The thesis is about New Zealand House of Representatives electoral system. In introductory part is briefly presented the political system of New Zealand. Then is currently used electoral system, its genesis and impacts of transition from the first past the post to mixed member proportional system researched. Thesis is in its effort focusing on segments of electoral system and trying to identify its problematic points and to introduce alternative electoral system proposed to the electors in referenda. The thesis is using the electoral studies methods, especially quantitative measuring of attributes of electoral system and party structure within the House of Representatives.

Prior work provides large evidence that civic duty to vote represents a key predictor of electoral participation. Moreover, the analysis of civic duty questions from extant surveys reveals that many individuals feel the moral obligation to participate in elections. However, is civic duty the result of rationalization, meaning that those who voted in an election are likely to report a belief in the duty to vote, while those who abstained are likely to report that voting is not a duty, but rather a choice? Also, where does the sense of civic duty to vote come from? In this doctoral dissertation, I provide an answer to those questions. More specifically, in Chapter 1, I investigate the extent to which duty is stable in search of evidence on the rationalization of duty. In this analysis, I rely on structural equation models, which I fit to unique, nine-wave panel data from Spain and the United Kingdom. I find that civic duty is a very stable attitude, implying that, while some rationalization is possible, duty is unlikely to be strongly driven by individuals’ previous voting behavior. In Chapter 2, I examine whether civic education in school contributes to the development of duty. I focus on civic education as a potential source of duty given its role in transmitting social norms to new generations, and its influence on duty-related attitudes like political interest, implying that civic education likely contributes to the development of duty. To examine the connection between civic education and duty, I use data from the 2016 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study, as it represents the largest survey research containing civic duty and civic education measures. My analyses reveal that three common forms of civic education (civics courses, active learning strategies, and open classroom environment) contribute to predicting duty, but that civics courses exert the largest effect on duty. i In Chapter 3, I investigate the role of compulsory voting in the development of duty. I examine the relationship between compulsory voting and duty given the possibility that compulsory voting signals that a “good” citizen must vote, and, in this way, that compulsory voting fosters duty. I analyze this relationship by leveraging the abolition of compulsory voting in Chile (in 2012), which I explore with synthetic control models and Latinobarometer data. With this empirical strategy, I find evidence that compulsory voting positively affects duty. In Chapter 4, I investigate if corruption bears an effect on duty. I focus on the relationship between corruption and duty given the chances that corruption reduces individuals’ incentives to believe in the duty to vote, and, consequently, that corruption affects duty. I examine the link between corruption and duty through mediation tests, where corruption represents the independent variable, duty the mediating variable and turnout the dependent variable. Using data from the Making Electoral Democracy Work project, I find that, unlike civic education and compulsory voting, corruption exerts a marginal effect on duty. / Plusieurs travaux montrent que le devoir civique constitue un prédicteur clé de la participation électorale. De plus, les recherches antérieures indiquent que le sentiment d’obligation de voter est répandu parmi un grand nombre de citoyens. Cependant, le devoir civique est-il le résultat d’une rationalisation de la part des électeurs ? Autrement dit, ceux qui ont voté lors d’une élection sont-ils plus enclins à dire que le vote est un devoir plutôt qu’un choix ? En outre, quelles sont les origines du sens du devoir civique de voter ? Dans cette thèse de doctorat, j’offre une réponse à ces questions. Plus précisément, dans le premier chapitre, j’examine dans quelle mesure le sens du devoir civique est stable afin de déterminer s’il y a, oui ou non, un phénomène de rationalisation parmi l’électorat. Je m’appuie sur des modèles d'équations structurelles et sur des données de panel espagnoles et britanniques comprenant neuf vagues. Je trouve que le devoir civique est très stable, ce qui indique qu’il y aurait peu de rationalisation en ce qui a trait à cette attitude politique. Dans le second chapitre, j’examine si l’éducation civique contribue au développement du devoir civique. Je me concentre sur l'éducation civique en raison du rôle que joue celle-ci dans la transmission des normes sociales aux nouvelles générations et de son influence sur les attitudes liées au sens du devoir comme l'intérêt politique. Pour déterminer la nature du lien entre éducation civique et devoir civique, j’utilise les données de l’International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) de 2016. Il s’agit de la plus grande enquête sur le devoir civique et l’éducation civique. Mes analyses montrent que trois formes courantes d’éducation civique (les cours d’éducation civique, les stratégies d'apprentissage actif et un environnement de classe ouvert) contribuent à prédire le sentiment du devoir civique de voter chez les individus, mais que les cours d’éducation civique disposent du plus grand impact. Dans le troisième chapitre, j’étudie l’effet du vote obligatoire sur le devoir civique. J’examine la corrélation entre le vote obligatoire et le devoir civique dans la mesure où cette institution politique peut signaler aux individus qu’un « bon » citoyen doit voter. Prenant l’abolition du vote obligatoire au Chili comme cas d’analyse, j’utilise des modèles de contrôle synthétiques et les données des Latinobarometers afin de mesurer le lien causal entre le vote obligatoire et le devoir civique. Je trouve que le vote obligatoire affecte positivement le devoir civique. Dans le quatrième chapitre, j’étudie l’impact de la corruption sur le devoir civique. Je me concentre sur la corrélation entre la corruption et le devoir civique puisque les individus risquent d’avoir un sentiment de devoir moindre dans les contextes de corruption politique. J’examine la corrélation en question à travers des tests de médiation et les données du projet Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW). Je trouve qu’au contraire de l’éducation civique et du vote obligatoire, la corruption affecte marginalement le devoir civique.

Since the 1980s a growing number of populist parties have made a breakthrough in European party systems. Examples of these are the Belgian Vlaams Belang (VB), the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands or the German Die Linke (DL). All of these parties can considered to be populist because they share a thin centred ideology “that considers society ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004: 543). This thin centred ideology can be combined with other full ideologies such as the radical right but also democratic socialism. The main objective of this study is to explain why people vote for populist parties. Such a question is difficult to answer, however, because populism is mostly attached to other ideologies. To address this problem, this study draws on a comparative research design. By studying the electorates of a wide range of different populist parties, it is disentangled what is exactly the populist element, rather than elements related to the host ideology, that drives voters towards these parties.<p>The study begins with a careful investigation of all parties in Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany by means of both qualitative and quantitative methods to explore which of them could be labelled populist. Support was found for at least the following cases: LPF, the Belgian Lijst Dedecker (LDD), the Dutch Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV), VB, the Dutch Socialistische Partij (SP) and DL. In a next step, the voters of these parties were analyzed by means of election survey data (Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, Partirep Survey and German Longitudinal Election Study). <p>The main finding of is that dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy and a desire for more decision making through referendums are important and unique drivers for populist voting in general. On the demand side it is argued that a process of cartelization, i.e. increased reliance of parties on state subventions, more cooperation between government and opposition, and ideological moderation, combined with the growth of critical citizens has led to the questioning of political authority. On the supply side, an increasing group of well-organized populist parties have begun challenging mainstream parties by depicting them as a group of self-serving elites depriving the ordinary people of their sovereignty. Moreover, populist parties claim to restore the voice of the people through the introduction of direct democracy. Accordingly, a growing group of voters who share these concerns are attracted to the populist appeal.<p>Another important finding of this study is that populist parties generally attract social groups that feel themselves deprived. In Eastern Germany of the 1990s these were the ‘losers of unification’, i.e. highly educated civil servants who had lost the social prestige that they enjoyed during the heydays of the DDR. Yet in contemporary ‘diploma democracies’ it appears that populist parties, regardless of their host ideology, are increasingly attracting the ‘losers of globalization’, which are the lower educated and lower social classes. While populism has mostly been considered a threat for democracy, the ability of populist parties to integrate excluded social groups into the political system certainly deserves notice. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Problématique. Cette thèse examine comment la pression sociale — issue de la norme sociale que voter est un devoir civique — influence la décision d’aller voter ou non. La recherche sur la participation électorale est largement dominée par une vision de l’électeur comme étant un acteur individuel et rationnel. Ce faisant, trop peu d’attention a été portée spécifiquement au rôle du cercle social comme vecteur de pression sociale. De plus, une importante littérature en psychologie sociale démontre de la puissante influence des normes sociales et de la pression sociale qui s’en dégage sur les comportements. En science politique, les études expérimentales associées au projet Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) ont démontré l’effet causal de la pression sociale sur la participation électorale. Cependant, ces études ne nous aident pas à comprendre comment cette pression s’exerce dans la vie quotidienne, ni à en déterminer la fréquence, l’intensité, ou encore qui l’exerce et qui la subit. Quelques études observationnelles récentes traitent de certaines de ces questions et offrent de premiers éléments de réponse. Cette thèse s’inscrit dans cette littérature émergente, avec pour objectifs de mesurer, décrire et comprendre la pression sociale pour aller voter et son influence sur la participation électorale en dehors d’un contexte expérimental. Questions de recherche. Je cherche à répondre à quatre questions fondamentales sur la pression sociale pour aller voter : 1) Combien ? Quelle proportion de personnes rapportent de la pression sociale pour aller voter et combien de pression reçoivent-elles ? 2) Qui ? Qui émet la pression sociale pour aller voter et qui la subit ? 3) Comment ? Comment la pression sociale pour aller voter s’exerce-t-elle ? Par quel mécanisme influence-t-elle la décision de voter ou non ? 4) Quels effets ? Quel est l’effet de la pression sociale sur la participation électorale et comment est-ce que cet effet varie ? Méthodologie. La thèse se divise en trois chapitres empiriques sous forme d’articles scientifiques. Je présente dans le premier chapitre empirique un portrait descriptif et comparatif de la pression sociale à partir de données de 65 études électorales dans 11 pays, totalisant environ 287 000 répondants et plus de 872 000 mesures de pression sociale. Je me concentre dans les deux autres chapitres empiriques sur le rôle et l’influence des attentes de désapprobation de l’abstention sur la participation électorale. Je cherche dans le second chapitre empirique à comprendre les déterminants des attentes de désapprobation ainsi que l’intersection entre le devoir civique et la désapprobation. Pour ce faire, j’utilise les données d’un module de questions original administré dans l’Étude électorale autrichienne de 2019. Je m’intéresse dans le dernier article empirique au rôle de modération de la visibilité du comportement sur la désapprobation ; les gens devraient voter pour éviter la désapprobation des autres seulement s’ils pensent que les autres seront au courant de leur décision. Je mobilise pour ce chapitre les données d’un second module de questions original, administré cette fois dans l’Étude électorale canadienne de 2019. Résultats obtenus. Mes analyses confirment que la pression sociale pour aller voter est très présente dans la société. La pression sociale descriptive est plus fréquente que celle injonctive et ses effets sur la pression sociale sont plus stables. En fait, je trouve que la pression sociale injonctive influence la décision de voter dans la moitié des études. D’autre part, mes analyses montrent que la pression sociale est plus fréquente et plus forte lorsqu’elle provient de personnes plus proches dans notre réseau, comme la famille et le partenaire. Elle est également plus forte chez les personnes plus éduquées, plus riches, et plus âgées. Les personnes ayant un sens élevé du devoir civique rapportent également plus de pression sociale, mais ne semblent pas influencées par cette pression. Contrairement aux attentes théoriques, je ne trouve pas d’effet de modération de la visibilité du comportement sur l’influence de la désapprobation. Enfin, je trouve également que la pression sociale varie surtout sur le plan la mesure. Conclusions. Cette thèse confirme le rôle crucial de la pression sociale comme déterminant de la participation électorale. Elle contribue à notre compréhension générale des normes sociales, et de leur influence spécifique sur la participation. Ceci est important, car la participation électorale est l’un des piliers caractérisant un système démocratique en bonne santé. Mieux comprendre le mécanisme de pression sociale contribuera au développement d’outils de mobilisation efficaces, éthiques et non partisans pour pallier au déclin de la participation électorale au Canada et ailleurs dans le monde. Cette thèse a également des conséquences méthodologiques importantes pour la mesure de la pression sociale et avance de nouvelles théories pour comprendre la participation électorale et l’influence de la pression sociale. En somme, cette thèse pose de bases solides pour de futures recherches sur la pression sociale pour aller voter. / Background. This dissertation examines how social pressure — stemming from the social norm that voting is a civic duty — influences the decision to vote or not. Research on electoral participation is largely dominated by a view of the voter as an individual and a rational actor. Hence, too little attention has been paid specifically to the role of the social circle as a vector of social pressure. Moreover, a large body of literature in social psychology demonstrates the powerful influence of social norms and the social pressure they generate on behaviour. In political science, experimental studies associated with the Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) project have demonstrated the causal effect of social pressure on voter turnout. However, these studies do not help us to understand how social pressure is exerted in everyday life, to determine its frequency and intensity, or who exerts it and who receives it. Recent observational studies have sought to answer these questions and offer some initial answers. This thesis is part of this emerging literature, with the objectives of measuring, describing and understanding the social pressure to vote and its influence on electoral participation outside an experimental context. Research questions. I am seeking to answer four fundamental questions about the social pressure to vote: 1) How much? How many people report social pressure to vote, and how much pressure do they report? 2) Who? Who exerts social pressure to vote, and who experiences it? 3) How? How does the social pressure to vote mechanism work? How does it influence the decision to vote or not? 4) What effects? What are the effects of social pressure on voter turnout, and how do these effects vary? Methodology. The dissertation is divided into three empirical chapters in the form of scientific articles. In the first empirical chapter, I present a descriptive and comparative portrait of social pressure based on data from 65 electoral studies in 11 countries, totalling about 287,000 respondents and more than 872,000 measures of social pressure. In the other two empirical chapters, I focus on the role and influence of abstention disapproval expectations on electoral participation. In the second empirical chapter, I seek to understand the determinants of disapproval expectations and the intersection between civic duty and disapproval. To do so, I use data from an original question module administered in the 2019 Austrian Election Study. In the last empirical paper, I focus on the moderating role of behaviour visibility on disapproval; people should vote to avoid disapproval only if they believe that others will be aware of their decision to vote or not. For this chapter, I mobilize data from another original question module, this time administered in the 2019 Canadian Election Study. Results. My analyses confirm that social pressure to vote is quite prevalent in society. Descriptive social pressure is more frequent than injunctive pressure, and its effects on social pressure are more stable. In fact, I find that injunctive social pressure influences the decision to vote in about half the studies. My analyses also show that social pressure is more frequent and stronger from relationships in our social circle, such as family or the partner. Social pressure is stronger among people who are better educated, wealthier and older. Although people with a strong sense of civic duty also report more social pressure, they do not seem to be influenced by it. I find no moderating effect of behavioural visibility on the influence of disapproval contrary to theoretical expectations. At last, I also find that most of the variance in social pressure occurs at the measurement level. Conclusions. This dissertation confirms the crucial role of social pressure as a determinant of electoral participation. It contributes to our general understanding of social norms and their specific influence on voter turnout. This is important because electoral participation is one of the pillars of a healthy democratic system. A better understanding of the social pressure mechanism will help to develop effective, ethical and non-partisan mobilization tools to counter the decline in electoral participation in Canada and the world. This dissertation also has important methodological implications for measuring social pressure and suggests new theories for understanding voter turnout and the influences of social pressure. In sum, this thesis dissertation offers a solid foundation for future research on social pressure to vote.

Esta investigación contrasta la estrategia de campaña que se elaboró en torno a la imagen de Verónika Mendoza, candidata del Frente Amplio a las elecciones presidenciales peruanas del 2016, con los contenidos periodísticos que elaboraron en torno a ella dos de los principales diarios peruanos, El Comercio y La República, con el objetivo de determinar hasta qué punto se logró plasmar esta estrategia en ambos diarios. Este estudio tiene un carácter empírico descriptivo y utiliza las entrevistas a profundidad a los jefes del equipo de campaña del Frente Amplio para establecer los atributos que quisieron resaltar de Mendoza; así como el análisis de contenido a la luz de la teoría del encuadre o framing en los medios seleccionados. El análisis muestra que se logró posicionar estas cualidades de forma parcial en el diario La República y contribuyó a atenuar la posición contraria de El Comercio a Mendoza, a través de una mayor presencia de notas de carácter positivo que balanceó el contenido adverso hacía la candidata

台灣地區的民主化過程一直是中外學者注視的焦點。在長期實行民選地方政府或地方自治的台灣，真正是一個民主的社會嗎？在解嚴、動戡時期終止前，很容易回答，由於沒有組黨自由，中央民代選舉只是部分的增額改選，台灣的全國政治並不能達到民主社會的基本標準。但是，地方選舉則是長期地、完整地在舉行，要回答台灣地方是否民主，仍很難輕易地給予答案。地方民主是如此複雜、多樣化的面貌，如何才算達成地方民主？本論文基本上是以Leach和Percy-Smith所提出的地方民主的四個面向為標準，此即：1、課責性；2、回應性；3、參與性；4、代表性；進而探討。 筆者研究後發現：第一，從台北市的民主經驗來看，代表性應該不是問題的癥結；所謂的代表性是否意味著該和R. A. Dahl所言的，和社會人口或職業的結構相符合？在地方民主上來看，由於社會的多元化，以及要求民意代表的專業及高學歷背景，代表社會結構的多元民主（polyarchy）是否值得再強調？可以深思。第二，從台北市的民主經驗來看，參與性應該是地方民主很重要的一項指標。如何讓民眾更直接的參與到民主政治中，除了選舉之外，應該有更多的、直接的交換意見的平台或管道，例如公民投票、公民論壇、協調會等等。第三，地方民主的參與和地方政府的回應性夾雜在一塊，民眾參與到政策討論的領域中，政府也加入予以回應。所以，地方民主中，回應性與參與性似乎呈現某種程度的關聯性。第四，不論是參與性、回應性等民主的程度，都與政府能力有關，似乎地方政府解決問題的能力越高，民眾就越會表現出對於地方政府做為的參與，以及政策的回應。

Die Dissertation untersucht mittels Lokalstudien die Massendemokratie der Zwischenkriegszeit im Medium der Praxis von Wahlkämpfen. Sie argumentiert, dass die britische Demokratie bereits in den 1920er Jahren in deutlich stärkerem Maße als die deutsche nach den Prinzipien eines politischen Marktes funktionierte. Während in der hiesigen politischen Kultur Wähler als Individuen von den Parteien umworben wurden, standen sie sich in Deutschland als Großgruppen und feste Anhängerschaften der Parteien als Gegner - und Feinde - entgegen. Das gab der demokratischen Auseinandersetzung in der Weimarer Republik ein kriegerisches Gepräge, im Kontrast zum pragmatisch-spielerischen Umgang mit Konflikt in Großbritannien. Erklären lässt sich dieser Unterschied aus den Traditionen der Eingewöhnung politischer Partizipation in beiden Ländern im Verlauf des 19. Jahrhunderts, die der „Politik“ in Deutschland ein deutlich höheres Gewicht im sozialen Miteinander mitgab als in Großbritannien. Das letztendliche Scheitern der Weimarer Republik an dieser Attributierung des Politischen mit Bedeutung und des Konflikts mit Ernsthaftigkeit, wirft die Frage auf, ob die moderne Demokratie für ihr Bestehen ein gewisses Maß an Gleichgültigkeit benötigt. / The thesis uses local contexts to study mass democracy in the inter-war period in the medium of electioneering practice. It argues that British democracy already followed the logic of a political market in the 1920s, to a much higher degree than was the case in Germany. Whereas parties wooed voters as individuals here, they were rather seen as part of big social groupings in German political culture, standing off against each other as opponents - and as enemies. This gave democratic contests in the Weimar Republic a war-like character, which stood in contrast to the pragmatic and playful way of dealing with conflict in Britain. The difference is explained by the traditions of how political participation had been learned throughout the 19th century in both countries, where the German path had resulted in 'politics' weighing much more heavily on social relations than was the case in Britain. The eventual failure of the Weimar Republic due to the attribution of meaning to everything political, and due to the seriousness of conflict, begs the question of whether modern democracy, to persist, requires a certain amount of disinterest among the electorate.

Perseguendo politiche comuni per gli Stati membri, l'Unione Europea si è trasformata da unione puramente economica ad unione politica. Tuttavia, per quanto riguarda quest'ultimo aspetto, è stato fatto poco. Lo scetticismo è venuto a caratterizzare il clima politico dell'Unione Europea e l’elevata eterogeneità nei termini degli Stati membri hanno causato difficoltà nel processo decisionale. Questa tesi si concentra sulle politiche europee da tre aspetti: la legittimità, che si riferisce al sostegno politico dei cittadini, il comportamento di voto e di partecipazione dei cittadini. Una delle questioni principali della ricerca riguarda l’esistenza delle basi per la genesi di veri e propri partiti politici europei, come via d’uscita dalla crisi di legittimità dell'Unione Europea. Ci si chiede poi quali sono i principali fattori che influenzano la partecipazione alle elezioni del Parlamento Europeo, dal momento che esso è l'unica fonte diretta di legittimità. Infine, si studiano le cause del gap in affluenza per le elezioni europee e nazionali, guardando la quota di voto del partito. L'argomento principale per l’esistenza dei partiti pan-europei è quello di difendere gli stessi interessi e valori su scala europea. I risultati empirici sottolineano che la polarizzazione di classe sociale, è già presente nei primi 12 Stati membri dell'UE, e anche nei nuovi Stati membri, mentre nelle elezioni del Parlamento europeo gli elettori votano sinceramente. In conclusione: l'Europa soddisfa la base per la creazione di partiti pan-Europei che difendino vere e proprie politiche europee, mirate ai gruppi sociali che rappresentano, come una possibile soluzione per la crisi di legittimità. / By pursuing common policies for its Member States, the European Union moved from being a purely economic union, to being a political one as well. However, little has been done to tackle the latter aspect. Skepticism has come to characterize the political climate of the European Union and high heterogeneity in terms of Member States has induced difficulties in the decision-making process. This thesis focuses on the European Politics from three aspects: legitimacy, which refers to citizens’ political support, voting behavior and turnout. One of the main research questions we address is whether or not the basis for the existence of true European party politics exists, as a way out of the European Union legitimacy crisis. Then, we ask what are the main factors that influence electoral participation in the European Parliament elections since it is the only source of direct legitimacy. Lastly, we investigate what are the causes for the turnout gap across European and National elections, looking at the party vote share. The main argument for pan-European to exist is to defend the same values and interests European-wide. Empirical results point out that social class's polarization already exists in the initial 12 EU Member States, as well as later entries, while in the European Parliament elections voters cast their vote sincerely. We conclude that Europe fulfils the base requirement for the creation of true European politics, party politics and social groups' targeted-policies being a possible solution for the legitimacy crisis.

L’institution municipale est restée à l’écart des recherches menées en histoire sur le 19e siècle sinon sous l’angle d’une prosopographie des maires et sous celui des élections municipales de la monarchie de Juillet. Les apports des autres sciences sociales – sociologie, anthropologie, ethnologie – ont renouvelé les approches, ainsi que l’histoire sociale fine. Cette recherche propose une analyse sociale et politique de cette institution, inscrite sur la longue durée (1800-1940) et sur un terrain resserré (un arrondissement et plus particulièrement cinq communes). Au moyen de bases de données relationnelles permettant une agrégation des données à différentes échelles de temps et d’espaces, elle vise à identifier les édiles (maires, adjoints, conseillers municipaux) pour eux-mêmes, dans une approche prosopographique, puis relativement pour définir leur représentativité (échelle de l’arrondissement) et pour les inscrire dans les relations qu’ils entretiennent avec les autres acteurs de la vie municipale (échelle communale).Cette analyse permet de mettre au jour une institution municipale que les villageois se sont appropriés au cours du 19e siècle, en reconnaissant une autorité au maire qui s’est construite d’abord dans l’opposition à celle du desservant et qui dépasse le cadre donné par la loi. De fait, les outrages à leur encontre sont peu nombreux et permettent d’appréhender non les limites de l’autorité consentie à la fonction mais le défaut d’exercice de son dépositaire. De même, les élections municipales font l’objetd’une préparation, d’une mobilisation et d’un contrôle – parfois jusqu’à la protestation électorale qui constitue alors un troisième tour – qui donnent la légitimité aux élus.L’identification des édiles a également permis de nuancer le portrait qu’il en est généralement dressé : s’il existe bien des familles éligibles parfois très anciennement implantées dans les communes d’exercice, la part de conseillers municipaux mobiles reste forte pendant tout le 19e siècle avant de se réduire progressivement. La reconstitution des carrières municipales montre aussi que l’accession au conseil municipal n’est pas définitivement acquise du fait d’une compétition électorale réelle.Quoiqu’un cadre légal précis préside la prise de décision au sein de l’institution municipale, la comparaison des modes de gouvernement d’une commune à l’autre fait émerger deux extrêmes, de l’exercice solitaire du maire à une décision prise collégialement par le conseil municipal dont le maire se fait le porteur. Entre ces deux extrêmes, les situations sont nombreuses et, si dans certaines communes, l’un s’impose davantage que l’autre, il existe aussi des mouvements de fluctuation en fonction des rapports de force qui se dessinent.Enfin, ce politique défini comme organisation du pouvoir au sein de la société, n’est pas enfermé dans les limites communales : les conflits au sein des conseils municipaux mettent au jour des réseaux sociaux qui sont également culturels et porteurs de sensibilités politiques ; c’est alors à une échelle intercommunale qu’ils prennent sens, marqués par les scansions nationales. / Historical researches on the nineteenth century have left aside Municipal institutions, except from the point of view of a prosopography of mayors and municipal elections of the July Monarchy. The contributions of other social sciences - sociology, anthropology, ethnology - have renewed the approaches, as well as the one on precise social history. This research puts forward a social and political analysis of this institution, registered on the long term (1800-1940) and on a tightened ground (a district and more particularly five localities).By means of relational databases allowing the aggregation of data at different scales of time and spaces, it aims at identifying the city councilors (mayors, deputies, councilors) for themselves, in a prosopographic approach, then relatively to define their representativeness (district scale) and to register them in the relationships they maintain with the other actors in municipal life (municipal scale).This analysis brings to light a municipal institution that villagers took over during the 19th century, by recognising an authority to the mayor and which was first shaped in opposition to that of the parish priest and which then overtook the given law framework. In fact, the outrages against them are few and allow to understand not the limits of the authority granted to the function but the lack of exercise of its depositary. In the same way, municipal elections deal with preparation, mobilisation and control -sometimes up to the electoral protest which constitutes then a third roundwhich brings legitimacy to the elected ones.The identification of the city councilors has also qualified the portrait that is generally drawn up: if there are many eligible families sometimes anciently established in the municipalities of exercise, the share of the moveable city councilors remains strong throughout the 19th century before gradually decreasing. The reconstitution of the municipal careers also shows that the access to the municipal council is not definitively acquired because of a real electoral competition.

This thesis is an examination of whether the “egalitarian model” for political finance that has been established by the Supreme Court of Canada, other Canadian courts and legal scholars and commentators is actually egalitarian and has been applied consistently (in Chapter 2), and whether Canada’s political finance system measures up to the Court’s model (in Chapters 3 and 4), and how it could be changed to comply with a more egalitarian model that would also be ethical in terms of preventing even the appearance of a conflict of interest (in Chapters 6 and 7). Chapter 1 sets out a general theoretical framework for evaluating the Supreme Court’s egalitarian model, and I develop and set out a more egalitarian model in Chapter 5. In the Chapter 8 conclusion, I summarize the findings and propose structural and positive Charter rights court cases as a way forward, given that the platforms federal politicians and political parties from the past few elections, and the reports of parliamentary committees, have not called for the most of the changes I propose are needed to make the system more egalitarian. The thesis addresses political finance broadly defined as money, property, use of property, gifts, services, favours and other benefits and advantages provided to nomination contestants, election candidates and political party leadership contestants, electoral district associations, political parties, politicians and their staff during election campaign periods and also during the time period between elections, including support provided by “third-party” interest groups, lobbyists and other individuals, and by media outlets. In Chapter 3, I examine the rules that apply to each of these political actors in the areas of registration, donations and loans, spending, public subsidies and disclosure (including auditing), including a separate section on the role of media and social media. Given that political systems include providers (whether as contractors or donors) of money, property and the use of property (including gifts and other benefits and advantages), and services (including favours) to politicians, and given that providers could be lobbyists, I also examine in Chapter 4 the rules concerning gifts, favours and other benefits and relations between voters, lobbyists and politicians, and concerning the conflicts of interest that can be caused by these activities. Other than disclosure and auditing, I do not cover enforcement measures or systems in any of the areas. However, I do note at various points in the thesis that, as several studies and history have shown clearly, effective enforcement measures, policies and practices are key to ensure compliance with such rules. The main contentions that I make are: that the key principles of the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model have not been consistently upheld by the Court and other Canadian courts, that Canada’ federal political finance system does not fulfill the Court’s egalitarian model, and that several changes are needed to make the model and the system more egalitarian, only a few of which have been addressed by Canadian courts and scholars to date. These contentions counter the claim made in the Court’s rulings, and by many scholars and commentators, that Canada’s political finance system has developed and is based on an egalitarian model. In Chapters 5 through 7, I develop a more egalitarian model and set out specific proposed changes to make Canada’s systems more egalitarian, both in theory and in practice, within the framework of a democratic good government political system (meaning a system with separation of powers, elections, human rights protections, rule of law etc.) and a mixed market economy with both public sector institutions and private sector businesses, unions and other organizations (cooperatives, non-profit, religious organizations etc.). Both the model and many of the specific proposed measures should also be applicable in other jurisdictions with different political systems and economic systems. The framework of 19 standards for a more egalitarian model that I develop in Chapter 5 is based mainly on John Rawls’ theory of justice, but modified and expanded to incorporate critiques of Rawls’ theory, other legal principles and democratic good government theories, international standards, government ethics case law, behavioural psychology studies, and evidence of the public’s expectations. The 201 proposals I make in Chapters 6 and 7 for specific changes to the rules of Canada’s current federal political finance system (again, broadly defined), are based on the model, measures from various jurisdictions in Canada and elsewhere, and international standards. I am not claiming that these changes would definitely result in “better” or more “public interest” policy-making decisions, however that would be determined. I am only contending that the framework I develop is more egalitarian than the Supreme Court’s model, and that the rule changes I suggest would make the political finance, gifts, favours, conflict of interest and lobbying systems align with the more egalitarian model I propose. I primarily use the doctrinal research methodology by examining scholarly research and, given I also examine aspects of the laws of Canadian provinces and municipalities, and other countries, I also deploy some aspects of the comparative methodology (most fully when comparing Canada’s federal rules to Quebec’s rules, and somewhat when comparing Canada’s rules to the U.S. and U.K. rules). The research results from these sources inform the conclusions I set out in my thesis. The thesis advances knowledge in the following areas: 1. It is the first complete evaluation of the federal Canadian political finance, gifts-favours-benefits, conflict of interest and lobbying rules and systems in their current state as of May 2023, based on the findings of extensive new research into key parts of these systems; 2. It sets out the first comprehensive analysis of how the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model has been applied by the Court and other courts inconsistently, in ways that do not comply with the model; 3. It sets out the first analysis of how Canada’s political finance statutory rules, again defined broadly to include rules that apply to donations, loans, gifts, services, favours and other benefits, lobbying and conflicts of interest, do not comply with the Supreme Court’s egalitarian model, based in part on new statistical research set out in 28 charts, and; 4. It sets out a new theoretical framework based on 19 standards, and a comprehensive set of 201 innovative proposals for changes to make Canada’s political finance rules (again defined broadly) more egalitarian, and more ethical in terms of preventing conflicts of interest. Five comprehensive studies of key parts of the political finance, ethics and lobbying systems are also proposed to gather key information needed to inform the design of some of the 201 proposed changes. Eight structural and positive Charter rights cases are also proposed to challenge current rules that do not comply with the egalitarian model.