Global ETD Search

41	Droit du sport et droit pénal : recherche d'un équilibre / Sports law and criminal law : finding a balance Cohen, Jennifer 10 December 2015 (has links) Rien de prime abord ne rapproche le sport et la violence. Le sport contribue à un épanouissement personnel alors que la violence est un moyen d’oppression. Du fait de l’augmentation croissante des violences sportives, le droit du sport s’est trouvé dépassé. Le droit pénal est alors intervenu à son secours afin de réprimer et de faire diminuer ces violences. Au fil du temps, le droit pénal a pris une place de plus en plus importante dans le contentieux sportif, de sorte qu’un droit pénal spécifique du sport a émergé. Si le droit pénal ne peut plus intervenir dans le contentieux sportif en raison du particularisme fort qui caractérise le droit du sport, la création d’un droit pénal du sport est devenue nécessaire, avec ses incriminations spécifiques, en conservant toutefois un droit pénal commun, également applicable en droit du sport. Pour autant le droit du sport est encadré par le droit pénal mais également par le droit disciplinaire. Toutefois, le droit du sport s’autorégule si bien qu’il se suffit à lui seul et qui n’a pas besoin de recourir systématiquement au droit pénal. Peu à peu une dépénalisation s’est mise en place. Le droit pénal a alors pu prendre ses distances avec le droit du sport afin de laisser la pratique sportive s’épanouir. En somme, si l’intervention du droit pénal en droit du sport est devenue inéluctable, il n’en demeure pas moins que le droit du sport, compte tenu de sa spécificité, est capable de s’autoréguler / Nothing at first only brings sport and violence. Sport contributes to personal fulfillment while violence is a means of oppression. Due to the increasing violence of sports, sports law has been overtaken. Criminal law is then stepped to his aid to suppress and decrease the violence. Over time, criminal law has become an increasingly important litigation in the sports, so that a specific criminal law of sport has emerged. If the criminal law can no longer intervene in the sports litigation because of the strong individualism that characterizes sports law, the creation of a criminal law sport has become necessary, with specific offenses, keeping however a common criminal, also apply in the sports law. However sports law is framed by the criminal law, but also by the disciplinary law.However, sports law regulates itself so that it is sufficient in itself and does not need to systematically use the criminal law. Gradually decriminalization was implemented. Criminal law was then able to distance sports law to allow the sport to flourish. In sum, if the intervention of criminal law sports law has become inevitable, the fact remains that sports law, given its specificity, is able to regulate itself Acceptation des risques Autorégulation Corruption sportive Droit pénal du sport Droit du sport pénal Éthique Faits justificatifs Hooliganisme Immunité pénale Intégrité des compétitions sportives Légalité criminelle Spécificité sportive Acceptance of risks Self-Regulation Sports corruption Criminal law of sport Sports criminal law Ethics Justifications Hooliganism Criminal immunity Integrity of sporting competition Criminal law Sports specificity
42	A Competitive Environment? : Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the European Green Deal Lundgren, Lars January 2021 (has links) Europe is facing a climate and environmental crisis. To respond to this, the European Commission has launched several programmes, which aim to increase sustainability and environmental protection. This aim has been condensed into the policy document that is the European Green Deal. The European Green Deal sets out the aim of making the Union’s economy climate neutral, while improving environmental protection and protecting biodiversity. To this end, several different sectors of the economy need to be overhauled. In EU Law, a key policy area is to protect free competition. Article 101 TFEU sets out that agreements between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition are prohibited. Similarly, Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse by an undertaking of a dominant position. This thesis explores what happens when competition law thus intersects with the environmental policy of the Union. The thesis identifies two main situations of interaction. Undertakings can invoke environmental protection to justify a restriction of competition. The Union may also rely on its antitrust provisions to enforce sustainability by holding unsustainable practices as restrictive agreements or abuses of dominant behaviour, respectively, and thus prohibited by the antitrust provisions. Generally, the thesis concludes that there is not enough information on how the Commission and the CJEU will approach arguments relating to sustainability in its antitrust assessment. The Commission’s consumer welfare standard appears to limit environmental integration to points where a certain factor results affects the environment or sustainability on the one hand, and consumer welfare on the other. The lack of information, moreover, is in itself an issue as undertakings may abstain from environmental action if they believe they will come under scrutiny due to violations of the antitrust provisions. Therefore, a key conclusion in the thesis is that the Commission and the CJEU should set out clear guidelines for environmental action by undertakings, in relation to the antitrust provisions. Similarly, the Commission appears to be cautious to use antitrust as a tool against unsustainable practices. The Commission has, however, recently decided to open an investigation into agreements which limit sustainability, which shows that the picture may be changing. competition law antitrust abuse of a dominant position objective justifications efficiencies environmental integration the european green deal article 11 tfeu article 101 tfeu article 102 tfeu efficiencies consumer welfare konkurrensrätt missbruk av dominerande ställning konkurrensbegränsningar artikel 101 feuf artikel 102 feuf miljö klimat Law Juridik
43	Competition and Data Protection Law in Conflict : Data Protection as a Justification for Anti-Competitive Conduct and a Consideration in Designing Competition Law Remedies Bornudd, David January 2022 (has links) Competition and data protection law are two powerful regimes simultaneously shaping the use of digital information, which has given rise to new interactions between these areas of law. While most views on this intersection emphasize that competition and data protection law must work together, nascent developments indicate that these legal regimes may sometimes conflict. In the first place, firms faced with antitrust allegations are to an increasing extent invoking the need to protect the privacy of their users to justify their impugned conduct. Here, the conduct could either be prohibited by competition law despite of data protection or justified under competition law because of data protection. In the EU, no such justification attempt has reached court-stage, and it remains unclear how an enforcer ought to deal with such a claim. In the second place, competition law can mandate a firm to provide access to commercially valuable personal data to its rivals under a competition law remedy. Where that is the case, the question arising in this connection is whether an enforcer can and should design the remedy in a way that aligns with data protection law. If so, the issue remains of how that ought to be done. The task of the thesis has been to explore these issues, legally, economically, and coherently. The thesis has rendered four main conclusions. First, data protection has a justified role in EU competition law in two ways. On the one hand, enhanced data protection can increase the quality of a service and may thus be factored in the competitive analysis as a dimension of quality. On the other, data protection as a human right must be guaranteed in the application of competition law. Second, these perspectives can be squared with the criteria for justifying competition breaches, in that data protection can be invoked to exculpate a firm from antitrust allegations. Third, in that context, the human rights dimension of data protection may entail that the enforcer must consider data protection even if it is not invoked. However, allowing data protection interests to override competition law in this manner is relatively inefficient as it may lead to less innovation, higher costs, and lower revenues. Fourth, the profound importance of data protection in the EU necessarily means that enforcers should accommodate data protection interests in designing competition law remedies which mandate access to personal data. This may be done in several ways, including requirements to anonymize data before providing access, or to oblige the firm to be compliant with data protection law in the process of providing access. The analysis largely confirms that anonymization is the preferable option. competition law antitrust data protection law GDPR the charter of fundamental rights big tech abuse of a dominant position objective justifications efficiencies article 102 TFEU consumer welfare competition remedies anonymization big data personal data German Facebook Case Google/Fitbit konkurrensrätt konkurrensbegränsning dataskydd dataskyddsförordningen missbruk av dominerande ställning objektivt rättfärdigande artikel 102 FEUF anonymisering Law Juridik
44	Fighting Tyranny in Fantastic Literature for Children and Young Adults Kokorski, Karin 10 June 2020 (has links) The focus of fighting tyranny and the justifications of the consecutive wars in fantasy literature for children and young adults play a noteworthy role in the intertwinement of literature and its educational potential. This genre is filled with numerous images of violence, in particular different scenarios of war and its justifications. In the books war constitutes the final battle between good and evil, and thus manifests the protagonists’ ultimate moral decisions between these two forces. The following books constitute the corpus: C. S. Lewis’s The Chronicles of Narnia (1950-56), Susan Cooper’s The Dark Is Rising Sequence (1965-77), Philip Pullman’s His Dark Materials (1995-2000), J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series (1997-2007), Christopher Paolini’s Inheritance Cycle (2002-11), Amanda Hemingway’s Sangreal Trilogy (2005-07), and P. C. Cast and Kristin Cast’s House of Night novels (2007-2014). Although not all the books feature wars, all display justifications for war and the imperative to fight tyranny. Located within an intersection of diverse critical theories, my thesis engages literary texts in order to reflect on their capacity to negotiate, challenge, subvert, and perpetuate values and power structures. Motif analysis forms the centre of this analysis. I deploy a varied approach to literary analysis, relying upon literary and cultural theories (especially theories of ideology) to understand the realizations of the different motifs. Through issues of character construction, (political) authority, religion, and the construction of difference, the reader learns much about the culture and values of the respective world. Furthermore, this analysis invites the reader to find parallels between the fabricated world and the real world, and thus transfer what s/he has learned from the texts his/her own world. Engaging in such a reading ensures the drawing of direct connections between the reality constructed in the books on the one hand, and politics, the construction of difference, religion, and just war theory in the reader’s world on the other. The content analysis leads to broader cultural messages, which comprise assumptions about gender, power, ethnicity, religion, and morality. This methodology emphasizes the relevance as well as the complexity of the books and their educative potential, and facilitates the analysis of the books as tools for the defence and perpetuation of Western values and culture. Children's Literature Young Adult Fantasy Fighting Tyranny Justifications War Harry Potter His Dark Materials The Chronicles of Narnia The Dark Is Rising Inheritance Cycle The House of Night Sangreal Trilogy Villains Ideology Race and Racism Authority Religion Just War Theory Gender Power Structures Morality 17.87 - Besondere Literaturkategorien 18.05 - Englische Literatur 18.06 - Angloamerikanische Literatur ddc:820
45	La coaction en droit pénal / Co-perpetration in criminal law Baron, Elisa 07 December 2012 (has links) Le coauteur est traditionnellement défini en droit pénal comme l’individu qui, agissant avec un autre, réunit sur sa tête l’ensemble des éléments constitutifs de l’infraction. Pourtant, il est permis de douter de la pertinence de cette affirmation tant la jurisprudence comme la doctrine en dévoient le sens.En réalité, loin d’être cantonnée à une simple juxtaposition d’actions, la coaction doit être appréhendée comme un mode à part entière de participation à l’infraction. En effet, elle apparaît comme un titre d’imputation à mi-chemin entre l’action et la complicité, auxquelles elle emprunte certains caractères. Autrement dit, elle se révèle être un mode de participation à sa propre infraction. Surtout, son particularisme est assuré par l’interdépendance unissant les coauteurs : parce que chacun s’associe à son alter ego, tous sont placés sur un pied d’égalité. Ces différents éléments, qui se retrouvent dans sa notion et dans son régime, permettent ainsi d’affirmer la spécificité de la coaction tout en renforçant la cohérence entre les différents modes de participation criminelle. / In criminal law, the co-perpetrator is classically presented as an individual who, acting jointly with another, gathers all the constitutive elements of the offence. However, one may harbor doubts concerning the relevance of this assertion since both case law and legal scholars denature its meaning.Actually, far from being limited to a mere juxtaposition of perpetrations, co-perpetration must be understood as a full mode of participation in the offence. Indeed, it appears as a form of imputation halfway between perpetration and complicity, from which it borrows some characteristics. In other words, it proves to be a mode of participation in one’s own offence. Above all, its particularism is provided by the interdependence between the co-perpetrators : because each of them joins forces with his alter ego, all are placed on an equal footing. These elements, which are found both in it’s concept and in it’s regime, demonstrate thereby the specificity of co-perpetration while strengthening the coherence of the different modes of criminal participation. Action Aide Autorité Causalité Circonstances agravantes Chef d’entreprise Chose jugée Commencement d’exécution Communication pénale Compétence Complicité Connexité Emprunt de criminalité Entente Faits justificatifs Fautes concurrentes Fautes conjuguées Filiale Groupe de sociétés Imprudence Imprudence commune Indivisibilité Infraction collective Instigation Intention Interdépendance Participation Peine justifiée Personne morale Préposé, Résultat Solidarité Subordination Tentative Violences collectives Perpetration Aiding and abetting Authority Causal link Aggravating circumstances Civilian superiors Res judicata Initiation of execution Criminal communication Jurisdiction Complicity Connexity Borrowing of criminality Common plan Justifications Subsidiary Group of companies Recklessness Collective recklessness Imputability Imputation Indivisibility Collective offence Instigation Intent Interdependence Participation Justified sentence Legal persons Agent Solidarity, subordination Attempt Collective violence 340
46	Le préjudice en droit pénal / Prejudice in criminal law Rabut, Gaëlle 17 October 2014 (has links) Le préjudice est une notion qui appartient classiquement à la matière civile. Figuretraditionnelle et incontournable de cette discipline, le préjudice suscite aujourd’hui l’engouement desspécialistes de la matière. Face à ce phénomène, les pénalistes sont légitimes à s’interroger sur laplace du préjudice en droit pénal. Si le concept est peu utilisé dans cette matière, il n’est toutefois pastotalement inconnu. Cependant, l’étude du préjudice en droit pénal devra révéler l’absence de placepour cette notion en droit répressif. Cette différence entre le droit civil et le droit pénal s’explique parles finalités distinctes qui animent les deux disciplines. Alors que le droit civil a pour objectif laréparation des préjudices soufferts individuellement, le droit pénal est guidé par l’impératif deprotection de l’intérêt général par le maintien de l’ordre public.Ainsi, le préjudice n’a, d’une part, pas de place dans la théorie de l’infraction. Il n’est pris encompte ni dans le processus de création des incriminations, ni dans celui de leur qualification. Lepréjudice n’est pas un élément constitutif de l’infraction, et n’équivaut ainsi pas au résultatinfractionnel. D’autre part, le préjudice n’a qu’une place limitée dans la théorie de l’action en droitpénal. S’il apparaît comme une condition de recevabilité de l’action civile exercée devant lesjuridictions répressives, c’est parce que celle-ci se présente comme une action en responsabilitécivile, à vocation uniquement réparatrice. En revanche, le préjudice n’est pas une condition de l’actionpénale en répression de l’infraction. / The notion of prejudice habitually falls within the boundaries of civil law. As a traditionaland inescapable feature of this discipline, prejudice is today sparking off heated debates amongspecialists. Confronted with this new trend, criminal law experts can rightfully wonder about the placeof prejudice in criminal law. If the concept is little used in this law area, it is nonetheless not totallyunknown. However, the study of prejudice in criminal law will have to prove the irrelevance of thisnotion in that regard. This difference between civil and criminal law can be accounted for by thedistinct purposes of these two areas of the law. Whereas civil law aims at seeking redress for harminflicted on individuals, criminal law is guided by the imperative need to protect general interestthrough the maintenance of law and order.Thus, prejudice does not fall within the scope of the criminal offence theory. It is neither taken intoaccount in the process of defining offences by the lawmaker nor in the classification of the offence bythe trial court. Prejudice is not a constituent part of the infringement and thus is not tantamount to itsoutcome. Furthermore, the notion of prejudice plays a limited role in the theory of criminal lawprocedure. If prejudice appears as a condition governing the admissibility of a civil action brought incourt it is because it is perceived as a legal action for damages, for the sole purpose of monetarycompensation. On the other hand, prejudice is not a condition for criminal proceedings with thepurpose of punishing the offence. Abus de confiance Action civile Action collective Action pénale Action privée Action publique Causalité civile Causalité juridique Causalité matérielle Causalité pénale Cessation de l'illicite Destructions Dégradations Détériorations Dommage Environnement Escroquerie Faux Intérêt pénalement protégé Justification Principe de nécessité Ordre public Peine Préjudice Remise en état Réparation Résultat illicite Résultat infractionnel Résultat typique Rétablissement prospectif Rétablissement rétrospectif Trouble Victime civile Victime pénale Violences Assault and battery Breach of trust Causal relation Cessation of illegality Civil action Compensation Criminal proceedings Damage Disturbance Environment Forgery Fraud Harm Justifications Law and order Legal consequences Prejudice Prospective restoration Public prosecution Restoration Retrospective restoration Sentence Victim 340
47	Les conditions de la responsabilité en droit privé : éléments pour une théorie générale de la responsabilité juridique / The conditions of responsibility in private law : elements for a general theory of legal responsibility Lagoutte, Julien 16 November 2012 (has links) Alors que l’on enseigne classiquement la distinction radicale du droit pénal et de la responsabilité civile, une étude approfondie du droit positif révèle une tendance générale et profonde à la confusion des deux disciplines. Face à ce paradoxe, le juriste s’interroge : comment articuler le droit civil et le droit pénal de la responsabilité ? Pour y répondre, cette thèse suggère d’abandonner l’approche traditionnelle de la matière, consistant à la tenir pour une simple catégorie de classement des différentes branches, civile et pénale, du droit de la responsabilité. La responsabilité juridique est présentée comme une institution autonome et générale organisant la réaction du système à la perturbation anormale de l’équilibre social. Quant au droit de la responsabilité civile et au droit criminel, ils ne sont plus conçus que comme les applications techniques de cette institution en droit positif.Sur le fondement de cette approche renouvelée et par le prisme de l’étude des conditions de la responsabilité en droit privé, la thèse propose un ordonnancement technique et rationnel du droit pénal et de la responsabilité civile susceptible de fournir les principes directeurs d’une véritable théorie générale de la responsabilité juridique. En tant qu’institution générale, celle-ci engendre à la fois un concept de responsabilité, composé des exigences de dégradation d’un intérêt juridiquement protégé, d’anormalité et de causalité juridique et qui fonde la convergence du droit pénal et du droit civil, et un système de responsabilité, qui en commande les divergences et pousse le premier vers la protection de l’intérêt général et le second vers celle des victimes. / While the radical distinction between criminal law and civil liability is classically taught, a thorough survey of positive law reveals a general and profound trend towards a confusion of these two disciplines. Faced with this paradox, the jurist wonders : how to articulate the civil and criminal laws of responsibility ? To answer this question, the thesis suggests abandoning the traditional approach of the subject, which consists in treating it as a mere category of classification of the different branches, civil and criminal, of responsibility/liability. Legal responsibility is presented as an autonomous and general institution organizing the response from the system to abnormal disturbance of social equilibrium. Civil liability law and criminal law are, as far as they are concerned, henceforth conceived as the mere technical applications of this institution in positive law.On the basis of this new approach and through the prism of the study of liability conditions in private law, the thesis proposes a technical and rational organization of criminal law and civil liability that may provide the guiding principles of a real general theory of legal responsibility. As a general institution, it gives not only a concept of responsibility, requiring degradation of a legally protected interest, abnormality and legal causation, and establishing the convergence of criminal law and civil law, but also a system of responsibility, determining the divergences of them and steering the first towards the protection of general interest and the second towards the protection of victims. Anormalité Antijuridicité Bien juridique Causalité juridique Causalité Cause étrangère Cessation de l’illicite Complicité Contrainte Culpabilité Dangerosité Discernement Dol général Dol spécial Dommage Droit des obligations Droit pénal Faits justificatifs Faute simple Faute Fautes qualifiées Force majeure Illicéité Immunités de fonction Imprudence consciente Imprudence inconsciente Imputabilité Infraction impossible Infraction Intention Mobile Personnalité juridique Personnalité morale Préjudice écologique Préjudice extrapatrimonial Préjudice patrimonial Préjudice Présomptions Principe de précaution Responsabilité civile Responsabilité contractuelle Responsabilité des personnes morales Responsabilité du fait d’autrui Responsabilité du fait des choses Responsabilité du fait personnel Responsabilité extracontractuelle Responsabilité juridique Responsabilité pénale Responsabilité pour faute Responsabilité préventive Responsabilité sans faute Résultat légal Risque Tentative Troubles du voisinage Volonté Abnormality Aggravated faults Attempt Causation Cessation of illegality Civil liability Complicity Duress Contractual liability Corporate personality Crime Criminal law Criminal liability Culpability Damage Dangerousness Discernment Dolus directus Dolus specialis Ecological damage External cause Fault Fault-based liability Force majeure Functional immunities Harm Illegality Impossible crime Individual responsibility Intent Justifications Law of obligations Legal causation Legal consequences Legal personality Legal property Legal responsibility Liability of corporations Material damage Mere faults Moral damage Motive Neighbourhood disturbances Precautionary principle Presumptions Preventive responsibility Recklessness Negligence Responsibility for the actions of things Risk Strict liability Tortious liability Vicarious responsibility Wilfulness 340

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