近年來，國際經濟危機層出不窮，產生各式各樣之公司治理問題；全球化之企業經營模式的崛起與迅速發展，企業之經營從國內走向國際，使得公司治理成為國際性之重要議題，美國之公司治理模式的移植亦於世界各國蔚為風潮。 公司治理之架構下，鑑於所有權與經營權分離原則，掌握公司經營權限之董事係公司核心，為避免擴大董事之經營權限的同時，會損及公司與股東之利益，美國法對於董事乃課以受託義務，其內涵包含忠實義務、注意義務與善意義務。然基於商業環境詭譎多變且有限司法審查能力，如董事必須為做出失誤經營決策負擔法律責任，將造成具有能力之人不願意擔任董事而不利於經濟社會之發展，故美國法院判決乃發展出經營判斷法則。經營判斷法則係推定董事係立於充分資訊、出於善意且誠實確信其係為公司之最佳利益，當原告主張董事違反受託義務時，應負有先行舉證證明董事行為不符合經營判斷法則之構成要件。 我國公司法第23條係忠實義務與注意義務之規定，惟對於經營判斷法則尚無明文規範，學說見解對於我國是否應引進經營判斷法則仍有爭議，法院實務雖早已援用經營判斷法則作為公司經營者之責任標準，卻存在諸多誤解導致誤將該法則視為行為標準。因此，似有必要重新審視經營判斷法則之定位，故本文嘗試提出對於經營判斷法則於我國之應用的見解與省思。然經營判斷法則與我國現有法制應如何相互融合仍有待立法配合與後續觀察。 / In recent years, the world has been engulfed by international economic crises, resulting in a wide range of corporate governance matters. The rise and rapid development of the global business model has made the management of enterprises go from a single country toward the whole world, making corporate governance an important international issue. The transplantation of corporate governance of America legal model has emerged as a global trend. Under the framework of corporate governance and in view of the principle of separation of ownership and control, the directors empowered decision-making authority are the core of the company. To avoid the expanding of directors’ decision-making authority and protect the interests of both the corporation and its shareholders, the directors has fiduciary duty which includes duty of loyalty, duty of care and duty of good faith. However, based on the complexity of the business environment and the limit of the capability of the judicial review, if the directors burden the responsibility for making wrong decisions will make capable people unwell to be directors and affect the development of the economy. The business judgment rule is the presumption that in making decisions not involving self-interest and self-dealing, corporate directors act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the corporation’s best interest. Article 23 of Taiwan Company Act is the regulation of duty of loyalty and duty of care. However, the business judgment rule is not regulated in Taiwan Company Act. The opinion of whether the business judgment rule should be introduced to Taiwan is still controversial. Therefore, it is necessary to reexamine the position of the business judgment rule in Taiwan legal structure and this article attempts to provide points of view in the issue. Last but not least, the interaction of business judgment rule and Taiwan legal structure still needs the cooperation of the legislation and following observation.

全球併購浪潮下，敵意併購向來是併購議題中備受矚目的焦點，許多國家均針對敵意併購設有明確的法規範，而我國自2002年通過企業併購法以來，已歷經十五年，在敵意併購相關法制的建構上卻顯有不足，導致實務上面臨許多問題。蓋我國近年來引發高度關注的敵意併購案件，幾乎皆以失敗收場，且雙方攻擊防禦的過程中往往演變為經營權惡鬥，不僅兩敗俱傷，亦使公司及股東利益蒙受損失。 有鑑於前述情況，本文擬從實證觀點探討我國企業環境與文化脈絡對於敵意併購之影響，並透過國內曾發生過的案例、主管機關的態度與法院見解，對我國現行法制進行反思。另外，本文亦藉由美國、英國、德國、歐盟和日本之比較法研究，從目標公司採行防禦措施之相關規範、對於股東之資訊揭露以及少數股東權益保障等面向，討論出可能且適合用於我國之規範方向，以作為建構我國敵意併購法制之參考。 / In the wave of global mergers and acquisitions, hostile takeover has long been a focal point on the issues relating to mergers and acquisitions. Many countries have already built up more transparent regulatory regimes specifically for hostile takeover activities. However, since Taiwan promulgated the Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act in 2002, the relevant laws and regulations were not sufficient to govern hostile takeover activities during the past fifteen years and a number of issues arose in practice. In recent years, the well-known hostile takeover cases in Taiwan all ended up in failure. The actions taken by the party initiating hostile takeover and the target company often led to corporate control contests, making both parties and the shareholders suffer losses. This thesis examines the influences of Taiwanese culture and corporate environment on hostile takeover. It also marks the deficiencies of the current regulatory regime in Taiwan by reviewing the hostile takeover cases, the opinions of the competent authority and the judicial judgements. In addition, this thesis introduces the legislations of the United States, England, Germany, European Union, and Japan on anti-takeover tactics, information disclosure as well as the protection of minority shareholders’ rights and interests. The thesis then analyzes whether these legal systems are suitable as a reference for Taiwan to establish relevant laws and regulations in the future.

隨著企業經營規模日趨複雜、專業化，股東因人數眾多、股東意見不一，在面臨公司所有與經營分離所產生的代理成本控制上，實有困難。一般小股東因持股過低，對於公司經營事務只能消極以待，若對公司經營成果不滿意，只能選擇華爾街準則(Wall Street Walk or Vote with Feet)，而賣掉股票，甚難對管理階層進行更進一步的影響。相較之下，機構投資人基於其人力及資源優勢，能深入參與公司治理、監督管理階層，進而提昇公司經營績效，增進股東投資價值，此即為機構投資人積極主義。 本篇論文探討機構投資人行使股東權以促進公司治理發展。首先討論機構投資人積極主義之兩大基礎支柱－其一，良好公司治理確能對公司績效表現有所助益，其二機構投資人促進公司治理乃其善盡受託義務之體現。 由於美國機構投資人主義高度成熟發展，而國內機構投資人積極主義仍屬起步階段，本篇論文即以比較研究法，探討美國機構投資人行使股東權如股東提案、委託書投票、直接與管理階層溝通、發布黑名單、團體訴訟與股東提名董事草案等，及分析說明我國公司治理相關條文與機構投資人行使表決權時所會遭逢之困境。 此外，本論文經由案例研究，深入蒐集資料並訪談兩個在促進公司治理領域夙負盛名的退休基金-美國威斯康辛州投資委員會與加拿大安大略省教師退休計畫，從而細膩地觀察美國及加拿大機構投資人積極主義之發展、瓶頸與挑戰。 最後，本論文提出促進機構投資人提出公司治理及表決權行使政策、鼓勵機構投資人於股東提案權與表決權等議案進行合作及建置對機構投資人餐與公司治理友善之法規環境等建議，期能對於我國機構投資人積極主義之發展有所助益。 / The increase in institutional funds has been extraordinarily rapid. Comparing with the minority shareholders, the institutional shareholders’ size and expertise can minimize the collective choice problem and agency costs. Their resources enable them to investigate and monitor management in corporate governance field. This is the “Institutional Shareholder Activism“. This article discusses the institutional shareholder’s enhancement of corporate governance. It explores from the two backbones of the Institutional Shareholder Activism: Firstly, the correlation between corporate governance and corporate performance, and secondly, fiduciary duties of the Institutional Shareholder. It makes two conclusions: Good corporate governance certainly helps protect shareholder interests, and contributes to superior long-term economic performance, and institutional shareholders can comply with fiduciary duties by enhancing corporate governance. Furthermore, due to America institutional shareholder activism is highly developed, while Taiwan institutional shareholder activism is not developed. This paper compares America institutional shareholder activism with Taiwan’s. It discusses America institutional shareholder activism in many aspects, such as shareholder proposal, proxy solicitation, vote, direct negotiation with the corporate management, focus list, class action, security holder director nominations bill etc. Then, it analyses some of Taiwan’s corporate governance related articles such as shareholder proposal and security holder director nominations, and some difficulties which the pension fund and the security investment trust fund face when they vote as shareholders. Moreover, through case study, this paper analyses two prestigious pension funds: State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) and The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP), and investigates their stages of development and current operation and future challenges in the corporate governance field. At last, this paper provides some suggestions and inspirits the institutional shareholder activism in our country.

自2008年5月起，國內發生了向銀行購買號稱保本或條件式保本的結構型債券的投資人，因所購買之結構債觸及下限，導致本金大賠，而這些投資人無法承受損失，組成自救會要向銀行討回投資本金的事件；同年9月美國雷曼兄弟公司倒閉，購買連結該公司股票，或購買由該公司及其子公司發行或保證之結構債之受害投資人要求銀行全額買回不當銷售之結構債，另外投資人亦多向銀行主管機關行政院金融監督管理委員會、民意代表等提出陳情，指稱銀行在販售結構債時，並沒有善盡事前告知的義務，加上用詐欺或誘導等方式進行不當行銷勸誘，並對應告知投資人的重要事項僅為選擇性的說明，且更有理專在簽約書面文件中偽造其已告知投資人相關風險及資訊，因此造成銀行不當銷售結構債等金融商品的議題受到重視及討論。 我國傳統上面對金融商品係針對個別商品之架構（例如有價證券或期貨）而採不同的監理規範，惟此種立法係以商品得以明確定性為前提，然在財務工程技術不斷推陳出新，金融創新成為趨勢的現在，混合傳統商品所推出的新型態金融商品就應如何定性及適用法律，即為監理及投資人保護法制上的新課題。 此外，從民眾經由銀行推介而投資結構型債券而生的糾紛可發現，銀行在向民眾推介購買金融商品時，常發生糾紛的類型多可歸類為未推薦符合客戶風險屬性商品的商品適合性（suitability）不符，以及銷售時未確實對於該項商品可能產生的風險完整告知。故有關商品適合性及告知義務在我國法上的規範及內容，及對於違反商品適合性及告知義務時，受害投資人若要提起相關訴訟時，應該如何主張自身的權益，亦為本文研究的重心。 本文於第壹章提出本文研究動機及研究方法，第貳章則介紹結構型債券的種類及風險，並嘗試替結構債進行法律定性，第參章分析銀行辦理財富管理業務時，應遵守之法規範，同時介紹國內銀行受投資人委託投資結構債之規定，並附論主管機關因結構債銷售爭議事件發生，而對結構型商品所增訂的管制規範，以及我國統一管理金融服務業銷售行為規範的金融服務業法。第肆章為分析國內銀行不當銷售結構債予一般投資人之法律爭議，並介紹國外實務案例，以及國外有關違反忠實義務及注意義務的判斷標準；另從我國現行法制下檢討受到銀行不當銷售之投資人可能得主張銀行損害賠償之請求權基礎，並觀察與分析我國目前利用銀行公會評議機制處理投資人申訴之情形；第伍章介紹英國2000年金融服務暨市場法中，關於消費者遇到金融商品服務相關糾紛時得採用的申訴機制，並介紹日本金融商品販賣法及金融商品交易法中對銷售行為管制相關規定；另附論該國實務界對於金融機構不當銷售時，對投資人應負的責任，以及該國實務界調節損害賠償責任的方式；第陸章為結論及建議，將提出我國目前法制對不當銷售之問題面臨的挑戰，尤其是於金融商品交易資訊不對稱的情形下，投資人提起商品適合性與金融機構未盡告知義務訴訟時產生的難題，並提供相關建議。

Le présent mémoire dresse un portrait des règles entourant la mise en vigueur et l'entrée en application de régimes de droits de souscription d'actions. À cet effet, l'auteur résume les règles entourant les offres publiques d'achat, examine les principes touchés par la mise en place d'un régime de droits de souscription d'actions, ainsi que les effets d'un tel régime sur la valeur des actions. Dans un deuxième temps, l'auteur se penche sur la légalité des régimes de droits de souscription d'actions en effectuant une revue du principe de l'égalité des actionnaires et des droits et obligations des administrateurs en matière de défense à une offre publique d'achat. L'auteur termine en effectuant une revue des divers recours qui s'ouvrent aux divers intervenants. / The present thesis tries to review the main rules regarding the creation and the application of a shareholders rights plan. The author reviews also the sections of the Securities Act pertaining to the Take-Over bid. The author also explains the main principles of the corporation law domain and how a shareholders rights plan may be implemented. Second, the author reviews the legality of the implementation of the shareholders rights plan with regards to the shareholders rights given by the Law, and to the obligations and duties of the directors of the Corporation. At the end of the present thesis, the author presents a review of the main recourses opened to the Shareholders, the corporation and the bidder.

近年來我國屢次爆發掏空公司資產之弊案，而細究其掏空之方式，多係藉由公司之交易行為，將公司資產不法輸送予特定人士。我們不難發現這些特定人士時常某程度與公司之董事或控制股東，具有一定之利害關係，甚至這些特定人士即為董事或控制股東本身。正因如此，關係人交易在我國公司治理議題上逐漸受到重視，並引起廣泛之討論，尤其針對具有董事或控制股東身分之人。由於此兩類身分之人同時具有掌握公司資訊及影響公司經營決策之權力，更易藉此方式自公司謀取私利。 我國對於關係人交易下董事之義務，雖已有規範，然而自比較法之觀點，美國法對此部分顯然較我國完備，不僅對於關係人交易設有事前之董事行為標準，並且對於符合行為標準之關係人交易，給予董事安全港之保護。同時，配合司法實務上所發展之司法審查標準，採取寬嚴不一的審查模式，使董事得於關係人交易中合理預測訴訟風險。一方面可降低關係人交易中非常規交易發生之可能性，另一方面亦不至於全然扼殺關係人交易在現代經濟社會中產生之正面價值。我國法之董事義務既是繼受英美法上受任人義務之概念，因此本文嘗試分析美國法中關於關係人交易之相關規定，希冀做為我國修法之參考以求法制之完備。 又我國現行公司法在控制股東義務方面，似存在重大之法律漏洞。尤其在關係人交易下，有心人士為規避擔任董事可能帶來之相關義務，轉而選擇置身於幕後，成為不具董事身分卻實際掌握公司經營決策權之控制股東。此無疑對於欲利用關係人交易不法掏空公司之人，開啟方便之大門。事實上，在英國及美國法上對於控制股東在特定情況下課予如同公司董事一般之受任人義務，而本文則將其焦點限縮在關係人交易下控制股東之義務，經由整理分析英美兩國法制上之條文、學說及重要判決，以期建構出我國規範關係人交易下控制股東義務之依據。

本文係在我國勞退新制改以個人帳戶制及年金保險制中併行下，針對其中年金保險制度之爭議、規範缺失做一整理研究，並參酌美國ERISA對於企業退休計畫之相關法制提出相關建議。 自立法機關確定勞退新制將揚棄過去確定給付制之設計，改以確定提撥制作為企業退休制度之主軸起，勞動法學者即針對確定提撥制對勞工之保障不足，新舊制轉換等爭議提出諸多質疑與討論，但對於其中年金保險制之規劃多僅止於條列介紹而未多加著墨。本研究以敘述性、回顧性之方式將我國與美國之退休金制度作歸納探討，針對目前年金保險制中較有疑義之部分，以比較法之方式進一步檢討，最後提出若干建議。 本研究共分為四個部分，第一部份為我國勞工退休制度之變革。針對我國由確定給付制發展為確定提撥制之風險轉換作一分析，次介紹新制之規範內容。第二部分以美國ERISA法案為中心，對美國企業退休計畫之發展及基本實質規範進一步整理探討，以為後續我國年金保險規範分析之參考。第三部份探討我國企業年金保險之法制爭議，以現行之勞工退休金條例年金保險實施辦法及企業年金保險保單示範條款為基礎，剖析其與保險法及相關子法間之互動。並針對其中有關最低保證收益、非退休給付及退休金運用管理人之忠誠義務等議題，參酌美國之規定進行深入探討。第四部份為結論及相關立法建議。 / This thesis analyzes and examines various issues regarding the anuuity insurance scheme under the modified Taiwan Labor Pension Act (hereinafter the “Act”), which together with the individual account scheme forms the keynote of the retirement scheme under the Act. Moreover, this thesis also provides several suggestions on the Act and relevant regulations with special reference to the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Beginning with the announcement that the prevailing defined benefit retirement program previously in effect under the Act would be discarded and replaced by a new retirement program adopting the spirit of the defined contribution program, scholars specializing in labor law ceaselessly questioned and discussed the inherent deficiency of the proposed defined contribution program as well as various issues regarding transitional measures. Most articles pertaining to the newly presented annuity insurance scheme, however, merely introduced its operation mechanism and provided little commentary. This thesis descriptively and retrospectively studies the pension system of Taiwan and the United States and reviews the discrepancy and other issues in a comparative way. Finally, this thesis will provide several suggestions for relevant issues. This thesis is organized into four parts. First is the reformation of the labor retirement scheme in Taiwan. This section begins with a risk analysis between a defined benefit and defined contribution program and further elaborates on the related content of the Act. The second part introduces the development of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in the U.S. and discusses the fundamental regulations of the plan. The third portion of this thesis probes into the legal issues arising from the current annuity insurance scheme, mainly the Enforcement Rules of the Annuity Insurance Scheme under the Labor Pension Act and the Example of the Annuity Insurance Clauses, both being promulgated by the Financial Supervisory Commission, Executive Yuan, and how those regulations coordinate with the Insurance Law and its ancillary regulations. Issues arising from guaranteed minimum returns, non-retirement benefits and fiduciary duty were analyzed through comparative research with special reference to the similar provisions under ERISA. The final portion of this thesis contains concluding statements on the above analyses and offers several suggestions with respect to the current regulations of the annuity insurance scheme.

控制公司與從屬公司在法律面各具有獨立法人格，但在經濟面共同為聯盟經濟體。法律上允許控制公司與從屬公司不對等的控制支配關係存在，控制公司對從屬公司之財務、經營或人事具有控制支配力，可使從屬公司為或不為一定行為，當該行為不合於一般營業常規（本研究簡稱非常規交易）時，從經濟學角度，非常規交易或因集團整體運作需要，或因風險彼此瞭解或共同承擔等，致交易條件與一般常規不同，並非絕對無效率或涉有不法目的，完全禁止反有礙市場效率，故先進國家如美國、德國及我國等，對於非常規交易行為立法採不禁止，只是管制方式不同。我國公司法重視從屬公司權益之保障，制約控制公司適當補償或損害賠償責任；證券交易法則就行為致公司遭受重大損害，以刑責相繩；所得稅法基於租稅公平，按營業常規予以調整納稅，所謂不同法律立法目的所欲保護的法益不同，對於非常交易行為課以的法律效果也不同。 　　本研究以公司法第369條之4規定作為探討主軸，除認識、剖析我國公司法、證券交易法及所得稅法對非常規交易的規範目的及構成要件外，釐清控制關係、非常規交易等意涵也是很重要的，概實務案例上，非常規交易的確是不法利益輸送或掏空公司資產行為最常藉用的手法，主要原因除了控制與從屬關係外，非常規交易複雜難辨亦是原因之一。又控制公司支使從屬公司為非常規交易行為可能產生三種法律後果，一為直接損害從屬公司的權益；二為直接損害控制公司少數股東或債權人權益；三為同時損害從屬公司少數股東及其債權人權利。我國公司法、證交法及所得稅法基於不同立法目的而律定規範制約控制者責任，引進控制股東之受託義務、公司法人格否認、揭穿公司面紗原則、深石原則及代位訴訟等法理基礎與實務判例來作制約，保障受害者權益，立法意義值得肯定。但沒有一種責任機制能夠在所有情況下都發揮作用，水能載舟，亦能覆舟，加強控制公司責任，並賦予從屬公司或少數股東相對應的防衛工具，某種程度也影響了企業集團整體利益之運作，又法律正義權益平衡的設計，恐因舉證責任的關係，而難以落實。國內非常規交易規範行之有年，但商業交易行為推陳出新，以及跨境交易查證困難等，法制上及實務上面臨一些問題，本研究試著歸納並提出建議意見，希望法律正義得以伸張，經濟發展與利益保護得以衡平。 / The controlling company and the subsidiary company is independent in law, but in the economic side together for the Union economy. The law allows them to non-arm’s length transactions. From an economic perspective, it is not absolute inefficiency, so the advanced countries does not prohibit, but different control mode. Different legal legislative purpose is seeking to protect legal interests of different, so legal effect is different. 　　In this study, First, introducing and analyzing the legislative purposes and constituent elements of non-arm’s length transactions in the Company Act, the Securities and Exchange Act and the Income Tax Act. Second, understanding and clarifying the meaning of control relationship, non-arm’s length transactions, etc. Third, jurisprudencing fiduciary duty, disregard of the corporate fiction, piercing the corporate veil, doctrine of deep stone and derivative suit. Finally, summarizing cases from the substantive issues, concludes with recommendations observations.

Le présent mémoire dresse un portrait des règles entourant la mise en vigueur et l'entrée en application de régimes de droits de souscription d'actions. À cet effet, l'auteur résume les règles entourant les offres publiques d'achat, examine les principes touchés par la mise en place d'un régime de droits de souscription d'actions, ainsi que les effets d'un tel régime sur la valeur des actions. Dans un deuxième temps, l'auteur se penche sur la légalité des régimes de droits de souscription d'actions en effectuant une revue du principe de l'égalité des actionnaires et des droits et obligations des administrateurs en matière de défense à une offre publique d'achat. L'auteur termine en effectuant une revue des divers recours qui s'ouvrent aux divers intervenants. / The present thesis tries to review the main rules regarding the creation and the application of a shareholders rights plan. The author reviews also the sections of the Securities Act pertaining to the Take-Over bid. The author also explains the main principles of the corporation law domain and how a shareholders rights plan may be implemented. Second, the author reviews the legality of the implementation of the shareholders rights plan with regards to the shareholders rights given by the Law, and to the obligations and duties of the directors of the Corporation. At the end of the present thesis, the author presents a review of the main recourses opened to the Shareholders, the corporation and the bidder.

L’intérêt social est la raison d’être principale de la règlementation des conventions réglementées. Il est délimité par des intérêts voisins et par l’intérêt personnel abrité par ces conventions, dont le jeu conflictuel peut léser la société. L’existence d’un conflit et de sa justification peuvent être présumées. L'intérêt social est désormais celui de l’entreprise vue dans son contexte économique large. Un intérêt de groupe est distinctement reconnu. La qualification des conventions sert à identifier celles qui doivent être contrôlées. La mise en oeuvre de la protection de l’intérêt social s’opère à travers la prévention des conflits d’intérêts, moyennant une révélation de l'intérêt personnel. Cette révélation déclenche la procédure d'appréciation par les organes sociaux concernés. Des garanties législatives et jurisprudentielles assurent la primauté de l’intérêt social, par la limitation de l’exercice de certains droits et par l’application judiciaire stricte du respect des obligations légales qui pèsent sur les intéressés. La convention frauduleuse est nulle. Celle non autorisée qui est préjudiciable à la société est annulable; et ses conséquences sont supportées par l’intéressé qui engage sa responsabilité civile et même parfois sa responsabilité pénale. La comparaison du traitement de ce sujet dans les trois systèmes juridiques libanais, français et américains a dévoilé des failles dans les deux premiers ; des projets de réforme sont proposés. / The corporate interest is the main reason behind the regulation of related party transactions. Its limits are defined by similar interests and the personal interest embodied in these transactions. The inter-action of these conflicting interests may harm the company. The existence of a conflict and of its justification may be presumed. The corporate interest is from now on that of the enterprise seen within its wide economic context and the interest of a group of companies is distinctively acknowledged. The qualification of those transactions helps identify those that are subject to scrutiny. The protection of the corporate interest is achieved by the prevention of the conflicts of interests through the disclosure of the personal interest. This disclosure triggers the concerned corporate bodies’ evaluation process. Legislative and jurisprudential guarantees ensure the predominance of the corporate interest through limitations on the exercise of certain rights and a strict judicial enforcement of legal duties laid on the interested party. The fraudulent transaction is void. The unauthorized one that is damaging to the company is voidable and its consequences are assumed by the interested party who may be exposed to civil and, sometimes, criminal liability. The comparison of the treatment of this subject in the Lebanese, French and American legal systems revealed the weaknesses in the first two; amendment proposals are made.