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Les données à caractère personnel sont appréhendées par le droit comme des objets distincts de la personne à laquelle elles se rapportent. Ce statut particulier serait justifié par la transformation résultant du traitement de données. La loi du 6 janvier 1978 suggère pourtant un rattachement en définissant la donnée personnelle comme une « information relative à une personne physique identifiée ou qui peut être identifiée, directement ou indirectement ». Lesdites données sont donc des éléments identifiants, et en cela, par une interdépendance des éléments subjectifs et objectifs, des composantes de l’identité. Elles forment l’identité numérique de la personne, toujours plus sollicitée et collectée. L’hypothèse intuitive de l’identité est contrariée par le droit positif français, au sein duquel la loi Informatique et libertés marque son autonomie par rapport à l’article 9 du Code civil, matrice des droits de la personnalité. Le droit de l’Union européenne isole également, au sein de la Charte des droits fondamentaux, la protection des données à caractère personnel de la protection de la vie privée. Cette autonomisation permet l’accélération de la patrimonialisation des données à caractère personnel, visées comme éléments isolés par une multitude de contrats d’adhésion autorisant le traitement. Le sectionnement du lien entre la personne et ses données n’est toutefois pas inéluctable : la protection de l’autonomie de la personne peut maintenir cette connexion. La Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme, qui intègre la protection des données à celle de la vie privée, affirme le lien entre ces informations personnelles et l’identité. En outre, sa jurisprudence relative à la protection de l’autonomie personnelle peut constituer une réponse à l’objectivation des personnes. Dans le même sens, la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel relative à la liberté personnelle, vecteur du droit au développement de la personnalité et de la protection de l’identité en France, a déjà accueilli favorablement la protection des données à caractère personnel. Une réflexion qui prend l’identité comme point de départ de l’étude d’un droit à la protection des données met en lumière le véritable enjeu de la collecte exponentielle des données à caractère personnel et du profilage qui s’en suit : l’autonomie des personnes, dont la préservation est assurée à travers le concept de personne humaine, sujet des droits fondamentaux. / French law approaches personal data and the person they are related to as separated objects. This special status would be justified by the transformation resulting from the data processing. However, by defining personal data as "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person, directly or indirectly", the law of 6 January 1978 suggests that they are in fact connected to each other. Therefore, those data are to be understood as identifying elements. Following the interdependence of subjective and objective elements, they are components of identity. They form the person’s digital identity, which is increasingly solicited and gathered. The intuitive assumption of personal data as components of identity is thwarted by French positive law, within which the Data Protection Act marks its autonomy in comparison to Article 9 of the Civil Code – the latter being the matrix of rights related to personality. The same way, protection of personal data is distinguished from protection of privacy in the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. This increasing autonomy allows the accelerated conversion of personal data into assets. In a multitude of conventions, they are regarded as isolated elements of which processing is allowed. Yet the split between the person and their data could be avoided: protection of the autonomy of the person can ensure a connexion. The European Court of Human Rights considers data protection as part of the right to privacy, hence asserting the existence of a link between personal data and identity of the individual. Moreover, its case law regarding the protection of personal autonomy may constitute an answer to the objectification of individuals. Correlatively, the French Constitutional Court has already taken data protection as a part of personal freedom, the latter being considered in its case law as the embryo of the right to the development of personality and the protection of identity. By taking identity as the starting point of a study examining a right to data protection, it is possible to reveal the stakes of exponential gathering of personal data and ensuing profiling: the autonomy of the individual. Therefore, the latter can be protected by the concept of human person as subject of fundamental rights.

Cette étude de philosophie comparée propose une herméneutique de l’idée de soi à partir d’une analyse de la dimension ascétique de la question « quel soi ? », qui se manifeste à travers les disciplines de libération mises en place par les traditions du Portique et du Zen. Déclinée sous différentes formes, cette question constitue la pierre angulaire des pratiques de soi propres aux deux traditions. Il apparaît que sa principale fonction est celle d’orienter l’idée de soi, eu égard à une polarité soi ↔ non-soi, afin de parvenir à la condition du sage, celle d’un accord libérateur avec une nature originelle commune à tous. Ainsi, au lieu de désigner simplement un fondement ontologique – réel ou supposé – l’idée de soi joue alors bien plutôt un rôle de vecteur, qui, selon son orientation,permet ou non d’actualiser cet accord. Par la prise en compte comparative du rôle de la négation (détachement) de soi, cette étude cherche donc à élargir le spectre des processus de subjectivation ou des pratiques de soi et, ainsi, de mettre au jour un aspect assez négligé par l’histoire occidentale de la subjectivité. Par là même, cette thèse permet de mieux comprendre comment une (méta)physique stoïcienne du plein peut être à même de penser la négation (détachement) de soi et, inversement, comment une métaphysique bouddhiste de la vacuité peut développer une pensée de la subjectivité morale et de la responsabilité / This study in comparative philosophy offers a hermeneutics of the idea of self. It explores the ascetic dimension of the question “what self?” apparent across the various disciplines of liberation developed by the Stoic and Zen traditions. In its diverse guises, this question is the cornerstone of specific practices of the self within these traditions. As such, its main function is to guide the idea of self, with regard to the polarity self ↔ non-self, in order to achieve the status of the sage, which represents a kind of harmony with an original nature that is common to all individuals. Therefore, rather than simply designating an ontological foundation – real or alleged – the idea of self has the role of a vector, which, depending on its orientation, allows one to actualise (or not) this harmony. Through comparative analysis of the role of negation (detachment) of the self, this study seeks to broaden the spectrum of the processes of subjectification or practices of the self and, thus, to bring to light an aspect that has been somewhat neglected by the Western history of subjectivity. In doing so, this thesis enables better understanding of how the full-bodied (meta)physics of the Stoics is able to think the negation (detachment) of the self and, conversely, of how the Buddhist metaphysics of emptiness can develop an idea of moral subjectivity and responsibility

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Living Disability: Ways Forward from Decontextual Models of Disability consists of six articles that provide both theoretical and pragmatic commentaries on decontextual approaches to vulnerability and disability. In What Contemporary Models of Disability Miss: The Case for a Phenomenological Hermeneutic Analysis I argue many commonly accepted models for understanding disability use a vertical method in which disability is defined as a category into which people are slotted based on whether or not they fit its definitional criteria. This method inevitably homogenizes the experiences of disabled people. A hermeneutic investigation of commonly accepted models for understanding disability will provide an epistemological tool to critique and to augment contemporary models of disability. In A Phenomenological Hermeneutic Resolution to the Principlist- Narrative Bioethics Debate Narrative, I note narrative approaches to bioethics and principlist approaches to bioethics have often been presented in fundamental opposition to each other. I argue that a phenomenological hermeneutic approach to the debate finds a compromise between both positions that maintains what is valuable in each of them. Justifying an Adequate Response to the Vulnerable Other examines the possibility of endorsing the position that I, as a moral agent, ought to do my best to respond adequately to the other’s vulnerability. I contend that, insofar as I value my personal identity, it is consistent to work toward responding adequately to the vulnerability of the other both ontologically and ethically. Who Can Make a Yes?: Disability, Gender, Sexual Consent and ‘Yes Means Yes’ examines the ‘yes means yes’ model of sexual consent, and the political and ethical commitments that underpin this model, noting three fundamental Ph.D. Thesis – C. Kavanagh; McMaster University - Philosophy v disadvantages. This position unfairly polices the sexual expression of participants, particularly vulnerable participants such as disabled people, it demands an unreasonably high standard for defining sexual interaction as consensual, and allows perpetrators of sexual violence to define consent. In Craving Sameness, Accepting Difference: The Possibility of Solidarity and Social Justice I note realist accounts typically define solidarity on the basis of a static feature of human nature. We stand in solidarity with some other person, or group of people, because we share important features in common. In opposition to such realist accounts, Richard Rorty defines solidarity as a practical tool, within which there is always an ‘us’, with whom we stand in solidarity, and a ‘them’, with whom we are contrasted. I argue that by understanding Rorty’s pragmatic solidarity in terms of the relational view of solidarity offered by Alexis Shotwell, it is possible to conceptualise solidarity in a manner that allows for extending the boundaries of the community with whom we stand in solidarity. In Translating Non-Human Actors I examine Bruno Latour’s position that nonhuman things can be made to leave interpretable statements, and have a place in democracy. With the right types of mediators, the scientist can translate for non-humans, and those voices will allow for nonhuman political representation. I wish to suggest that, like scientists, people with disabilities are particularly capable of building networks that facilitate translation between humans and non-humans. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Living Disability: Ways Forward from Decontextual Models of Disability consists of six separate articles that provide both theoretical and pragmatic commentaries on decontextual approaches to vulnerability and disability. The first three articles examine contemporary approaches to understanding vulnerability and disability, and explore what a contextual theoretical approach, one that puts the experiences of people with disabilities at the centre, might look like. The second three articles provide a bioethical examination of practical ethical questions associated with the treatment of people with disabilities when it comes to social and political positions on disability and sexuality, solidarity with people with disabilities, and the relationship between people with disabilities and objects.

El propòsit principal d'aquesta tesi és analitzar críticament l'antropologia filosòfica de Charles Taylor.A la primera part abordem qüestions preliminars: les fonts, els fonaments teòrics i els elements metodològics del seu pensament.A la segona part elaborem la seva teoria de la identitat. Això implica: (1) donar compte de la relació inextricable entre el jo de la persona i la seva orientació moral, i (2) per mitjà d'arguments transcendentals, articular una ontologia que determini els trets perennes de la naturalesa humana.Una ontologia de la identitat exigeix l'articulació de les continuïtats i discontinuïtats entre els animals humans i no humans. És a dir, una filosofia de la biologia que aporti les intuïcions de l'aristotelisme al post-darwinisme. En línia amb Adaslair MacIntyre, intentem completar les aportacions realitzades per Taylor en el context de la seva filosofia de l'acció.D'altra banda, identifiquem alguns dels trets distintius de l'agent humà (lingüisticitat, propòsit i dialogicitat), i abordem els desafiaments de (1) les versions que radicalitzen les conseqüències de la contingència del subjecte i (2) els reduccionisme que prosperen entre els filòsofs analítics. Per això hem confrontat a les interpretacions de Richard Rorty sobre Nietzsche i Freud, i a la posició quasi-budista de Parfit, l'hermenèutica forta de Charles Taylor i Paul Ricoeur.A la tercera part, estudiem la dimensió històrica de la identitat humana. Això implica assenyalar les peculiaritats del anthropos modern. Per això, a més de contraposar al jo modern la versió premoderna de la nostra comuna humanitat, hem hagut d'enfrontar a la interpretació de Taylor sobre el sentit de les mutacions cosmovisionales, antropològiques i ètiques de la modernitat, les interpretacions que a aquestes mutacions concedeixen autors com Michel Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre i Jürgen Habermas. / El propósito principal de esta tesis es analizar críticamente la antropología filosófica de Charles Taylor. En la primera parte abordamos cuestiones preliminares: las fuentes, los fundamentos teóricos y los elementos metodológicos de su pensamiento. En la segunda parte elaboramos su teoría de la identidad. Eso implica: (1) dar cuenta de la relación inextricable entre el yo de la persona y su orientación moral; y (2) por medio de argumentos trascendentales, articular una ontología que determine los rasgos perennes de la naturaleza humana. Una ontología de la identidad exige la articulación de las continuidades y discontinuidades entre los animales humanos y no humanos. Es decir, una filosofía de la biología que aporte las intuiciones del aristotelismo al post-darwinismo. En línea con Adaslair MacIntyre, intentamos completar los aportes realizados por Taylor en el contexto de su filosofía de la acción. Por otro lado, identificamos algunos de los rasgos distintivos del agente humano (lingüisticidad, propósito y dialogicidad); y abordamos los desafíos de (1) las versiones que radicalizan las consecuencias de la contingencia del sujeto y (2) los reduccionismos que prosperan entre los filósofos analíticos. Para ello hemos confrontado a las interpretaciones de Richard Rorty sobre Nietzsche y Freud, y a la posición cuasi-budista de Parfit, con la hermenéutica fuerte de Charles Taylor y Paul Ricoeur.En la tercera parte, estudiamos la dimensión histórica de la identidad humana. Eso implica señalar las peculiaridades del anthropos moderno. Para ello, además de contraponer al yo moderno la versión premoderna de nuestra común humanidad, hemos tenido que enfrentar a la interpretación de Taylor sobre el sentido de las mutaciones cosmovisionales, antropológicas y éticas de la modernidad, las interpretaciones que a éstas mutaciones conceden autores como Michel Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre y Jürgen Habermas. / The main purpose of this thesis is to critically analyze the philosophical anthropology of Charles Taylor.The first part deals with preliminary issues: the sources, the theoretical and methodological elements of his thought.In the second part we elaborate his theory of identity. This implies: (1) to account for the inextricable relationship between the self of the person and his moral orientation, and (2) by means of transcendental arguments, to articulate an ontology that determines the perennial features of human nature.An ontology of identity requires the articulation of the continuities and discontinuities between human and nonhuman animals. That is, a philosophy of biology which provides insights from Aristotelianism to post-Darwinism. In line with Adaslair MacIntyre, we try to complete the contributions made by Taylor in the context of his philosophy of action.On the other hand, we identify some of the distinctive features of human agency (language, purpose and dialogue) and tackle the challenges of (1) versions that radicalized the consequences of the contingency of the subject and (2) the reductionism that thrive among the analytical philosophers. So we confront the interpretations of Richard Rorty about Nietzsche and Freud, and the quasi-Buddhism of Parfit, with the strong hermeneutics of Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur.In the third part, we study the historical dimension of human identity. That means pointing out the peculiarities of the modern anthropos. Therefore, in addition to contrast the modern self with the premodern version of our common humanity, we confront Taylor's interpretation of the meaning of the cosmological, anthropological and ethical mutations of modernity, with the interpretations that authors as Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas and Alasdair MaIntyre offer about these mutations.

The philosophical literature on akrasia and/or weakness of the will tends to focus on individual actions, removed from their wider socio-political context. This is problematic because actions, when removed from their wider context, can seem absurd or irrational when they may, in fact, be completely rational or, at least, coherent. Much of akrasia's apparent mystery or absurdity is eliminated when people's behaviours are considered within their cultural and political context. I apply theories from the social and behavioural sciences to a particular behaviour in order to show where the philosophical literature on akrasia and/or weakness of the will is insightful and where it is lacking. The problem used as the basis for my analysis is obesity caused by overeating. On the whole, I conclude that our intuitions about agency are unreliable, that we may have good reasons to overeat and/or neglect our health, and that willpower is, to some degree, a matter of luck. / Graduate / 0630 / 0573 / 0422 / felshereeno@aol.com

Information technology evidence consists of a mix of representations of various applications of digital electronic equipment, and can be brought to the fore in all contexts that result in legal decisions. The occurrence of such evidence in legal proceedings, and other legal decision-making, is a phenomenon previously not researched within legal science in Sweden. The thesis examines some of the consequences resulting from the occurrence of information technology evidence within Swedish practical legal and judicial decision-making. The thesis has three main focal points. The first consists of a broad identification of legal problems that information technology evidence entails. The second focal point examines the legal terminology associated with information technology evidence. The third focal point consists of identifying sources of error pertaining to information technology evidence from the adjudicator’s point of view. The examination utilizes a Swedish legal viewpoint from a perspective of the public trust in courts. Conclusions include a number of legal problems in several areas, primarily in regards to the knowledge of the adjudicator, the qualification of different means of evidence and the consequences of representational evidence upon its evaluation. In order to properly evaluate information technology evidence, judges are – to a greater extent than for other types of evidence – in need of (objective) knowledge supplementary to that provided by parties and their witnesses and experts. Furthermore, the current Swedish evidence terminology has been identified as a complex of problems in and of itself. The thesis includes suggestions on certain additions to this terminology. Several sources of error have been identified as being attributable to different procedures associated with the handling of information technology evidence, in particular in relation to computer forensic investigations. There is a general need for future research focused on matters regarding both standards of proof for and evaluation of information technology evidence. In addition, a need for deeper legal scientific studies aimed at evidence theory has been identified, inter alia regarding the extent to which frequency theories are applicable in respect to information technology evidence. The need for related further discussions on future emerging areas such as negative evidence and predictive evidence are foreseen.