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The Islamic State’s Enslavement of the Yazidi Minority : An Inquiry into the Female Devotees’ ResponsibilityJenabpour, Mina January 2022 (has links)
No description available.
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HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOUR RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES. PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIESMARICONDA, CLAUDIA GABRIELLA 06 April 2016 (has links)
Lo studio si inserisce nel dibattito sul potere delle multinazionali e il rispetto dei diritti umani fondamentali e approfondisce i concetti di responsabilità sociale delle imprese (CSR) e della loro "accountability", inquadrando l'analisi nel contesto più ampio degli investimenti esteri diretti (FDI), con i relativi aspetti economici, tecnologici e sociali, nonché ambientali e politici.
Si analizzano le norme internazionali in tema di rispetto dei diritti umani da parte delle aziende, ed i meccanismi legali per rendere le società "accountable", soprattutto in caso di complicità aziendali negli abusi perpetrati dagli Stati, anche attraverso la giurisprudenza dei tribunali penali internazionali e dei tribunali statunitensi.
Viene data attenzione al settore della sicurezza, i.e. "Private Military and Security Companies" (PMSCs, interessato da notevole crescita negli ultimi decenni. Le PMSCs, impiegate da parte dei governi che esternalizzano una funzione tipicamente dello stato e da imprese e ONG attive in contesti difficili, hanno operato senza adeguato controllo.
Le loro attività sollevano questioni su potenziali abusi dei diritti umani commessi dai propri dipendenti oltre che su violazioni dei diritti del lavoro subite dagli stessi.
Le azioni ONU per portare le PMSCs fuori dalla 'zona legale grigia' in cui hanno operato vengono trattate insieme alle iniziative di autoregolamentazione. / The study, given the debate about the increasing power of corporations and the attempts to ensure their respect of fundamental human rights, deepens the concepts of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate accountability, framing the analysis within the broader discourse of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), with its economic, technological and social aspects as well as environmental and political issues.
International standards in the area of corporations’ human rights obligations are analyzed in addition to legal mechanisms to hold corporations accountable, particularly for corporate complicity in human rights abuses by States, through the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals and U.S. Courts.
Special attention is given to the security sector, i.e. Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), interested in the last decades by a steady growth. PMSCs, increasingly contracted by governments willing to outsource a typical state function and by companies and NGOs active in difficult contexts, have been operating without proper supervision and accountability.
PMSCs activities raise issues concerning potential human rights violations committed by their employees and labour rights abuses their employees might suffer themselves.
UN actions aimed at bringing PMSCs out of the legal ‘grey zone’ where they have been operating are tackled alongside with self-regulatory initiatives.
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Libertés, Droit, Désordres : les violences émeutières dans l'espace urbain, dynamique des phénomènes et organisation de la réponse sociale / Liberties – Law – Disorders : rioting acts of violence in Urban Areas, Dynamics of the Phenomena and organisation of the social responseJoubert, Didier 03 July 2017 (has links)
L’objet de la recherche consiste à mettre en évidence que la prise en compte des violences émeutières requiert une évolution de l’environnement juridique et des méthodes de maintien de la paix publique hérités de notre histoire. Notre dispositif de gestion de l’ordre public est particulièrement adapté au modèle français de manifestation. C’est considérable et exemplaire à beaucoup d’égards mais cela ne peut clore le débat sur les formes de la réaction sociale nécessaires pour répondre aux différentes formes du répertoire de la protestation en particulier à la dynamique complexe des désordres émeutiers.Alors que la manifestation, son encadrement par les forces de sécurité intérieure et son environnement juridique ressortissent à la culture de l’organisation et de l’ordre, les violences émeutières relèvent, quant à elles, de comportements colériques naturels. Elles constituent un objet et un enjeu différents que traduisent notamment la récurrence des crises en milieu urbain et la difficulté d’y faire face de façon satisfaisante.Sur le plan opérationnel comme sur le plan juridique, l’éventail de la réponse aux désordres est particulièrement large, mais il traduit également un double embarras :• Les violences émeutières sont le plus souvent des violences d’expression. Qu’ils en soient conscients ou non, face à ces comportements, le juge et le politique se sont montrés fréquemment indulgents dans un contexte juridique où la liberté d’expression est un droit fondamental et la manifestation une conquête sans équivalent dans notre pays. Les réponses sociale et judiciaire se caractérisent donc par une mansuétude parfois légitime, parfois inadaptée mais souvent mal comprise.• Les modes d’action policiers et les outils du Droit façonnés par l’environnement juridique et la culture de la manifestation, peuvent se révéler inadaptés pour répondre aux émeutes urbaines et conduire à des évolutions aussi variées qu’inappropriées comme la banalisation du recours à des régimes juridiques d’exception et la sédimentation d’une culture d’affrontement entre police et population.Le concept retentissement / identification et l’analyse des colères rebelles et insoumises ouvrent la voie à une adaptation du droit et de la réponse sociale conciliant le respect des droits fondamentaux et le maintien de la paix publique dans l’espace urbain. Tel est l’enjeu de la dialectique « Libertés - Droit - désordres ». / The object of the research is to highlight that rioting violence cannot be dealt with without an evolution of the legal framework and public-order policing inherited from our History. Our way to manage public-order policing is particularly suitable to our French traditional demonstration pattern. It is significant and exemplary in many respects but that alone cannot close the debate about the forms of social reaction that would be necessary to answer the various forms of the repertoire of protest especially the complex dynamics of rioting disorders.Even though the demonstration, its framing by the police and its legal framework are both an order issue and a cultural issue, rioting acts of violence are a natural irascible behaviour of the human nature. Riots are an object and an issue which translate into in recurring urban crises and the difficulty to satisfactorily deal with them.From an operational point of view and from a judicial one, there is a wide range of answers to the disorders but this results in a double embarrassment:• Riots are very often a means of expression. Consciously or not, the judge and the policy-maker have frequently been indulgent with these behaviours in a legal context in which freedom of expression is a fundamental human right and demonstrating a conquest without equivalent in our country. Social and judicial answers are characterized by indulgence, sometimes legitimate, sometimes inadequate and often ill-understood.• Policing and the tools of the law that were shaped by the legal framework and the culture of demonstration can prove to be inadequate to cope with urban riots and they can result in various as well as inappropriate answers like the trivialization of emergency legal schemes and the sedimentation of a culture of clash between people and the police.The repercussion and identification concept and the analysis of the rebel and unsubdued bouts of anger pave the way to an adaptation of the law and the social response aiming at balancing both the expression of the basic rights and the preservation of public peace in urban areas. This is what is at stake with the dialectics « Liberties – Law – Disorder ».
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La participation a l'infraction internationale. / The participation in the international crimeDuffourc, Marie 12 December 2013 (has links)
Qu’elle soit extranationale, transnationale ou internationale par nature, l’infraction internationale est toujours construite de la même manière : elle naît de la réunion d’un élément matériel et d’un élément moral, incluant parfois un élément contextuel. Cette constance structurelle dominant la diversité définitionnelle milite en faveur d’une unification des formes de la participation associées à ces infractions internationales : la spécificité de la participation à l’infraction internationale résiderait donc dans la spécificité, non des formes de la première, mais de la définition de la seconde. D’ailleurs, il n’existe que deux grands systèmes de participation applicables à l’infraction internationale : celui des juridictions pénales nationales et celui des juridictions pénales internationales. De leur comparaison, pourrait naître un système unique de participation à l’infraction internationale, permettant de mieux appréhender la criminalité collective en attribuant aux participants intellectuels une place plus juste au sein de la participation. En effet, après quelques adaptations nécessaires, il pourrait être fait appel au critère mixte du contrôle sur l’infraction internationale, développé récemment par la Cour pénale internationale, pour distinguer les formes principales des formes secondaires de la participation à l’infraction internationale. Ainsi, seraient des participants principaux les agents qui, avec l’état d’esprit idoine, prennent le contrôle de l’infraction internationale (coauteurs et auteurs intellectuels), tandis que seraient des participants secondaires les agents qui ne prennent pas un tel contrôle (complices par aide ou assistance et subordonnants). / Can it be extranational, transnational or international by nature, the international crime is always the same : it needs the reunion of a material element and a moral element, sometimes including a contextual element. This structural constancy, which dominates the definitional diversity, inclines us to campaign for the unification of the participation forms associated to the whole international crimes. In other words, the specifity of the participation in the international crime would be less due to the specifity of the first one’s forms than to the specifity of the second one’s definition. Now, there are only two grand systems of participation in the international crime : the one applied by the national criminal jurisdictions and the one applied by the international criminal jurisdictions. From the comparison of these two systems, it is possible to imagine a unique system of participation in the international crime, permitting a better understanding of the collective criminality by attributing a righter role to the intellectual participants within the participation. More precisely, and after a few necessary adaptations, control over the international crime, which is a mixed criterion recently developed by the International Criminal Court, could be used to distinguish the main forms from the secondary forms of participation in the international crime. Thus, main participants might be those who, with the suitable state of mind, take control over the international crime (co-perpetrators and intellectual perpetrators) while secondary participants might be those who don’t take such a control (accomplices by aid and assistance and “subordinators”).
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La coaction en droit pénal / Co-perpetration in criminal lawBaron, Elisa 07 December 2012 (has links)
Le coauteur est traditionnellement défini en droit pénal comme l’individu qui, agissant avec un autre, réunit sur sa tête l’ensemble des éléments constitutifs de l’infraction. Pourtant, il est permis de douter de la pertinence de cette affirmation tant la jurisprudence comme la doctrine en dévoient le sens.En réalité, loin d’être cantonnée à une simple juxtaposition d’actions, la coaction doit être appréhendée comme un mode à part entière de participation à l’infraction. En effet, elle apparaît comme un titre d’imputation à mi-chemin entre l’action et la complicité, auxquelles elle emprunte certains caractères. Autrement dit, elle se révèle être un mode de participation à sa propre infraction. Surtout, son particularisme est assuré par l’interdépendance unissant les coauteurs : parce que chacun s’associe à son alter ego, tous sont placés sur un pied d’égalité. Ces différents éléments, qui se retrouvent dans sa notion et dans son régime, permettent ainsi d’affirmer la spécificité de la coaction tout en renforçant la cohérence entre les différents modes de participation criminelle. / In criminal law, the co-perpetrator is classically presented as an individual who, acting jointly with another, gathers all the constitutive elements of the offence. However, one may harbor doubts concerning the relevance of this assertion since both case law and legal scholars denature its meaning.Actually, far from being limited to a mere juxtaposition of perpetrations, co-perpetration must be understood as a full mode of participation in the offence. Indeed, it appears as a form of imputation halfway between perpetration and complicity, from which it borrows some characteristics. In other words, it proves to be a mode of participation in one’s own offence. Above all, its particularism is provided by the interdependence between the co-perpetrators : because each of them joins forces with his alter ego, all are placed on an equal footing. These elements, which are found both in it’s concept and in it’s regime, demonstrate thereby the specificity of co-perpetration while strengthening the coherence of the different modes of criminal participation.
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Particularly Responsible: Everyday Ethical Navigation, Concrete Relationships, and Systemic OppressionChapman, Christopher Stephen 20 August 2012 (has links)
In this dissertation, I articulate what I call a personal-is-political ethics, suggesting that the realm of human affairs long called ethics is inseparable from that which is today normatively called psychology. Further, I suggest that these names for this shared realm are situated in different discursive traditions which, therefore, provide different parameters for possible action and understanding. In my exploration of what it is to be human, I strategically centre ethical transgressions, particularly those that are mappable onto systemic forms of oppression. I explore personal-is-political enactments of sexism, ableism, racism, colonization, classism, ageism, and geopolitics, including situations in which several of these intersect with one another and those in which therapeutic, pedagogical, or parenting hierarchies also intersect with them. Without suggesting this is ‘the whole story,’ I closely read people’s narrations of ethical transgressions that they – that we – commit. I claim that such narrations shape our possibilities for harming others, for taking responsibility, and for intervening in others’ lives in an attempt to have them take responsibility (e.g., therapy with abuse perpetrators and critical pedagogy).
I work to demonstrate the ethical and political importance of: the impossibility of exhaustive knowledge, the illimitable and contingent power relations that are ever-present and give shape to what we can know, and the ways our possibilities in life are constituted through particular contact with others. I explore ethical transgressions I have committed, interrogating these events in conversation with explorations of resonant situations in published texts, as well as with research conversations with friends about their ethical transgressions and how they make sense of them. I tentatively advocate for, and attempt to demonstrate, ways of governing ourselves when we are positioned ‘on top’ of social hierarchies – in order to align our responses and relationships more closely with radical political commitments.
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Particularly Responsible: Everyday Ethical Navigation, Concrete Relationships, and Systemic OppressionChapman, Christopher Stephen 20 August 2012 (has links)
In this dissertation, I articulate what I call a personal-is-political ethics, suggesting that the realm of human affairs long called ethics is inseparable from that which is today normatively called psychology. Further, I suggest that these names for this shared realm are situated in different discursive traditions which, therefore, provide different parameters for possible action and understanding. In my exploration of what it is to be human, I strategically centre ethical transgressions, particularly those that are mappable onto systemic forms of oppression. I explore personal-is-political enactments of sexism, ableism, racism, colonization, classism, ageism, and geopolitics, including situations in which several of these intersect with one another and those in which therapeutic, pedagogical, or parenting hierarchies also intersect with them. Without suggesting this is ‘the whole story,’ I closely read people’s narrations of ethical transgressions that they – that we – commit. I claim that such narrations shape our possibilities for harming others, for taking responsibility, and for intervening in others’ lives in an attempt to have them take responsibility (e.g., therapy with abuse perpetrators and critical pedagogy).
I work to demonstrate the ethical and political importance of: the impossibility of exhaustive knowledge, the illimitable and contingent power relations that are ever-present and give shape to what we can know, and the ways our possibilities in life are constituted through particular contact with others. I explore ethical transgressions I have committed, interrogating these events in conversation with explorations of resonant situations in published texts, as well as with research conversations with friends about their ethical transgressions and how they make sense of them. I tentatively advocate for, and attempt to demonstrate, ways of governing ourselves when we are positioned ‘on top’ of social hierarchies – in order to align our responses and relationships more closely with radical political commitments.
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Les conditions de la responsabilité en droit privé : éléments pour une théorie générale de la responsabilité juridique / The conditions of responsibility in private law : elements for a general theory of legal responsibilityLagoutte, Julien 16 November 2012 (has links)
Alors que l’on enseigne classiquement la distinction radicale du droit pénal et de la responsabilité civile, une étude approfondie du droit positif révèle une tendance générale et profonde à la confusion des deux disciplines. Face à ce paradoxe, le juriste s’interroge : comment articuler le droit civil et le droit pénal de la responsabilité ? Pour y répondre, cette thèse suggère d’abandonner l’approche traditionnelle de la matière, consistant à la tenir pour une simple catégorie de classement des différentes branches, civile et pénale, du droit de la responsabilité. La responsabilité juridique est présentée comme une institution autonome et générale organisant la réaction du système à la perturbation anormale de l’équilibre social. Quant au droit de la responsabilité civile et au droit criminel, ils ne sont plus conçus que comme les applications techniques de cette institution en droit positif.Sur le fondement de cette approche renouvelée et par le prisme de l’étude des conditions de la responsabilité en droit privé, la thèse propose un ordonnancement technique et rationnel du droit pénal et de la responsabilité civile susceptible de fournir les principes directeurs d’une véritable théorie générale de la responsabilité juridique. En tant qu’institution générale, celle-ci engendre à la fois un concept de responsabilité, composé des exigences de dégradation d’un intérêt juridiquement protégé, d’anormalité et de causalité juridique et qui fonde la convergence du droit pénal et du droit civil, et un système de responsabilité, qui en commande les divergences et pousse le premier vers la protection de l’intérêt général et le second vers celle des victimes. / While the radical distinction between criminal law and civil liability is classically taught, a thorough survey of positive law reveals a general and profound trend towards a confusion of these two disciplines. Faced with this paradox, the jurist wonders : how to articulate the civil and criminal laws of responsibility ? To answer this question, the thesis suggests abandoning the traditional approach of the subject, which consists in treating it as a mere category of classification of the different branches, civil and criminal, of responsibility/liability. Legal responsibility is presented as an autonomous and general institution organizing the response from the system to abnormal disturbance of social equilibrium. Civil liability law and criminal law are, as far as they are concerned, henceforth conceived as the mere technical applications of this institution in positive law.On the basis of this new approach and through the prism of the study of liability conditions in private law, the thesis proposes a technical and rational organization of criminal law and civil liability that may provide the guiding principles of a real general theory of legal responsibility. As a general institution, it gives not only a concept of responsibility, requiring degradation of a legally protected interest, abnormality and legal causation, and establishing the convergence of criminal law and civil law, but also a system of responsibility, determining the divergences of them and steering the first towards the protection of general interest and the second towards the protection of victims.
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