés risquent d’être jetés par-dessus bord avec trop de facilité et sans délai, pour servir des visées à court terme. / Authorization to use force is a practice whereby the Security Council allows member States of the United Nations or regional arrangements or agencies or the Secretary General of the United Nations to use military coercion. Such authorization circumvents the wrongfulness of using force in international relations as prohibited by article 2, § 4 of the UN Charter. It is obvious that this practice does not match the letter of the Charter, but it derives its legitimacy from the fact that it allows the Security Council to fulfill its primary mission of maintaining peace and security, since the system of military coercion under the Charter is inapplicable in practice. Nonetheless, this practice is marked by ambiguity: sometimes it appears as a UN intervention, and yet sometimes as a unilateral action of certain powers capable of conducting major operations. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the issue of presumed consent to intervene in various conflicts that some States attribute to the Security Council. In fact, the practice of authorization reinforces a hawkish tendency that characterized earlier periods. It can, if unchecked, undo the legacy of the law against war (jus contra bellum) of the twentieth century, which was the fruit of much effort in the history of international relations. The most serious danger is that hard-won negotiated achievements be thrown easily overboard and without delay, in order to serve short term goals.