Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-01T18:18:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao_joao_alfredo.pdf: 846823 bytes, checksum: 9fcdde5a914fb9fec8cfe00783f12005 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-24 / This research aims to demonstrate and discuss the relevance of religion as a cultural element which is based on a pluralistic post-modern western society, and hence the right, in counterpoint to recent anti-democratic tendencies which advocate the withdrawal of the religion of the public arena, because of an alleged breakdown of its worldview as a constituent element of this society. It is highlighted the influence of the religion in the emergence of modern democracy as a source of political elements of the pre-constitutional state, it is also punctuated the dialogue between faith and reason and the possibility of relationship between religion and law mediated by the language of human rights. The author argues that the religious vision of the world can contribute to the interpretation of normative statements that express constitutional values, so religious denominations appear as vehicles of religious discourse in public space and pluralistic. The author chooses the procedure for judicial review as an abstract singular moment when the religious discourse can legitimately get into the democratic constitutional interpretation and implementation activity. The figure of the amicus curiae is quickly investigated, pointing to their characteristics and performance before the Supreme Court, pointing to the procedural aspects of the performance of religious faiths for the betterment of democracy / A presente pesquisa tem por objetivo demonstrar e discutir a relevância da religião como um elemento cultural no qual está fundamentada a sociedade pluralista ocidental e pós-moderna e, consequentemente, o direito, em contraponto a recentes tendências antidemocráticas que propugnam uma retirada da religião da arena pública, em razão de uma suposta superação de sua cosmovisão como elemento constitutivo e orientador dessa mesma sociedade. É destacada a influência da religião no surgimento da democracia moderna, como fonte de elementos prépolíticos do Estado constitucional, como também é pontuado o diálogo entre fé e razão e a possibilidade de relação entre religião e direito mediada pela linguagem dos direitos humanos. Defende o autor que a visão religiosa de mundo pode contribuir para a interpretação de enunciados normativos constitucionais que expressam valores, e as confissões religiosas aparecem como veículos do discurso religioso no espaço público e pluralista. O autor elege o procedimento de controle de constitucionalidade abstrato como singular momento em que o discurso religioso pode ingressar legitimamente na atividade democrática de interpretação e concretização constitucional. A figura do amicus curiae é rapidamente estudada, apontando-se suas características e modo de atuação perante o Supremo Tribunal Federal, ressaltando-se o aspecto procedimental da atuação das confissões religiosas para o aprimoramento da democracia

Submitted by Biblioteca Central (biblioteca@unicap.br) on 2018-01-03T20:34:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rayanne_Alves_Monteiro.pdf: 1103266 bytes, checksum: 9bbefaa17133a45d00976eac88d8eb9f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-03T20:34:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rayanne_Alves_Monteiro.pdf: 1103266 bytes, checksum: 9bbefaa17133a45d00976eac88d8eb9f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-02 / The movement of personalization of Lawand the conception that every legal norm of the Brazilian legal system must inexorably follow the precepts relating to fundamental rights, embodied in the Federal Constitution of 1988, initiates the conception of Civil-constitutional Law and, consequently, changes the paradigm of family relationshipsand the scope of the guardianship by the State. The affectivity becomes the foundation of the family law. The new constitutional order establishes to the category of fundamental right,the special protection of the family by the State, accepting the porosity of an open and plural system in the constitution of the family entities.Given this new scenario,it is also understood that the theory of the efficiency of the fundamental rights is applied in the relations between private individuals. In face of these constitutional transformations, it is now understood that the relations marked by ostensibility, affectivity, stability and subjective good faith are considered families, therefore must be protected by the juridical order, irrespective of the form it takes. The open concept of family results in new pretensions, in which people are seeking the recognition of the simultaneous families. The discussion regarding the possibility of their recognition revolves around the multiplicity of the affective-sexual relationships. The initial step concerning the mentioned recognition is the affirmation that monogamy is a principle that has been slackened with the plural conception of the contemporary family.The Family, as a place of promotion of individuals, cannot suffer great restrictions by the State, which may only intervene to guarantee the dignity of its members, according to the principle of minimum intervention of the state. In face of legislative omission by the State, in recognizing the existence of the simultaneous family as a family arrangement compatible with the constitutional protection, it is up to the Legal State , by means of the application of the theory of efficiency of the fundamental rights in the private relationships, to compensate for the legislative omission, guaranteeing the recognition of the effects of personal and patrimonial nature of the simultaneous families as a way of reaching the purpose of conception of the eudemonist constitutional family, which is the quest for happiness and guarantee of dignity of the individuals who compose it . / O movimento de repersonalização do Direito e a concepção de que toda norma jurídica do ordenamento brasileiro deve inexoravelmente seguir os preceitos dos direitos fundamentais, inseridos na Constituição Federal de 1988, dá início à concepção do Direito Civilconstitucional e, consequentemente, muda o paradigma das relações familiares e da abrangência da tutela por parte do Estado. A afetividade passa a ser fundamento do direito de família. A nova ordem constitucional erige à categoria de direito fundamental a especial proteção da família pelo Estado, acolhendo a porosidade de um sistema aberto e plural na constituição das entidades familiares. Diante desse novo cenário, passa-se também a entender que a teoria da eficácia dos direitos fundamentais aplica-se nas relações entre os particulares. À frente dessas transformações constitucionais, passa-se a entender que as relações marcadas pela ostensibilidade, afetividade, estabilidade e boa-fé subjetivasão consideradas famílias, logo devem ser protegidas pelo ordenamento jurídico, independente da forma com a qual se revestem. O conceito aberto de família faz com que surjam novas pretensões, em que pessoas vêm buscando o reconhecimento das famílias simultâneas. A discussão quanto à possibilidade de seu reconhecimento gira em torno da multiplicidade das relações afetivo-sexuais. O passo inicial para o referido reconhecimento é a afirmação de quea monogamia é um princípio que vem sendo abrandado com a concepção plural da família contemporânea. A família, como lugar de promoção dos indivíduos, não pode sofrer grandes restrições por parte do Estado, que somente poderá intervir para garantir a dignidade dos seus membros, segundo o princípio da intervenção mínima do Estado. Na omissão do Estado-legislador, em reconhecer a existência da família simultânea como um arranjo familiar compatível com a proteção constitucional, cabe ao Estado-juiz,por meio da aplicação da teoria da eficácia dos direitos fundamentais nas relações privadas, suprir a omissão legislativa, garantindo o reconhecimentodos efeitos de cunho pessoal e patrimonial das famílias simultâneas como forma de alcançar-se a finalidade da concepção da família constitucional eudemonista, que é a busca da felicidade e garantia da dignidade dos indivíduos que a compõem.

Cette étude traite de la répartition de la richesse nationale en Turquie vis-à-vis des principes démocratiques. La richesse nationale peut être formulée à des fins d'utilisation dans le domaine juridique comme le total du patrimoine des ménages et des personnes morales de droit public de l’année précédente additionné au produit national net de l'année donnée. La démocratie exprime la possibilité pour chacun de participer à la politique (la participation) avec ses différences (dans ses intérêts- selon son revenu, son âge, son état de santé et des états similaires- et son idéologie) et d’avoir ainsi une influence en politique à travers ses différences (le pluralisme). Cette étude se base sur l'idée que doit être analysée avant tout la manière dont est répartie la richesse du peuple pour savoir si l'Etat revêt un caractère démocratique. En effet, l’attente de chacun d’une organisation comme l’Etat ne peut être qu’une meilleure vie et cette dernière satisfaisant tous les besoins des hommes tels que l’hébergement, la santé, l’enseignement, la liberté, la culture, les espaces verts a une contrepartie monétaire. / This study deals with the distribution of the national wealth in Turkey according to the principles of democracy. National wealth can be formulated for use in the legal field as the sum of the previous year’s household assets and the assets of legal persons governed by public law added to the net national product of the current year. Democracy is the possibility for everyone to participate in politics (participation) with his or her differences (in his or her interests based on income, age, state of health and similar conditions and his or her ideology) and thus to have an influence in politics through his or her differences (pluralism). This study is based on the idea that the way which the national wealth is distributed must be brought up before anything else, in order to find out whether a state has a democratic nature or not. Indeed, everyone expects a better life from an organization like the state, and such a life satisfying all human needs such as housing, health, education, freedom, culture, green spaces has a monetary consideration.

No description available.

Ce mémoire présente une réflexion sur la mise en récit de l’indicible. Essentiellement insaisissable parce qu’inexprimable et / ou inexprimé, son étude consiste en une tentative de le démasquer, et de comprendre quelle(s) architecture(s) littéraires en permettent la révélation. Cette analyse approfondira le sens littéral des textes : il s’agira d’en investiguer les différentes interprétations possibles afin d’en définir le noyau originel. Cette entreprise ne peut s’effectuer que de manière indirecte, le sens totalisant ne s’inscrivant jamais dans l’instant présent. De ce fait, le médium artistique du langage se trouvera au centre de ma recherche, notamment avec le concept de la Différance derridienne comme point d’ancrage. L’indicible sous-tend nécessairement un mouvement précédant le texte et allant au-delà de celui-ci, signifiant une impossibilité d’arriver en présence de l’événement traumatique, ou du référent originel. Le mouvement même du discours, de sa structure, génère et fait ressurgir l’indicible. Je penserai le langage (et les mouvements le constituant) comme socle de l’indicible : ironiquement, il en est à la fois la source (soulignant son incapacité à produire une représentation du réel) et ce qui en permet le dévoilement. Nous nous concentrerons sur trois formes d’indicible, à travers trois œuvres distinctes : les conséquences d’un traumatisme et ses temporalités (W ou le souvenir d’enfance, George Perec), la mise en image des affects (L’Écume des jours, Boris Vian), et le récit de soi (Orlando, Virginia Woolf). Ces trois cas de figure témoignent – malgré leurs divergences thématiques – d’une déstructuration de la temporalité, de l’espace et du langage, signifiant l’inaptitude de l’écriture normative à retranscrire le réel, ainsi qu’une remise en question des codes littéraires traditionnels. / This master’s thesis explores the narratives poetics of what in French is called the indicible – a noun that, in English translation, hovers between the “unsayable” (i.e., that for which there is no precise or prehensible language) and the “unspeakable” (i.e.; that which concerns affects that are not easily expressed). As a thematic or affective content that slides between the inexpressible and unexpressed, the indicible generates various literary architectures of indirect story-telling. The goal of this thesis is to illuminate these innovative signifying structures. Accordingly, the analytical project that unfolds here is a necessary movement beyond and beneath the literal thematics of the texts. Within a range of possible interpretations, the text will reveal something of its original conception, its traumatic mark or primal scene. Language as an artistic medium is the essential focus of this work – language, or discourse, as a matrix informed by Jacques Derrida’s model of Différance is, above all, a theory of the movement of narrative or expository language in time. The very movement of discourse around a thematic project – that of bearing witness, of conceptualizing desire, or of mapping identity – is itself generative of the unsayable. Ironically, language is at once the matrix of representation’s limits and incapacities, and the medium of its unveiling and illumination. This mémoire explores three distinct narrative examples of the unsayable by way of three radically different texts : trauma and its temporalities (W, of the memory of childhood, by George Perec), the image-structure of the affects (Froth on the Daydream, by Boris Vian), and the gendered metamorphosis of the self (Orlando: a biography, by Virginia Woolf). Although these narratives vary in form, subject, and thematic content, they collectively dismantle the linear sequence of events and the familiar contours of space; they deconstruct the referential certainties of language; and they point to the limitations of traditional narrative codes in the encounter with reality and the real.

Selon la théorie cellulaire, issue des travaux de M. J. Schleiden, T. Schwann et R. Virchow au 19e siècle, le plus petit niveau d’organisation comprenant toutes les caractéristiques nécessaires et essentielles au vivant serait la cellule. Cette affirmation est aujourd’hui remise en question par les scientifiques et philosophes, d’une part à la suite de l’analyse d’entités biologiques ambiguës aux frontières (inférieures et supérieures) de la « cellule vivante », et d’autre part de l’avènement des récents enjeux en lien avec la création et la recherche de nouvelles entités vivantes. Un pluralisme épistémologique du concept de « vivant » a ainsi émergé, duquel aucune définition claire et unanime n’est encore acceptée. L’objectif général de cette thèse est de trouver des pistes de solution au problème du pluralisme épistémologique du concept de « vivant » ainsi qu’aux enjeux pratiques reliés à ce concept en biologie. Pour ce faire, je propose l’idée que les enjeux pratiques peuvent contribuer à résoudre le pluralisme conceptuel du « vivant », en particulier que la biologie synthétique est à même de nous offrir une définition du vivant permettant de dépasser l’actuel pluralisme de ce concept. Plus spécifiquement, en ce qui a trait à la question du pluralisme, j’expose dans cette thèse un pluralisme « biologique » et « philosophique ». Du côté « biologique », je démontre la flexibilité d’application ainsi que le pluralisme du concept de « vivant » grâce à l’exposition de cas ambigus d’entités biologiques issues de divers niveaux hiérarchiques de complexité du vivant. Ce faisant, je défends une position symbiotique et holistique d’organisation du vivant (permettant d’inclure et d’articuler ces divers niveaux hiérarchiques). Du côté « philosophique », je démontre le pluralisme du concept de « vivant » à la suite d’une analyse que je qualifierai de disciplinaire, ontologique, linguistique et épistémologique. Ce faisant, je défends une position gradualiste et opérationnelle du concept de « vivant ». En ce qui concerne les enjeux pratiques, j’explore principalement la discipline de la biologie synthétique, qui s’est donné l’objectif de construire de nouvelles entités biologiques vivantes et ainsi le fort potentiel de contribuer au développement de nouvelles connaissances sur le vivant. Ce faisant, je prends ainsi la position que la biologie synthétique peut apporter des pistes de solution pragmatiques (par la construction d’entités vivantes fonctionnelles) au pluralisme épistémologique du concept de « vivant ». Finalement, après une analyse de théories de la connaissance associées à ces enjeux, de définitions stipulatives, ainsi que de concepts du vivant issus de la biologie synthétique, je développe mon propre modèle du « vivant» (que je qualifie de biosynthétique), qui se veut « pragmatique » (en accord avec la pratique des biologistes synthétiques), « progressiste » (s’adaptant à de futures découvertes dans le domaine), « holistique » (s’appliquant à l’ensemble des niveaux d’organisation du vivant) ainsi que « minimaliste et universelle» (correspondant aux caractéristiques essentielles de base retrouvées au sein de toutes les entités vivantes). Cette thèse présentera ainsi « pourquoi » et « comment » la biologie synthétique peut répondre à la question de la définition du vivant. / According to the cell theory, resulting from the works of M. J. Schleiden, T. Schwann and R. Virchow in the 19th century, the smallest level of organization including all the necessary and essential characteristics to the living would be the cell. This assertion is now challenged by scientists and philosophers, on the one hand following the analysis of ambiguous biological entities at the boundaries (lower and upper) of the "living cell", and on the other hand the advent of recent issues related to the creation and search for new living entities. An epistemological pluralism of the "living" concept has thus emerged, from which no clear and unanimous definition is yet accepted. The general objective of this thesis is to find possible solutions to the problem of epistemological pluralism of the "living" concept and to the practical issues related to this concept in biology. To do this, I propose the idea that practical issues can contribute to solving the conceptual pluralism of the concept "living", in particular that synthetic biology is able to offer us a definition of the living allowing to overcome the current pluralism of this concept. More specifically, regarding the question of pluralism, I expose in this thesis a "biological" and "philosophical" pluralism. On the "biological" side, I demonstrate the flexibility of application as well as the pluralism of the concept "living" following the description of ambiguous cases of biological entities coming from various hierarchical levels of complexity of life. In doing so, I defend a symbiotic and holistic view of organization of the living (allowing to include and articulate these various hierarchical levels). On the "philosophical" side, I demonstrate the pluralism of the "living" concept following an analysis that I will describe as disciplinary, ontological, linguistic and epistemological. In doing so, I defend a gradualist and operational position of the concept "living". Regarding practical issues, I am mainly exploring the discipline of synthetic biology, which has set itself the goal of building new living biological entities and thus the potential to contribute to the development of new knowledge about life. In doing so, I take the position that synthetic biology can provide pragmatic solutions (through the construction of functional living entities) to the pluralism of the concept "living". Finally, after an analysis of the relevant theories of knowledge associated with these issues, of stipulative definitions, as well as of living concepts stemming from synthetic biology, I develop my own model of the "living" (that I call biosynthetic), which is "pragmatic" (in agreement with the practice of synthetic biologists), "progressive" (adapting to future discoveries in the field), "holistic" (applying to all levels of organization of the living) as well as "minimalist and universal" (corresponding essential characteristics found within all living entities). This thesis will present “why” and “how” synthetic biology can provide an answer to the question “what is life ?”.

Spiritual care in hospitals is a well-established practice in Sweden that is justified by religious freedom. Contemporary Sweden is a multicultural society with a culturally and religiously diverse population. Since 2006, a Muslim spiritual care organization has been established in co-operation with the Swedish state. This interview study with Muslim spiritual caregivers examines how Islam is being interpreted and how Muslim spiritual care in Swedish hospitals is apprehended by the informants. By approaching Islam as a discursive tradition and combining historical and ethnological methods, this study sheds light on what aspects of Islam are considered relevant in the hospital context and it examines why that is the case. The study shows that Muslim spiritual care is regarded to be a complement to other healthcare practices. To a large extent, the care is provided by supportive conversations, Islamic counseling, as well as help with religious practices and rituals. To manage a patient’s various wants and the denominational diversity, the Muslim representatives hold that they put the patient’s and the relatives’ needs and interpretations of Islam first. The study concludes that the representatives are spiritual care professionals that are loyal to the state and the secular institutions they serve. This involves staying true to ideals of cultural and religious pluralism and equality but also knowing that these principles are subordinated to the hospital’s rules. This constructs boundaries regarding how Islam is interpreted and has to be negotiated in the efforts of making Islam a natural part of the institution.

L’eau constitue un élément naturel fondamental dans la constitution des communautés humaines qui se sont regroupées autour d’elle. Ces sociétés de l’eau se sont organisées en fonction de la ressource qui fonde les liens juridiques entre leurs membres. L’on remarque alors l’existence d’une solidarité écologique qui lie les individus entre eux, et conduit à l’émergence de règles de droit en fonction des pratiques mises en œuvre au sein de ces communautés. Généralement qualifiées de coutumes, ces règles sont spontanées dans le sens où ses promoteurs en sont également les récepteurs, et sont transmises à l’échelle d’un groupement identifié qui assure leur pérennité. Les usages de l’eau désignent alors tant les utilisations qui sont faites de la ressource, que les règles de droit qu’elles induisent. La généralisation d’un droit commun à vocation uniformisatrice du système juridique français conduit à marginaliser l’existence de systèmes de droit traditionnels. Pour autant, certains territoires ruraux appliquent encore des règles spontanées et coutumières dans le cadre de l’exploitation de la ressource en eau, à des fins d’irrigation ou de pisciculture. S’opposent alors le droit coutumier et le droit commun qui s’appliquent à l’eau. Ces usages sont alors confrontés aux règles propres à la préservation de la propriété et à la protection de l’environnement. Bien que leurs finalités diffèrent radicalement, le droit spontané contribue à la réalisation des objectifs du droit de l’environnement dans la mesure où il participe à une gestion équilibrée et durable de la ressource en eau. Le renouvellement des formes juridiques des règles traditionnelles permet ainsi d’envisager la coexistence de ces deux ordres normatifs sur certains territoires ruraux dans la perspective de consacrer un pluralisme juridique. / Water is a fundamental natural element in the formation of human communities that have gathered around it. These water societies are organized according to the resource that bases the legal links between their members. We notice the existence of an ecological solidarity that binds people together and leads to the emergence of rules of law based on the practices implemented within these communities. Generally referred to as customs, these rules are spontaneous because their promoters are also the receivers, and are transmitted on the scale of an identified group that ensures their sustainability. The uses of water then designate both the uses that are made of the resource, and the rules of law they induce. The generalization of a common law with a unifying purpose of the French legal system leads to the marginalization of the existence of traditional systems of law. However, some rural areas still apply spontaneous and customary rules for the exploitation of water resources for irrigation or fish farming purposes. Customary law and the common law that applies to water seem to be opposed. These uses are then confronted with the rules dedicated to the protection of property rights and the environmental preservation. Although their purposes differ radically, the spontaneous right contributes to the achievement of the objectives of environmental law insofar as it contributes to a balanced and sustainable management of the water resource. The renewal of the legal forms of the traditional rules makes it possible to envisage the coexistence of these two normative orders on certain rural territories in the perspective of devoting a legal pluralism.

Les États africains de l’espace francophone ont rénové leurs droits civils, par la refonte des dispositions du Code civil français de 1804, reçu en héritage colonial. Les textes issus des réformes, dénommés « Codes des personnes et de la famille », étaient censés mettre fin au pluralisme juridique dans les relations d’ordre privé, lequel résultait de la coexistence du droit positif et des normes coutumières et religieuses, par l’unification des droits de la famille. L’occasion devait en même temps être saisie de conformer les législations du mariage au dispositif juridique international des droits humains, en particulier sur le mariage. À cet effet, l’égalité de l’homme et de la femme tenait la place centrale dans l’énoncé des motifs des lois. Cependant, les droits des sexes définis, au terme des codifications, se signalent par leur faiblesse pour ce qui concerne la femme. Bien davantage, le caractère sectoriel des approches juridiques de réduction des inégalités ne permet pas au droit de jouer le rôle transformateur escompté. Par ailleurs, il est constaté, à travers ses manifestations, que le pluralisme normatif demeure, avec une incidence négative sur l’effectivité des règles en vigueur.En comparant les Codes du Bénin, du Burkina Faso et du Mali, il apparaît qu’en contrepartie de certains droits nouveaux institués en faveur de la femme (comme l’autonomie professionnelle), qui souffrent en outre d’inapplication, des coutumes inconciliables avec les droits humains (comme la polygynie) ont été incorporées dans les droits républicains. Il en découle que les législateurs africains ne se sont pas significativement détachés des traditions qui participent au maintien de la condition juridique et sociale féminine. La situation appelle des réformes en profondeur des droits de la famille, de même que la mise en œuvre de politiques gouvernementales coordonnées, afin d’atteindre l’égalité réelle des sexes dans le mariage. / French-speaking black African countries have renewed their civil rights, on the basis of the French civil code resulting from the 1804 colonial legacy. The texts issued from the reform called “Codes of persons and family” were supposed to put an end to legal pluralism within private relationships, resulting from the coexistence between positive law, customary and religious rules, by the unification of family rights. It provides at the same time the opportunity to confirm marriage regulations within the legal law of international human’s rights, particularly about nuptiality. In this respect, equality of man and woman held the central place in statements of laws patterns. However, the rights of sexual equality moreover disadvantage women. Much more, the sectoral character of the legal approaches concerning the reduction of the inequality, compromises the transforming role of the right. Furthermore, some facts demonstrate that normative pluralism remains and that its impact is negative on the efficiency of the rules in force.When we compare the Codes of Benin, Burkina and Mali it reveals that in return of some new rights instituted in favor of woman, for example the unapplied professional autonomy, irreconcilable customs with human rights such as polygyny has been incorporated in republican rights. It follows that some African legislators are not significantly detached from traditions that contribute to the maintenance of woman legal and social condition. This situation calls for deep reform of family rights, as well as the implementation of a governmental action plan to achieve equality of sexes within marriage.

Les arguments du mouvement Critical Legal Studies sur l’indétermination du droit ne sont doublés d’aucune théorie sur la légitimité des interprétations qu’offrent les juges et donc d’aucun critère juridique pour critiquer une décision. La théorie pluraliste critique du droit, qui prend acte de la pluralité du droit officiel pour redéfinir le phénomène juridique plutôt que de nier qu’il puisse exister, pourrait toutefois fournir un tel critère. En effet, elle présente plusieurs correspondances avec les travaux de Dworkin, qui défend que les citoyens sont en droit d’obtenir les fruits d’une attitude interprétative en germe dans le concept même de droit. Ces deux théories maintiennent que le droit sert à reconnaître la valeur de l’histoire d’un groupe dans sa conception de lui-même tout en soutenant qu’il doit trouver une pertinence contemporaine pour être effectif et légitime. Les pluralistes priorisent toutefois la résonance actuelle des règles de droit et croient que toute communauté est divisée entre diverses définitions du bien. Selon eux, le droit est avant tout un procédé pour penser la conduite humaine et lui conférer un sens, qui dépend des capacités créatrices des citoyens. Chaque règle est alors la cause d’une pluralité d’ordres juridiques concurrents. Suivant ce portrait, seule l’acceptation d’une interprétation par un groupe, sa capacité à lui reconnaître un sens, pourrait rendre cette interprétation légitime. Ce critère nous mène vers un modèle de justice négociée où deux personnes s’adressent à un juge pour développer une lecture en commun du droit, pour identifier une interprétation légitime dans leurs univers juridiques respectifs. / No theory of the legitimacy of judges accompanies the Critical Legal Studies’ arguments on the indeterminacy of law, which entails there are no criteria to identify a legitimate interpretation. Critical legal pluralism, which redefines law to take account of its inherent plurality rather than denying its very possibility on these grounds, could however provide such criteria. Indeed, it presents many resemblances with Dworkin’s theory of law which argues that citizens are entitled to reap the benefits of the interpretative nature of law. Both theories defend that law allows to bridge a group’s past, which is essential to its self-understanding, with the present, and both insist that law must be made to appear relevant in the present. Pluralists however prioritize the current significance of law and stress that communities are split by a variety of definitions of the good. According to them, law is mainly a process to think about human conduct and grant it meaning, and it depends as such on citizens’ creative capacities. Accordingly, only an interpretation that is accepted by a group and seen as meaningful can be considered legitimate. This criterion forces us to consider a form of negotiated justice, where two persons consult a judge to develop a common reading of a rule which would be legitimate in each person’s legal universe.