雖然近年來的文獻已嘗試以有系統的方式，探討創投的參與投資，是否有助於提昇被投資公司的價值，然而這些實證研究卻鮮少剖析創投是透過何種途徑來影響被投資公司的價值。再者，此類研究往往從被投資公司上市、上櫃時的股票折價幅度，來探討創投的介入是否對於被投資公司的價值有所貢獻，不過卻較少針對被投資公司的長期經營績效和上市、上櫃後的股價績效進行分析，特別是有關創投對於被投資公司的經營績效影響之相關研究仍付之闕如。因此，本研究嘗試為相關研究另闢蹊徑，以期瞭解創投的參與投資是否確實為被投資公司帶來實質的貢獻。 首先，經由文獻探討和個案分析得知，將代理理論引用至本研究主題確實具有合理性。因此，本研究以代理理論的觀點，嘗試克服傳統「基本主理人──代理人的模式」之限制，並藉由Von Neumann-Morgenstern 效用函數而針對創投的介入對於被投資公司在經營績效和技術上的影響進行理論模式推導，故本研究的理論模式不僅強調技術的提昇為刺激高科技公司產出增加的原動力之外，同時亦考量監控機制和激勵制度彼此可能具互補性的特質。 本研究的各個研究假說分別演繹自理論模式結論或歸納自文獻探討暨個案分析。在實證研究方面，本研究將實證分為三個層次：第一層次係比較國內有創投參與投資的上市、上櫃公司和無創投參與投資的上市、上櫃公司，其在長期經營績效與短期股價表現上是否具有差異性。實證結果發現，有創投參與投資的公司，其在長期經營績效和短期股價表現上皆較無創投參與投資的公司來得差；不過，創投的介入確實承擔了被投資公司本身的部分風險。 實證的第二層次則在於檢視，創投是透過何種途徑來影響被投資公司的績效表現。實證結果顯示，主要創投的持股比例、參與被投資公司的創投家數、創投佔被投資公司的董監事席位比例、創投所承擔被投資公司的技術股股本佔總資本額的比例，或創投投資被投資公司的時點越早，皆對於被投資公司的長期經營績效表現有顯著的正面影響。 另外，創投佔被投資公司的董監事席位比例、創投所承擔被投資公司的技術股股本佔總資本額的比例、主要創投成立的年數越長，或創投參與被投資公司的時點越早，則對於被投資公司上市、上櫃後的短期股價表現有顯著的正面影響。 實證之第三層次，旨在探討創投的參與投資是否加速被投資公司上市、上櫃的時間。根據實證結果得知，有創投參與投資的公司，其從公司設立至上市、上櫃的時間確實較無創投參與投資的公司來得短，此意謂創投可加速被投資公司上市、上櫃的時間，使得被投資公司可以較早在資本市場上募得資金。 綜合上述實證結論，囿限於國內創投的籌資壓力和追逐聲譽的壓力，以及在「逆選擇」的前提之下，導致國內有創投參與投資的公司其績效表現較無創投參與投資的公司來得差。然而，本研究的實證結果並不否定創投的能力，換言之，本研究的實證結果肯定創投的專業能力和監控能力，同時亦肯定創投在國內產業升級上所扮演的重要角色。 / Although recent work attempts to explore what venture capitalists do and whether venture capitalists' involvement adds value for venture-capital-backed firms, it does not investigate the ways in which venture capitalists add value to their portfolio companies.　Moreover, recent empirical research usually investigates whether venture capitalists' involvement reduces underpricing when their portfolio firms going public, but it seldom explicitly examines the effect of the presence of venture capitalists on operating performance of venture-capital-backed firms.　As a matter of fact, a number of issues relate to the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs have not been fully addressed.　Therefore, the objective of this study is to fill both theoretical and empirical gaps. This study applies agency theory which captures the essence between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, and use Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function to analyze the effect of venture capitalists' involvement on their portfolio firms' operating performance and skills.　Our theoretical model not only considers the importance of new technology in modern economies, but also includes the possibility that these two control mechanisms, monitoring and incentives, might be complementary. Moreover, empirical results of this study reveal several important findings.　First, we contrast venture-capital-backed firms with companies that have no venture-capital backing. Our empirical results indicate　operating performance and after-market stock performance of firms with venture-capital backing are both inferior to that of firms without such backing, and the differences are statistically significant.　However, venture-capital-backed firms seem to have lower levels of firm risk. Secondly, empirical results provide evidence that the fraction of equity holdings of the lead venture capitalist, the number of venture capitalists, the number of the venture-capital-backed firm's board seats held by venture capitalists, stock compensation system and the length of time that venture capitalists have invested are all positively associated with operating performance of venture-capital-backed firms. In addition, the number of the venture-capital-backed firm's board seats held by venture capitalists, stock compensation system, the age of the lead venture and the length of time that venture capitalists have invested are positively associated with after-market stock performance of firms with venture-capital backing.　Not surprisingly, empirical results also provide evidence that venture-capital-backed firms go public earlier than non-venture-capital-backed firms. Overall, the results of this study support the idea that venture capitalists do provide much more than financing to their portfolio firms.　However, in a venture capital setting, adverse selection, grandstanding and money-recycling are important concerns; these　concerns might explain why performance of venture-capital-backed firms are significantly inferior to that of non-venture-capital-backed firms.　Indeed, our findings support the notion that venture capitalists' investment behavior does influence performance of their portfolio firms in a number of ways due to their skills, expertise and monitoring abilities.

本文研究問題為：為何習近平在十八大後會展開大規模人事調動？為何人事調動會出現某些特徵與規律？又要從何種角度去進行分析？由於習近平所面對的外部環境與胡錦濤剛接班時相比更為嚴峻，傳統的派系理論已不足以提供解釋。本文藉由委託代理理論進行分析，主要論點在於人事調動有助於減緩代理問題，可區分為頻繁的調動、排除不合格者和甄補具有同質性者。分析資料則從中共政治菁英資料庫匯出十八大以來的所有正部級幹部，並進一步分成省委書記、省長和中央部會幹部三個群體。研究結果顯示調動幹部的幅度極大，除了部份幹部晉升速度極快之外，整體戰略上傾向於掌控更多中委會席次；不適任幹部或與薄、周政變集團有所交集的幹部，不是落馬就是快速退居二線職務；與習近平具同質性的幹部，多數均在兩年內快速從副部級晉升至正部級。結論部份以十九屆中央委員評估作為習近平五年來的成果總結，發現習近平將能在十九大上佔據半數以上席次，顯示出透過人事調動來減緩代理問題有其效果。最後，從中共政治推導出的結論除了可以與委託代理理論對話之外，也有助於其他大型組織的領導人思考如何處理代理問題。

速食食品不但在我們的生活中扮演重要的角色，在台灣，其亦是最重要的餐飲產業之一。文獻上有關於加盟總部與加盟商之間的決策背後的模型，各個因子如何影響彼此，最後加盟總部與加盟商皆能極大化他們的效用，達到一個最適加盟的平衡點。然而，未看到有使用校準分析(Calibration)的方式回推出無法觀察到變數之合理區間的文獻。本研究使用此方法及台灣麥當勞的資料來解開加盟與否決策背後模型的面紗。在最基本的經濟模型中，我們發現加盟商努力的重要性增加時會導致加盟率的下降。再者，都會區的加盟商風險趨避程度以及市場風險較非都會區高。為了針對麥當勞總部的市場策略，延續上個模型的設定，我們在生產函數中另外加入健康食品的產品線以建設出較細緻的第二種模型。此延伸模型相較於第一個模型能解釋更多資料。我們亦觀察到當健康食品佔麥當勞產能提高時，模型的適配度會下降。此現象可解釋為在其他條件不變下，當麥當勞在菜單內加入更多比重的健康食品時，加盟商與加盟主的獲利將低於現階段的水準。 關鍵字: 速食產業，委託代理理論，校準分析，加盟 / Fast food restaurants play an important role in our daily life; they are also one of the most important restaurant business types in Taiwan. The literature posits and examines models behind how franchisors and franchisees reach their franchising decisions, and how different factors affect optimal franchising rates. On that basis, they derive the optimal franchising rates, at which both franchisors and franchisees can maximize their utility. However, there is no literature on determining the reasonable range of variables in the model that we cannot observe in the real world. This study takes the initiative to unveil the model behind the franchising decision with proxies of variables by calibrating a basic economic model using data from McDonald’s Taiwan. Our finding are that a higher importance level of effort results in a higher optimal franchising rate, and the level of franchisees’ risk aversion and the market risk in metropolitan areas are higher than in non-metropolitan areas. In accordance with McDonald’s Taiwan’s strategy in the past years, we construct a more detailed model to capture the characteristics more accurately by adding a healthy food product line into the production function. The extended model can explain the real-world data better than the previous model. On the strategy side, we find that if healthy products account for a higher proportion of the production capacity, the model fitness level drops. In other words, the profit for both the franchisor and franchisees decreases when McDonald’s Taiwan introduces more healthy food to the menu. Key Words: fast-food industry, principal-agent model, calibration, franchising

由中央與地方之間財政關係中權力不對等與對利益要求的目標不一致以及委託代理結構中委託人與代理人同樣存在著資訊不對稱與目標不一致的特性。是以中國大陸中央與地方之間必然存在著委託代理問題，代理人常常只會追求著自己的目標，甚至會損害整體利益，中國大陸中央與地方之間的一切矛盾與問題起源自中央權力大過地方，因此中央動輒使用「決定」與通知這類的行政性指令，取代應該經由制度或是法制的模式來調整諸如財政管理體制等政策，造成地方擁有較多的資訊，但在權力上卻無法脫離中央而獨立。換言之，地方在某些程度上仍受中央所控制，在分稅制實施之後，中央與地方雖然各自有其所屬的稅種，但中央與地方共享稅的分成比例以及何種稅種屬中央抑或地方，這些事項縱然不致於全盤由中央決定，但未來中央與地方定會共同協議與決定財政資源的分配比例。 是以由委託代理理論來驗證中國大陸中央與地方之間的財政關係，本論文發現中央與地方之間所產生種種問題，乃是因為缺乏制度化以及法制化所致，中共中央以行政性指令來達到其分權、集權的目的，這些措施卻不能真正解決問題。制度變遷與經濟發展係為促進中國大陸經濟成長及中央、地方之間財政資源配置產生變動的重要誘因。在此前提下，制度變遷促成市場機能逐漸恢復，以及經濟發展使得生產、就業結構改變。是以由中國大陸的財政收入結構產生根本的改變、中央與地方對於財政資源的配置仍未訂定合理的比例，以及中央政府仍然能夠主導資源配置這三方面觀之，未來只有在中央主導下與地方協調共同決定財政資源的分配比例，這是本論文研究的發現。

In response to the changing financial environment both internally and externally, the government endeavored to pass the Financial Holding Company Act, which is intended to provide an environment conducive to financial integrations. According to the Principal-Agent theory, agency problems tend to take place when misalignment occurs between an ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and voting power. It is of interest whether the financial holding company structure actually increases or decreases such misalignment. The shareholdings of the Hong family of SinoPac Holdings is the subject of this research, and the essence of the research is to examine the Hong family’s shareholding and their actual control based on the one-share-one-vote principle before and after the holding company structure. The findings conclude that the misalignment between the Hong family’s ownership and control in fact increases under the holding company structure, which is generally viewed as a negative sign of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, the Hong family has adopted some measures to strengthen corporate governance despite the widening misalignment.

區段徵收為目前政府大規模進行土地整體開發，促進都市發展，以及無償取得公共設施用地的重要舉措之一，為一種具有高度自償性之土地開發事業。由於區段徵收需要投入大量的資金與人力，在政府財政困窘及國內不動產市場自民國81 年以來，長期處於不景氣之故，其非但無法達成原先設定之有效減低公共支出之目的，反而需要額外編列預算以支應財務缺口。爰此，造成縣市政府往往視區段徵收為畏途，但礙於相關政策規範及都市發展須盡速取得必要之公共設施用地，而不得不予執行，從而導致惡性循環，因此，如何解決區段徵收財務問題，乃成為政府必須面對的最大困境與挑戰。 在政府財政狀態日益惡化，短期內又無法籌措區段徵收開發過程中龐大的資金需求，再加上地方專業人力不足之困境下，使得區段徵收之辦理型態有所演變，部分地方縣（市）政府遂逐步引進民間資源與活力（即BT模式），朝向由民間機構自行籌措資金並由該機構專業人員負責規劃與執行開發工作，政府從旁提供必要之行政協助。此外，開發所需總費用均先由民間機構墊付，而政府再以剩餘可建築土地來償付費用，藉此創新開發模式，以有效解決區段徵收有關資金籌措及開發後土地去化等至為關鍵之癥結問題。 然而BT模式在實務執行過程時，仍存在著法令、政策制定及實施方式等相關爭議，以致於無法有效大量推廣實施，本文藉由研究相關法令、文獻記載、分析目前實施案例、並透過訪談專家學者及整理相關問題等，說明區段徵收業務在走向政府委託民間機構、引進民間資源辦理區段徵收BT開發模式時，所需面對與管理之委託-代理關係，藉由代理理論，探討區段徵收實務執行層面中，可行的解決措施（包括誘因與監督機制），並建議區段徵收應與時俱進地檢討與修正相關配套措施，以利此項善用民間資源與活力，並具有突破性的土地開發委外機制能夠更臻完備，並可作為後續土地整體開發學術研究之重要參考。 綜合本研究之結論與建議，謹分述如次： 一、結論 （一）區段徵收機制基於政策、民意與制度之可行性，可以作階段性創新改革。 （二）現行區段徵收委外機制相關法制，尚欠完備。 （三）區段徵收委外辦理機制，應同時配套建構監控制度。 （四）區段徵收委外過程，應運用誘因機制，以避免代理問題產生。 （五）區段徵收BT開發模式，應可進一步強化學術研究與應用探討。 二、建議 （一）限期檢討修正區段徵收BT開發模式法制化工作。 （二）由中央與地方成立專案小組，全力協助BT得標廠商。 （三）加強BT開發模式之宣導，建構良好的溝通協調機制。 （四）根據現有兩案例開發結果，審慎評估策訂推廣實施計畫。 / Zone expropriation is presently the large-scale integrated land development carried out by the government to promote urban development. Acquiring land for public facilities without compensation is also an important measure to have high self-liquidation of land development enterprise. Because zone expropriation needs to invest in a great deal of funds and manpower, the government finance and the domestic real estate market were in a long-term depression from 1981 until 1992. Not only unable to reach the targeted profit margin to reduce the public expenses, additional budget is needed to deal with financial gap. Therefore, it makes the county and city government often look at zone expropriation as a dangerous choice to take. But hindrance related to policy standardization and urban development must acquire the necessary land for public facilities as soon as possible because there's no choice but to implement it. As a result, it leads to a vicious circle. Therefore, the government needs to face the greatest dilemma and challenge on how to settle the zone expropriation financial problems. The financial status of the government is worsening day by day. Within a short time the government was unable to raise funds for the huge financial requirement of the zone expropriation. In addition, professional manpower is also a dilemma, causing the handling pattern of zone expropriation to evolve to some extent. Partially the local county and city government gradually brings in non-government resources and vitality (private participation-BT mode). Non-government organizations voluntarily raise funds and professionals in private sectors manage the plans and implementation, while the government provides necessary administrative assistance. In addition, the development necessary for the total costs is paid first by the non-government organization, and the government excess land will be liquidated, thereby creating modes in effect of settling the zone expropriation's fund raising and developed land key problems. However in the implementation of the BT mode process, the decrees, policymaking and implementation methodology related to disputes are still kept. Because of the incapability to take effect the large number of widespread implementation, this writing discuss about the laws, research about decrees, document records, analysis of present case studies, and interviews of professional scholars and arrangements related to the problems. Zone expropriation business is illustrated in moving towards the government's entrusting of non-government organizations. The introduction of non-government resources to handle the zone expropriation BT development method is necessary for facing with the management of principal-agent relationship. By means of principal-agent theory, probing into the implementation dimension, feasible resolutions (including incentive and monitoring mechanism), and recommending the steady advancement of zone expropriation to review and amend about the formation of a complete set of measures, these are all for making good use of non-government resources and vitality, as well as to have a break through in the land development outsourcing mechanism to make them more perfect, and may make a follow-up for the land integrated development academic study of important references. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation: 1. Conclusions: (1)Gradual improvements can be made on the zone expropriation mechanism based on policy, public opinion and system feasibility. (2)The legal system regarding the current zone expropriation mechanism is still incomplete. The external committee handling zone expropriation should simultaneously form a complete construction monitoring system. (3)The external committee handling zone expropriation should utilize a financial incentive mechanism to avoid any problems. (4)A zone expropriation based on the BT model should go further in strengthening academic research and application 2. Recommendations: (1)Establish a deadline for reviewing the legal work for zone expropriation in the BT development model. (2)Allow the national and local relevant groups to fully assist the winning bidder for the BT project. (3)Strengthen guidance for the BT development model; construct a good communication mechanism. (4)Based on the development results of the above case studies, carefully appraise the presented implementation plan . Keywords: Zone Expropriation、Private Participation(BT Mode)、Principal-Agent Theory、Incentive Mechanism

股東權益與意見在公司治理中屬重要一環，否則少數公司決策者（例如董事會或公司的CEO）會過度左右企業資源的分配，甚至發生浪費、貪污等代理問題，進而損及小股東權益，甚至勞工權益。本論文以公司治理的基本概念及架構為基礎，並以惡意併購的個案作為案例，探討並說明股東行動主義的經濟與法律意涵。其中，主要就「金融控股公司依金融控股公司法申請轉投資審核原則」法規設計，選擇具代表性個案，探討個案公司於股東治理的基礎規範與相關運作程序，包括非合意併購、委託書爭奪戰等相關法律問題。若根據目前台灣上市/櫃公司，其公司治理的實施狀況，許多法律學者均認為職業股東屬必要之罪，委託書是在目前公司所有權與經營權不分下，可能的外部監督力量。目前台灣委託書的相關規定過於保護大股東、公司派，導致小股東的權益受到一定程度的損害。若能自由化委託書收購，並且讓委託書可以在自由市場買賣，如此所創造的市場機制，據委託書的價格及外部市場機制，對於台灣過度依賴大股東或管理階層的公司治理結構會產生顯著改善效果，有效提升公司治理。本論文所選擇的個案公司，可以充分顯現上述這些方面的法律與經濟意涵。另外一個好的金融控股公司合併政策有賴一個健全之法律制度加以配套。針對金控公司是否得以所謂非合意併購達成合併之目的，金管會僅以行政命令「金融控股公司依金融控股公司法申請轉投資審核原則」與「公開收購公開發行公司有價證券管理辦法」作為主要法源，在法律上之位階上似乎有將行政命令之位階提高至法律位階之必要，本文以個案公司為例探討其相關法律問題。 關鍵字：公司治理、委託書、非合意併購、代理理論、價購委託書 / Shareholder’s interests play an important role in corporate governance. Otherwise, few decision-makers (ex. Board members, directors, etc) might misuse corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions in which interests of minority shareholders and employees will be jeopardized. This thesis will explore synergies of shareholder’s activism based on basic concepts and framework of corporate governance. In particular, case studies will focus on related regulations and practicable mechanisms of corporate governance in which certain legal issues, such as hostile takeover and proxy battle, will be elaborated based on ‘Principles of supervising investment application from financial holding companies’. Related regulations of proxy rights in Taiwan tend to protect interests of major shareholders and result in negative impacts of minority shareholders. If purchase offers of proxy could be freely traded in public, marketing mechanisms will balance the distortion of major shareholders and enhance the essence of corporate governance effectively. Case studies in this thesis therefore will reflect the above-mentioned legal and business implications. In addition, merge policies of financial conglomerate need supplementally sound regulations. In Taiwan, legal sources in financial holding companies are based on “Principles of supervising investment application from financial holding companies “ and “Regulations Governing Tender Offers for Purchase of the Securities of a Public Company “ issued by Financial Supervisory Committee of Executive Yuan. Positions of legal sources, in which case studies will be reviewed, seemingly need to be upgraded from administrative to legal level. Key word: Corporate Governance, Proxy,Hostile takeover,Agency Theory, Proxy Buying

台灣地區工業區開發已近50年，民國84年中央工業主管機關不再開發工業區，由地方政府與興辦工業人接續為工業區開發主流。就工業區開發資料顯示，有興辦工業人開發大型工業區不易，及開發商不易尋找之情況，前者乃取得完整大面積土地困難，為開發主體問題，後者乃在政府開發工業區未編列預算所致，為開發模式問題，因此本文認為「編定工業區開發模式」課題，有研究之必要。 　　本研究宗旨就工業區開發模式中資金籌措為主題，以工業區開發規劃至開發完成之過程為軸線，經由(一)市場與政府理論，論證工業區開發主體及數量變化。(二)對不同開發主體在開發過程中，所產生交易成本、代理成本、衝突成本異同討論。(三)對開發模式之交易成本等相關文獻、法制面、實務面、分析研究，以及對實際參與工業區開發人士進行深入訪談，發覺工業區開發困境所在。 經研究認為地方政府擁有公權力及行政資源，所開發工業區交易成本最低，為編定工業區開發最佳模式，爰此本研究建議編定工業區開發必須搭配以下措施：(一)政府編列預算。(二)公私統包開發。(三)引進不動產估價師制度。(四)引進銀行融資制度。(五)工業區銷售採預售制度。 　　透過上述工業區開發配套措施，除有益於開發商參與工業區開發，及減少民眾抗爭之衝突成本，使得開發順利外，尚可降低搜尋成本、協商成本，及時間成本等，達成降低編定工業區開發交易成本之目的，提昇工業區開發之效率。 / The development of industrial sites in Taiwan has been carried out continuously for nearly 50 years. In 1995, the central government made a decision that they no longer played an active role in developing industrial sites, and thereafter, the task was taken over by local governments as well as host industrialists. The literature that recorded such development shows that some host industrialists encountered difficulty in developing large-scale industrial sites, and also it was difficult to find developers. The problem of the former was caused by the difficulty in looking for large area of land, which was a problem of development entity, and the problem of the latter was caused by no budget arranged by the government, which was a problem of development mode. Thus, in this text, it is considered that a study on “the Development Mode of Projected Industrial Sites” has become essential. The purpose of this study is to explore the subject of fund raising in the process of industrial site development, from the stage of its planning up to its accomplishment, which goes through (1) the theory of market and government: to discuss and verify entity and quantity variation in industrial site development. (2) the discussion about similarities and dissimilarities in transaction cost, agent cost, and conflict cost emerging in the process of development. (3) the analysis and research of transaction cost of development mode through relative literature, legal aspect, and practical aspect, as well as interviewing personnel who took take part in the actual development of industrial sites in order to find out potential problems. As a result of research, it is deemed that the transaction cost in developing industrial sites is lowest when executed by a local government as it holds civic rights and administrative resources, so that turns out to be the best mode in projected industrial site development. It is therefore proposed in this study that when developing projected industrial sites, following measures should be taken: (1) budget planned by the government (2) execution of consolidated development contract for both public and private projects (3) introduction of real estate appraiser system (4) introduction of bank loan system (5) adoption of advance booking for selling and purchasing premises in industrial sites. By taking above supplementary measures for developing industrial sites, the benefits include encouraging developers’ involvement in developing industrial sites, reducing conflict cost arose by mob protest so as to facilitate development process, and further lowering searching cost, negotiation cost, time cost etc. As a result, the purpose of reducing transaction cost of developing projected industrial sites can be achieved, and the efficiency of such development can be elevated.

近年來，受到美國法學界以及全球經濟形勢巨變的影響下，國內學者也逐漸開始注意關於公司經營者報酬之相關議題，並陸續開始就此議題發表相關著作，而本文則試圖從代理成本的觀點切入，並以我國在此議題方面最借重之美國經驗來分析、檢討此議題在我國的發展現況。 以美國近二十年的發展經驗來看，報酬議題是否受社會大眾、媒體甚至政府相關單位之重視，並進而採取相關改革措施，實際上與經濟景氣的循環以及重大公司弊案之發生，有相當密切的關係，大抵上，當經濟景氣下降或重大公司弊案發生，股東、投資人及新聞媒體便開始關注公司經營者是否有超額報酬之現象。而我國關於此議題之改革發展軌跡，雖然未必與美國的發展經驗相符，但由於我國深受美國的影響，在改革方向上幾乎可謂是跟著美國的腳步前進。例如在90年代初期，美國政府受到學說「理想締約說」之影響，大肆推廣股票選擇權等股權性報酬之使用，我國受此潮流影響，便於2001年修正公司法時，將員工認股選擇權、員工股票分紅納入規範；而2000年初期，美國發現股權性報酬的大量使用反而促使經營者報酬的飆高，為解決此問題，美國政府在學說「高階經理人權力說」的影響下，著手改革資訊揭露制度、修正會計認列制度和推動股東建議性投票規範，而在我國方面，政府也在媒體輿論的壓力下，進行了類似的修正；最後，在2008年後半爆發、衝擊全球的金融海嘯，美國國會為平息民怨，將經營者報酬之限制條件納入抒困方案中，而我國的立法院也效法美國，修正公司法，對於成為政府抒困對象之公司限制其經營者報酬額度。 然而綜觀我國這十年來關於經營者報酬規範之發展會發現，雖然我國是跟隨著美國的步伐前進，但我國的公司體制和股權結構畢竟與美國有很大的不同，僅是將美國的改革措施套用在我國並無法解決我國的問題，更何況我國始終未曾透過系統性地檢討經營者報酬在相關理論下之定位，來發覺我國現行制度的缺失並予以對症下藥，是以，改革至今，仍難以看出初步的成效。因此，本文嘗試從美國法近年改革之理論依據，即從代理理論衍生而出的「理想締約說」和「高階經理人權力說」來檢視我國現行的經營者報酬監控制度之缺失，並提出未來的修正建議。 歸納上開兩學說的主要想法，關於經營者報酬之監控，應從三方面即強化報酬與績效之連結、董事會的內部監控、和股東的外部監控著手。而在內部監控方面，因董事會成員易受互惠心理、同儕情誼之影響，是以必須輔以股東的「憤慨」力量才能達成。 則首先，在績效與報酬之連結方面，實證研究結果發現，我國無論是非股權性報酬、股權性報酬、或報酬整體，皆呈現與績效連結不佳的現象，其原因，或許與我國多數公司係由控制股東所掌控，存在核心代理問題，且董事兼任經理人之現象普遍，董事往往同時領取兩份報酬，產生雙重評價績效之情況有關。 其次在內部監控方面，由於我國公司法將董事報酬之決定權劃歸為股東會所有，是以，我國董事會關於董事報酬之決定，原則僅居於負責提案的輔助性地位，也因此，我國公司法並未另外在董事會內設置董事報酬之監控力量。而此情形縱使在證交法引進獨立董事、審計委員會制度後，亦未發生重大改變，因實際設有審計委員會之公司寥寥可數，是以在大多數公司中，關於董事報酬議題實際上不存在內部監控制度。 最後在外部監控方面，股東之外部監控主要是透過表決權之行使，以及代表訴訟之提起組成，但由於各公司的股東會普遍在章程中將董事「報酬」與「酬勞」之決定委託由董事會行使，使得在我國公司實務上，董事會始為董事報酬最終決定者，股東會的表決完全流於形式；且我國的報酬資訊原則上仍採「彙總」揭露制，外部人無法得知公司內部實際的報酬分配狀況，高階經理人權力說主張的「憤慨成本」於我國也很難形成，無法對董事會產生實質的壓力。另外，我國的股東代表訴訟在制度設計上存有很大的缺陷，很少有股東願意透過此機制來糾正董事會的不當決策；加上資訊揭露不健全，股東根本無從知曉內部的報酬分配情況；另外，縱使股東提起代表訴訟，也會被沈重的舉證責任以及證據蒐集之困難所擊倒。因此，從此面向檢視我國現狀會發現，我國關於經營者報酬議題，實際上不存在真正的外部監控。 綜合上述檢討之結論，對於我國現行的經營者報酬監控機制，本文認為應進行下列數項改革：(1) 放寬董事報酬中股權性報酬工具之使用；(2) 報酬決定設計之修正；(3) 強化報酬資訊透明度；(4) 建構有效的司法審查。且由於我國公司存在核心代理問題和少數股東控制結構，是以，本文認為，對於董事報酬監控之改革，必須倚靠強大的外部監控力量始可能達到監控效果，而外部監控力量能否發揮的前提便建立在完整的資訊揭露制度上，因此強化報酬資訊透明度應為當前的改革重點。

村里組織是台灣實施地方自治的最基層編組，而村里資源如何運用與分配，更是影響地方自治行政功能甚鉅，然過去研究鮮少討論村里公共資源的分配政治現象。於此，本研究以政治學的分配理論為基礎，採取質性研究方法，以村里基層工作經費為研究主軸，透過深入訪談及文件分析探討村里長是分配村里資源的情形，並分析公所與村里長之間委託-代理關係的監督失靈現象。 研究結果顯示，村里長分配村里資源的模式偏向Cox-McCubbins的模型，村里長以是否為「選舉票倉區」，作為分配村里基層工作經費的基準，而鄉鎮公所與村里長之間的委託-代理關係，則因資訊不對稱及里幹事聯繫失衡對村里長的行政監督有所失靈。 基於研究發現，本文建議，村里基層工作經費應依照村里的大小及人口予以公式化的補助金分配，此外村里長與公所之間的行政責任釐清，可助於減少資訊不對稱的問題，最後村里長運用村里資源的情形應建立衡量指標，落實稽核制度。本文為一初探性嘗試，提供台灣分配政策與政治研究另外一種思考的面向，並且提供未來台灣分配政治研究的實證基礎。 / Village and Neighborhood organization is the most basic unit of local governance in Taiwan, and how the village and neighborhood uses and allocates resources has important impact on the local self-government administration. However, existing research rarely discusses distributive politics of public resources in the village arena. Therefore, based on the perspective of distributive theory, this study explores the allocation of village resources by in-depth interviews and archival research. It further presents the supervision failure by township, on village and neighborhood. The results of this study confirm Cox-McCubbins ’s model on resources allocation. The village and neighborhood chiefs use "election support zone" as criteria to allocate the village and neighborhood funds. The principal-agency relationship between township and village was disconnected due to information asymmetries and loss of contact with the village secretary, which leads to the failure of administrative supervision on village chiefs regarding allocation of the funds.. This study proposes three suggestions for reforms. First, the village and neighborhood funds should be distributed in accordance with a formula based on the size of the village and neighborhood. Second, the administrative responsibility should be clarified between the village and neighborhood chief and townships to reduce the information asymmetry problem. Finally, the indicators measuring the effectiveness of the fund’s usage, should be constructed in order to enforce the audit system. This research is a pilot attempt to provide another perspective and empirical analysis on the distributive policy at local level. It has theoretical and empirical implications for distributive politics.