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The origins of European integration and the factors that made it possible in the post-1945 era have been examined from different perspectives and interpreted in various ways. While federalists argue that the concept of European unity had been developed over centuries by different intellectual movements, the realist approaches of Milward and Dinan stress the importance of economic, political and security motives. Referring to the factors that contributed to the implementation of the Schuman Plan, both the federalist and realist approaches highlight the chief importance of states and their representatives. Yet, the ideas that inspired Jean Monnet, who designed the Schuman Plan, have received little attention. While the state is seen in the literature as the main actor that made the outcome possible, the role of Monnet and that of some of his close associates are almost ignored. By investigating Monnet's thought, this study shows that the source of his inspiration was not the countless plans for European unity put forward by European federalist movements or the random concepts that he came across, such as the New Deal. Rather, it is argued here that he was in fact constantly exposed to a coherent and well-structured philosophy. This thinking reached him through his direct contacts and frequent encounters with Felix Frankfurter and his associates, who formed an epistemic community, as defined by Peter M. Haas. The core concepts of this thinking inherited from Louis Brandeis and developed by Frankfurter – restoring and overseeing free competition – can be identified in Monnet's 1950 plan. The evidence shows that it became a shared philosophy of Monnet's group of friends. This is a fundamental aspect since, once the Schuman Plan was made public, Monnet's friends rallied around his project and contributed not only to overcoming stalemate at critical moments of the negotiations on the future treaty, but also to convincing statesmen of the value of the project. / Graduate

Ce mémoire propose une conception narrative du système de justice criminel. Pour ce faire, l’auteure mobilise la théorie narrative suivant laquelle le procès contradictoire est appréhendé comme un concours entre différentes histoires. Le caractère général de cette théorie confère à l’auteure l’espace nécessaire pour analyser et expliquer différents aspects du traitement judiciaire des faits, que ce soit la preuve judiciaire, le processus de détermination judiciaire des faits, l’intervention judiciaire en appel ou encore le droit qui encadre chacun de ces aspects. La notion d’« histoire » favorise l’adoption d’une perspective qui sort du cadre restreint du procès dans lequel la notion de « preuve » est enfermée. La théorie narrative permet ainsi à l’auteure d’expliquer et d’organiser en un tout unifié divers aspects du processus judiciaire comme l’enquête, le dépôt des accusations, la théorie de la cause, le contre-interrogatoire ou encore la façon dont les faits sont d’abord choisis et assemblés par les parties avant d’être administrés et traités au procès sous forme de « preuve ». Appliquée au procès, cette théorie implique une approche holistique de la preuve suivant laquelle la détermination judiciaire des faits est une évaluation de la vraisemblance relative des histoires en compétition. Cela remet en question la vision traditionnelle (ou rationaliste) atomiste de la preuve où les faits sont déterminés suite à une décision sur la véracité ou la fausseté de chacun des éléments de preuve. Le nouvel éclairage qu’apporte cette vision narrative du procès et ses diverses implications mènent l’auteure à remettre en question le bien-fondé de la vision traditionnelle voulant que le procès mène à une détermination judiciaire des faits qui soit exacte. Au terme de son illustration de la valeur heuristique de la théorie narrative, l’auteure revisite sous la perspective narrative les récentes études en matière d’erreurs judiciaires. Elle en conclut que le droit commande au juge d’atteindre une vérité hybride sur les faits, à michemin entre, d’une part, ce qui est survenu dans la réalité et, d’autre part, ce qui permet de conférer un maximum de cohérence aux éléments de preuves effectivement présentés au procès. / This master’s thesis proposes a narrative conceptualization of the criminal justice system. The author employs the narrative theory framework that conceives the adversarial trial as a contest between different stories. This comprehensive theory offers a lens through which the author analyzes and explains multiple aspects of the judicial processing of facts including evidence at trial, fact-finding, appellate review and the law governing these aspects. The concept of “story” allows a broader perspective than the concept of “evidence” which is limited to the trial. This umbrella theory is therefore used to explain, organize and provide a united understanding of various aspects of the judicial system, such as the investigatory process, the laying of charges, the theory of a case, the cross-examinations, as well as how facts are chosen and organized before being presented and processed at trial as “evidence”. At trial, the global perspective of the narrative theory challenges the traditional (or rationalist) atomist approach to evidence, which explains fact-finding as a decision based on the truthfulness or the falseness of each individual piece of evidence adduced at trial. The narrative perspective, rather, suggests a holistic approach – fact-finding is a decision regarding the relative plausibility between two competing stories. Thus, these insights from the narrative theory call into question the traditional assumption that trials lead to accurate findings of fact. After her demonstration of the heuristic value of the narrative theory, the author applies the narrative framework to recent studies on miscarriages of justice. She concludes that the law enables triers of fact to reach only a hybrid truth, halfway between what happened in reality and an assessment of the consistency between the evidence adduced at trial.

Entre 1880 et 1920, l’institution scolaire en France, les pédagogues et les professeurs de pédagogie, les enseignants dans leurs commentaires, les parents souvent inquiets en appellent à la volonté qui explique l’échec lorsqu’elle manque, qui galvanise les énergies si elle s’exerce et qui élève l’esprit quand elle est une ascèse. Au même moment, silencieusement parce que dans les marges de la communauté éducative, se forment les conditions même de la disparition de la volonté. L’Education nouvelle de congrès en congrès desserrera l’étau de cette volonté anémiante. Edouard Claparède invitera à dévolontariser la volonté. L’écho de Jean-Jacques Rousseau prônant l’épanouissement de l’enfance retrouvée légitimera cet effacement de la volonté. Et très vite de volonté il ne sera plus question. Comment expliquer cette contradiction entre cette omniprésence de la volonté et sa disparition ? Deux voies : l’une qui analysera la volonté même, l’autre qui décrira des pratiques éducatives où la volonté a joué un rôle ou celles d’où elle s’est retirée. L’enquête s’en tiendra au mot même de volonté dans ses composants sémantiques et dans l’histoire de sa traduction du grec ou du latin au français, puis au concept qui lui correspond : décomposition en traits, description de ses modalités et évaluation de sa teneur ontologique en dessinant la scène de toute action. Apparaîtront quatre dimensions de la volonté : effort, intention, décision et force, dimensions qui renverront aux vertus épistémiques, à la logique de l’action et à une conception de l’homme. Autrement dit, à quelle anthropologie la volonté comme force correspond-elle ? Et son éviction, quel sujet implique-t-elle ? D’autre part, si la volonté est intention et décision, ne relève-t-elle pas de la logique de l’action, comme son contraire l’acrasie ? Enfin, identifier volonté et effort, c’est redécouvrir les vertus épistémiques de la studiosité, de la curiosité, de l’attention, c’est dire ce qu’elles sont et comment les développer. Il est un dernier point qu’on ne saurait négliger : la volonté, ou du moins son contraire qu’est la paresse, met en jeu l’assise métaphysique de tout homme.Cette analyse sera corrélée, sinon à des pratiques éducatives puisque l’archive en est souvent absente, du moins à des théories ou à des comptes rendus de pratiques dans des genres littéraires le plus divers. D’abord, Célestin Freinet parce qu’il a critiqué la volonté comme instance morale, mais a gardé la notion d’effort s’appuyant peut-être sur le travail comme force d’émancipation, en tout cas comme émanation de la vie. Ensuite Piaget qui transforme la volonté en un contraire de la ligne de moindre résistance dans une conception évolutionniste, la naturalisant ainsi. Puis, Maine de Biran et Pestalozzi qui fondèrent une école presque ensemble, l’un faisant de l’effort le constituant premier de l’homme, l’autre hésitant entre l’épanouissement dévolontarisé et les nécessaires contraintes de toute action. Descartes aussi parce qu’il éduque la volonté conçue comme décision et qu’il la place au cœur de sa logique de sorte que l’homme se caractérise par la générosité qui est l’aptitude à poser des actes judicieux. Enfin, Dewey et Kilpatrick qui substitueront à la volonté l’intérêt s’opposant à l’éducation comme jeu et aux conceptions d’Herbart pour qui rien ne venait de l’élève et pour qui tout s’imposait de l’extérieur. Ce parcours s’achève par une mise en rapport de ces conceptions de la volonté et de certains traits d’anthropologie dans le but de dessiner une logique où le recours à la volonté correspond à un sujet vide et où l’effacement de la volonté suppose un sujet doté d’une intériorité qui ne demande qu’à s’exprimer. Puis, la fiction d’un compte rendu d’un congrès de philosophie de l’éducation permettra de reprendre les perspectives des uns et des autres et d’exprimer leur style de pensée. S'ouvrent alors les perspectives, dans une vision naturaliste, d'un sujet se constituant .... / Between 1880 and 1920 the academic institution of France, pedagogues and professors of pedagogy, teachers writing school reports and worried parents, have called upon the concept of will to explain failure where there is a lack of it, to galvanise energy where it is present and to raise the spirit in the field of asceticism. At the same time, the very conditions for the extinction of the concept of will have been growing quietly, at the margins of the education community. The Modern School Movement, from conference to conference, have been loosening the grip on this debilitating concept. Edouard Claparède suggests the ‘dewilling’ of will. The echo of Jean-Jacques Rousseau defending the blossoming of a rediscovered childhood, adds further weight to the idea of the fading out of the notion of will. How long before the question of will becomes no longer relevant? How can this contradiction between the omnipresent subject of will and its disappearance be explained? There are two approaches: the first analyses will itself, the second describes the educative practices where will plays a role or those where it is absent. The inquiry analyses the semantic components of the word, from its translation in Greek or Latin to French. Alongside this, it investigates the concept behind the word: its distinguishing features, the description of its modalities and its ontological constitution, describing the nature and the elements that make up an action. Four dimensions of will are identified: effort, intention, decision and strength. These dimensions clearly refer to epistemic virtues, the logic of action and the concept of what it is to be human. Put another way, to which anthropological system does will, as a strength, correspond? And in its absence, what idea of human behaviour do we conceive? On the other hand, if will is intention and decision, can it not be assumed that it comes from the logic of action, along with its opposite, akrasia. Finally, to identify will in terms of effort, is to revisit the epistemic virtues of studiousness, curiosity and attention, stating what they are and how to develop them. Another aspect that deserves consideration: will, or at least its opposite, laziness, calls into play the metaphysical bases underpinning human existence. This analysis correlates if not to the educative practices, archival material not often existing, at least to the theories or accounts of practices to be found in the myriad literary genres. Firstly, Célestin Freinet who criticised the idea of will as a moral value, but maintained the idea of effort, emphasing perhaps the notion of work as a liberating force, as an expression of life. Then Piaget, working within the school of evolutionary theory, who transforms will into an opposite of the path of least resistance. This is followed by Maine de Biran and Pestalozzi who almost founded a school together, the former identifying effort as the principal characteristic of man, the later hesitating between the blossoming of the individual that happens outside of will and the essential limits of any given action. Decartes conceives will as a decision which he places at the centre of his theory that man is characterised by generosity, which he defines as the ability to be reasonable. Lastly Dewey and Kilpatrick who substitute will for interest, opposing the idea of education as a game and Herbart’s idea that nothing comes from the student, everything is imposed from external sources. The journey finishes with a bringing together of the concepts of will and certain anthropological features, the aim of which is to draw upon logic where will is called upon in a situation of personal need or is eliminated, presuming that the individual’s inner life is left unexpressed. The imaginary reporting to a fictitious conference between the various educational philosophers would allow the sharing and reformulating of each other’s perspectives along with the investigation of their various styles of thought...

Alors que les principales activités d’un chef de projet s’effectuent à travers le processus de communication, on observe que de nombreux projets font l'objet de retards, dérives ou défauts de spécifications. Excès de mesures pour prévenir le risque ou gestion déficiente de la communication laissant trop de place à l’incertitude ? La Théorie de la Réduction de l’Incertitude développée par Berger et Calabrese (1975) dans le champ de la communication ne permet pas de totalement saisir comment un chef de projet dissipe l’incertitude existante entre les acteurs. En revisitant un projet opérationnel dans le cadre d’une recherche-action, nous nous employons à identifier comment incertitude et communication s’influencent et se structurent mutuellement. Nous avons convoqué l’approche constructiviste et la théorie de l’acteur-réseau de Callon et Latour pour accéder au sens de cette relation circulaire. Nous avançons les hypothèses selon lesquelles : - L’incertitude est un actant qui intervient dans la construction du réseau (au sens de Bruno Latour (2007) « ce qui est tracé par les traductions »).- Le processus de communication diffère suivant la nature de l’incertitude rencontrée ou ressentie. - Le processus de communication performe et scelle les relations en les rendant si coûteuses à défaire et si économiques à maintenir, qu’elles deviennent irréversibles. L’approche communicationnelle de l’incertitude mettra en évidence plusieurs caractéristiques de cet actant, comme sa capacité à peupler un « réseau de manques », la façon dont le réseau se hiérarchise pour faire sens, la description du processus d’estimation continue dont il fait l’objet (l’Incertus). Si nous concevons l’incertitude comme l’attribut d’un phénomène alors la « communication-incertitude » fabrique le sens en même temps qu’elle détermine la valeur de cet attribut. En positionnant l’incertitude comme un phénomène socialement construit, nous présentons un modèle constructiviste de « communication-incertitude » où l’observateur est un acteur intentionnel limité par des contraintes (Boudon, 2009) et proposons de distinguer la nature de l’incertitude suivant une typologie : l’incertitude de variabilité (inhérente à la variabilité des choses), l’incertitude épistémique ambiguë ou non (due à l’imperfection de nos connaissances) et l’incertitude d'échelle (en rapport avec l’imperfection de nos modèles de représentations). Dans ce mouvement vers l’irréversibilité, les processus de communication participent au remplacement des médiateurs (qui transforment, redonnent du sens, font faire des choses inattendues) par des intermédiaires (qui transmettent, transfèrent sans modifier) et les actants les plus réversibles sont évacués vers la périphérie du réseau. / While the main activities of a project manager are done through the communication process, it is observed that many projects are subject to delays, excesses or defects specifications. Excess of measurements to prevent the risk ? Defective management of the communication which leaves too much place to uncertainty ? The Theory of Uncertainty Reduction developed by Berger and Calabrese (1975) in the field of communication does not fully understand how a project dissipates the existing uncertainty between actors. By revisiting an operational project within the framework of action research, we strive to identify how uncertainty and communication influence and form themselves mutually. We used the constructivist approach and the actor-network theory of Callon and Latour to reach the meaning of this circular relationship. We advance the following hypotheses: - Uncertainty is a nonhuman actor involved in the construction of the network (as defined by Bruno Latour (2007) "which is drawn by translations"). - The communication process differs according to the nature of the uncertainty encountered or felt. - The communication process performs and seals relationships by making them so expensive to undo and so economic to maintain, that they become irreversible. The communicational approach of the uncertainty will highlight several features of this nonhuman actor, as its ability to populate a "network of gaps", the way the network ranks into a hierarchy to make sense, the description of the continuous process of estimation (the Incertus). If we conceive uncertainty as an attribute of a phenomenon, then "communication-uncertainty" makes sense at the same time it determines the value of this attribute. By positioning uncertainty as a socially constructed phenomenon, we present a constructivist model of "communication-uncertainty" where the observer is an intentional actor limited by constraints (Boudon, 2009). We propose to distinguish the nature of uncertainty following a typology: the variability uncertainty (inherent variability of things), the epistemic uncertainty ambiguous or not (due to the imperfection of our knowledge) and the scale uncertainty (in touch with the imperfection of our models of representations). In this movement towards irreversibility, the communication processes involved in replacing mediators (which transform, give meaning, make unexpected things do) by intermediaries (which transmit, transfer without changing) and the most reversible nonhumans actors are evacuated to the network edge.

Denna uppsats undersöker hur den svenska myndigheten Sida med föregångare använt människorättsbegreppet i årsredovisningar 1956 – 2019. Specifikt undersöks vilken relation detta har till epistemiska jämlikhetsdimensioner i materialet. Med epistemisk makt menas makten att påverka de begrepp och diskurser som ligger till grund för förståelsen av bistånd och utvecklingssamarbeten. Människorättsbegreppet var i stort sett osynligt i materialet fram till1980. Från och med slutet av 1980-talet associeras mänskliga rättigheter starkt till demokratibegreppet på ett sätt som därefter dominerar stora delar av materialet. Under 2010-talet syns också en ökande association mellan mänskliga rättigheter och jämställdhets- respektive miljöfrågor. Även om det finns exempel på formuleringar som reproducerar epistemisk ojämlikheteller återspeglar en eurocentrisk universalism, är exemplen förhållandevis få. Givet Sidas speciella uppdrag, är det naturligt att fokus ligger på problem och lösningar i länder i det globala Syd. Samtidigt bidrar detta dock till en epistemiskt ojämlik helhet av diskurser där den sammantagna bilden blir att det globala Syd utgör arenan där både hinder och lösningar för hållbar utveckling finns. Det kan leda till att de förändringar som krävs i Nord för att uppnå en hållbar global utveckling inte får tillräckligt med uppmärksamhet. / This study examines how the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)and its predecessors have used the concept of human rights in annual reports 1956 – 2019, and what relation this use has to epistemic equality. Epistemic power is the power over the conceptsand discourses, forming the basis for the understanding of international development. Human rights as a notion is almost invisible in the reports until 1980. As from the end of the 1980s and onwards, the concept is associated to democracy in a way that dominates large parts of the reports. In the 2010s, the concept is also increasingly connected to gender equality and environmental issues. Although there are examples of reproduction of epistemic inequality or mirroring of an eurocentric universalism, these are proportionately few. Due to Sida’s mission, it’s natural to focus on problems and solutions in the Global South. At the same time, this contributes to an epistemically unequal entirety of discourses, in which the overall picture is that the Global South is where both obstacles and solutions to sustainable development are to be found. This way, changes in the Global North that are also necessary to achieve global sustainable development will not be paid sufficient attention. / <p>Godkänt datum 2020-06-05</p>

English summary The main objective of this thesis is to present some key issues relevant for postcolonial field of study with respect to two basic areas of interest: concepts of identity and place, respectively displacement in contemporary postcolonial discourse and their reflection in fiction, too. The thesis should provide the potential reader with basic theoretical background based on the most fundamental sources and by means of selected literary works it should support (or disclaim, if necessary) conclusions reached by the most notable theories. This dissertation work consists of three major parts. In the introduction, apart from providing the motivational, theoretical and literary objectives of the thesis, I cover some basic difficulties that may occur when dealing with the postcolonial field of study. The central part of the thesis can be divided into two parts, each of them consisting of two further sections. The first one, "Identity in Postcolonial Discourse", is focused on one of the key terms in all of postcolonial theory: identity and other concepts related with it. I cover the basic development of theoretical reflection concerning this concept, drawing primarily from secondary sources dealing with it. The theoretical part on identity is succeeded by a chapter "Reflections of Identity in the...

In this thesis, the theory of rational irrationality is used to explore the incentives behind seemingly irrational beliefs held by a large part of the contemporary American society towards anthropogenic climate change. Applying causal analysis, three questions are answered: "is it rationally irrational for people to be indifferent towards climate change?" "Are Americans inherently more likely than others to hold irrational beliefs about global issues such as climate change?" If so, "is this phenomenon rooted in certain values that constitute the American identity?" The author focuses on specific "American values" and uses statistics and recent empirical studies to find correlations and causality between those values and the exhibited behavior of individuals, while discussing its possible causes and implications. The study concludes that the root cause of irresponsibility of the American citizen towards climate change is a lack of social mechanisms rewarding individuals for holding epistemologically accurate beliefs. The author then proposes a set of general measures to be prioritized in order to improve social reward mechanisms in the American society. If implemented, those measures should be able to effectively enforce epistemic rationality in the U.S. political debate, which is desirable...

Albert Einstein published the English translation of Relativity: The Special and General Theory in the midst of two big events in 1920: the confirmation of the two theories of relativity and spacetime in 1919 and the Nobel prize in physics in 1921. The new global celebrity wanted to make the theories intelligible and readable for an international English-speaking audience, an audience that also included antagonistic scientists and even anti-Semites. The aim of this thesis is to do a rhetorical analysis of Einstein’s character, his ethos, in Relativity, with a specific focus on creation of credibility in regard to his historical context: scientific ideals, values and norms as well as the political and cultural tendencies in Europe during the early 20th century. This was done firstly by identifying the implied auditor. Secondly, based on the material, I have identified three stereotypes or characters – the professional idealist, the mentor and the internationalist –  which emphases different features and capacities that are crucial for the credibility of the text. Thirdly, by using these stereotypes and in regard to the specific historical context, I investigated how Einstein developed his primary ethos into a secondary ethos in the text. The rhetorical analysis of Einstein’s Relativity shows that his ethos stands in relation to the social and cultural perception of the virtuous epistemic scientist; to fight prejudices regarding being a Jewish-German theoretical physicist; and, noteworthy, a way to produce a well-needed international space – a crucial alternative to continue the positivistic knowledge production counter to the nationalistic project.

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