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81	La régulation des groupes financiers d'assurance : analyse critique de l'encadrement juridique canadien Côté, Martin 08 1900 (has links) La crise financière de 2008 a entraîné des conséquences dramatiques sur l’économie réelle et a mis en péril la stabilité financière mondiale. Elle a également mis en lumière le rôle névralgique des activités menées par les institutions financières et leur groupe. Afin d’assurer la protection des consommateurs, l’efficience des marchés et la stabilité financière, les États et les régulateurs ont depuis intensifié leurs efforts afin de renforcer l’encadrement juridique applicable. Cet exercice est capital dans la mesure où la pérennité de notre système financier est tributaire de la robustesse du cadre juridique qui s’applique aux acteurs participant à cet écosystème. Notre étude s’inscrit dans le continuum de cette démarche en s’intéressant à la régulation des groupes financiers d’assurance au Canada. Plus précisément, notre étude vise à déterminer si le droit canadien assure une régulation efficace des groupes financiers d’assurance en utilisant une approche fondée sur le risque. Nous analysons l’hypothèse selon laquelle le droit canadien n’assure pas un encadrement efficace des groupes financiers d’assurance en ce qu’il adopte une approche microprudentielle limitant les interventions des régulateurs au niveau des entités financières, dont les sociétés d’assurance, et non au niveau du groupe financier. Cette hypothèse découle des évaluations menées par le Fonds monétaire international qui soulèvent une disharmonie entre ce que prévoit le droit canadien et les principes directeurs préconisés par les organismes internationaux, dont l’Association internationale des contrôleurs d’assurance. Dans la partie préliminaire, cette étude présente les différentes composantes de la question de recherche. Cet exercice conceptuel permet de circonscrire la portée de nos travaux et d’inscrire ceux-ci sous le champ d’un positivisme juridique revisité au sein duquel le pouvoir exécutif joue un rôle important dans la création et l’application du droit. Cela permet également de cibler les méthodologies employées dans cette étude, soit l’analyse documentaire, le cadre d’analyse du nouveau management public et celui de la gestion des risques. Dans la partie I, l’analyse du périmètre juridique des groupes financiers est effectuée. Cet exercice répond au besoin de toute démarche d’analyse des politiques publiques de circonscrire adéquatement les activités à réguler. Ainsi, le portrait du secteur financier canadien et international est brossé afin de présenter les autorités d’encadrement et les organismes internationaux participant à la création et au déploiement de la régulation financière. À cela s’ajoute une présentation des fondements de la régulation financière, des groupes financiers d’assurance ou encore, des risques induits par ces regroupements d’entreprises. L’analyse descriptive de cette partie contribue au projet positiviste visant à assurer l’accès à la connaissance des règles juridiques applicables tout en posant les connaissances nécessaires à l’évaluation menée à la partie II. Ensuite, prenant appui sur les deux parties précédentes, la seconde partie de la thèse conduit à l’analyse critique de la régulation des groupes financiers d’assurance au Canada. Pour ce faire, une grille d’analyse en cinq étapes inspirée des enseignements du Public Policy Analysis est élaborée. À cette fin, une étude de cas est effectuée afin de cibler les groupes financiers d’assurance d’envergure au Canada ainsi que les risques pouvant potentiellement être induits par eux. Face à ces risques, les meilleures pratiques devant être adoptées par les Étatsafin de réguler les groupes financiers d’assurance sont mises au jour. Cette présentation permet d’analyser le cadre juridique canadien s’appliquant aux groupes financiers d’assurance et de comparer celui-ci avec l’encadrement présent dans certaines juridictions ciblées, soit les États Unis, la France et l’Union européenne. Ces étapes préalables mènent à l’évaluation du degré d’efficacité de l’encadrement juridique canadien. À terme, l’analyse permet de confirmer en partie l’hypothèse et d’affirmer que le cadre juridique canadien est d’une efficacité et d’une efficience limitées. Ce constat découle notamment de sa portée relative à l’égard des groupes financiers d’assurance et d’autres vulnérabilités qui ont été relevées. Cette étude se conclut par la proposition de 19 recommandations visant à améliorer l’efficacité et l’efficience de l’encadrement juridique canadien s’appliquant aux groupes financiers d’assurance. / The 2008 financial crisis had dramatic consequences for the real economy and jeopardized global financial stability. It also highlighted the key role of the activities carried out by financial institutions and their group. To ensure consumer protection, market efficiency and financial stability, the states and the regulators have since intensified their efforts to strengthen the applicable legal framework. This exercise is crucial for the sustainability of our financial system, which depends on the robustness of the legal framework that applies to the participants of this ecosystem. Our study is part of the continuum of this approach as it focuses on the regulation of financial insurance groups in Canada. More specifically, our study aims to determine whether Canadian law provides effective regulation of financial insurance groups by using a risk-based approach. We hypothesize that Canadian law does not provide an effective framework for financial insurance groups. It adopts a micro-prudential approach limiting the interventions of the regulators at the level of the financial entities, including insurance companies, and not at the level of the financial group. This hypothesis stems from the International Monetary Fund assessments, which point out a disharmony between Canadian law and the international core principles recommended by international organizations, like the International Association of Insurance Supervisors. In the preliminary part, this study presents the different components of the research question. This conceptual exercise circumscribes the scope of our work within a revisited legal positivism in which the executive power plays an important role in the creation and application of law. It also introduces the methodologies used in this study, namely the documentary analysis, the analytical framework of new public management and that of risk management. Part I presents the analysis of the legal scope of financial groups. It defines the activities to be regulated which is an essential exercise for public policy analysis. Thus, it introduces the Canadian and international financial sector to identify the supervisory authorities and international organizations involved in the creation and deployment of financial regulation. In addition, there is a presentation of the foundations of financial regulation, of the financial iv insurance groups as well as the risks induced by these groups. This descriptive analysis contributes to the positivist project which aims to ensure that the knowledge of the applicable legal rules is accessible. It also lays down the necessary foundations for the evaluation carried out in Part II. Building on the two previous parts, the second part of the thesis conducts a critical analysis of the regulation of financial insurance groups in Canada. It develops a five-step analysis grid inspired by the lessons of Public Policy Analysis. Following this, it introduces a case study that targets the major insurance financial groups in Canada as well as the risks they could potentially induce. Then we present the best practices regarding the regulation of financial insurance groups that states should adopt to mitigate these risks. This forms the basis to analyze the Canadian legal framework that applies to financial insurance groups and to compare it with the framework of other targeted jurisdictions, namely the United States, France and the European Union. These preliminary steps lead to the evaluation of the degree of effectiveness of the Canadian legal framework. As a result, the analysis partially confirms the hypothesis that the effectiveness and efficiency of the Canadian legal framework is limited. This finding stems in particular from the limited scope of the legal framework regarding financial insurance groups, as well as from other vulnerabilities that have been identified. This study concludes with the proposal of 19 recommendations aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the Canadian legal framework applicable to financial insurance groups. Groupe financier Conglomérat financier Institution financière Assurance Régulation Droit Positivisme juridique Politiques publiques Financial Group Financial Conglomerate Financial Institution Insurance Regulation Law Legal Positivism Public Policies Law / Droit (UMI : 0398)
82	O Império dos Direitos: lei e autoridade política em Ronald Dworkin / Rights Empire: Law and Political Authority in Ronald Dworkins Theory Lima, Caio Moyses de 03 August 2011 (has links) O objetivo desta dissertação é expor as características centrais da teoria do filósofo norte-americano Ronald Dworkin sobre a natureza dos direitos fundamentais ou morais. A referida teoria é aqui compreendida como uma defesa da noção de direitos fundamentais, tal como aparece no sistema constitucional norte-americano, contra os ataques do utilitarismo e do juspositivismo. A concepção dworkiniana dos direitos fundamentais como razões de justiça (ou princípios) que operam como trunfos contra a utilidade geral é contrastada com duas teses adversárias: a concepção utilitarista dos direitos morais de John Stuart Mill e a tese juspositivista das fontes sociais. A famosa querela entre Ronald Dworkin e os juspositivistas é analisada em um enfoque normativo, como uma disputa sobre o conceito de autoridade política: Dworkin compreende os direitos fundamentais como a fonte última da autoridade jurídica, enquanto os positivistas sustentam que uma das funções da autoridade jurídica é precisamente estabelecer quais são os direitos das pessoas. / The purpose of this research is to expound the main characteristics of Ronald Dworkins theory of fundamental (or moral) rights. Dworkins theory is herein considered as a defense of the idea of fundamental rights, as it appears in the United States Constitutional System, against the attacks advanced by the doctrines of utilitarianism and legal positivism. Dworkins conception of fundamental rights as reasons of justice (or principles) that function as trumps against the general utility is contrasted with two defiant theories: John Stuart Mills utilitarian conception of moral rights and the positivist social sources thesis. The well-known debate between Ronald Dworkin and the legal positivists is approached as a normative dispute concerning the concept of political authority: Dworkin regards fundamental rights as the ultimate source of legal authority, whereas legal positivists argue that one of laws main functions is precisely to settle peoples rights. Autoridade política Constitucionalismo Constitutionalism Direito Direitos Direitos fundamentais Direitos morais Filosofia do direito Filosofia jurídica Fontes do direito Fundamental rights Juspositivismo Justiça Justice Law Legal philosophy Legal positivism Lei Moral rights Political authority Positivismo jurídico Princípios Principles Rights Social sources thesis Sources of law Tese das fontes sociais Trumps Trunfos Utilitarianism Utilitarismo
83	法與道德--德沃京對法實證主義分離命題之批判 / Law and morality--Ronald Dworkin's critique of the separation thesis of legal positivism 許家馨, Hsu, Chia-hsin Unknown Date (has links) 本論文總共分為三部分，共八章。第一部份是「分離命題綜論」，包含了第一、二章。在第一章當中，筆者從歷史及分析的路徑，對分離命題做了一個初步的介紹。歷史的部分，筆者選取邊沁與奧斯丁、美國法現實主義、德國自然法復興運動這三個對於英美法理學界來說較為重要的關於分離命題的討論。在分析的部分，筆者簡單地說明分離命題與法概念以及道德概念的關係。當然，筆者也介紹了本文所探討的主角—德沃京的生平、其學說的發展以及其學說與分離命題的關係。第二章則是特別針對德沃京最主要的理論對手哈特的法理論以及他對分離命題的主張。第一章與第二章一起，才算是完成本文的預備工作。第二部分是德沃京前期對分離命題的批判。本文將德沃京前期與後期區分開來，是因為德沃京學說的前期與後期都有很大的影響力，可是他後期的理論所使用的語彙有經過相當的修正，因此不適合放在一起介紹。第二部分包括第三、四章，筆者分別名之為「原則論I」與「原則論II」。這是因為德沃京前期的法理論是以「原則」概念為主軸所發展出來的。第三章主要是對德沃京《認真看待權利》一書中《規則模式I》一章的介紹。第四章則是對《規則模式II》以及疑難案件這兩章的介紹。《規則模式I》是德沃京整個法理論的出發點。它本身構成一個完整的整體，儘管仍是一個有待發展的整體。《規則模式II》是對《規則模式I》的補充。疑難案件則是德沃京法理論的突破性發展，許多他在後期完整發展的觀念都可以在這篇文章中看到雛形。筆者將《規則模式II》及疑難案件中的重點一起放入第四章作為對於第三章的補充。這些一起構成了德沃京前期的完整面貌。當然，筆者用以貫穿其中的軸線，就是德沃京對分離命題的批判。第三部份是德沃京後期對分離命題之批判。這一部份主要焦點是在德沃京集大成的系統著作法律帝國。這一部份包括第五、六、七章。第五章說明了德沃京後期修正過後的概念架構，以及在這個新的概念架構與分離命題的關係是什麼。處理的對象是法律帝國的第一章。第六章則是對德沃京「詮釋」概念的闡釋。「詮釋」概念是德沃京後期理論的核心，因此我們有必要對之清楚地說明。顯得比較突兀的是第六章的第一節。筆者從社會科學方法論的角度分析了哈特與德沃京法理論在方法上的意涵。這是因為，筆者認為分離命題的焦點乃是在於法理論家如何看待法概念，若要深入地評估法理論的意涵，勢必要探討其方法。這個部分處理的對象主要是法律帝國的第二、三章。第七章則介紹德沃京後期法理論的重點，也就是他認為的法概念的「構念」--作為整全性的法律。最後，也就是第八章是結論。這是筆者對全篇論文的回顧，以及筆者對於分離命題這個主題的價值的看法。第一部分離命題綜論第一章緒論第一節分離命題概論I—歷史的路徑第一項邊沁與奧斯丁第二項法現實主義者的挑戰第三項德國自然法復興運動第二節分離命題概論II—分析的路徑第一項法概念第一款規範取向的法概念與非規範取向的法概念第二款法概念的指涉與理論說明第二項道德概念第三節德沃京的法理論與分離命題第一項德沃京生平簡介第二項德沃京的法理論發展及其分期第三項本文問題意識：德沃京法理論與分離命題第四節本論文架構第二章哈特與分離命題第一節從定義到核心要素第一項定義第二項組織性原則與一組核心要素第二節哈特的法概念與分離命題第一項初級規則與次級規則的結合第二項個別法律的效力第三項法體系的存在第四項個案中的法律第三節哈特法理論的性質第一項一般性第二項描述性第三項一般性、描述性與分離命題第二部德沃京前期對法實證主義分離命題之批判第三章原則論 ( I ) 第一節德沃京的論證第一項原則是存在的第二項原則與規則邏輯性質的差異第三項原則也是法規範第四項原則無法被承認規則鑑別出來第一款妥當感第二款制度上的佐證第三款習慣法的問題第五項原則是某種道德第二節原則是什麼？第一項原則的功能第一款原則的五種功能第二款原則之功能的省思第二項原則的來源第三節規則與原則的邏輯性質差異是否成立？第一項如何判斷是規則或原則？第二項規則衝突則失效？第三項規則與原則之區分的理論意涵第四節原則是不是法規範？第五節原則與道德的關係是什麼？第四章原則論（II）第一節對承認規則的批判第一項哈特的社會規則論第二項對社會規則論的批判第一款社會規則與規範規則第二款「自主而合意的道德」與「從眾而成習的道德」第三款疑難情況的出現第三項對作為社會規則之承認規則的批判第二節權利論第一項權利第一款權利與目標第二款幾種權利的分類第二項法律權利第一款規範與價值第二款作為權利執行者的司法部門第三款政治理論第三項權利與道德第三節對裁量論的批判第一項德沃京對司法裁量論的批判第一款弱意義與強意義的裁量第二款法實證主義者的裁量論第二項對司法裁量論之批判的理論意涵第三部德沃京後期對法實證主義分離命題之批判第五章新的起點：新的法概念第一節新的概念架構第一項關於法律的理論爭議第二項法律命題與法律根據第三項新的法概念第二節疑難案件的實例第三節單純事實觀點第四節語意學的刺第一項法的語義學理論第二項法實證主義第三項語義學的刺第五節小結：新的起點第六章詮釋性的法概念第一節社會科學方法論上的批判第一項法理論的自我理解第二項作為受制於規則之活動的法律言說第一款語言遊戲與說話行動第二款哈特的困境第三項一般性與描述性法理論之困難第一款一般性第二款描述性第四項詮釋性的法理論第二節建構詮釋論第一項建構性詮釋第一款一個虛構的例子第二款對話性詮釋、科學性詮釋與創造性詮釋第三款建構性詮釋第二項對社會實踐的建構性詮釋第一款詮釋的三個階段第二款概念、構念與典範第三節詮釋性的法概念第七章整全的法律第一節成規主義與法實用主義第一項成規主義第二項法實用主義第二節整全性第一項整全性符合嗎？第二項整全性有吸引力嗎？第一款真正的社群第二款政治社群第三節整全的法律第一項連環小說第二項海克力斯法官第三項法律與道德第四節懷疑論的挑戰第八章結論參考文獻 / Abstract This master dissertation elaborates the leading anti-positivist Ronald Dworkin’s standing on critique of the separation thesis, the positivist doctrine that law and morality are separate, or ‘what law is’ is different from ‘what law ought to be’. The author firstly argues that although the dispute over the separation thesis in the old context, which mainly concerns with the relationship between legal validity and morality, no longer stands in the central spotlight, the recent heating concern with the role morality plays in legal reasoning is actually a continuance of the old-time concern. The overarching rationale behind these developments is a battle about where and how to base the objectivity of law in the modern world. Therefore, despite that Dworkin’s legal theory has focused on the part morality plays in legal reasoing, it could still be elaborated as a critique of separation thesis in a broader sense. This dissertation distinguishes ‘early Dworkin’ and ‘later Dworkin’s’ critique of the separation thesis. ‘Early Dworkin’ means Dworkin’s legal theory in Taking Right Seriously. ‘:Later Dworkin’ means Dworkin’s legal theory in Law’s Empire. While the author thinks the essence of Dworkin’s legal theory remained basically the same throughout his early and later thoughts, it is necessary to introduce his theory in two parts because the concepts he used were greatly changed and improved, and the arguments shifted. Dworkin’s early critique of separation thesis is organized around the concept of ‘principle’. The author argues that the most important argument Dworkin should be making is not that principles exist, but that principles are ‘law’ and that principles cannot be identified by the rule of recognition. And these two arguments are not to be cleared up only until Dworkin’s later argument using the concept of ‘interpretation’. The author also criticizes Hart’s claim that the nature of legal theory could fruitfully remain general and descriptive. By surveying the development of the methodology of social science, the author argues that Hart’s standing on the nature of legal theory reveals his ultimate philosophical foundation of empiricism and positivism. The author therefore argues that a fruitful gain a legal theory is to get, it has to be particular and ‘interpretive’, as Dworkin has claimed. 法實證主義自然法論規則與原則承認規則德沃京哈特詮釋性法理論法與道德 legal positivism natural law rule and principle rule of recognition Ronald Dworkin H. L. A. Hart interpretive theory of law law and morality
84	Το ηθικό, το νόμιμο, το πολιτικό : θεμελιώσεις και διακρίσεις, ανεξαρτησία και σύνδεση της ηθικής, του δικαίου και της πολιτικής, με βάση τη Θεωρία του Δικαίου του Καντ και σε προβολή προς τις θεωρίες δικαίου του νομικού θετικισμού / The ethical, the rightful, the political Χατζηνάσου, Ευθυμία 04 May 2011 (has links) Στην εργασία παρουσιάζεται η Θεωρία Δικαίου του Καντ, σε συνδυασμό με την Ηθική και Πολιτική Φιλοσοφία του φιλοσόφου προκειμένου να αναδειχθεί η κοινή θεμελίωσή τους στον ηθικό νόμο που ενυπάρχει στον ανθρώπινο Λόγο και ελευθερία.. Η σύνδεση πολιτικής, δικαίου και ηθικής διατυπώνεται ρητά από τον Καντ, και επίσης υπό την ανάλυση του σύγχρονου φιλοσοφικού στοχασμού (Τίμμονς, Βίλλασεκ, ΜακΝτάουελ) τεκμηριώνεται η ανεξάλειπτη ηθική διάσταση εντός του δικαίου και της πολιτικής μέσα από την πραγμάτευση των σύγχρονων αντιλήψεων, όπως η περιγραφικότητας, η εξωτερικότητα και η επιτακτικότητα, και μέσα από την απόρριψη των επιμέρους θέσεων της ανεξαρτησίας και της εξωτερικότητας του δικαίου. / In this paper, the Kant’s Doctrine of Right is presented in combination with his Moral and Political Philosophy, in order to display; their common foundation on the moral law that prevails on the human Reason and freedom. Kant has explicitly expressed the connection between politics, law and morality, and additionally in the modern philosophical thought (Timmons, Willaschek, McDowell) the ineffaceable moral dimension of right and politics is validated through the modern concepts of descriptivity, externality and prescreptivity, by the refutation of Independence and Externality Theses. Ηθική φιλοσοφία Πολιτική φιλοσοφία Φιλοσοφία δικαίου Εμμάνουελ Καντ Μεταφυσική των ηθών Αιώνια ειρήνη Νομικός θετικισμός Αυστηρό δίκαιο Ασαφές δίκαιο Θετικό δίκαιο 170 Moral philosophy Political philosophy Doctrine of right Immanuel Kant Critique of practical reason Metaphysics of morals Perpetual peace Legal positivism Strict right Ambiguous right Positive law Categorical imperative
85	O combate às omissões inconstitucionais à luz dos direitos fundamentais e das novas tendências hermenêuticas. Santana Júnior, Dejair dos Anjos January 2011 (has links) Submitted by Edileide Reis (leyde-landy@hotmail.com) on 2013-04-11T20:33:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Santana Júnior.pdf: 1153660 bytes, checksum: 20be7a9173896fad800771ee30d280bb (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Meirelles(rodrigomei@ufba.br) on 2013-05-09T17:37:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Santana Júnior.pdf: 1153660 bytes, checksum: 20be7a9173896fad800771ee30d280bb (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-09T17:37:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Santana Júnior.pdf: 1153660 bytes, checksum: 20be7a9173896fad800771ee30d280bb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / A presente pesquisa, de natureza bibliográfica, tem o objetivo de analisar o instituto da “omis-são inconstitucional” no ordenamento jurídico vigente, explicando de que forma a evolução dos direitos fundamentais e da nova hermenêutica permitem o seu enfrentamento. Para isso, será observado de que forma a evolução do constitucionalismo e a posterior crise do positi-vismo jurídico está atrelado à emergência dos direitos fundamentais e da necessidade de com-bate daquela temática. O estudo permitirá que se demonstre que a crise do positivismo jurídi-co, materializado nas duas grandes guerras mundiais, fez surgir a necessidade de retomada dos valores aos ordenamos jurídicos mundiais, fazendo com que os “princípios” passassem a ter a natureza de normas jurídicas, e por isso, de observância forçosa. Será analisado, ainda de que forma os princípios constitucionais – dentre eles, o princípio da máxima efetividade cons-titucional e o da aplicação imediata dos direitos e garantias fundamentais – estão diretamente vinculados ao nascimento de uma teoria que combate as omissões legislativas inconstitucio-nais. Verificar-se-á, então, algumas propostas estrangeiras para o combate a tais omissões à luz das novas tendências hermenêuticas e de que maneira possa ser feita uma releitura nos atuais instrumentos no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro – o mandado de injunção, a ação direta de inconstitucionalidade por omissão e a argüição por descumprimento de preceito fundamen-tal – para que possam ser um efetivo meio de combate às omissões inconstitucionais. / Salvador Constitucionalismo Crise do positivismo jurídico Direitos fundamentais Princípio da máxima efetividade Mandado de injunção Constitutionalism The crisis of legal positivism Fundamental rights The principle of maximum effectiveness The writ of injunction Direito
86	O Império dos Direitos: lei e autoridade política em Ronald Dworkin / Rights Empire: Law and Political Authority in Ronald Dworkins Theory Caio Moyses de Lima 03 August 2011 (has links) O objetivo desta dissertação é expor as características centrais da teoria do filósofo norte-americano Ronald Dworkin sobre a natureza dos direitos fundamentais ou morais. A referida teoria é aqui compreendida como uma defesa da noção de direitos fundamentais, tal como aparece no sistema constitucional norte-americano, contra os ataques do utilitarismo e do juspositivismo. A concepção dworkiniana dos direitos fundamentais como razões de justiça (ou princípios) que operam como trunfos contra a utilidade geral é contrastada com duas teses adversárias: a concepção utilitarista dos direitos morais de John Stuart Mill e a tese juspositivista das fontes sociais. A famosa querela entre Ronald Dworkin e os juspositivistas é analisada em um enfoque normativo, como uma disputa sobre o conceito de autoridade política: Dworkin compreende os direitos fundamentais como a fonte última da autoridade jurídica, enquanto os positivistas sustentam que uma das funções da autoridade jurídica é precisamente estabelecer quais são os direitos das pessoas. / The purpose of this research is to expound the main characteristics of Ronald Dworkins theory of fundamental (or moral) rights. Dworkins theory is herein considered as a defense of the idea of fundamental rights, as it appears in the United States Constitutional System, against the attacks advanced by the doctrines of utilitarianism and legal positivism. Dworkins conception of fundamental rights as reasons of justice (or principles) that function as trumps against the general utility is contrasted with two defiant theories: John Stuart Mills utilitarian conception of moral rights and the positivist social sources thesis. The well-known debate between Ronald Dworkin and the legal positivists is approached as a normative dispute concerning the concept of political authority: Dworkin regards fundamental rights as the ultimate source of legal authority, whereas legal positivists argue that one of laws main functions is precisely to settle peoples rights. Autoridade política Constitucionalismo Direito Direitos Direitos fundamentais Direitos morais Filosofia do direito Filosofia jurídica Fontes do direito Juspositivismo Justiça Lei Positivismo jurídico Princípios Tese das fontes sociais Trunfos Utilitarismo Constitutionalism Fundamental rights Justice Law Legal philosophy Legal positivism Moral rights Political authority Principles Rights Social sources thesis Sources of law Trumps Utilitarianism
87	Law in 3-Dimensions 2013 March 1900 (has links) This project, overall, involves a theory of law as dimensions. Throughout the history of the study of law, many different theoretical paradigms have emerged proffering different and competing ways to answer the question ‘what is law’? Traditionally, many of these paradigms have been at irreconcilable odds with one another. Notwithstanding this seeming reality, the goal of this project was to attempt to take three of the leading paradigms in legal theory and provide a way to explain how each might fit into a single coherent theory of law. I set out to accomplish this by drawing on the field of theoretical physics and that field’s use of spatial dimensions in explaining various physical phenomena. By engaging in a dimensional analysis of law, I found that I was able to place each paradigm within its own dimension with that dimension being defined by a specific element of time, and in doing so much of the conflict between the paradigms came to be ameliorated. The project has been divided into two main parts. PART I discusses the fundamentals of legal theory (Chapter 1) and the fundamentals of dimensions (Chapter 2). These fundamentals provide a foundation for a dimensional analysis of law which takes place throughout PART II. In Chapter 3, I argue that the three fundamental theses of Positivism coalesce with the 1st-dimension of law, which is defined as law as it exists at any one point in time. From there, I argue in Chapter 4 that the 2nd-dimension of law, being law as it exists between two points in time (i.e. when cases are adjudicated), is characterized by Pragmatism. I then turn, in Chapter 5, to argue that the 3rd-dimension of law, being law as it exists from the very first point in legal time to the ever changing present day, coalesces with the fundamental theses of Naturalism. Ultimately then, I argue that a theory of law as dimensions, through the vantage points of the specific elements of time, provides a more complete account of the nature of law. Legal Theory Jurisprudence Philosophy of Law Legal Positivism Positive Law Natural Law Pragmatism Inclusive Positivism Exclusive Positivism Interpretation Hart Dworkin Posner Finnis Fuller Gardner Shapiro Hume Elements of Time Dimensions Constitutional Law Morality Morals Separation Legal Reasoning Lawyers Law Necessary Connection Multiple Right Answer Best Choice Principle Practicality Judicial Adjudication Point in Time Audacity of Morality Law's True Ambition What is Law? Theoretical Physics Double Bind Multiple Bind First-Order Considerations Second-Order Considerations Penumbra Purity General Goal Incommensurable Legal System Wicked Legal System.
88	A Pragmatic Standard of Legal Validity Tyler, John 2012 May 1900 (has links) American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law. These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism. In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method. This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior. The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will. Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil. natural law theory legal positivism HLA Hart William Blackstone John Locke Jeremy Bentham John Austin Galileo Socrates Trotsky Athens Soviet law Stuart dynasty John Dewey Dewey Commission Sidney Hook Congregation of the Holy Office Galileo Affair trial of Socrates Moscow Trials trial of Galileo heresy trial of Trotsky reason autonomy consent philosophy of law pragmatism Kant Inquisition ostracism Anaxagoras Protagoras Alcibiades Arginusae Pericles Peloponnesian War Solon Ephialtes Apology Plato Herodotus Xenophon Plutarch Roscoe Pound common law Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The Common Law The Path of the Law Learned Hand Christopher Columbus Langdell Ronald Dworkin Lon Fuller Lenin Stalin King Rex Sergei Kirov Permanent Revolution Socialism in One Country Great Terror Dekulakization Holomodor Terror Famine Italian positivist school Harold J. Berman Gustav Radbruch Ramon Mercader Trotsky assassination Marteman Ryutin Old Bolsheviks Genrikh Yagoda Pope Urban VIII Walter Duranty Harold Denny New York Times Joseph E. Davies Mission to Moscow New Republic John F. Finerty Lev Sedov Military Collegium Vasili Ulrikh Gaspare Borgia Cardinal Robert Bellarmine Pericles Father Commissary Michelangelo Segizzi Cardinal Francesco Barberini Cardinal Maffeo Barberini Siderius Nuncius Starry Messenger Accademia dei Lincei Letters on Sunspots Friar Tommaso Caccini Niccolo Lorini Commentaries on the Laws of England Second Treatise on Civil Government Henry de Bracton Sir Edward Coke Sir John Fortescue Matthew Hale Ranulf de Glanvil James I Charles I James II Charles II ship money forest fines distraint of knighthood impositions dispensing power royal prerogative Duke of Buckingham Oliver Cromwell Bishops Wars William Prynne Great Migration Declaration of Indulgence Settlement Act Test Act Protectorate Clarendon Code Quaker Act William and Mary English Civil War Puritan Revolution Glorious Revolution Thirty Years' War Earl of Shaftesbuty William Laud Historiomatrix Long Parliament Rump Parliament Barebones Parliament sociological jurisprudence Red Terror war communism New Economic Policy 1926 Criminal Code Kirov Amendments judicial discretion semantic sting The Concept of Law Fragments on Government The Province of Jurisprudence Determined A Fragment on Government Anarchical Fallacies primary rules secondary rules rule of recognition legal validity internal point of view external point of view law as prediction the bad man perspective on law life of the law page of history Basilikon Doron Trew Law of Free Monarchies

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