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This essay attempts to bring the experiences of eight soldiers to light, seven of them Swedish and one English, that took part in the fighting on the western front as volunteers in the French foreign legion during World War One. The main source material consists of letters sent between these soldiers and another Swedish ex-foreign legionnaire, Sven Blom, both during Mr. Bloms recovery from wounds which put him out of service in late 1914, and through Mr. Bloms work as first secretary of the Swedish consulate in Paris, with the last letters dating to 1918. The letters, which are part of a large archive left behind by Sven Blom, are transcribed and analyzed in this essay to answer five questions posed in order to ascertain the experiences and mindset of these soldiers. Are there any common themes in the soldiers’ letters? Are there any examples where Swedish national identity is commented on by the soldiers? What is their experience of the war, and what do they choose to tell Mr. Blom about? How do they feel they are treated by the French system and French soldiers? And, what are the soldiers’ opinion of reports from the war, like their fellow Swede Elow Nilson’s articles in the Swedish newspaper Vecko-Journalen?

This thesis investigate Swedish policy-making concerning promotion of wood gas and ethanol distilled from fermented sulphite lye as domestic fuel alternatives in the Interwar years and World War II. With a departure point in the theories of social constructions of technology (SCOT), the sociology of expectations and Thomas P. Hughe’s socio-technical systems I analyse the measures that were undertaken in these efforts, the arguments put forward for and against the ethanol and wood gas projects and how the efforts turned out. I also investigate how the interpretations of ethanol and wood gas as fuel alternatives changed from the Interwar period on through World War II and what consequences this had for ethanol and wood gas policy immediately after World War II. Source material includes Parliament and Government records, cabinet meeting files, governmental commissions, authority archives, technical evaluations and handbooks and scientific medical publications. Ethanol and wood gas were promoted from a nationalist vantage point. The Interwar debate was imbued with visions of national techno-scientific prowess in a perceived ongoing global contest for technological and scientific advancement, of which achieving autarky, self-sufficiency on important raw materials and industrial products, was an ideal for some. Ethanol and wood gas were also promoted as means for creating a lucrative new market for the forestry industry, which also held a prominent position in nationalist visions of technology. Expectations of a new war also motivated the promotion of ethanol and wood gas as national fuels. Measures for promotion included tax exemptions, sales guarantees and legislation for mandatory ethanol purchase for all petrol importing companies and gasifier loan funds. Political conflicts mainly centred around the principles of free trade as opposed to protectionism, proper use of tax funds and whether the potentials of the fuel alternatives were rhetorically exaggerated. During World War II ethanol and wood gas in particular served as important petrol surrogates. The increased wood gas use led to negative interpretations of wood gas a fuel alternative due to its hazardous, dirty and time-consuming maintenance and the changed driving behaviour it required from its users compared to petrol or ethanol fuelled automobiles. Compared to wood gas, ethanol was appreciated for its socio-technical similarities to petrol, but production was after the war deemed difficult to maintain during wartime. Whereas wood gas remained an important stand-by surrogate during the cold war, Swedish politicians lost interest in ethanol of the kind that was promoted in the Interwar years. / Fuel of the Future? A Research Programme on the Science, Technology and Selling of Biofuels in Sweden

The study deals with the life stories of six women and four men who were born in Germany and who now live in Sweden.  Its purpose is to examine the histories of those who grew up in Germany during and after the Nazi era, their descriptions of their lives and experiences during childhood and adolescence, and how they regard their encounters with Swedish people, and the ways in which these encounters have affected their ways of describing the growth of their attachment to this country. The main approach is a narrative analysis focussing on the interview interaction and the wider social and political contexts of their life stories. When speaking of their lives in the two countries they show varying degrees of attachment to the places involved. This is why I use the term “travellers” when describing how their feelings of “belonging” change. The theoretical concepts used are those of habitus and capitals derived from Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, and Marianne Horsdal’s view that people often refer to the idea of a “good life” when relating their life stories. This concept can of course vary widely from one person to another. Nine of the group emigrated to Sweden voluntarily; the remaining one came here as a refugee after the end of the second World War.  The older ones - born between 1920 and 1940 - have memories of their early years in Nazi Germany and of the wartime period. The younger ones, born after 1950, have differing memories of childhood and adolescence spent in East and West Germany. Some of them lost close relatives during the war.  Those who came to Sweden during the late 1940s and the 1950s were met with very negative attitudes from some Swedes, while the later immigrants were treated with respect. / Tyskland i Sverige och Sverige i Tyskland

ABSTRACT Gustafsson, J. & Söderqvist, N., “’The Island of Peace in the Sea of War’ A newspaper study of Växjö city’s newspaper editorials regarding the conflicts of the Second World War in the Nordic countries”, Linnaeus University.   A qualitative textual analysis delving into three local newspapers from Växjö city is in many ways the essence of this study. The main purpose of this study is to examine three key conflicts, the Winter War, Operation Weserübung and the Continuation War. Each conflict has been assessed in relation to the opinions advocated in the editorials of the three politically diverse newspapers. The theoretical basis for this study is founded on similar analysis made by Nybom, Johansson and Åmark who all have contributed to the content of this particular essay. Most of all, Nyboms categorization of the so-called realism and idealism have helped us in understanding the motives and plans of action concerning the nations involved in the selected conflicts. There are several interesting conclusions in this study, in particular the newspapers’ view on main antagonists such as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, as well as the Allies.

Kemisk krigföring i form av luftburna gifter har förekommit i många historiska kontexter. Trots att luftburna gifter, som till exempel giftig rök och gas är likartade företeelser, har inte forskare kunnat enas om äldre former av denna krigföring är jämförbar med den moderna. Huvudorsaken är att deras analyser saknar teoretiska perspektiv som belyser hur respektive   kontexts kemiska förutsättningar påverkar krigföringen. Syftet med den här undersökningen är att jämföra ett modernt nyttjande av luftburna gifter, tyskarnas första klorutsläpp vid Ypres 1915 med ett forntida exempel, den moistiska skolans användande av brandrök som gift under århundradena f. Kr. i Kina. För att kringgå tidigare forsknings problem anläggs ett teoretiskt perspektiv. En teori som belyser dynamiken   mellan kemisk krigföring och respektive kulturs föreställningar om och förhållande till miljön. Undersökningen visar att det är relevant att jämföra det moderna användandet av luftburna gifter med användandet i andra historiska kontexter eftersom det sker i liknande taktiska sammanhang och kräver mycket naturkunskap. Samtidigt belyser analysen att kontexten ger krigföringen en viss karaktär. Moisterna försökte nå framgång genom att samordna och   förbättra den process som gjorde det luftburna giftet effektivt samtidigt som de förlitade sig på generalistkunskap. Tyskarna, däremot förlitade sig på ett så effektivt  kemiskt ämne (agens) som möjligt. För denna typ av krigföring nyttjades utpräglade specialister.   Dessutom var relationen till själva giftet annorlunda i de två kontexterna. Moisterna utsatte sig för röken medan tyskarna avskärmade sig helt från klorgasen. Dessa skillnader går att förstå genom att se hur människorna i respektive kontext utnyttjade den för krigföringen relevanta kemin i icke-militära sammanhang. Den tidigare forskningens problem med att diskutera kemisk krigföring blir också tydligt i undersökningen. Problemet beror på att den vetenskapliga disciplinen kemi medför institutioner och begrepp som begränsar synen på användandet av luftburna gifter. Denna insikt tillsammans med undersökningens övriga resultat belyser något som har relevans för dagens hotbild. Luftburna gifter, kan i rätt sammanhang och genom rätt   prioriteringar göras effektiv utan tillgång till modern vetenskap och industri. Detta bör beaktas när hotbilden från aktörer utan egen militärindustri analyseras. / Airborne poison, as a type of chemical warfare, has been used in many historical contexts. Although airborne poison such as toxic smoke and gas are similar phenomena, researchers have not been able to agree if older forms of warfare are comparable to modern. One reason for this is that their respective analysis lacks theoretical perspectives that account for contextual chemical conditions. The purpose of this study is to compare a modern example of the use of airborne poison, the Germans' first chlorine emissions at Ypres in 1915 with an ancient one, the Mohists use of smoke as a poison in ancient China. A theoretical perspective is applied to circumvent the problems of earlier research. This theory focuses on the dynamics between decision-making in chemical warfare and a particular culture's perception of and relationship to the environment. The study shows that it is relevant to compare the modern use of airborne poison with its use in other historical contexts because the weapon occurs in a similar tactical context. Also this type of warfare requires a lot of knowledge of the natural world. At the same time the analysis illustrates that a specific context gives the warfare a certain character. The Mohists tried to achieve success by coordinating and improving the process by which the airborne poison was made effective. Furthermore they relied on generalist knowledge. The Germans, however, relied on having an efficient chemical substance (agent). For this type of warfare they utilized specialists. The human-poison relationship also differed. The Mohist exposed himself to smoke while the German soldier shut himself off completely from the chlorine gas. These differences can be understood by studying how people exploited similar chemistry in a non-military way  in their respective context. The problems that previous research has had in discussing chemical warfare is also made evident. These problems occur because chemistry as a scientific discipline creates institutions and concepts that limit the view of airborne poison as a weapon. This realization, along with results of the survey in general, illustrates something which has relevance in today’s world. Airborne poison can, in the right place and with the right priorities be effective without modern industrial and scientific resources. This should be considered when analyzing political actors lacking a modern military industry.

No description available.

Denna uppsats undersöker Sveriges marinstrategi i händelse av krig med Tyskland respektive Sovjeteunionen våren 1941 utifrån Chefen för Marinens instruktioner för krigsfall I respektive II. / This paper explores Swedish naval strategy during the Second World War (1939-1945), an area that has not seen significant research. This paper focuses on how Swedish maritime forces were to be used in case of war with Germany (War Plan I; Krigsfall I), and with the Soviet Union (War plan II; Krigsfall II). This paper focuses on Swedish planning during the spring of 1941. The period after the fall of France (June 1940) and before the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941) was a period where both Germany and the Soviet Union possessed what could be described as strategic freedom of action. This means large parts of their armed forces could have been used for operations against Sweden. The basis for each potential conflict was different: Germany occupied Norway and Denmark and could launch a ground invasion of Sweden directly; meanwhile Sweden and the Soviet Union were still separated by Finland and the Baltic Sea. Maritime forces would therefore play very different roles in the two War Plans. No official plans in case of war with the western Allies existed at the time, and hence this has not been explored here. The conclusion of this paper is that Swedish naval strategy at the time was somewhat offensive and focused on gaining sea control, at least in the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Bothnia, to maintain freedom of action to be able to conduct troop movements along the Swedish coast, to the island of Gotland, and to Finland.

The aim of this thesis is to enhance our understanding of Swedish marine insurers' choices of business strategies under the potentially difficult business circumstances of the interwar period 1918-1939. Little previous research exists on marine insurance during the interwar period. This is remarkable in the Swedish context since the Swedish economy has traditionally depended on its exports. The focus on Sweden is justified since the Swedish insurance market saw regulatory stability during the interwar period. It was also characterised by the coexistence of stock and mutual insurers, allowing this thesis to contribute with insights on potentially problematic insurance cartelisaton. This thesis employs a mixed methods design, including qualitative methods and regression analysis. To interpret results, this thesis employs insurance risk theory, cartel theory, theories on reinsurance and risk diversification, and agency theory. By employing this combination of theories, it is possible to explain choices and outcomes of adopted strategies both with reference to particularities of marine insurance and with reference to particularities of the two different organisational forms. The results show that the insurers conceived several new characteristics of their business environment as challenges and implemented both cartel strategies and company-specific strategies of risk diversification. Among the challenges were rapid inflation, rapidly decreasing prices and business volumes in shipping and trade, the introduction of motor ships, and the existence of naval mines on many trade routes. Also, exchange-rate fluctuations were considered to cause losses on established marine insurance contracts and rendered business results uncertain. Swedish insurers adopted cartel strategies from 1918 through The Swedish Association of Marine Underwriters (Sjöassuradörernas Förening) since they had anticipated a post-war crisis. Market division agreements were adopted for the most attractive market segments, but eventually price agreements became the primary cartel strategy, supported by prohibitions of competition. The work on price agreements sometimes increased the market efficiency since it reduced uncertainty, for instance in insurance of cargo with motor ships. Few price agreements were however adopted for the insurance of shipping since that market segment was dominated by mutual insurers, highlighting the difficulties of cartelisation in insurance markets inhabited by both stock and mutual insurers. The cartel further adopted reinsurance agreements to create barriers to entry in the Swedish marine insurance market. It however experienced prominent difficulties to implement the cartel strategies. One prominent difficulty of implementation was cheating. Also international competition created difficulties. The cartel companies therefore engaged in international cartelisation through The International Union of Marine Insurance (Internationaler Tranport-Versicherungs-Verband) from the late 1920s. This international cartel sought to reduce international competition by agreements not to compete in foreign markets. It also sought to manage the exchange-rate fluctuations of the early 1920s and the early 1930s by agreements among marine insurers, but it failed to obtain sufficient support. In spite of cartelisation, the returns on marine insurance were pushed down by the recognized challenges during the early 1920s, inflicting losses. The business however recovered and remained profitable throughout the 1930s, showing that the great depression was not as great as the deflation crisis in marine insurance. Exchange-rate fluctuations affected the international competitive strength of both stock and mutual insurers and additionally influenced the stock insurers' returns on established marine insurance contracts. The insurers were however compensated for the poor marine business results of the early 1920s by greater reliance than previously on reinsurers and by diversification among insurance lines, which rendered profits less negative than the returns on marine insurance. The business ceded to reinsurers on average inflicted losses during each of the first seven years of the 1920s. These losses were indirectly caused by World War I since that war had caused the establishment of new reinsurers in different countries, not the least in Scandinavia, and in turn caused over capacity during the 1920s. New contractual formulations evolved internationally to the benefit of ceding insurers, indicating information asymmetries. Exits became frequent among reinsurers. In effect, into the 1930s, ceding insurers internationally found it difficult to obtain obligatory reinsurance treaties. During the early 1920s, the Swedish stock marine insurers also increasingly diversified their insurance businesses among insurance lines. This process had been catalysed by World War I, was accelerated during the 1920s, and continued into the 1930s. / Syftet med denna avhandling är att förståeliggöra svenska marinförsäkringsbolags val av affärsstrategier under mellankrigstiden 1918-1939, en period som kännetecknades av potentiellt svåra affärsförhållanden. Försäkringsverksamhet är känslig för ekonomiska kriser, men har uppmärksammats mindre än bankverksamhet när det gäller mellankrigstiden. Inte minst marinförsäkring är känslig för ekonomiska kriser eftersom de försäkrade verksamheterna, sjöfart och handel, endast förekommer i den mån som transporterade varor efterfrågas. Tidigare forskning har endast i liten omfattning fokuserat på marinförsäkring, vilket ur ett svenskt perspektiv kan tyckas anmärkningsvärt med tanke på att den svenska ekonomin har i hög grad varit beroende av sjöburen handel. En studie av svensk marinförsäkring är motiverad ur ett internationellt perspektiv eftersom den svenska försäkringslagstiftningen förblev i stort sett oförändrad under perioden, vilket gör det rimligt att tolka marinförsäkringsbolags val av affärsstrategier som svar på ekonomiska omständigheter. Under mellankrigstiden var katellstrategier ett vanligt svar på svåra affärsförhållanden i olika verksamheter, men kartellisering var potentiellt problematisk i marinförsäkring eftersom den verksamheten är internationell och eftersom marinförsäkring är en heterogen produkt. Dessutom befolkades den svenska försäkringsmarknaden av både aktiebolag och ömsesidiga bolag, vilket är ett ytterligare potentiellt hinder för kartellisering. Studier av kartellisering under potentiallt svåra förutsättningar kan bidra med insikter om under vilka förutsättningar karteller uppstår, vilket ytterligare motiverar studien. Denna avhandling analyserar även två företagsspecifika riskdiversifieringsstrategier, som potentiellt kan kompensera för låg avkastning på mottagen försäkring, nämligen återförsäkring och diversifiering mellan försäkringsgrenar. Återförsäkring har av tidigare forskning framhållits som ett underutforskat område. Avhandlingen tillämpar både kvalitativa och kvantitativa undersökningsmetoder. För att uttolka de empiriska resultaten tillämpas riskteori för försäkring, kartellteori, återförsäkringsteori, riskdiversifieringsteori, samt incitamentsteori på företagsnivå (agency theory). Denna kombination av teorier gör det möjligt att förklara strategival med utgångspunkt både i marinförsäkringens karaktäristika och i de båda olika organisationsformers karaktäristika. Resultaten visar att försäkringsbolagen noterade ett antal nya affärsförhållanden som utmaningar och att dessa bolag implementerade både kartellstrategier och företagsspecifika riskdiversifieringsstrategier. Bland de noterade utmaningarna märks snabb inflation, snabbt fallande priser och affärsvolymer i sjöfart och handel, införandet av motorfartyg, samt sjöminor på många fartygsrutter. Försäkringsbolagen behärskade endast lite erfarenhet av risker associerade med motorfartyg och sjöminor, vilket gjorde riskbedömningar osäkra. Även växelkursfluktuationer uppfattades som utmaningar eftersom de orsakade förluster på etablerade marinförsäkringskontrakt och skapade problem att förutsäga affärsresultaten. Från 1918 antog svenska marinförsäkringsbolag kartellstrategier genom branschorganisationen Sjöassuradörernas Förening, detta eftersom de förväntade sig en efterkrigskris. Marknadsuppdelningsavtal infördes i attraktiva marknadssegment, men med tiden blev prisöverenskommelser den främsta kartellstrategin, understödd av avtal som förbjöd konkurrens. Arbetet med prisöverenskommelser ökade marknadseffektiviteten i vissa marknadssegment, detta genom att reducera osäkerheten i riskbedömningarna. Ett tydligt exempel på ett sådant marknadssegment är försäkring av varor transporterade med motorfartyg. Kartellen etablerade däremot få prisöverenskommelser för försäkring av sjöfart eftersom detta marknadssegment dominerades av ömsesidiga försäkringsbolag. Denna kontrast mellan varuförsäkring och sjöfartsförsäkring belyser svårigheterna med att kartellisera en försäkringsmarknad som befolkas både av aktiebolag och av ömsesidiga bolag. Kartellen antog också återförsäkringsavtal i syfte att skapa etableringshinder på den svenska försäkringsmarknaden. Den upplevde emellertid svårigheter att implementera överenskommelserna, såsom brott mot prisöverenskommelserna och mot konkurrensförbuden. Ytterligare svårigheter skapades av internationell konkurrens. Från slutet av 1920-talet deltog därför kartellbolagen i den internationella marinförsäkringskartellen Internationaler Tranport-Versicherungs-Verband (senare benämnd The International Union of Marine Insurance). Medlemsbolagen i denna internationella kartell skapade överenskommelser med innebörden att utländska försäkringstagare inte skulle erbjudas försäkring. Dessa överenskommelser syftade till att reducera den internationella konkurrensen. Denna kartell försökte också reducera effekterna för marinförsäkringsbolag av växelkursfluktuationer genom överenskommelser om hur växelkurser skulle beräknas i marinförsäkringsfrågor. Sådana försök gjordes både under de första åren av 1920-talet och under de första åren av 1930-talet. Det avsedda resultatet kunde emellertid inte nås, detta eftersom uppslutningen förblev otillräcklig. Trots kartelliseringen reducerades avkastningen på marinförsäkring till förlustnivåer under det tidiga 1920-talet. Avkastningen förbättrades sedan stegvis och förblev positiv under 1930-talet. I marinförsäkring var alltså den stora depression inte lika stor som deflationskrisen. Växelkursfluktuationer påverkade både aktiebolags och ömsesidiga bolags internationella konkurrenskraft. Dessutom påverkade växelkurserna aktiebolagens avkastning på etablerade marinförsäkringskontrakt. Försäkringsbolagen kompenserades för 1920-talets förlustresultat i marinförsäkring genom ökad cedering av risk till återförsäkringsbolag och genom diversifiering av de mottagna riskerna mellan olika försäkringsgrenar. Under 1920-talet var bolagens vinster därför mindre negativa än resultaten i marinförsäkring. Den affär som cederades till återförsäkringsbolag var i genomsnitt förlustbringande under vart och ett av 1920-talets första sju år. Dessa förluster orsakades indirekt av första världskriget, eftersom det kriget stimulerade etablering av nya återförsäkringsbolag, detta i olika länder och inte minst i Skandinavien. I förlängningen skapade första världskriget därmed överkapacitet på återförsäkringsmarknaden. Nya kontraktsformuleringar introducerades internationellt till de cederande bolagens fördel. Detta förhållande indikerar informationsasymmetrier i relationen mellan cederande och mottagande försäkringsbolag. Många återförsäkringsbolag lämnade marknaden. Resultatet blev att cederande bolag under början av 1930-talet i olika länder fick svårigheter att sluta obligatoriska återförsäkringsavtal. Under början av 1920-talet diversifierade aktiebolagen också sin verksamhet mellan olika försäkringsgrenar. Denna process katalyserades av första världskriget, accelererade under början av 1920-talet och fortsatte in på 1930-talet.